Kathy Miotke, V Spokane County

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
Obi I S10N11
2011i MAY 20AN10 : 55
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Order of Remand of the No. 44121 -7 -II
Growth Management Hearings Board of
Eastern Washington, Case No. 05 -1 - 0007,
dated August 30, 2011
KATHY MIOTKE, an individual, and
NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE OF
SPOKANE,
Petitioner,
v:
SPOKANE COUNTY, a political subdivision PUBLISHED OPINION
of the State of Washington,
Respondent,
and
RIDGECRES, DEVELOPMENTS, LLC, a
T
Washington Limited Liability Company; FIVE
MILE CORPORATION, a Washington
Corporation; NORTH DIVISION COMPLEX,
LLC, a Washington Limited Liability
Company; CANYON INVESTMENTS, INC.,
a Washington Corporation; DONALD and VA
LENA CURRAN, husband and wife;
STEPHEN W. TREFTS d/ b /a NORTHWEST
TRUSTEE & MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
Additional Named Parties.
No. 44121 -7 -II
JOHANSON, J. - After Spokane County ( County) expanded its comprehensive plan' s
Urban Growth Area" ( UGA), property owners in the newly -
expanded UGA commenced urban
development. Kathy Miotke and the " Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane" ( Miotke) petitioned
the Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board ( Board) for review of the
County' s expansion. The Board found the County' s UGA expansion invalid under the Growth
Management Act ( GMA), ch. 36. 70A RCW. In an attempt to address the invalidity
determination, the County passed a resolution that repealed the UGA expansion resolution.
Based on the repeal of the UGA expansion resolution, the Board found the County in compliance
with the GMA. Miotke appeals the Board' s decision, arguing that the mere repeal of the UGA
expansion resolution fails to establish GMA compliance. We reverse the superior court decision
upholding the Board and remand to the Board to determine whether repeal of the UGA
expansion, given the urban development vested under it, has remedied the expansion' s
interference with GMA goals.
FACTS
In August 2005, Miotke petitioned the Board to review the County' s enactment of
resolution 5 - 0649, which amended the County' s comprehensive plan by expanding its UGA. In
February 2006, the Board issued a final decision and order of invalidity ( Final Order) finding
that the County' s expansion of its UGA violated the GMA. Specifically, the Board found that
2
No. 44121 -7 -II
1
resolution 5 - 0649 interfered with the GMA goals 1, 2, 3, and 12. The Board found that the
County failed to prepare a land quality analysis and failed to plan for capital facilities, utilities,
and transportation among other things. The Board concluded that the County failed to " show its
work" and ordered the County to bring itself into compliance with the GMA. Administrative
Record (AR) at 76.
Between the enactment of resolution 5 -0649 and the Board finding that resolution invalid
for interfering with GMA goals, development permits were submitted and accepted by the
development expanded UGA.
in the newly - Urban
County, thereby vesting urban rights
development then occurred in these areas. This development is the center of the dispute here.
After its February 2006 Final Order, the Board twice found the County in continued
noncompliance with the GMA. In July 2006, the Board found that the County was in
noncompliance because it had failed to resolve any of the issues enumerated in the Final Order.
The Board found further that the County failed to address " other issues of non -compliance such
2
as the ` island UGA. "' AR at 259.
1
Goal 1 provides, " Urban growth. Encourage development in urban areas where adequate
public facilities and services exist or can be provided in an efficient manner." RCW
36. 70A. 020( 1). Goal 2 provides, " Reduce sprawl. Reduce the inappropriate conversion of
undeveloped density development."
land into sprawling, low - RCW 36. 70A. 020( 2). Goal 3
provides, " Transportation. Encourage efficient multimodal transportation systems that are based
on regional priorities and coordinated with county and city comprehensive plans." RCW
36. 70A. 020( 3). And Goal 12 provides, " Public facilities and services. Ensure that those public
facilities and services necessary to support development shall be adequate to serve the
development at the time the development is available for occupancy and use without decreasing
current service levels below locally established minimum standards." RCW 36. 70A.020( 12).
2
This is the term used by Miotke and the Board to describe the expanded UGA that was
determined to be invalid. " Island" is used because this subject area is surrounded by land
designated " urban reserve."
3
No. 44121 -7 -II
In October, the Board determined that the County remained noncompliant, having
resolved none of the issues set forth in the Final Order. The Board recognized that the County
had made progress, but the Board raised concerns regarding the County' s use of an " emergency
provision" to allow further UGA expansion. The Board ordered the County to comply by
December 6, 2006. Shortly thereafter, various cities within the County reported that their
contributions to the planning process would not be available until after the County' s compliance
deadline. 3 In order to meet its deadline, the County considered removal of the subject land from
the UGA. Endeavoring to achieve GMA compliance, the County passed resolution 7 -0077
which repealed resolution 5 -0649, shrinking the UGA back to the borders that existed before the
adoption of resolution 5 -0649.
Miotke submitted additional briefing urging the Board to conclude that adopting
resolution 7 -0077 and repealing the expanded UGA was inadequate to bring the County into
compliance. For example, Miotke argued, "[ T] he paper exercise of re- designation [ of the
UGAs], not only fails to comply with the Board' s Final Order, it is inconsistent with other
provisions of the GMA and substantially interferes with other GMA goals:" AR at 633.
Nevertheless, on March 5, 2007, the Board found that the County was now in GMA compliance:
With the repeal of the portions of the resolution which enlarged the UGA, the objected to action
brought itself into AR at 698. The Board did not
was removed and the County compliance."
consider in either the order finding compliance or the order on reconsideration the effect of
resolution 7 -0077 with regard to the specific GMA violations enumerated by the Board in its
3 There is some indication that the County feared that the Board would impose sanctions if it
remained out of compliance any longer.
4
No. 44121 -7 -II
Final Order. On March 15, 2007, Miotke unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Miotke
now appeals the superior court' s order affirming the Board' s Final Order.
ANALYSIS
I. APA STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a hearings board' s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA),
ch. 34. 05 RCW. Feil v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 367, 376, 259 P.3d
227 ( 2011). We apply APA standards directly to the Board' s record, performing the same
function as the superior court.
City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings
Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 45, 959 P.2d 1091 ( 1998). The party challenging the Board' s decision bears
the burden of proving it is invalid. RCW 34. 05. 570( 1)( a). The decision is invalid if it suffers
from at least one of many enumerated infirmities.4 RCW 34.05. 570( 3).
We review de novo errors of law alleged under RCW 34. 05. 570( 3)( d). Thurston County
v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 164 Wash. 2d 329, 341, 190 P.3d 38 ( 2008). We accord
the Board' s interpretation of the GMA " substantial weight." King County v. Cent. Puget Sound
Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 ( 2000). But the Board' s
interpretation does not bind us. City ofRedmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46.
We apply the substantial evidence review standard to challenges under RCW
34. 05. 570( 3)( e), determining whether a sufficient quantity of evidence exists to persuade a fair -
minded person of the truth or correctness of the order. City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46. We
4 We must grant relief from a decision if, as relevant here,
d) [ t] he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
e) The order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed
in light of the whole record.
RCW 34. 05. 570( 3).
5
No. 44121 -7 -II
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the highest forum that
exercised fact -
finding authority. City of Univ. Place v. McGuire, 144 Wash. 2d 640, 652, 30 P.3d
453 ( 2001).
II. COUNTY GMA COMPLIANCE
Miotke contends that RCW 36. 70A.320( 4) requires the County to respond to the Board' s
determination that resolution 5 - 0649 was invalid in a manner which shows that the County no
longer substantially interferes with GMA goals. Specifically, Miotke argues that the County
failed to address how mere repeal of the invalid UGA expansion will remedy the GMA
5
violations outlined in the Board' s Final Order. Miotke claims that the Board' s compliance
finding resulted in an order that ( 1) was an erroneous interpretation and application of the law,
2) was not supported by substantial evidence, and ( 3) was arbitrary or capricious.
The County responds with two arguments to suggest that the Board correctly found the
County no longer substantially interfered with GMA goals. First, the County argues that it did
not violate GMA goals concerning reduction of urban sprawl ( goal 1) and promotion of urban
development within the UGA ( goal 2) because the expanded UGA was valid at the time the
developers' rights vested. Second, the County contends that it did not interfere with goals 3 and
12 because local regulations require adequate facilities and services in place before development
is permitted to occur. Finally, the County asserts that it carried its burden to demonstrate
5 Miotke initially argued that the Board erroneously shifted the burden of proof from the County
to Miotke, but she now concedes that the Board applied the burden correctly. Wash. Court of
Appeals oral argument, Miotke v. Spokane County, No. 44121 -7 -II (Jan. 14, 2014), at 29 min., 40
sec. - 32 min., 45 sec. ( on file with court). We accept this concession because the Board, which
did misstate the burden, corrected the error in its compliance order.
6
No. 44121 -7 -II
compliance under RCW 36. 70A.320( 4) because resolution 7 -0077 repealed resolution 5 -0649,
6
which created the noncompliance at the outset. We agree with Miotke.
We conclude that the County failed to sustain its burden because merely rescinding
resolution 5 -0649, without more, does not establish that the County' s initial UGA expansion no
longer substantially interferes with GMA goals where urban development rights vested and
urban growth occurred. Consequently, the Board' s conclusion that the County was in
compliance with the GMA was an incorrect application of the law and its order finding
compliance was not supported by substantial evidence.
A. RULES OF LAW
The purpose of the GMA is to control urban sprawl and to ensure that citizens,
communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one
another in comprehensive land use planning. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., 138 Wash. 2d 161, 166 -67, 979 P.2d 374 ( 1999). The GMA requires that counties
adopt a comprehensive plan which, among other things, designates UGAs. King County, 138
Wash. 2d at 167. UGAs are regions within which urban growth is encouraged and outside of which
growth can occur only if it is not urban in nature. Former RCW 36. 70A. 110( 1) ( 2004); King
County, 138 Wash. 2d at 167. Hearings boards are charged with adjudicating GMA compliance.
6 The County advances arguments tangential to this dispute that we need not fully address
because they mischaracterize Miotke' s the County argues that because
position. First,
determinations of invalidity are prospective in effect, the County could not prevent urban
development from occurring outside the errant UGA once developers' rights vested by law.
Second, the County argues that Miotke could have challenged proposed development permit
applications under the Land Use Petition Act, ch. 36. 70C RCW. But Miotke' s central argument
is not that site specific urban development should not have been permitted, but rather that the
County was not free to diminish the UGA' s size once vested urban growth had occurred and
would remain without demonstrating that in doing so the County no longer substantially
interfered with GMA goals.
7
No. 44121 -7 -II
Whidbey Envtl. Action Network v. Island County, 122 Wash. App. 156, 163, 93 P.3d 885 ( 2004),
review denied, 153 Wash. 2d 1025 ( 2005). The hearings boards conduct hearings and issue
findings of compliance or noncompliance. RCW 36. 70A.330( 2).
We presume that comprehensive plans and development regulations are valid upon
adoption. RCW 36. 70A.320( 1). And, generally, the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate
that any action taken by an agency or local government is not in compliance with the GMA.
RCW 36. 70A.320( 2). But
a] county or city subject to a determination of invalidity made under RCW
36. 70A.300 or 36. 70A.302 has the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance or
resolution it has enacted in response to the determination of invalidity will no
longer substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of this chapter under
the standard in RCW 36. 70A.302( 1).
RCW 36. 70A. 320( 4); Wells v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt Hearings Bd., 100 Wash. App. 657, 666,
997 P.2d 405 ( 2000) ( "[ W] hen a local government is subject to a determination of invalidity, it
bears the burden under RCW 36. 70A.320( 4). ").
B. VESTED RIGHTS AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
First, we address the County' s argument that it did not interfere with GMA goals 1 and 2
because development rights vested before resolution 5 -0649 was found invalid and, secondly,
that it did not interfere with goals 3 and 12 because local regulations require the existence of
adequate services and facilities before urban development occurs. We disagree with the County.
When a County enacts urban development regulations that are later determined to violate
the GMA, all development permit applications submitted before the County' s receipt of the
invalidity determination remain vested to the development regulations under which they were
submitted. RCW 36. 70A.302( 2); Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 172 Wash. App. 643,
661, 291 P.3d 278 ( 2013), aff'd, No. 88405 -6, 2014 WL 1419187 ( Wash. Apr. 10, 2014). Vested
8
No. 441 21 -7 -II
development rights entitle the developer to divide and develop the land in accordance with the
statutes and ordinances in effect when a fully complete application is submitted. See Noble
Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 275, 943 P.2d 1378 ( 1997).
Here, the County passed resolution 5 - 0649 in July 2005. After resolution 5 - 0649
expanded the UGAs, property owners in these newly- expanded UGAs sought and received
permits to pursue urban development on UGA properties.
their then - These permits vested before
the Board found that resolution 5 -0649 rendered the County' s comprehensive plan noncompliant
with the GMA. Accordingly, the vested rights doctrine protected rights of developers who
completed permit applications after resolution 5 - 0649 was enacted, but before it was deemed
invalid. Once these rights vested, the County could not extinguish developers' rights to complete
projects in the now invalid UGA.
In the County' s view, its inability to prevent urban development in the errant UGA
expansion also compels the conclusion that it did not interfere with GMA goals designed to
reduce urban sprawl and to prevent urban development outside of a valid UGA. We disagree.
The vested rights doctrine exists -in part to ensure fairness to landowners and developers
who would otherwise be subject to unforeseeable rule changes. Valley View Indus. Park v. City
of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 637, 733 P.2d 182 ( 1987). The County cites no authority to
suggest that the vested rights doctrine insulates the County from responsibility for its own
shortcomings in the planning process. The vested rights doctrine and the provisions of the GMA
are often intertwined, but nothing in our vested rights cases or in the language of the
corresponding statutes indicates that the vesting of developers' rights somehow relieves a County
from its obligation to comply with planning goals under the GMA. It was the County' s .
enactment of resolution 5 -0649 that gave rise to the sequence of events culminating in the
9
No. 44121 -7 -II
creation of an " island UGA." We reject the County' s argument that the vested rights doctrine
relieved the County of its burden to show compliance with the GMA.
Moreover, even if we accepted the County' s argument that the vested rights doctrine
precludes a finding that the County substantially interfered with goals 1 and 2, the County failed
to demonstrate that it did not interfere with goals 3 and 12 that relate to transportation systems
and public facilities. The County claims that certain safeguards exist to ensure the presence of
these facilities in the form of County- mandated, project -level development regulations that are
substantially similar to those contemplated by the GMA' s planning goals. But the County did
not advance this argument before the Board nor did it present evidence that these development
regulations were sufficiently comprehensive such that the Board could determine whether the
County no longer substantially interfered with the specified planning goals. Because the County
did not present these arguments or the relevant evidence to the Board, we cannot conclude that a
sufficient quantity of evidence exists to persuade a fair -
minded person of the truth or correctness
of the order on these grounds. City ofRedmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46.
Accordingly, we reject the County' s argument. Neither the vested -rights doctrine nor the
availability of project -level development regulations preclude a finding that the County
substantially interfered with the GMA.
C. EFFECT OF RESOLUTION 7 -0077
The County also argues that the Board correctly determined that it no longer substantially
interfered with GMA goals solely because it enacted resolution 7 -0077, repealing the legislation
that gave rise to the finding of invalidity in the Final Order. We disagree.
Following resolution 7- 0077' s adoption, the County moved the Board to determine
whether it had reestablished compliance with the GMA. In response, the Board stated,
10
No. 44121 -7 -II
The question on compliance is whether the jurisdiction has met the
requirements of the [ GMA], not whether it complied with the specific directives
of the Board' s last order... .
The Petitioners contend that the Board should review the case
substantially as well as procedurally. In doing so, the Board could only look at
the County' s action and whether it addresses the findings and conclusions in the
Final Order] .
AR at 697 -98.
An examination of the Board' s language reveals that the Board understood that it was
required to analyze whether the County, by enacting resolution 7 -0077, sufficiently addressed the
findings and conclusions of the Final Order. Stated otherwise, the Board' s task was to determine
whether repeal of the expanded UGA was sufficient to show that the County no longer
GMA 1, 2, 3, 12. RCW 36. 70A. 320( 4). The Board
substantially interfered with goals and
determined that repeal of resolution 5 -0649 alone was sufficient. The Board erred when it so
found.
Growth management hearings boards in other cases have expressly stated that a county
fails to sustain its burden after a determination of invalidity when it makes no attempt to respond
to the findings that gave rise to that determination. Futurewise v. Lewis County, No. 06 -2 -0003,
7
2006 WL 2349047, at * 1( Western Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr' gs Bd. Aug. 2, 2006). In
Futurewise, the city of Winlock wished to alter the designation and mapping of lands from
agricultural to urban in an attempted UGA expansion. 2006 WL 2349047, at * 1. This land,
however, was still subject to a determination of invalidity because the Board previously found
7 Though administrative decisions are not binding on this court, these decisions can serve as
guidance in the interpretation of the law. Floating Homes Ass 'n v. Dep' t of Fish.& Wildlife, 115
Wash. App. 780, 788 n.33, 64 P.3d 29, review denied, 150 Wash. 2d 1011 ( 2003).
11'
No. 44121 -7 -II
that such an expansion created substantial interference with goal 8 of the GMA.8 Futurewise,
2006 WL 2349047, at * 1. The Board stated,
Lewis] County failed to offer any evidence that the change in designation
and mapping of those lands as urban lands within the Winlock UGA will no
longer substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the , natural resource
industries goal of the GMA. This is [ Lewis] County' s burden under RCW
36. 70A.320( 4) and 36. 70A.302( 7)( a).
Futurewise, 2006 WL 2349047, at * 1.
In addition, a close reading of RCW 36. 70A. 320( 4) does not support the County' s
interpretation that the Board merely had to find that resolution 7 -0077 was itself in compliance
with the GMA. The plain language of RCW 36. 70A.320( 4) states that the question is not
whether the action to remedy the invalidity itself complies with the GMA, but whether the
remedial action in response to the invalidity finding " will no longer substantially interfere" with
the GMA. This language implies that the Board' s analysis should not be confined strictly to the
remedial action but that the Board should review the extent to which development that vested
under the flawed UGA expansion interferes with GMA goals and should condition its finding of
compliance on measures that will remedy that interference.
Here, the County presented no evidence that repeal of the UGA expansion resolution, in
and of itself, demonstrates that the County is no longer substantially interfering with GMA goals
1, 2, 3, and 12. The Board is correct that the County removed the offending legislation and that
no additional urban development can occur in the subject area. But the Board cannot simply
ignore the facts that vested rights were secured, urban development was permitted, and such
8 Goal 8 is aimed at the maintenance and enhancement of natural resource -based industries,
including productive timber, agricultural, and fisheries industries. This goal also encourages the
conservation of productive forest lands and productive agricultural lands, and discourages
incompatible uses. RCW 36. 70A.020.
12
No. 44121 -7 -II
development occurred, changing the status quo. In Quadrant Corp., our Supreme Court held that
a hearings board erred in ruling that a county could only consider " built environment" ( which did
not yet exist) in determining whether an area was already " characterized by urban growth."
Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash. 2d 224, 240 -41, 110
P.3d 1132 ( 2005). In so holding, the court endorsed the following reasoning regarding vested
rights and urban growth:
Under the definition [ of ` urban growth] approved by the legislature,
territory already committed to the process of growing in a manner incompatible
with rural uses can be considered for an urban designation, and indeed it would be
inconsistent with the goals of the GMA not to.... While there is always a
possibility that construction may never occur, an area of land already committed
to urban development from [ King] County' s perspective bears characteristics of
urban use that should not be ignored in the planning process."
Quadrant Corp., 154 Wash. 2d at 241 ( first two alterations in original) ( quoting Quadrant Corp. v.
Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 119 Wash. App. 562, 580, 81 P.3d 918 ( 2003)
dissenting),
Coleman, J., concurring / aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 154 Wash. 2d 224).
Although the facts in Quadrant are distinguishable in that the county in Quadrant was
considering whether to designate land as UGA, 154 Wash. 2d at 240, the cited reasoning applies.
Here, the vested rights doctrine opened the door for urban development. The rescission of the
UGA then stranded areas of urban development in formerly rural zones without consideration of
the planning policies or development standards needed to ensure consistency with the GMA.
The area is now incompatible with rural uses, bearing characteristics of urban use that should not
be ignored in the planning process. Quadrant Corp., 154 Wash. 2d at 241. The Board should have
required the County to demonstrate how, in light of the vested urban development, that
resolution 7 -0077 terminates the County' s interference with GMA goals as RCW 36. 70A.320( 4)
demands.
13
No. 44121 -7 -II
One Board member believed that the County failed to meet its burden simply by
repealing resolution 5 -0649 and that the County should have considered existing urban growth.
Board member John Roskelley dissented from the order on reconsideration, stating that
t] he County has not met its burden of proof simply by revoking Resolution 5-
0649. The County failed to show or demonstrate how this action corrected the
Board' s order of February 14, 2006, and how this action will " no longer
substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals under this chapter...."
The County' s initial action created an urban growth area ..., with all
the trappings and requirements, such as urban-like roads, police protection, public
transportation, sewer and water, outside of a legally established UGA. This alone
flies in the face of The County must answer how its action
RCW 36. 70A. 110( 1).
no longer substantially interferes with the GMA goals.
AR at 730 -31. We agree with Roskelley.
Here, the Board considered, only the fact that the County repealed the legislation that
gave rise to the invalidity and concluded on this basis alone that the County no longer
substantially interfered with the four enumerated planning goals. The County did not present
enough evidence for the Board to have made this determination. Under the GMA, local
governments must coordinate and cooperate with their communities to ensure wise use of our
lands and sustainable economic development. RCW 36. 70A. 010. Integral to the planning
process is the recognition and adoption of the several planning goals as guiding principles in the
development of comprehensive plans. RCW 36. 70A. 020. Upon a finding of invalidity in which
the Board identifies specific ways in which the County' s action strays from GMA principles, the
County then bears the burden to show how the County' s responsive action cures the resulting
invalidity. RCW 36.70A.320( 4).
The County failed in this regard because it did not produce sufficient evidence that
resolution 7 -0077 addressed the Board' s original finding of invalidity in any meaningful way.
14
No. 44121 -7 -II
We need not determine what quantum of proof is necessary, but repeal of the offending
legislation, without more, does not discharge the County' s burden. The Board' s conclusion to
the contrary constituted an incorrect application of the law and its order finding compliance was
not supported by substantial evidence. Viewing the evidence in the County' s favor, the Board' s
compliance finding was not based on substantial evidence. Other than the paper rescission of the
offending ordinance, there was no evidence submitted, much less a sufficient quantity of
evidence, to persuade a fair -
minded person of the truth or correctness of the Board' s order. City
of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46. Accordingly, additional fact finding is required before it can be
said that the County carried its burden.
We reverse the decision of the superior court upholding the Board' s decision. We
remand to the Board to determine whether the County, by reverting the subject land back to a
rural designation but leaving urban development that has required and will continue to require
urban- like services, no longer substantially interferes with GMA goals. On remand, the Board
shall require the County to demonstrate compliance by producing evidence that resolution 7-
2) 3) encourages
0077 ( 1) encourages urban growth only in urban areas, ( reduces urban sprawl, (
efficient multimodal transportation, systems, and ( 4) ensures that available public facilities are
adequate to serve the development. The Board shall consider this evidence in light of the vested
urban development in the subject area.
15
No. 44121 -7 -II
III. ATTORNEY FEES
The County seeks attorney fees on appeal. Because the County did not prevail, we deny
its request for attorney fees. RAP 18. 1
16