Todd Mclaughlin v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TODD MCLAUGHLIN, a Washington )
resident, ) No. 78534-6-1
)
Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. )
)
TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL )
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign ) PUBLISHED OPINION
corporation, )
) FILED: August 12, 2019
Respondent. )
)
SMITH, J. — Todd McLaughlin appeals the trial court's dismissal of his
lawsuit against his insurer, Travelers Commercial Insurance Company.
McLaughlin was injured after he struck an open car door while riding his bicycle.
McLaughlin's personal injury protection (PIP) policy covers injuries to a
"pedestrian" but does not define that term. Because we must give an undefined
term in an insurance policy its plain, ordinary, and common meaning and
because the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" excludes bicyclists, we hold that
McLaughlin was not a pedestrian at the time of his injury and therefore not
entitled to PIP benefits. Additionally, we reject McLaughlin's contention that a
definition of "pedestrian" in Washington's Insurance Code, Title 48 RCW,
requires that a bicyclist is a pedestrian under his policy. Accordingly, we affirm.
No. 78534-6-1/2
FACTS
On July 31, 2017, McLaughlin was injured while riding his bicycle on
Westlake Avenue in Seattle. Daniel Moore, who was parked on the street, did
not see McLaughlin approach and opened his driver's side door, striking
McLaughlin.
At the time of the accident, McLaughlin was covered by a California
Personal Auto policy from Travelers. The policy provided PIP benefits of up to
$5,000 in medical expenses sustained by an "insured." The term "insured" was
defined in relevant part as "a pedestrian when struck by" a motor vehicle. The
term "pedestrian" was not defined.
McLaughlin sought coverage for his medical expenses under the policy.
Travelers denied coverage, finding that McLaughlin was not a pedestrian
because he was riding his bicycle at the time of the accident. McLaughlin sued
Travelers for breach of contract and other related theories based on its denial of
coverage. Both McLaughlin and Travelers moved for summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim. The trial court concluded that the ordinary and common
meaning of the term "pedestrian" does not include a bicyclist. It therefore
granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment and denied McLaughlin's
motion for summary judgment. McLaughlin appeals.
ANALYSIS
McLaughlin argues that because the ordinary meaning of "pedestrian"
includes a bicyclist, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
Travelers. We disagree.
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"'This court reviews summary judgment determinations de novo, engaging
in the same inquiry as the trial court.'" Kut Suen Lui v. Essex Ins. Co., 185
Wash. 2d 703, 709-10, 375 P.3d 596(2016)(quoting Durland v. San Juan County,
182 Wash. 2d 55, 69, 340 P.3d 191 (2014)). "'Summary judgment is proper where
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Kut Suen Lui, 185 Wash. 2d at 710(quoting Durland,
182 Wash. 2d at 69)). "Courts interpret language in an insurance policy as a matter
of law," and this court reviews those interpretations de novo. Kut Suen Lui, 185
Wash. 2d at 710. As the insured, McLaughlin bears the burden to prove that he was
entitled to coverage under the policy. E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers
lndem. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 901, 906, 726 P.2d 439 (1986).
Courts construe insurance policies as contracts. Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wash. 2d 654, 665, 15 P.3d 115 (2000). When the
court interprets an insurance policy, it considers the insurance policy as a whole,
giving the policy "a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given
to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance." Quadrant Corp. v.
Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wash. 2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733(2005)(quoting
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash. 2d at 666). "Undefined terms in an insurance contract
must be given their 'plain, ordinary, and popular' meaning." Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 877, 784 P.2d 507(1990)(quoting Farmers Ins.
Co. of Wash. v. Miller, 87 Wash. 2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9(1976)). "To determine the
ordinary meaning of an undefined term, our courts look to standard English
language dictionaries." Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 877.
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No. 78534-6-1/4
Here, McLaughlin's policy covers "reasonable expenses incurred for
necessary medical and funeral services because of 'bodily injury': 1. Caused by
an accident; and 2. Sustained by an 'insured." The policy defines an "insured"
as:
1. You or any "resident relative":
a. While "occupying"; or
b. As a pedestrian when struck by;
a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public roads
or a trailer of any type.
The term "pedestrian" is not defined in the policy. Therefore, we look to
the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" to determine its plain, ordinary, and
popular meaning. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
"pedestrian" as "a person who travels on foot : WALKER: as a : one who walks for
pleasure, sport, or exercise : HIKER .. . b :one walking as distinguished from one
travelling by car or cycle." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1664 (2002).
The plain, ordinary meaning of "pedestrian," as defined by the dictionary,
defeats McLaughlin's argument. Based on this definition, a pedestrian is distinct
from a bicyclist, who travels by cycle. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
concluding that McLaughlin was not an insured under the policy and that
Travelers was entitled to summary judgment.
Both McLaughlin and Travelers agree that there is no conflict of law when
the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" is used. But McLaughlin argues that the
definition of "pedestrian" in RCW 48.22.005(11), which is part of Washington's
Insurance Code, is automatically incorporated into the policy and includes a
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No. 78534-6-1/5
bicyclist. In its amicus curiae brief, United Policyholders also asserts that
RCW 48.22.005(11) applies here. But none of the authority cited by McLaughlin
mandates that the plain meaning of an undefined term in an insurance policy be
displaced if there is a definition of the same term in an insurance statute. Rather,
they stand for the general proposition that insurance policies cannot violate
applicable statutes. See Rincistad v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 550, 553-
55, 47 P.2d 1045(1935)(merely holding that a life insurance policy could not
discriminate against insureds who borrow against their policies because an
insurance statute prohibited such discrimination); Mission Ins. Co. v. Guarantee
Ins. Co., 37 Wash. App. 695, 699,683 P.2d 215(1984)(similarly holding that
reformation of a policy after an injury was improper in part because a statute
fixed the insurer's liability under the policy at the time the injury occurred).
Nevertheless, even if RCW 48.22.005(11) is incorporated into the policy, we
disagree with McLaughlin's narrow reading of that statute and hold that
McLaughlin has not met his burden to show that a bicyclist is a pedestrian, even
under RCW 48.22.005(11).
"The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's
intent and to apply it." Seciura v. Cabrera, 184 Wash. 2d 587, 591, 362 P.3d 1278
(2015). "When possible, we derive the legislature's intent solely from the
statute's plain language, considering the text of the provision at issue, the context
of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Segura,
184 Wash. 2d at 591.
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RCW 48.22.005(11) states that '"[p]edestrian' means a natural person not
occupying a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.320." (Emphasis added.)
Title 46 RCW not only includes a definition of "motor vehicle," it also includes
definitions for the terms "pedestrian" and "vehicle." See RCW 46.04.400
("Pedestrian" is defined as "any person who is afoot or who is using a wheelchair,
a power wheelchair, or a means of conveyance propelled by human power other
than a bicycle."), .670 ("Vehicle" is defined as "every device capable of being
moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property
is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles.").
Under those related definitions, the legislature expressly determined that a
bicyclist was not a pedestrian, but a vehicle. The definition of "pedestrian" in
RCW 48.22.005(11) specifically refers the reader to Title 46 RCW. Therefore,
we attempt to harmonize the definition of "pedestrian" in that statute with the
definition of "pedestrian" found in RCW 46.04.400. Because RCW 48.22.005(11)
does not explicitly refer to bicyclists, the statutes can be harmonized by excluding
bicyclists from that definition of "pedestrian," in accordance with RCW 46.04.400.
McLaughlin argues that we must narrowly read RCW 48.22.005(11) to
incorporate only the definition of "motor vehicle" from chapter 46.04 RCW. But
doing so would violate the maxims of statutory construction that require us to
determine the legislature's intent in part by reading a statute within the context of
its related provisions and the statutory scheme as a whole. See Segura, 184
Wash. 2d at 591. Therefore, we do not read RCW 48.22.005(11) narrowly.
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Citing a non-binding Maryland case, Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986), McLaughlin argues that the dictionary
definition of "pedestrian" is not controlling because RCW 48.22.005(11) provides
a broader definition of that term. As discussed, we disagree with his conclusion
that the definition of "pedestrian" in RCW 48.22.005(11) includes a bicyclist.
Furthermore, Tucker is not persuasive because that case involved statutory
construction, not contract interpretation. See Tucker, 517 A.2d at 734 (giving the
undefined term pedestrian in a PIP statute a broad interpretation consistent with
the overall purpose of the statute). Tucker does not require reversal here.
McLaughlin argues that multiple cases have recognized that bicyclists are
pedestrians for insurance purposes. He cites Mattson v. Stone, 32 Wn. App.
630,648 P.2d 929 (1982), as an example. There, a passenger on a bicycle was
struck by a car and obtained an insurance settlement from the driver's insurer.
Mattson, 32 Wash. App. at 631-32. The issue on appeal was whether the driver's
insurer had a valid subrogation claim against a later settlement between the
bicycle passenger and driver. Mattson, 32 Wash. App. at 632. Although the court
stated that the bicycle passenger was "a pedestrian injured in an accident" in its
recitation of the facts of the case, it did not analyze whether the insurance policy
defined a bicyclist as a "pedestrian." Mattson, 32 Wash. App. at 632-33.
Therefore, Mattson is not applicable to our analysis.
In a statement of additional authorities, McLaughlin cites to Barriga
Figueroa v. Prieto Mariscal, 193 Wash. 2d 404, 441 P.3d 818 (2019), a recent
Supreme Court case that considered whether an insurer owes a person injured
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No. 78534-6-1/8
under a tortfeasor's PIP policy the same quasi-fiduciary duties it would owe to the
named insured. There, an eight-year-old boy was hit by a minivan. Barriqa
Figueroa, 193 Wash. 2d at 407. The police report stated that the boy rode his
bicycle into the roadway in front of the minivan. Barriqa Figueroa, 193 Wash. 2d at
407. The boy gave a number of statements about the accident, but his most
detailed version was that his right shoelace got stuck in his bicycle spokes and
the minivan ran over his leg when he leaned over to untangle the shoelace.
Barriqa Figueroa, 193 Wash. 2d at 407. At the subsequent tort trial against the
driver of the minivan, the trial court admitted a PIP application form signed by the
boy's mother that mirrored the events reported in the police report. Barriqa
Figueroa, 193 Wash. 2d at 410. The Supreme Court held that the PIP application
was protected work product and should have been excluded. Barriqa Figueroa,
193 Wash. 2d at 415. In doing so, the court concluded, without extensive
discussion, that the boy was an insured because under RCW 48.22.005(5)(b)(ii),
"a pedestrian injured in an automobile accident is statutorily defined as an
'insured." Barriqa Figueroa, 193 Wash. 2d at 411. The court's statement does not
help McLaughlin. The court did not specifically consider whether the definition of
"pedestrian" includes a bicyclist. Furthermore, there was a factual dispute as to
whether the boy was riding his bicycle in the road or was stopped to tie his
shoelaces. For these reasons, Barriqa Figueroa does not require reversal.
McLaughlin also cites authority from other jurisdictions that is similarly
inapplicable in interpreting the undefined term "pedestrian" in his insurance
policy. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Kerger, 194 Ga. App. 20, 389 S.E.2d
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541, 542(1989)(issue on appeal was the meaning of "struck by" in the insurance
policy even though "[t]he parties agree[d] that for the purposes of this case
plaintiff must be considered a 'pedestrian' under Georgia law"); Harbold v. Olin,
287 N.J. Super. 35, 670 A.2d 117, 119(App. Div. 1996)(acknowledging that the
statutory definition of "pedestrian" under New Jersey PIP statutes includes a
bicyclist); Pilotte v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384 Mass. 805, 427 N.E.2d 746-47
(1981)("The defendant's insurance policy defines a pedestrian as 'a person who
is walking or who is operating a bicycle, tricycle or similar vehicle, or a person on
horseback or in a vehicle drawn by an animal."). Furthermore, each of those
other jurisdictions employ the reasonable expectation doctrine, which requires
courts to interpret insurance policies from the standpoint of the insured's
expectations. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Hutsell, 164 Ga. App. 443, 296
S.E.2d 760, 763(1982); Home Indem. Ins. Co. v. Merchants Distribs., Inc., 396
Mass. 103, 483 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (1985); Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J.
590, 775 A.2d 1271-72 (2001). But our Supreme Court "has on several
occasions specifically declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
under which the insured's subjective expectation of coverage determines the
insurer's liability." Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 894; see Quadrant, 154 Wash. 2d at 172
("[E]xpectations of the insured cannot override the plain language of the
contract."). These cases are not relevant.
McLaughlin next argues that public policy concerns weigh in favor of
defining a bicyclist as a "pedestrian" because bicyclists, like pedestrians, are
"particularly vulnerable and susceptible to injury on the roadway." But as
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explained, an undefined term in an insurance policy must be given its plain,
ordinary, and popular meaning. McLaughlin cites no authority for the proposition
that the plain meaning of an undefined term can be set aside on policy grounds.
Therefore, we assume that he found none. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intellioencer,
60 Wash. 2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193(1962)("Where no authorities are cited in
support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but
may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.").
McLaughlin argues that refusing to recognize a bicyclist as a pedestrian
under the plain meaning of that word will lead to an absurd result. To illustrate
this argument, he claims that a baby in a stroller would not be covered by the
dictionary definition of "pedestrian." But to resolve this case, we need not
determine whether such a baby would be an insured under McLaughlin's policy.
McLaughlin also argues that we should look to "the purpose of the laws at
issue" when defining "pedestrian." As an example, he cites to Pudmaroff v.
Allen, 138 Wash. 2d 55, 977 P.2d 574 (1999), a Supreme Court case that examined
whether a bicyclist was a "pedestrian" under former RCW 46.61.235(1)(1993),
which required drivers to stop to allow pedestrians to cross the street in
crosswalks. Pudmaroff, 138 Wash. 2d at 60. The Supreme Court held that the
definition of "pedestrian" in RCW 46.04.400 as a person "afoot" did not overrule
prior case law establishing bicyclists would be treated the same as pedestrians
when they were in a crosswalk. Pudmaroff, 138 Wash. 2d at 64-65. The court
explained that to hold otherwise would yield an absurd result because under
such an interpretation, a driver would not be liable under RCW 46.61.235(1)for
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hitting a child riding his or her bicycle across a crosswalk. Pudmaroff, 138 Wash. 2d
at 64-65. But Pudmaroff is not controlling here. McLaughlin was not in a
crosswalk when he was hit by Moore's car door—he was riding down a busy
street in downtown Seattle. Furthermore, the term "pedestrian" in his insurance
policy is not subject to principles of statutory interpretation, but to the principles of
contract interpretation. The analysis of an undefined term in an insurance policy
is straightforward and requires only that we determine the plain, ordinary, and
popular meaning of "pedestrian." We need not look to the purpose of any laws
regulating pedestrians or bicyclists for this conclusion. Therefore, McLaughlin's
reliance on Pudmaroff is misplaced.
Finally, McLaughlin argues that to the extent the term "pedestrian" is
ambiguous in the policy, the ambiguity should be construed against Travelers,
who drafted the contract. He is correct that "[a]mbiguous policy language must
be liberally construed in the insured's favor." Gull Indus., Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 181 Wash. App. 463, 470-71, 326 P.3d 782(2014). But here,
"pedestrian" is not ambiguous under either the dictionary definition or
RCW 48.22.005(11). Therefore, we are not required to construe "pedestrian" in
McLaughlin's favor.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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