In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Ricardo Miquel Maldonado

FILED
NOVEMBER 18, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of )
) No. 36684-7-III
RICARDO MIGUEL MALDONADO, )
)
Petitioner. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAAB, J. — In a timely personal restraint petition (PRP), Ricardo Maldonado
challenges the sentence imposed for his 2017 Walla Walla County conviction of
attempted second degree murder while armed with a firearm, committed at age 18. Mr.
Maldonado claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his initial sentencing
hearing because his attorney failed to hold the State to its burden of proving that his
Oregon juvenile convictions were comparable to Washington felonies for offender score
purposes. Following two reference hearings conducted at our request, the Superior Court
determined that all of Mr. Maldonado’s Oregon convictions were comparable to
Washington crimes. We disagree with the Superior Court’s analysis and find that the
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crimes are not comparable. Having established deficiency and prejudice, we grant Mr.
Maldonado’s petition and remand for a full resentencing hearing where Mr. Maldonado
may raise claims of mitigation based on youthfulness.
FACTS
The facts leading to Ricardo Maldonado’s conviction are briefly recounted from
this court’s opinion, No. 35182-3-III. State v. Maldonado, No. 35182-3-III (Wash. Ct.
App. June 12, 2018) (unpublished).1 Mr. Maldonado traveled by car with three friends,
Raul Madrigal, Leonardo Corona Venegas, and Diego Rivera. The four stopped at some
grain elevators. While Rivera was urinating and had his back turned, one of his friends
shot him eight times. Rivera survived, but is now paralyzed from his waist down. Based
on statements made by Madrigal to police, the State charged Maldonado with attempted
first degree murder while armed with a firearm. At trial, Madrigal testified he saw
Maldonado fire the gun and then hand the gun to Venegas. According to Madrigal,
Venegas tried to shoot Rivera but the gun was empty. Venegas then complained to
Maldonado that he had used all the bullets. Rivera testified differently. He testified he
turned around after he felt the second bullet and saw Venegas shooting. According to
Rivera, Venegas then handed the gun to Maldonado, and Maldonado tried to shoot it.
1
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/351823_unp.pdf.
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The jury found Maldonado guilty of attempted second degree murder and found by
special verdict that he was armed with a firearm at the time of the shooting.
The pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) indicated Mr. Maldonado’s criminal
history was comprised of five Oregon juvenile convictions, including three for second
degree burglary and one each for attempting to elude and unauthorized use of a vehicle.
The court thus calculated Maldonado’s offender score at 2½, rounded down to 2, with a
resulting standard range of 168-243 months including the 60-month firearm
enhancement. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed the correct score was 2
based on the Oregon convictions. Mr. Maldonado’s attorney confirmed with the court
that he had no questions in that regard. There was no further colloquy about the offender
score or comparability of the Oregon convictions, and the State did not produce copies of
those judgment and sentences. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel advocated for
a low-end 168-month sentence. He related his own discussions with Mr. Maldonado and
information contained in the PSI that Mr. Maldonado had a troubled family upbringing
involving abuse and domestic violence, he had suffered several concussions before the
age of 13 that affected his memory of events prior to that age, he did not have a
significant criminal history and was not a gang member, he was remorseful for the crime,
and he exhibited desire and likelihood for rehabilitation. Defense counsel also asked the
court to consider Mr. Maldonado’s age of just 19 at the time of sentencing, and that he
would be leaving behind two children of his own while in prison. Mr. Maldonado’s
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mother also spoke on his behalf. She said that he had his attorney speak in his defense
because he sustained a concussion three or four years ago that affected his ability to
explain himself in a manner that would not further incriminate him. Mr. Maldonado
declined to make a statement in allocution.
The State recommended a mid-range sentence based on Mr. Maldonado’s direct
participation in the crime as a shooter (something that he denied) and his lack of taking
responsibility for the crime (including fleeing to the east coast after the shooting). Id. at
453-54, 447, 444-45. The court imposed a midpoint 206-month sentence. Id. at 464-65.
Mr. Maldonado filed a direct appeal and this court affirmed the judgment and
sentence. See Maldonado, No. 35182-3-III. The mandate was issued on July 27, 2018.
Mr. Maldonado filed this personal restraint petition with the court on March 25, 2019. In
the petition he claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney
failed to hold the State to its burden of proving that his five prior Oregon juvenile
convictions were comparable to Washington felonies for offender score purposes. In its
response, the State conceded it had failed to meet its burden of proof with regard to the
out-of-state convictions and requested an evidentiary hearing be ordered to adjudicate the
legal and factual comparability of the Oregon offenses.
Our Acting Chief Judge ordered an evidentiary hearing and directed the superior
court to determine “(1) the existence and comparability to a Washington offense of each
Oregon conviction referenced in the 2017 judgment and sentence, (2) whether, and to
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what extent, said Oregon convictions are considered the same criminal conduct in
computing the current offender score, and (3) the resulting correct offender score.” Order
for Ref. at 3. An evidentiary hearing was held in April 2020. First Evid. at 5. Finding
the first response insufficient, our Acting Chief Judge ordered a second evidentiary
hearing. See Second Order for Ref. The order for the second evidentiary hearing
requested the court make specific determinations on the following questions: “1. Does
Oregon’s crime of burglary require intent to commit a crime against ‘a person or property
therein,’ as opposed to intent to commit ‘any crime?’ 2. If the answer to the first question
is negative, are the Oregon adjudications factually comparable to any felony crime in
Washington? 3. Is the Oregon conviction for eluding factually comparable to RCW
46.61.024 when adjudged against the ‘reckless manner’ standard as defined in State v.
Naillieux, 158 Wn. App. 630, 241 P.3d 1280 (2010) (‘reckless manner’ is not
synonymous with ‘reckless driving’)? 4. Are Mr. Maldonado’s deferred disposition
orders ‘convictions’ for purposes of RCW 9.94A.030(9) and .525(3)? 5. What is Mr.
Maldonado’s offender score in light of the court’s answer’s to the preceding questions?”
See Second Order for Ref. at 2-3.
At the second evidentiary hearing, the trial court outlined responses to each of
these questions. Second Evid. at 90-98. In regards to the first question, the court found
that there was no requirement under the Oregon statute that the crime of burglary require
intent that a crime be committed against “a person or property therein.” Id. at 91.
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However, in answering the second question, the court found the Oregon burglary
adjudications were factually comparable to the felony crime of Washington burglary in
the second degree (RCW 9A.52.030) and residential burglary (RCW 9A.52.025). Id. at
92-93. The court supported its finding by citing to the defendant’s admissions to the
allegations contained in paragraphs one and two of the petition and a statement for
probable cause. Id. at 93.
Regarding the third question, the trial court found that the Oregon conviction was
factually comparable to the Washington crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle. Id.
at 93-95. However, in doing so, it relied solely on the testimony of an officer about Mr.
Maldonado’s driving contained in the statement of probable cause. Id. Regarding the
fourth question, the court determined that in each of the deferred dispositions, the
defendant made an admission of guilt on the record and the circuit court made a finding
that the defendant was “within the jurisdiction of the Court by reason” of the allegation of
the petition. Id. at 95-96. Thus, the court concluded that the deferred dispositions were
convictions for the purpose of RCW 9.94A.030(9) and .525(3). Id. Finally, regarding the
fifth question, the court gave Mr. Maldonado a half point for each of the prior
convictions, calculating Mr. Maldonado’s offender score at two.2 Id. at 96-97.
2
Rounded down from two-and-a-half.
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ANALYSIS
A. TIMELINESS OF PRP
Petitioners have one year from when their judgement becomes final to file a PRP.
Here, the judgment and sentence was entered on April 4, 2017. Mr. Maldonado appealed
the decision and the mandate was issued on July 27, 2018. This PRP was filed on March
25, 2019. Therefore, the PRP is timely. In re Pers. Restraint of McKiearnan, 165 Wn.2d
777, 781, 203 P.3d 375 (2009).
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Mr. Maldonado first claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his
original sentencing because his attorney failed to hold the State to its burden of proving
that his five prior juvenile dispositions were comparable to Washington felonies for
offender score purposes.3 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was
prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); In re Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 840,
280 P.3d 1102 (2012). The Court in Strickland defined prejudice as the “reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
3
Mr. Maldonado does not raise the issue of whether Oregon juvenile dispositions
are comparable to Washington convictions.
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would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
1. Deficient Performance
In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Maldonado must establish
that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient. To determine if counsel’s failure to
hold the State to its burden was deficient, we must conduct a comparability analysis.
State v. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d 409, 414, 158 P.3d 580 (2007). Defense counsel’s
performance is deficient when he or she fails to object to the comparability of out-of-state
offenses if the out-of-state offenses are neither legally nor factually comparable. Id. at
414-15. Since the trial court did not conduct this analysis at the initial sentencing
hearing, we remanded with instructions to conduct the analysis. After an evidentiary
hearing, the superior court found that Mr. Maldonado’s Oregon dispositions were
comparable to Washington crimes. We now review this comparability analysis to
determine if counsel’s failure to hold the State to its burden at the initial sentencing
hearing constitutes deficient performance.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW, an out-of-state
conviction is included in a defendant’s offender score if that offense is comparable to a
Washington offense. RCW 9.94A.525(3). The State bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of prior convictions used to enhance a
defendant’s sentencing range. State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913, 920, 205 P.3d 1138
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(2009). This includes proving the existence and comparability of a defendant’s prior out-
of-state convictions. State v. McCorkle, 137 Wn.2d 490, 495, 973 P.2d 461 (1991)
(citing State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 482-83, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). This burden must
be met, regardless of whether a defendant lodges an objection during the sentencing
process. Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 482. It is only when a defendant affirmatively
acknowledges the facts and information necessary to justify use of a prior conviction in
his or her offender score that the State is relieved of presenting evidence documenting the
existence of prior convictions. State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 912, 287 P.3d 584(2012).
The comparability analysis is a two-part test that first asks whether the foreign
offense is legally comparable to that of a Washington statute. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at
415. The offenses are legally comparable where the elements of the foreign offense and
the Washington offense are substantially similar. Id. If the offenses are not legally
comparable, the court must then determine whether they are factually comparable. Id.Factual comparability requires that the actual conduct underlying the foreign offense
would have resulted in a violation of the Washington statute. Id. However, the facts a
court can rely on in determining factual comparability are limited. State v. Arndt, 179 Wn.
App. 373, 389, 320 P.3d 104 (2014). “[S]entencing courts may only rely on facts in the
out-of-state record that are admitted or proved to the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt
in the out-of-state conviction.” Id. at 389 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154
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Wn.2d 249, 258, 111 P.3d 837 (2005); State v. Ortega, 120 Wn. App. 165, 174, 84 P.3d
935 (2004)). “While it may be necessary to look into the record of a foreign conviction to
determine its comparability to a Washington offense, the elements of the charged crime
must remain the cornerstone of the comparison. Facts or allegations contained in the
record, if not directly related to the elements of the charged crime, may not have been
sufficiently proven in the trial.” State v. Morley, 134 Wn.2d 588, 606, 952 P.2d 167(1998). Where an out-of-state conviction is neither legally nor factually comparable to a
Washington offense a sentencing court may not count the conviction in a defendant’s
offender score. Arndt, 179 Wn. App. at 380 (citing Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415).
a. Oregon Disposition for Second Degree Burglary
In this case, one-and-a-half points were added to Mr. Maldonado’s offender score
for three deferred dispositions of second degree burglary in Oregon. Second Evid. at 97.
The applicable Oregon statute provides, “a person commits the crime of burglary in the
second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein.” ORS 164.215(1) (emphasis added). Under the Oregon statute,
“‘Building,’ in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any booth, vehicle, boat,
aircraft or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of separate units, including, but
not limited to, separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to
being a part of such building, a separate building.” ORS 164.205(1) (emphasis added).
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The Washington statute for burglary in the second degree provides: “A person is
guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person
or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a
vehicle or a dwelling.” RCW 9A.52.030(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, the
Washington statute for residential burglary provides that “[a] person is guilty of
residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property
therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle.”
RCW 9A.52.025(1) (emphasis added).
Mr. Maldonado’s case was remanded to superior court for a reference hearing to
make a comparability analysis. At this hearing, the State admitted and the trial court
found that the two crimes were not legally similar because the Oregon statute simply
requires “intent to commit a crime therein,” while the Washington statute requires a
narrower “intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein.” We note that
the Washington statute is also narrower than that of Oregon because it applies to “a
building other than a vehicle or a dwelling,” while that of Oregon simply applies to “a
building.” The Oregon definition of “building” specifically includes certain categories of
vehicles, while the Washington statute specifically excludes vehicles.
As part of his first deferred disposition for second degree burglary, Mr. Maldonado
admitted to the following:
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The defendant, on or about January 16, 2013, in Umatilla County, Oregon,
did unlawfully and knowingly enter and remain in a building located at 303
S. Mill St, Milton-Freewater, OR, Oregon, with the intent to commit the
crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity
of the State of Oregon.
Second Evid. at 9. The admission satisfies the narrower Washington requirement of
intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein by stating that Mr.
Maldonado intended to commit the crime of theft in the building. However, he only
admitted to unlawful entry of a building. The requirement that the building not be a
vehicle or dwelling is not satisfied. Thus, the crimes are not factually comparable.
As part of the deferred disposition for the two other burglary crimes, Mr.
Maldonado admitted to paragraphs one and two of the related petition. Under paragraph
one, Mr. Maldonado admitted:
The defendant, on or about October 28, 2012, in Umatilla County, Oregon,
did unlawfully and knowingly enter and remain in a building located at or
about 301 Catherine Ave, Milton-Freewater, OR, Oregon, with the intent to
commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace
and dignity of the State of Oregon.
Second Evid. at 37. The admission in paragraph two repeated word for word paragraph
one.4 Id. at 38.
4
Count 1 and Count 2 state the exact same things. Second Evid. at 37-38. It
appears from the order of restitution in this case that this was a typo and the second
should have stated “299 Catherine Ave” in lieu of “301 Catherine Ave.” Id. at 88.
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The State and the trial court at the evidentiary hearing improperly relied on the
statement contained in the probable cause for custody in determining the crimes were
factually similar. The facts laid forth in this document were never found by the Oregon
court nor admitted to by the defendant. Therefore, they should not be relied on in the
factual comparability analysis. None of the statements admitted to by Mr. Maldonado as
part of his deferred disposition clarify what kind of “building” he entered for the purpose
of the burglary. Oregon, by definition, includes certain categories of vehicles, while both
Washington burglary statutes categorically exclude vehicles from the definition of
building.5 Thus, the burglary crimes committed in Oregon are not factually similar to the
crime of either burglary in the second degree or residential burglary in Washington.
b. Oregon Disposition for Attempting to Elude Police With a Vehicle
One-half of a point was added to Mr. Maldonado’s offender score for his
deferred disposition for attempting to elude police with a vehicle. Second Evid. at
97. The Oregon statute provides:
A person commits the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer if:
(a) The person is operating a motor vehicle; and
(b) A police officer who is in uniform and prominently displaying the
police officer's badge of office or operating a vehicle appropriately
marked showing it to be an official police vehicle gives a visual or
5
While Mr. Maldonado admitted that the “building” was “located at or about” a
certain address, this admission alone is insufficient since a vehicle may also be located at
an address when it is burglarized.
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audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, including any signal by
hand, voice, emergency light or siren, and either:
(A) The person, while still in the vehicle, knowingly flees or attempts
to elude a pursuing police officer; or
(B) The person gets out of the vehicle and knowingly flees or attempts
to elude the police officer.
ORS 811.540(1).
The Washington statute that is the most analogous is as follows:
Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately
bring his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a
reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after
being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be
guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by
hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal
shall be in uniform and the vehicle shall be equipped with lights and sirens.
RCW 46.61.024(1).
The statutes are not legally comparable. The Washington statute requires that the
individual be driving in a reckless manner while attempting to elude the police, while the
Oregon statute does not, making the Oregon statute broader than that of Washington. As
part of the deferred disposition, the defendant admitted to the following statement:
The defendant, on or about January 16, 2013, in Umatilla County, Oregon,
being an operator of a motor vehicle upon a public highway or premises
open to the public, and having been given a visual or audible signal to stop
by a pursuing police officer who was wearing a uniform, prominently
displaying the officer's badge of office, or who was operating a vehicle
appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle, did while
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still in the vehicle unlawfully and knowingly flee or attempt to elude said
officer; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of
Oregon.
Second Evid. at 9. There was no admission by defendant to driving in a reckless manner
or to facts that would indicate he was driving in a reckless manner. Again, the State and
the trial court improperly relied on the statement of probable cause whose facts were
never found by the court nor admitted to by the defendant. Therefore, they should not be
relied on in the factual comparability analysis. Thus, the deferred disposition for
attempting to elude is not factually similar to the Washington crime.
c. Oregon Disposition for Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
One-half of a point was added to Mr. Maldonado’s offender score for a deferred
disposition for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Second Evid. at 97. The Oregon
statute provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle when:
(a)(A) The person knowingly takes, operates, exercises control over or
otherwise uses another's vehicle, boat or aircraft;
(B) The person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the owner of the vehicle, boat or
aircraft does not consent to the taking, operation or other use of,
or the exercise of control over, the vehicle, boat or aircraft; and
(C) The owner of the vehicle, boat or aircraft did not consent to the
taking, operation or other use of, or the exercise of control over,
the vehicle, boat or aircraft;
(b)(A) The person knowingly rides in another's vehicle, boat or aircraft;
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(B) The person knows that the owner of the vehicle, boat or aircraft
does not consent to the person's riding in the vehicle, boat or
aircraft; and
(C) The owner or an authorized user of the vehicle, boat or aircraft did
not consent to the person's riding in the vehicle, boat or aircraft;
(c) Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircraft pursuant to an
agreement between the person or another and the owner thereof
whereby the person or another is to perform for compensation a
specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair or
use of such vehicle, boat or aircraft, the person intentionally uses or
operates it, without consent of the owner, for the person's own
purpose in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed
purpose; or
(d) Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircraft pursuant to an agreement
with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle, boat or aircraft is to be
returned to the owner at a specified time, the person knowingly
retains or withholds possession thereof without consent of the owner
for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render such
retention or possession a gross deviation from the agreement.
ORS 164.135 (emphasis added). The Washington statute that is most closely analogous
is Washington’s Taking A Motor Vehicle without Permission in the Second Degree. This
statute provides:
A person is guilty of taking a motor vehicle without permission in the
second degree if he or she, without the permission of the owner or person
entitled to possession, intentionally takes or drives away any automobile or
motor vehicle, whether propelled by steam, electricity, or internal
combustion engine, that is the property of another, or he or she voluntarily
rides in or upon the automobile or motor vehicle with knowledge of the fact
that the automobile or motor vehicle was unlawfully taken.
RCW 9A.56.075(1) (emphasis added).
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The State acknowledges that the statutes are not legally comparable because the
Oregon statute is broader. State v. Jackson, 129 Wn. App 95, 107-09, 117 P.3d 1182(2005). The mens rea requirement under the Oregon statute is recklessness because the
individual is “aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk”
that the owner has not consented to the use of the vehicle. See ORS § 161.085(9)
(“‘Recklessly’ . . . means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.”). The mens rea requirement under the Washington
statute is “intentionally.” In Washington, “[a] person acts with intent or intentionally
when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes
a crime.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a).
As part of his deferred disposition for unauthorized use of a vehicle, Mr.
Maldonado admitted to “paragraph 1” of the petition from January 22, 2013. Second
Evid. at 24. What paragraph 1 is referring to is not entirely clear. However, assuming it
was referring to all the allegations included under count one in the petition, the defendant
admitted to the following:
The defendant, on or about January 2, 2013, in Umatilla County, Oregon,
did unlawfully and with criminal negligence take, operate, exercise control
over, ride in and otherwise use a vehicle, a 2008 Landrover without the
consent of the owner, ROSA GLORIA DE DIOS; contrary to statute and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.
The state further alleges that the value of the vehicle was greater than
$10,000.
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The state further alleges that the vehicle was a motor vehicle used primarily
for personal, rather than commercial, transportation.
Second Evid. at 24. Mr. Maldonado’s admission states that he acted with criminal
negligence. “Criminal negligence,” under Oregon law, “means that a person fails to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists.” ORS § 161.085(10). Because Mr. Maldonado only admitted acting
with criminal negligence and there are not facts admitted to that would support
intentionality, the deferred disposition for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not
factually similar to the analogous Washington statute. The State relied on the testimony
of an officer in the statement for probable cause for custody to establish that the crimes
were factually similar. However, as in the above sections, the defendant did not admit to
the statement for probable cause, therefore it cannot be relied on to establish factual
comparability.
2. Prejudice
Having determined that the out-of-state convictions are neither factually or legally
comparable to Washington crimes, and thus counsel’s performance at the initial
sentencing hearing was deficient for failing to object to the use of the out-of-state
convictions, we must determine if Mr. Maldonado can show prejudice. Thiefault, 160
Wn.2d at 414. The Court in Strickland defined prejudice as the “reasonable probability
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that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If an offender score is reduced, the initially
miscalculated offender score implicates counsel’s performance and constitutes a
fundamental defect that entitles Mr. Maldonado to relief. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997) (miscalculated offender score constitutes
fundamental defect that inherently results in complete miscarriage of justice requiring
relief in personal restraint proceeding). Even where the length of a defendant’s
previously-imposed sentence still falls within the bounds of a sentence under the new
offender score, the defendant is still entitled to resentencing. Id. at 569.
Here, Mr. Maldonado’s offender score was incorrectly calculated at two and one-
half rounded down to two. None of the Oregon offenses were either legally or factually
comparable to Washington offenses. Thus, none of the Oregon offenses should have
counted toward the offender score. Without the Oregon offenses, Mr. Maldonado’s
offender score is zero. Thus, Mr. Maldonado was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient
performance.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Maldonado’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to address whether
the deferred dispositions qualify as convictions but was ineffective for failing to object to
the comparability of the offenses. Since the Oregon offenses should not have been
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included in his offender score, we do not need to address whether they counted as the
same criminal conduct for scoring purposes. We remand for a full resentencing where
Mr. Maldonado can raise relevant issues pertaining to mitigating factors.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________
Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
Fearing, J.
_________________________________
Siddoway, A.C.J.
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