State of Washington v. Joel Matthew Groves

FILED
AUGUST 13, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 35729-5-III
Respondent, ) (consolidated with
) No. 35730-9-III)
v. )
)
JOEL MATTHEW GROVES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, J. — Joel Groves appeals the trial court’s dismissal of motions asking
that it order the Department of Corrections (DOC) to cease deducting his legal financial
obligations (LFOs) from his inmate account. He argues that this court’s decision in State
v. Crook, 146 Wash. App. 24, 189 P.3d 811 (2008)—which held that such deductions are
not collection actions requiring inquiry into a defendant’s financial status under RCW
10.01.160(3)—is incorrect and harmful, and should be overruled.
Crook was correctly decided. For that reason, and because $200 in court costs that
he challenges reflect the mandatory criminal filing fee, we affirm the dismissal of his
motions.
No. 35729-5-III (consolidated with No. 35730-9-III)
State v. Groves
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While incarcerated, Mr. Groves, claiming an inability to pay LFOs imposed
against him in judgments entered in 2007 and 2010, moved for relief. The trial court
granted Mr. Groves’s motion in part, reducing his LFOs in each matter to $800,
comprising the victim’s penalty assessment ($500), the criminal filing fee ($200), and a
DNA1 collection fee ($100).
A few months later, Mr. Groves filed additional motions in both cases, asking the
trial court to prevent the DOC from deducting LFOs from his inmate account and to
vacate his remaining LFOs as unconstitutional.
At a hearing on the motions, the prosecutor reported her understanding that “at a
prior hearing . . . the court reduced the amount of LFOs to the lowest amount allowable
under the law” and she did not believe there was anything more the court could do.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 3. The court denied the motions. Mr. Groves appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mr. Groves argues that Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116,
40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974), State v. Blank, 131 Wash. 2d 230, 241-42, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997),
City of Richland v. Wakefield, 186 Wash. 2d 596, 380 P.3d 459 (2016), and RCW 10.01.160
(which applies to costs imposed at sentencing) require us to limit the DOC’s right and
obligation to deduct LFOs from amounts payable to him.
1
Deoxyribonucleic acid.
2
No. 35729-5-III (consolidated with No. 35730-9-III)
State v. Groves
His argument is backwards. We must begin with the statutes under which the
legislature has directed the DOC to deduct LFOs from inmate funds, which we can then
review for any constitutional infirmity.
RCW 72.11.020 provides that the secretary of the DOC “shall be custodian of all
funds of a convicted person that are in his or her possession upon admission to a state
institution, or that are sent or brought to the person, or earned by the person while in
custody, or that are forwarded to the superintendent on behalf of a convicted person” and
that “[a]ll such funds shall be deposited in the personal account of the convicted person.”
The statute further provides that
the secretary shall have authority to disburse money from such person’s
personal account for the purposes of satisfying a court-ordered legal
financial obligation to the court. Legal financial obligation deductions shall
be made as stated in RCW 72.09.111(1) and 72.65.050 without exception.
Unless specifically granted authority herein, at no time shall the withdrawal
of funds for the payment of a legal financial obligation result in reducing
the inmate’s account to an amount less than the defined level of indigency
to be determined by the department.
Id.
RCW 72.09.111(1) authorizes the DOC to develop a formula for the distribution
of offender wages, gratuities, and benefits and identifies certain maximum allowable
deductions. It further provides that the DOC’s formula “shall not reduce the inmate
account below the indigency level, as defined in RCW 72.09.015.” Id. “Indigent
inmate,” “indigent,” and “indigency” are defined by RCW 72.09.015(15) to mean “an
3
No. 35729-5-III (consolidated with No. 35730-9-III)
State v. Groves
inmate who has less than a ten-dollar balance of disposable income in his or her
institutional account on the day a request is made to utilize funds and during the thirty
days previous to the request.”
Mr. Groves does not contend that the DOC has been deducting amounts in excess
of its formula and statutory maximums. He does not demonstrate that the deductions are
unconstitutional. As recognized in Blank, the constitutional concern is at the point of
collection and when sanctions are sought for nonpayment. 131 Wash. 2d at 242. “If at that
time defendant is unable to pay through no fault of his own, Bearden [v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983)] and like cases indicate constitutional
fairness principles are implicated.” Blank, 131 Wash. 2d at 242.
As Wakefield demonstrates, for an individual who is no longer incarcerated, a
“crucial” consideration in determining ability to pay is the individual’s ability “to provide
for one’s own basic needs.” 186 Wash. 2d at 606. In Ms. Wakefield’s case, she was
receiving $710 in social security disability payments each month and presented expert
testimony that the self-sufficiency standard for a one person household in her
community—“the resources needed to meet only ‘the core necessities of life, such as
clothing, food, shelter and medical care at a decent level’”—was $1,492 per month. Id.
at 601-02.
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No. 35729-5-III (consolidated with No. 35730-9-III)
State v. Groves
“Indigency” for an individual who is incarcerated and whose basic needs are being
met by the State will have a different meaning. Under RCW 72.09.111(1)(a)(iii), for
instance, the maximum amount DOC can deduct from an inmate’s wages to contribute to
his or her cost of incarceration is 20 percent. Mr. Groves does not attempt to demonstrate
that, while incarcerated, he is unable to pay the amount toward his LFOs that the DOC is
permitted to deduct from his wages, gratuities or benefits. He does not demonstrate any
constitutional problem with RCW 72.09.015(15)’s definition of “indigent inmate,”
“indigent” and “indigency.”
Mr. Groves’s remaining challenge is to the trial court’s imposition in his modified
judgments of $200 identified only as “court costs.” He argues that the $200 should be
construed as unintended discretionary costs and asks us to remand with directions to
strike it. He makes this argument at the same time he admits that “[t]he trial court made
clear its intention of eliminating all discretionary LFOs from Groves’s judgment and
sentence, retaining only . . . ‘mandatory’ LFOs.” Br. of Appellant at 9.
The trial court’s orders that reduced his LFOs leave no room for confusion about
the $200 assessment; it was clearly the criminal filing fee, which, at the time of Mr.
Groves’s convictions, was mandatory even for indigent defendants. See former
RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) (2015). The orders state:
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No. 35729-5-111 (consolidated with No. 35730-9-111)
State v. Groves
IT IS ORDERED, on the Defendant's motion and upon hearing in
open court, the legal financial obligations in the above-captioned matter are
modified to consist only of the following:
Victim's penalty assessment $500.00
Criminal filing fee 200.00
DNA collection fee 100.00
Total 800.00
Clerk's Papers at 30, 160 (emphasis added). And as the State points out, ifwe deemed
the cost to be discretionary and remanded for the trial court to strike it, we would need to
direct the court to impose the criminal filing fee at the same time.
The dismissal orders are affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
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WE CONCUR:
Fearing, J. Pennell, A.CJ.
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