State of Washington v. Darrell F. Smith

FILED
April 9, 2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 29832-9-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
) OPINION PUBLISHED
DARRELL F. SMITH, ) IN PART
)
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, A.C.J. - Darrell Smith was convicted of multiple crimes arising out
of his alleged 12-hour unlawful imprisonment of Eric Chadwick. He was also convicted
for possession of methamphetamine found in a search following his arrest. While he
makes numerous assignments of error, we find one dispositive: the atypical wording of
the elements instructions given at trial could have allowed jurors to convict him even if
they entertained reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
We reject Smith's single evidence sufficiency challenge (to his conviction for
possession of methamphetamine), reverse his convictions on the basis of the instructional
error, and remand for a new trial.
No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
FACTS ANDPROCEDlmAL BACKGROUND
Darrell Smith was convicted of first degree robbery, unlawful imprisonment,
second degree assault, misdemeanor harassment, and second degree theft. All arose from
a scheme that Smith hatched with a drifter, Desert Sand Donini, who was then living at
the same motel in Moses Lake as was Smith. Donini had become acquainted with Eric
Chadwick, who was in Moses Lake to work a temporary construction job and had helped
her out when she ran out of money in late February 2010. Smith and Donini realized that
Chadwick, who had a good job and was then working 60 hours a week, probably had a
fair amount of money.
The many twists and turns of what became Smith's and Donini's alleged 12-hour
imprisonment of Chadwick need not be recounted, given the basis for our decision. It
suffices to say that Smith demanded that Chadwick withdraw funds from Chadwick's
bank accounts, buy assets that Smith could traffic, and-when Chadwick's credit/debit
card was eventually frozen-forced him to drive Smith to locations where Smith could
steal merchandise and then sell it. Eventually, Chadwick claims to have seen his
opportunity to escape and did, promptly calling police.
Smith and Donini were found and arrested. Smith agreed to speak with Moses
Lake police officers and his statement to police was recorded. A search warrant was
obtained for his motel room, resulting in discovery of a CD (compact disc) with white
residue on its surface that tested positive for methamphetamine.
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No. 29832·9-111
State v. Smith
Donini agreed to testify for the State at trial, where she supported Chadwick's
version of his imprisonment. Smith's defense at trial was that Chadwick had been a
willing participant in the 12-hour crime spree and called police only when he became
concerned about being charged.
At trial, the court-prepared jury instructions differed in several respects from the
Washington pattern jury instructions. The court's introduction to instructions given at the
conclusion of trial omitted some of the cautions and directions included in 11
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 1.02
(3d ed. 2008) (WPIC) (Conclusion of Trial-Introductory Instruction).
The elements instructions were generally based on WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the
Crime) but had been modified with respect to directions given the jury depending on how
it weighed the evidence. After stating the elements of it given crime, WPIC 4.21
provides:
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a
verdict of gUilty.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt ... , then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not
guilty.
(Emphasis added.)
The court's elements instructions to the jury generally read, instead:
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No. 29832-9-111
State v. Smith
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been
proved beyond a reasonable dOllbt, then you should return a verdict of
guilty ....
On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt ... , then you should return a verdict of not gUilty.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 60 (Instruction 12, second degree assault); 62 (Instruction 14,
possession of a controlled substance); 66 (Instruction 18, second degree theft); 71
(Instruction 23, unlawful imprisonment); 74 (Instruction 26, misdemeanor harassment);
52-53 (Instruction 5, robbery1). Smith did not object to any of these instructions.
The jury began its deliberations late in the afternoon. At around 11 a.m. the next
morning, the jury asked to watch Smith's recorded statement again. The trial judge
initially declined the request. After further deliberations, the jury sent out the following
statement:
We have come to a stand-still and don't believe we can get any
closer to a unanimous decision without seeing the parts of the interview
video between Officer Loyd and Darrell Smith that we viewed during triaL
CP at 80. The judge then allowed the video to be replayed for the jury in open court,
over Smith's objection. In replaying the video, portions that had not earlier been
admitted into evidence were inadvertently presented. The jury thereafter reached its
verdict.
I Instruction 5, dealing with robbery, was worded slightly different but still
directed the jury that "if, after weighing the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt ... ,
then you should return a verdict of not guilty."
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
Smith was convicted of first degree robbery, unlawful imprisonment, second
degree assault, possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor harassment, and second
degree theft. A motion for a new trial on the burglary charge was granted but the court
denied a motion for a new trial based on the inadvertent airing of video footage that had
not been admitted in evidence, the court finding no prejudice.
Smith was sentenced to 17 years in prison. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
I
The trial court's introductory instruction to the jury at the conclusion of the
evidence did not include 12 cautions or directions usually included; among those omitted
were that the jurors accept the law "regardless of what [they] personally believe the law
is," and "apply the law from [the court's] instructions to the facts that [they] decide have
been proved, and in this way decide the case." WPIC 1.02, compare with CP at 47-49.
More significantly, the elements instructions directed the jurors that "if, after weighing all
the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt ... , then you should return a verdict of not
guilty." Smith argues that modifications to the pattern instructions created a "free for
all," including leaving the jury with no constitutional guidance.
Generally, a party who fails to object to jury instructions in the trial court waives a
claim of error on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274,282,236 P.3d
858 (2010). Our general refusal to entertain issues that were not raised in the trial court
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
has a specific applicability to most jury instructions in criminal cases in light of
erR 6.15(c), requiring that timely and well stated objections be made to instructions
given or refused'" in order that the trial court may have the opportunity to correct any
error. '" State v. Scott, 11 0 Wash. 2d 682, 685-86, 757 P.2d 492 (1988) (quoting City of
Seattle v. Rainwater, 86 Wash. 2d 567, 571, 546 P.2d 450 (1976». Manifest errors
affecting a constitutional right may be ra~sed for the first time on appeal, however. Id. at
685.
Smith argues that the trial court's instructions relieved the State ofits burden of
proving all of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating due
process and constituting manifest constitutional error. We agree that his challenge to the
elements instructions presents an issue of manifest error affecting a constitutional right.
See State v. Dow, 162 Wash. App. 324, 330,253 P.3d 476 (2011) (citing State v. O'Hara,
167 Wash. 2d 91, 100-01,217 P.3d 756 (2009»; State v. Mills, 154 Wn.2d 1,6, 109 P.3d
415 (2005) (observing that the elements instruction "carries with it a special weight
because the jury treats the instruction as a 'yardstick' by which to measure a defendant's
guilt or innocence").
With respect to the claimed omissions from the trial court's introduction to its
concluding instructions, though, we disagree. The requirements of due process usually
are met when the jury is informed of all the elements of an offense and instructed that
unless each element is established beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant must be
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No. 29832-9-111
State v. Smith
acquitted. Scott, 110 Wash. 2d at 690. The directions and cautions included in WP1C 1.02
can prove important on appeal if a defendant contends that jurors reached their verdict for
an improper reason; in such cases, appellate courts regularly rely on a trial court's
introductory instructions and the presumption that juries follow those instructions. See,
e.g., Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457,474,285 P.3d 873 (2012). Smith has not
demonstrated that the trial court's omissions of some of the cautions and directions
included in WP1C 1.02 amounted to constitutional error, however, let alone manifest
constitutional error.
We therefore review only the elements instructions. Review is de novo, in the
context of the instructions as a whole. Gregoire v. City o/Oak Harbor, 170 Wash. 2d 628,
635,244 P.3d 924 (2010).
The specific language of the instructions is left to the discretion of the trial court.
State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 787, 684 P.2d 668 (1984). The instructions as a whole
must, however, correctly state the law. Boeing Co. v. Key, 10 1 Wash. App. 629, 633, 5
P.3d 16 (2000). While pattern jury instructions are intended to be accurate, concise,
unbiased statements of the law, they are not the law and are not mandatory. In re Pers.
Restraint o/Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356,369, 119 P.3d 816 (2005).
"What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by
the Due Process Clause." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993) (emphasis added). The prosecution bears the burden of proving all
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
elements of the offense charged and must persuade the fact finder beyond a reasonable
doubt of the facts necessary to establish each ofthose elements. Id. at 277 -78 (citing,
e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970». The
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement applies in state as well as federal proceedings.
Id. at 278.
A corollary of the due process requirement that a jury find proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to return a verdict of guilty is that it must return a verdict of not
guilty if the State does not carry its burden. Jury instructions must convey this. It is
reversible error to instruct the jury in a manner relieving the State of its burden. State v.
Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303,307, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007).
Smith argues that the substitution of the word "should" reduced the State's burden
by connoting what is proper rather than what is required. By directing the jury that it
"should" return a verdict of not guilty if the State failed to meet its burden of proof,
Smith argues that the jury was left with the impression that it ought to acquit if possessed
of reasonable doubt but that it was not mandatory. No Washington decisions address the
substitution of "should" for "duty" in an elements instruction, but Smith cites the
observation of a Massachusetts appellate court that the "use ofthe permissive 'should'
rather than the mandatory 'must'" is a serious misstep that "goes to the heart of the
[matter]: where reasonable doubt remains, acquittal is mandatory." Commonwealth v.
Caramanica, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 376, 729 N.E.2d 656,659 (2000). Even so, the
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No. 29832-9-II1
State v. Smith
Massachusetts court held that "[wJere this the only flaw ... , reversal might not be
required." Id.
Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004) supports Smith's position more
strongly. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court's grant of habeas relief
based, among other claimed error, on the court's instruction 10, which explained that
before the jury could convict, it '" should require the Prosecution to prove every material
allegation contained in the Information beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 821 n.5
(emphasis added). While the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas
relief, it explained that any error in instruction 10 was immediately cured by a following
statement that if" 'you entertain a reasonable doubt of the truth of anyone of these
material allegations, then it is your duty to give the Defendant the benefit of such doubt
and acquit him,'" and by summing up with the unequivocal statement: "'There must be
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 822. In a footnote, the court explained why
use of the term "should" may have misstated the jury's obligation, which was
by no means clear, as common definitions of "should," "shall" and "must"
include both an obligatory and an exhortatory connotation. See, e.g.,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged 1986).
Id. at 822 n.6; see also Caudill v. Judicial Ethics Comm., 986 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Ky.
1998) (concluding, in a different context, that "[s]hould, while definitely strongly
encouraging a particular course of action, is permissive. Shall requires a particular
course of action and accordingly, is mandatory"); Louisiana Seafood Mgmt. Council v.
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No. 29832-9-II1
State v. Smith
Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries CommJn, 97-1367 (La. 5/19/98); 715 So. 2d 387,394
("The modern rule rejects [the] 'arcane' meaning [of 'should' as 'was obliged to'] and
instead defines 'should' as 'the weaker companion to the obligatory "ought."'" (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1065 (1979); State v. Thomas, 528 So. 2d
1274, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1988»). Louisiana Seafood also relies on Bryan
Garnees A Dictionary ofModern Legal Usage, the most recent edition of which includes
the following entry addressing "ought" and "should":
Ought should be reserved for expressions of necessity, duty, or obligation;
should, the slightly weaker word, expresses mere appropriateness,
suitability, or fittingness.
DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 644 (3d ed. 2011); but cf Torrence v. State, 574 So. 2d
1188, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the use of "should" in instructing a jury
whether to acquit).
We suspect that in this case the jury more likely than not understood the court's
use of "should" in the elements instruction as mandatory. But we cannot be sure that it
did. One of our panel queried the lawyers during oral argument with "you should eat
your vegetables but you don't have to eat your vegetables," and "you should get more
exercise doesn't mean you shall get more exercise." Even the State did not disagree.
Erroneously instructing the jury that it may acquit if in reasonable doubt is
structural error. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149, 126 S. Ct. 2557,
165 L. Ed. 2d 409 (2006) (denial of the right to trial by jury by giving of a defective
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
reasonable doubt instruction is structural error, citing Sullivan). Structural error is not
subject to hannless error analysis; prejudice is necessarily presumed. State v. Strode, 167
Wash. 2d 222, 231,217 P.3d 310 (2009). '''[T]he difficulty of assessing the effect of the
error'" is one criterion for identifying harmless error. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 14 n.7,
288 P.3d 1113 (2012) (quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 nA). It is illustrated
here. At one point, this jury was deadlocked. We do not know why and we do not know
how the deadlock was resolved. Perhaps jurors concluded from the court's instructions
that while jurors with lingering doubts should return a verdict of not guilty, they did not
have to.
"The jury instructions, read as a whole, 'must make the relevant legal standard
manifestly apparent to the averagejuror.'" State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856,864,215 P.3d
177 (2009) (quoting State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469,473,932 P.2d 1237 (1997)). The
elements instructions did not do so here.
We reverse Smith's convictions and remand for a new trial.
The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed
for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions. RCW
2.06.040.
II
All but one of Smith's remaining assignments of error are to trial events that are
unlikely to recur. He does make one sufficiency of error challenge that requires review.
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No. 29832-9-II1
State v. Smith
He argues that possession of methamphetamine residue in only trace amounts is
insufficient to support a possession conviction. He urges us to construe Washington's
Unifonn Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW, to require possession of some
minimum amount of a controlled substance, beyond residue or a trace amount, to support
conviction.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Jacobs, 154
Wash. 2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain
the legislature's intent. ld. When a statute's meaning is plain on its face, we must give
effect to that meaning as expressing the legislature's intent. ld. The statute's plain
meaning is determined from the ordinary meaning of its language, the statute's general
context related provisions, and its statutory scheme as a whole. ld. When a statute is
unambiguous, words or clauses that the legislature has chosen not to include may not be
added. State v. J.P., 149 Wash. 2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003).
The act provides:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or her professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
RCW 69.50.4013(1). "Controlled substance" is defined to mean "a drug, substance, or
immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
laws, or federal or board rules." RCW 69.50.l0l(d). Nowhere does the act identify a
minimum quantity required to support conviction.
The plain language of the act, then, does not support the requirement that an
offender possess any minimum amount of a controlled substance. See State v. Alexander,
125 Wn.2d 717,726,888 P.2d 1169 (1995) (concluding that the legislature did not
establish a minimum amount for which a defendant could be prosecuted in determining
whether an "extraordinarily small amount" could be the basis of an exceptional reduced
sentence). Smith nonetheless urges us to recognize a quantity requirement as a common
law element of the offense, lest Washington be the only state in the union that
criminalizes possession of a trace amount of a controlled substance without at the same
time requiring knowledge as an element of the crime. Our Supreme Court has already
held that knowledge is not an element of the crime of possession. State v. Bradshaw, 152
Wn.2d 528,530-40,98 P.3d 1190 (2004).
As Smith acknowledges, Division One of our court rejected the construction of the
act that he asks us to adopt in State v. Malone, 72 Wash. App. 429, 438, 864 P.2d 990
(1994). And this division held in State v. Rowell, 138 Wash. App. 780, 785, 158 P.3d 1248
(2007) that an offender's lack of knowledge that she or he possesses a controlled
substance is properly considered in connection with the affirmative defense of unwitting
possession. While Smith suggests that neither Malone nor Rowell engaged in a full
analysis, we are satisfied that they do. The act does not require that a minimum amount
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No. 29832-9-III
State v. Smith
be possessed in order to sustain a conviction. Malone, 72 Wash. App. at 439. As to
knowledge or lack thereof,
once the State proves the elements of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, the burden then falls on the defendant to prove the affinnative
defense of unwitting possession. Bradshaw, 152 Wash. 2d at 538; State v.
Staley, 123 Wash. 2d 794, 799, 872 P.2d 502 (1994). The affinnative defense
of unwitting possession "does not improperly shift the burden of proof."
Bradshaw, 152 Wash. 2d at 538. Instead, it is a "'judicially created
affinnative defense that may excuse the defendant's behavior,
notwithstanding the defendant's violation of the letter of the statute.'"
State v. Buford, 93 Wash. App. 149, 151-52,967 P.2d 548 (1998) (quoting
State v. Balzer, 91 Wn. App. 44,67,954 P.2d 931 (1998)); Staley, 123
Wash. 2d at 799.
Rowell, l38 Wn. App. at 785-86. Possession of an "extraordinarily small amount" is also
a substantial and compelling reason for downward departure from the standard sentence
range. Alexander, 125 Wash. 2d at 727.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
In his pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG), Mr. Smith raises three issues,
two of which relate to the airing of the video. Given our remand for a new trial, there is
no need to address that event.
The third issue is his claim that the trial court erred in failing to make written
findings supporting its decision to admit the statements made by Mr. Smith to Officer
Loyd.
When a defendant's statement is to be offered in evidence, the court is required to
set a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the statement is admissible.
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No. 29832~9-III
State v. Smith
CrR 3.5(a). Although a CrR 3.5 hearing is mandatory, under proper circumstances a
defendant can waive a voluntariness hearing and the formal entry of written findings.
State v. Nogueira, 32 Wash. App. 954, 957, 650 P~2d 1145 (1982).
Here, Mr. Smith and the State signed a "Stipulation for the Admission of
Defendant's Statements Pursuant to CrR 3.5." SAG app. C. The stipulation provides
"that all statements made by the defendant to investigating officers during the pendency
of the investigation with regards to this case were made with the defendant's knowledge
of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda[2] and with the defendant waiving his/her
rights; and that the statements were freely and voluntarily given." ld.
The written findings required by CrR 3.5(c) are of the evidence presented and
conclusions reached at a CrR 3.5 hearing. Where the hearing is waived there is no record
to be made. The trial court did not err.
We reverse Smith's convictions and remand for a new trial.
WE CONCUR:
.
Brown, J.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
15