State Of Washington v. Jonathan D. Harris

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
July 24, 2018
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 49641-1-II
Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN DANIEL HARRIS,
Consolidated with
Appellant.
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint No. 50000-1-II
Petition of
JONATHAN DANIEL HARRIS, PART PUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
WORSWICK, J. — Jonathan Harris pleaded guilty to second degree murder, second degree
assault, and third degree assault. Harris stipulated that sufficient facts supported the plea to
second degree murder; however, he pleaded guilty to second degree assault and third degree
assault in accordance with In re Personal Restraint of Barr.1 As part of his plea agreement,
Harris signed a written waiver of his appeal rights.
In this consolidated appeal and personal restraint petition (PRP), Harris argues that his
guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent, that the superior court’s calculation of his offender
score violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, and that newly discovered evidence
1
102 Wash. 2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984).
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undermines the factual basis for his plea. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that
Harris’s plea was voluntary and intelligent and that he waived his right to appeal his sentence. In
the unpublished portion of this opinion we hold that Harris fails to meet the standard for newly
discovered evidence to merit withdrawal of his plea. Thus, we affirm Harris’s convictions and
sentence, and we deny his PRP.
FACTS
I. CHARGES
In June 2015, the State charged Harris with second degree felony murder of Nicole
White, predicated on second degree assault. The State’s probable cause declaration detailed that
earlier on the day White died, she and Harris had left a bar together, and that Harris’s neighbor
had seen a woman matching White’s description at Harris’s home and had also heard a female
screaming. The declaration stated that police found White’s body wrapped in a canvas tarp
down the side of an embankment. White had suffered multiple broken bones in her skull. The
declaration also stated that photographic and cell phone location evidence showed that on the day
of White’s death, Harris had driven his vehicle near the same embankment where police found
White’s body. The declaration further stated that police found a sweatshirt in Harris’s home with
White’s blood on it.
On November 4, the State filed an amended information charging Harris with first degree
premeditated murder, asserting that Harris “did unlawfully and feloniously, with premeditated
intent to cause the death of another person” cause White’s death. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5. The
superior court arraigned Harris on the new charge. The State’s supplemental probable cause
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declaration stated that in addition to multiple broken skull bones, White’s sternum had sustained
injuries consistent with being stomped on.
II. GUILTY PLEA
A. Plea Agreement
On July 27, 2016 the State filed a second amended information charging Harris with
second degree felony murder, second degree assault, and third degree assault of White.2 That
same day, Harris signed a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to the amended charges.
Harris’s statement on plea of guilty said, “[I]n the early morning hours of June 7, 2015, at my
residence in Pierce County, Washington State, with intent to cause her death, I severely beat
Nicole White, a human being, and thereby caused her death.” Clerk’ Papers (CP) at 27. Instead
of stating a factual basis for the assault charges, Harris acknowledged that under Barr, he was
pleading guilty to the assaults, which were crimes he did not commit and for which there is no
factual basis, “in order to take advantage of the plea agreement reached with the State.” CP at
14.
In an addendum to his guilty plea, Harris stated:
I understand that the prosecution would be unable to prove the amended charges
in Counts II and III at trial, but I see pleading guilty to the amended charges as
being beneficial to me because it will allow me to avoid the risk of conviction on
the greater charges I would face at trial. Based upon a review of the alternatives
before me, I have decided to plead guilty to crimes I did not commit in order to
take advantage of the State’s pretrial offer.
2
We assume Harris was arraigned on the original and the amended informations, but the record
on appeal contains neither the verbatim report of proceedings nor orders establishing conditions
of release establishing these facts.
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Suppl. CP at 547. Harris also stipulated to the facts and statements from the State’s probable
cause declaration. Harris further stated in his addendum that his counsel had discussed “all of
the elements of the original charge” with him and that he understood them all. Suppl. CP at 547.
Harris stipulated to his criminal history and further stipulated that his offender score
would be 7 points for the second degree murder conviction. He stipulated that the second degree
murder, second degree assault, and third degree assault each occurred on separate dates. In the
plea agreement, Harris also waived his right to an appeal for “any and all other appellate rights
[other than the right to appeal any sentence outside of his standard sentencing range] as part of
this plea agreement in accordance with State v. Lee.”3 CP at 14. Harris and his counsel both
signed acknowledgements that his counsel had consulted and reviewed the plea agreement with
Harris.
B. Plea Hearing
On July 28, at Harris’s plea hearing, the superior court engaged in a lengthy colloquy
with Harris. Although the superior court did not directly ask Harris about his appeal rights
waiver, the court inquired whether he had read his statement on the guilty plea, reviewed it with
his counsel, understood everything, and had all of his questions answered. Harris responded
affirmatively to all of the court’s questions in this regard. Harris affirmed that he had no
“confusion” or “questions” regarding the plea. 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 14. Harris’s
defense counsel also informed the court that he “went through the plea form with [Harris] in
3
132 Wash. 2d 498, 505, 939 P.3d 1223 (1997) (“[T]here is nothing per se wrong with the State
negotiating for a plea agreement which includes an agreement to waive the right to appeal a
criminal conviction.”).
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detail” and that Harris understood “his obligations under [the] plea agreement.” 1 RP at 7-8. At
the end of the colloquy, the superior court stated:
As to Counts 2 and 3 [the assaults], those are in the form of an In Re Barr plea and
because of that I have read the original declaration that supports the original
charges, the prosecutor’s statement. I believe that does support the charges—more
serious charges frankly, and I’m incorporating that declaration into this statement
of defendant on plea of guilty.
1 RP at 20-21. The superior court concluded that Harris’s plea was made freely, voluntarily,
intelligently, and with an understanding of the consequences.
III. SENTENCING
Harris was sentenced on October 31.4 Harris objected to an offender score of 7 for the
second degree murder conviction. In response, the State asserted that Harris should be held to
his bargain and stipulations in the plea agreement. Notwithstanding Harris’s objection, the
superior court calculated Harris’s standard range sentence for second degree murder based upon
an offender score of 7. The court then sentenced Harris to a standard range sentence of 316
months in prison.
Harris appealed his judgment and sentence. Harris also filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief
from judgment. The superior court transferred Harris’s CrR 7.8 motion to this court to consider
as a PRP. We consolidated Harris’s direct appeal and his PRP.
4
In August, Harris unsuccessfully moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea. In September, he
obtained new counsel.
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ANALYSIS
DIRECT APPEAL
I. VALIDITY OF PLEA
Relying on Barr and CrR 4.2, Harris contends that his guilty plea is invalid because he
was unaware that the nature of the original charge was premeditated murder and not second
degree murder. The State’s only response to this issue is that Harris invited this error, or
alternatively, waived this argument in his plea agreement.5 We hold that Harris did not waive his
right to challenge the validity of his plea and that Harris’s plea was valid because it was
intelligent and voluntary.
A. Legal Principles
1. In re Personal Restraint of Barr
We review whether a defendant’s guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary de novo
because it is a constitutional issue. State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wash. 2d 528, 531, 98 P.3d 1190
(2004). We also review de novo issues concerning the interpretation of a plea agreement. State
v. Bisson, 156 Wash. 2d 507, 517, 130 P.3d 820 (2006).
Due process requires a defendant to intelligently and voluntarily enter into a guilty plea.
In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wash. 2d 588, 594, 316 P.3d 1007 (2014). Under Barr, a
defendant may plead guilty to technically infirm charges to avoid conviction for a greater
offense. See 102 Wash. 2d at 269-70. To comport with due process, such a plea must be based on
5
Harris did not respond to the State’s argument that his written waiver precludes his right to
appeal.
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an “informed review of all the alternatives before the accused.” Barr, 102 Wash. 2d at 270. The
accused must understand “the nature and consequences of the plea bargain” and have
“determined the course of action that he believes is in his best interest.” Barr, 102 Wash. 2d at 270.
Before accepting a plea under Barr, the plea court must find a factual basis to support the
original charge, and determine that the defendant understands the relationship of his conduct to
that charge. 102 Wash. 2d at 271. Moreover, the defendant must be aware that the State’s evidence
on the original offense is sufficient to convince a jury of his guilt. Barr, 102 Wash. 2d at 270.
2. Waiver
A defendant may expressly waive his right to appeal in a plea agreement. State v. Lee,
132 Wash. 2d 498, 505, 939 P.2d 1223 (1997). “Waiver of the right to appeal must be made
intelligently, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the consequences.” Lee, 132 Wash. 2d at
506. To show the defendant’s understanding, “the State must prove a defendant understood both
his right to appeal and the effect of a waiver.” State v. Neff, 163 Wash. 2d 453, 459, 181 P.3d 819
(2008). Signing a waiver statement and admitting to understanding it creates a strong, but not
conclusive, presumption that the waiver was voluntary. Neff, 163 Wash. 2d at 459.
B. Waiver of Right To Challenge Plea Agreement
The State appears to argue that because Harris’s plea agreement contains a waiver, Harris
has waived his right to appeal even the validity of his plea. We disagree.
Harris argues that his entire plea is invalid, including the waiver. If a plea agreement is
not intelligent and involuntary, then any waiver contained in the plea is similarly flawed. See
State v. Smith, 134 Wash. 2d 849, 853, 953 P.2d 810 (1998) (holding that when a plea containing a
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waiver of the right to appeal is valid, the waiver itself is also valid). Thus, we reject the State’s
argument that Harris waived his right to appeal the validity of his plea agreement. Harris cannot
be bound by a waiver that was not made intelligently, voluntarily, and with an understanding of
the consequences. Stockwell, 179 Wash. 2d at 594. Thus, we examine whether Harris’s plea was
intelligent and voluntary.
C. Valid Plea
Harris argues that his plea was invalid because the superior court failed to determine
whether Harris (1) understood what the original charge was, (2) was aware of the relationship
between his conduct and the greater charge of premeditated first degree murder, (3) was aware of
the evidence available to the State to convince a jury of his guilt, and (4) understood the nature
and consequences of the plea bargain and whether he believed that the plea was in his best
interest. We disagree.
1. “Original” Charge
Harris first appears to argue that it is unclear from the record that he understood that
premeditated first degree murder was the greater “original” charge. Br. of App. at 10. Harris
asserts that the record does not show which charge, the premeditated first degree murder charge
or second degree murder charge, the court was referring to during the plea hearing when the
court discussed the “more serious” and “original” charge. Br. of App. at 11. Harris’s argument
fails.
An amended information supersedes an earlier original information. State v. Oestreich,
83 Wash. App. 648, 651, 922 P.2d 1369 (1996). An amended information that is complete on its
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face and is entitled “Amended Information,” shows that it was intended to change the offense
charged. State v. Kinard, 21 Wash. App. 587, 589, 585 P.2d 836, 838 (1978).
Here, well before the plea hearing, the State filed the amended information charging
Harris with premeditated first degree murder, superseding the first information that charged
Harris with second degree murder. The State filed the information in open court and the
amended information changed the offense charge. Harris therefore must be deemed aware that
he had been charged with premeditated first degree murder at the time of his plea.
Moreover, Harris stated that he was pleading guilty to second degree murder and two
assault charges to “avoid the risk of conviction on the greater charges [he] would face at trial.”
Suppl. CP at 547. Harris stated that he saw pleading guilty to the charges as being beneficial to
him. The original information charged Harris only with second degree felony murder. Harris
pleaded guilty to second degree murder plus two additional assault charges. Harris’s plea
statements show that he understood he was facing a charge greater than second degree murder.
There would be no “benefit” to pleading guilty to second degree murder and two assaults unless
Harris was fully aware that premeditated first degree murder was the greater charge he was
avoiding.
Because an amended information supersedes the original information, because the State
provided Harris with the new information in open court, and because Harris stated that he was
incurring a benefit by pleading, the record shows that Harris knew that the “greater charge” was
premeditated first degree murder. Harris’s argument fails.
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2. Relationship of Harris’s Conduct to Charge
Harris next argues that the record does not show that he understood the relationship of his
conduct to the charge of premeditated first degree murder. We disagree.
Harris admitted to severely beating White with the intent to kill her. Harris also
stipulated to the facts and statements from the State’s probable cause declaration which detailed
the medical examiner’s findings of multiple broken bones in White’s skull and a fracture in the
her sternum consistent with having been stomped. The declaration also detailed that a sweatshirt
with White’s blood on it was found in Harris’s home and that photographic and cell phone
evidence placed Harris at the location where police found White’s body. Harris also affirmed
that he understood the plea and the greater charge, which in this case was premeditated first
degree murder.
Harris’s addendum to the guilty plea clearly shows that he considered the State’s
evidence and also considered how his conduct of beating and killing White related to the greater
charge of premeditated first degree murder. Accordingly, Harris’s argument that he did not
understand how his conduct related to the charge of premeditated first degree murder fails.
3. Evidence Available to the State
Harris also argues that he was not aware of the evidence available to the State on the
original offense. We disagree.
As discussed above, Harris stipulated to the facts of the probable cause declaration that
detailed the State had photographic and cell phone evidence that placed Harris near the location
where White’s body was found. The declaration also described that the sweatshirt Harris wore
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the night of White’s death had White’s blood on it, and the declaration referenced the medical
report that showed that White’s injuries were consistent with having been stomped on.
Moreover, Harris affirmed that he understood the plea and that he went over it with his
counsel. Harris was aware of the evidence available to the State, and his argument fails.
4. Nature and Consequences of the Plea
Harris also argues that he did not understand the nature and consequences of the plea
bargain. We disagree.
The State’s first amended information detailed all the elements of premeditated first
degree murder. In his addendum to his statement on defendant’s plea of guilty, Harris stated that
his attorney discussed “all of the elements of the original charge” and that he understood “them
all.” Suppl. CP at 547. At the plea hearing, the court asked Harris if he had gone through the
plea on guilty and if he understood everything, to which Harris affirmed that he did. Harris also
affirmed that he had no “confusion” regarding the plea. 1RP at 14. Further, Harris’s defense
counsel also informed the court that he went through the plea form with Harris in detail and that
he thought Harris understood his obligations under the plea agreement. Harris also stated that he
saw that pleading guilty to second degree murder and the two assault charges that did not have a
factual basis as being “beneficial” to him because it would allow him to avoid the risk of
conviction on the greater charge he would face at trial.
The record shows that Harris confirmed that he understood the plea, and that he had
weighed the alternatives of either going to trial on the charge of premeditated first degree murder
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or pleading to a lesser murder charge and two assault charges for which there was no factual
basis. It is, therefore, apparent that Harris understood the nature and consequences of his plea.
We conclude that the record shows that Harris understood that he was pleading guilty to
charges for which there was no factual basis and understood the nature of the greater charge of
premeditated first degree murder and the consequences of his plea. Harris also understood how
his conduct related to the original charge of premeditated first degree murder and the evidence
the State had available to it. Accordingly, Harris presents no convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Harris’s argument that his
plea was invalid fails.
II. OFFENDER SCORE ARGUMENT WAIVED
Harris also appeals his sentence, arguing that inclusion of the two assault convictions in
his offender score violated double jeopardy principles, and accordingly the Sentence Reform Act
on 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, because it imposed two assault convictions for one act of murder.
Because Harris’s written waiver was valid, he waived the right to appeal his sentence.
Harris’s plea agreement included a waiver statement:
The defendant understands that he has a right to appeal his convictions. The
defendant understands that since he has entered pleas of guilty to the charges in the
second amended Information, he has waived his right to raise certain issues, as
discussed in his Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty, in an appeal. The
defendant understands that he has a right to appeal any sentence that is outside of
his standard sentencing range. The defendant hereby waives any and all other
appellate rights pertaining to this conviction and sentence as part of this plea
agreement in accordance with State v. Lee, [132 Wn.2d at 505-06].
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CP at 14 (emphasis added). Harris and his counsel signed acknowledgements that stated that
counsel reviewed the entire plea agreement with Harris and that Harris had made an informed
and voluntary choice to enter into the agreement. As discussed above, Harris’s express waiver of
his right to appeal was intelligent, voluntary, and made with an understanding of its
consequences. Neither Harris nor his counsel expressed a misunderstanding of the scope of the
waiver. And the waiver clearly sets forth its terms: Harris waived his right to appeal any
sentence except a sentence outside his standard sentencing range. Finally, Harris told the
superior court that he understood all of his plea agreement after carefully reviewing it with his
attorneys.
Moreover, Harris does not address his signed waiver. He makes no argument that under
the law or the facts of this case, he should not be bound by his express waiver. Because the right
to appeal may be waived, Harris signed a valid waiver and Harris makes no attempt to explain
why we should not adhere to the waiver, we do not review his arguments.6
We affirm Harris’s convictions and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion
will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for
public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
6
Harris relies upon In re the Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wash. 2d 861, 868, 50 P.3d 618
(2002) to support his argument that he could not agree to a sentence based on a miscalculated
offender score. But Goodwin is distinguishable because in that case, the defendant did not
affirmatively waive his right to appeal like Harris did. 146 Wash. 2d at 865.
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PRP
I. FACTS
In support of his PRP, Harris provides allegedly newly discovered evidence that the
victim’s injuries occurred after her death. This evidence includes an unsigned declaration from
Harris’s attorney recounting Harris’s version of events—that he punched the victim once,
attempted to perform CPR, then panicked and threw her body off a hillside, onto large rocks.
The attorney’s declaration also summarizes a defense interview of the medical examiner
who examined the victim’s body. The examiner purportedly informed Harris’s defense team that
the victim’s body had blunt force trauma injuries caused by an unknown instrumentality. The
examiner stated that efforts at resuscitation or to dispose of the body could have caused the
trauma. Finally, the examiner “was not willing to opine that the traumas to [the victim] were due
to stomping.” PRP at 25.
II. DISCUSSION
In his PRP, Harris asserts that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because
newly discovered evidence shows that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis.7 We deny Harris’s
PRP because he fails to show that he could not have discovered the evidence before his guilty
plea through the exercise of due diligence.8
7
Harris also appears to challenge the constitutionality of Barr pleas in his PRP reply. But we do
not review issues first raised and argued in a reply brief. In re Pers. Restraint of Rhem, 188
Wash. 2d 321, 327, 394 P.3d 367 (2017).
8
The State does not argue that Harris waived his ability to collaterally attack his conviction and
sentence by way of PRP. Accordingly, we address Harris’s PRP arguments.
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A. Legal Principles: PRPs and Guilty Pleas
We may deny, grant, or transfer a PRP to superior court for a full determination on the
merits or a reference hearing. In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872
(2013). We grant relief in a PRP if the petitioner can establish either a constitutional error that
caused actual and substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that is “a fundamental defect
resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wash. 2d at 18.
And we transfer for a reference hearing if the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of actual
prejudice, but we cannot determine the merits of his contentions solely on the record. Yates, 177
Wash. 2d at 18.
“To obtain relief in a personal restraint petition, based on newly discovered evidence,”
the petitioner “must satisfy the traditional five-factor test for obtaining a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.” In re Pers. Restraint of Reise, 146 Wash. App. 772, 781, 192 P.3d
949 (2008). The petitioner must establish that the evidence
(1) will probably change the result of the trial; (2) was discovered since the trial;
(3) could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4)
is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.
Reise, 146 Wash. App. at 781 (quoting State v. Williams, 96 Wash. 2d 215, 223, 634 P.2d 868
(1981)). Where the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the third factor requires
the petitioner to show that he could not have discovered the evidence before his guilty plea.
Reise, 146 Wash. App. at 781.
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B. Not Newly Discovered Evidence
In order to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of newly discovered evidence, Harris
must show that the evidence he relies upon was discovered since his guilty plea and could not
have been discovered before the plea by the exercise of due diligence. See Reise, 146 Wash. App.
at 781. But Harris makes no argument that the evidence he relies upon could not have been
discovered before his guilty plea through the exercise of due diligence. Indeed, Harris’s PRP
relies upon either his own version of events or his counsel’s recollection of a defense interview
with the medical examiner approximately three months after Harris’s guilty plea. Harris’s own
version of events was clearly known to him when he pleaded guilty. And there is no reason
apparent from the record or argued by Harris that his counsel could not have earlier interviewed
the medical examiner.
Harris fails to show that through the exercise of due diligence he could not have
discovered the evidence upon which he relies before he pleaded guilty. See Reise, 146 Wash. App.
at 781. Because he cannot satisfy the test for newly discovered evidence, we deny Harris’s PRP.
In summary, we affirm Harris’s convictions and sentence, and we deny his PRP.
Worswick, P.J.
We concur:
Bjorgen, J.
Sutton, J.
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