State Of Washington v. Douglas Joseph Moors

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS OW I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
20180CT 15 AM 8:56
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 76937-5-1
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DOUGLAS JOSEPH MOORS,
Appellant. FILED: October 15, 2018
APPELWICK, C.J. — Moors appeals the imposition of a $200 criminal filing
fee following his conviction for possession of heroin with intent to manufacture or
deliver. He argues that criminal filing fees imposed under former RCW
36.18.020(2)(h)(2015) are discretionary and require an individualized inquiry into
a defendant's ability to pay. Alternatively, Moors argues that the criminal filing fee
violates his right to equal protection. Moors is entitled to benefit from House Bill
1783's amendment to the criminal filing fee statute.1 We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On November 9, 2016, the State charged Douglas Moors with one count of
possession of a controlled substance (heroin) with intent to manufacture or deliver.
Moors pleaded guilty to the charge on March 22, 2017. In the plea agreement,
Moors agreed with the State's sentencing recommendation of 60 months, except
for the State's recommendation for legal financial obligations (LF0s).
ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1783, § 17(2)(h), 65th Leg., Reg.
Sess.(Wash. 2018)(House Bill 1783).
No 76937-5-1/2
The trial court imposed an 85 month sentence for the possession crime.
Th trial court also imposed LF05, including a $200 criminal filing fee pursuant to
for er RCW 36.18.020(2)(h). At the sentencing hearing, Moors did not object to
th court's imposition of the criminal filing fee. Moors appealed.
After he appealed, the Washington Legislature enacted House Bill 1783,
which amends the criminal filing fee statute. See LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, §
17 2)(h). The amendment prohibits courts from imposing the $200 filing fee on
in igent defendants. Id. The amended statute is effective as of June 7,2018. See
LA NS OF 2018, at ii (see (5)(a) setting out the effective date).
DISCUSSION
Moors contends that the trial court erred in failing to inquire into his ability
to pay the $200 criminal filing fee, imposed under former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h),
because the filing fee is a discretionary legal financial obligation (LFO).
Alternatively, he contends that the fee's imposition violates his right to equal
protection, because civil litigants are permitted a waiver of filing fees based on
incigency under GR 34.
Moors failed to raise these objections to the trial court. Thus, he has waived
th issues absent manifest constitutional error. RAP 2.5(a)(3). An error raised for
the first time on appeal must be manifest and truly of constitutional dimension.
Stte v. Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125(2007). The defendant must
show how the alleged error actually affected his rights at trial. Id. at 926-27. "If
the facts necessary to adjudicate the claimed error are not in the record on appeal,
no actual prejudice is shown and the error is not manifest." State v. McFarland,
2
No. 76937-5-1/3
127 Wash. 2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). However, we need not address this
threshold question, because Moors is entitled to benefit from House Bill 1783's
amendment to the criminal filing fee statute. State v. Ramirez, No. 95249-3, slip
op. at 22 (Wash. Sept. 20, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/
952493.pdf.
Under the former criminal filing fee statute, upon conviction or a guilty plea,
"an adult defendant in a criminal case shall be liable for a fee of two hundred
dollars." Former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h). But, the current statute prohibits a court
from imposing this fee "on a defendant who is indigent as defined in RCW
10.101.010(3)(a)through (c)." RCW 36.18.020(2)(h).
In Ramirez, the State Supreme Court held that House Bill 1783 applied on
appeal to invalidate a $200 criminal filing fee imposed on an indigent defendant.
No. 95249-3, slip. op. at 23. On March 7, 2018, the court granted Ramirez's
petition for review on the issue of discretionary LF0s.2 Id. at 6. House Bill 1783
was enacted on March 27, 2018. Id. The court reasoned that, because House Bill
1783's amendments pertain to costs imposed upon conviction and Ramirez's case
was not yet final when the amendments were enacted, he was entitled to benefit
from the statutory change. Id. at 22. Ramirez satisfied the indigency requirements
of RCW 10.101.010(3)(c) at the time of sentencing, so the court held that the trial
court impermissibly imposed the criminal filing fee on him. Id. at 20, 22.3
2 In addition to discretionary LF0s, the trial court had imposed a $200
criminal filing fee on Ramirez. Id. at 3.
3 The court also held that based on House Bill 1783's amendments,the trial
court impermissibly imposed discretionary LFOs of $2,100 on Ramirez. Id. at 22.
3
No. 76937-5-1/4
Moors filed his notice of appeal on June 5, 2017. When House Bill 1783's
amendments were enacted on March 27, 2018, his case was not yet final. Moors
is therefore entitled to benefit from the statutory change. See Ramirez, No. 95249-
3, slip. op. at 22.
If Moors was indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) at the time of
sentencing,the trial court impermissibly imposed the criminal filing fee on him. See
RCW 36.18.020(2)(h); Ramirez, No. 95249-3, slip. op. at 22. Under those
subsections, a person is "indigent" if he or she receives certain types of public
assistance, is involuntarily committed to a public mental health facility, or receives
an annual income, after taxes, of 125 percent or less of the current federally
' established poverty level. RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c). In addition, RCW
10.101.010(3)(d), defines "indigent" as a person unable to pay the anticipated cost
of counsel for the matter before the court.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated,
I'll sentence Mr. Moors to 85 months, add 12 months of
community custody on top of that, $500 victim penalty assessment,
$100 DNA fee, $200 filing fee. All other fines, fees, costs, and
assessments will be waived. I'll make that based on a finding of
indigency.
(Emphasis added.) And, the amended judgment and sentence established that
the additional fine for the possession charge was "deferred due to indigency." But,
we cannot ascertain from the record if the trial court found Moors indigent based
on the definitions in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c). Because the record is unclear, we
do not know if Moors satisfied the indigency requirement in RCW 36.18.020(2)(h).
4
No. 76937-5-1/5
We reverse the imposition of the criminal filing fee and remand for the trial
court to determine whether Moors is indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c).
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V 7
WE CONCUR:
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