Dorothy Hughes v. Homer Hughes

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DOROTHY MARIE HUGHES, )
) No. 77104-3-1 4:=>
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Appellant, ) co /224".F.,1
) DIVISION ONE
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) UNPUBLISHED OPINION -0
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HOMER HAYWOOD HUGHES, )
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Respondent. ) FILED: October 15, 2018 41,9 C;)
)
CHUN, J. — Dorothy Hughes appeals the partial denial of her motion to
vacate the dissolution decree in this matter. Dorothyl claims the court violated
her procedural due process rights when it entered the decree in her absence,
contending she did not receive sufficient notice of the trial. As such, she asserts
the court entered a void judgment. Dorothy now asks this court to vacate the
decree and award her the entirety of her late husband's estate per their
communityproperty agreement. Because there was no violation of her due
process rights, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
During their marriage, Dorothy and Homer signed a community property
agreement in which they agreed all their property constituted community
property.
1 For convenience, this opinion refers to the parties by their first names. We mean no
disrespect.
No. 77104-3-1/2
On October 21, 2012, Homer contacted the Skagit County Sheriff,
claiming Dorothy and their two daughters had dug up and stole silver worth
approximately $3 million from his backyard. Dorothy and the children admitted
they took the silver and transported it to Lakewood, Washington, and Kentucky.
On November 9, 2012, Dorothy, with the assistance of counsel, filed a
petition for dissolution of her marriage to Homer.
The trial court issued a Temporary Order Regarding Silver on March 1,
2013. The order directed Dorothy to return the silver located in Kentucky to
Washington State. After Dorothy failed to comply, Homer filed a motion for
----
contempt. The court granted the motion for contempt on October 18, 2013,
setting a $50.00 fine for each day, beginning November 23, 2013, the silver
remained outside of Washington State. On December 6, 2013, the court found
Dorothy owed $700 in fines and $200 in attorney fees. The court further ordered
Dorothy to pay a $25 fine for each day the silver was not returned thereafter.
Dorothy never complied with the court's orders.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2013, Dorothy's attorney, David Lowell,
withdrew from the case and Dorothy began representing herself. Dorothy then
failed to respond adequately to discovery requests and did not reply to letters,
phone messages, and emails from Homer's counsel. In a subsequent letter to
the court, Dorothy indicated she was out of state and unaware of any phone
messages or court documents to which she did not respond.
In March 2014, Dorothy received notice setting the trial in her dissolution
case for May 14, 2014. The notice stated, "Notice of Non-Jury Trial Date" and
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No. 77104-3-1/3
contained the case name, date, location, and time. Dorothy received this notice
from the Clerk by certified mail and the court filed the return receipt with her
signature.
Homer's attorney then sent Dorothy a letter on April 15, 2014 ("April 15
Letter"). In pertinent part, the letter stated as follows:
As I mentioned to you in my previous letter dated December 19,
2013, parties in dissolution proceedings are required by local court
rule 94.04.2(c) to participate in mediation prior to tria1.2 Earlier you
stated you would make yourself available for mediation in March,
but you did not follow through on that assurance.
As you know, we have a trial scheduled in this matter for May 14th
and 15th, 2014. If you do not participate in mediation prior to trial
and you or your representative appear at trial, I will have no
2 The portion of the SCLR that Homer's attorney referred to as well as the other pertinent
portions of SCLR 94.04.2 are:
(c) MEDIATION IN CONTESTED CASES. Mediation shall apply to all cases filed
after January 1, 2004. Except as provided in Section (d) below, in all cases
specified in Section (a) having unresolved issues (except child support
issues), both parties shall in good faith engage in mediation with a court-
approved mediator in an effort to resolve the case. The parties may either
agree to a mediator from the court-approved list or the mediator will be
determined by use of a strike list. Either party may seek a court apportionment
of the cost of mediation. In cases where parenting issues exist, the mediation
shall not occur until both parties have completed the parenting seminar
described in SCLSPR 94.04.1. A certificate of completion signed by the
mediator shall be filed with the clerk of the court prior to trial.
(d) WHEN MEDIATION IS NOT REQUIRED. Mediation shall be required as
provided in Section (c) except in the following cases:
(1) For good cause shown upon motion and approval by the court;
(e) FAILURE TO COMPLY. A party's compliance with the provisions of this rule
may be enforced upon Motion and Order to Show Cause. Unless compliance
is waived by the court for good cause shown, the court may order appropriate
sanctions including costs, attorney's fees, and adoption of the complying
party's proposal.
(g) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION. Prior to a final dissolution hearing or the
trial date, mediation must be completed. Failure to complete mediation, prior
to the trial date, will result in the trial being stricken. A certification of
completion signed by the mediator shall be filed with the clerk.
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No. 77104-3-1/4
alternative, but to ask for attorney fees and an order compelling you
to participate in mediation.
On May 14, 2014, Dorothy failed to appear for trial. Prior to trial, Homer's
attorney specifically mentioned mediation, stating he had "sent[Dorothy] letters
about mediation, telling her about it, telling her we would like to do it. .. but she
was never willing to actually engage in the question of whether she would
actually mediate or talk about how to resolve the case." The court then held the
trial, in which Homer testified as to jurisdictional facts, and it dissolved the
marriage in accordance with Homer's proposed final orders. In the dissolution
decree, Homer received all the real property, including timberland, while Dorothy
kept her pension, stocks, and the silver she had stolen.
On May 23, 2014, after learning the court entered the dissolution decree,
Dorothy hired a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside the decree under CR
56(a) and CR 60(b)(4), claiming fraud and misrepresentation. In her motion,
Dorothy argued Homer misrepresented the values of their community property
and the April 15 Letter led her to believe divorce would not be granted at trial.
Dorothy also asserted no pretrial mediation occurred as required by
SCLR 94.04.2. On June 6, 2014, however, Dorothy withdrew the motion
claiming she "could not take the emotional strain."
Based on the outcome of the dissolution proceeding, on June 24, 2014,
Homer drafted a new will. The same day, Dorothy executed quitclaim deeds to
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No. 77104-3-1/5
transfer the title to the real property awarded to Homer in the dissolution. Shortly
thereafter, on June 30, 2014, Homer passed away.
Over a year later, on November 19, 2015, Dorothy hired new counsel and
moved for an order to show cause as to why the May 2014 dissolution decree
should not be vacated. Dorothy argued the decree should be vacated under
various provisions of CR 60(b). As in her first motion, Dorothy maintained Homer
misrepresented the values of their community property to the court and pointed
to her confusion about the trial date because of the April 15 Letter. She asserted
again no SCLR 94.04.2 mandated pretrial mediation occurred.
On June 15, 2016, the court granted the show cause motion. Homer's
estate sought discretionary review of the order in this court, but a commissioner
determined Homer's estate had appealed prematurely.
After this Court denied discretionary review, the trial court held the show
cause hearing on February 24, 2017. The court stated that, while the local rules
require mediation, Dorothy intentionally3 avoided the proceedings to evade both
a contempt finding and potential law enforcement action based on her failure to
return the silver. As to the misrepresented values of property, the court found the
timberland extremely undervalued in the original dissolution due to either fraud or
3 At the February 24 hearing, the court made statements about Dorothy purposefully
absenting herself but did not make a finding that her absence from trial was intentional. Later, at
a proceeding to enter the order on June 7, 2017, the court stated it "was [his] impression" that
Dorothy purposefully absented herself from trial but that"may not have been an accurate
[impression]." Nevertheless, the court did not change its original decision to only vacate the
dissolution decree with respect to the timber property.
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No. 77104-3-1/6
gross negligence. Accordingly, the court bifurcated the dissolution decree and
vacated only the portion relating to the distribution of the timber property.
Dorothy timely appealed the order partially vacating the dissolution
decree. On January 4, 2018, Homer's estate moved to dismiss the appeal,
arguing the order was interlocutory and not appealable. A commissioner of this
court denied Homer's estate's motion to dismiss because, under RAP 2.2(a)(10),
one may appeal an order partially vacating a dissolution decree, which qualifies
as an order granting or denying a motion to vacate a judgment.
II.
ANALYSIS
Dorothy claims, although she received notice of the trial date, it failed to
satisfy procedural due process because SCLR 94.04.2 and the April 15 Letter led
her to believe a trial would not take place without prior mediation.4 Because
Dorothy received sufficient notice of the trial, we conclude the trial did not violate
her due process rights.
Appellate courts review de novo whether a trial court erred in granting or
denying a motion to vacate a judgment as void. Dobbins v. Mendoza, 88 Wn.
App. 862, 871, 947 P.2d 1229(1997).
Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 327, 335,
553 P.2d 442(1976). For notice to meet these constitutional requirements, it
4 At some points, Dorothy appears to argue the trial violated her due process rights
because no mediation occurred before trial. We do not consider the merits of this claim as she
offers no legal basis for them as required under RAP 10.3(a)(6).
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No. 77104-3-1/7
need only be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." In re Marriage of Nimes, 136 Wash. 2d 707, 736-37, 965
P.2d 1087(1998). Notice must also give a party "sufficient time to make an
intelligent decision to appear or default." Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Wash. App.
500, 504, 27 P.3d 654(2001).
A court enters a void judgment if it did not first provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard. State ex. rel. Adams v. Super. Ct., Pierce Cty., 36
Wash. 2d 868, 872, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950). Courts must vacate void judgments and
have no discretion to do otherwise. Chai v. Kong, 122 Wash. App. 247, 254, 93
P.3d 936 (2004). If, however, a court enters an order with both jurisdiction and
the inherent power to enter the order, a procedural irregularity makes the
judgment only voidable. Chai, 122 Wash. App. at 254.
Dorothy asserts the notice she received was inadequate because no
reasonable person, after reading SCLR 94.04.2 and the April 15 Letter, would
understand a trial would be held on May 14, 2014. However, the notice Dorothy
received for the trial date was quite clear. The notice came from the court and
stated "Notice of Non-Jury Trial Date" and contained the case name, date,
location, and time. Furthermore, Dorothy received the notice in March 2014,two
months before the scheduled trial date. With two months to prepare, Dorothy
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No. 77104-3-1/8
had "sufficient time to make an intelligent decision to appear or default." See
Johnson, 107 Wash. App. at 504.
Moreover, SCLR 94.04.2 and the April 15 Letter from opposing counsel
did not render this notice insufficient. First, though SCLR 94.04.2(c) states,
"[m]ediation shall apply to all cases filed after January 1, 2004,"
SCLR 94.04.2(d)(1)—(4) provides a number of instances in which the rule does
not necessitate mediation. In particular, SCLR 94.04.2(d)(1) does not require
mediation "for good cause shown upon motion and approval by the court." Thus,
a full reading of the rule demonstrates mediation prior to trial is not an absolute
requirement and may be waived in several circumstances. The "good cause"
language of SCLR 94.04.2(d)(1) alerts a party to the possibility trial may be held
without mediation if they do not participate in good faith. Further, permitting a
party to thwart a trial by continuously refusing to mediate would allow litigants to
manipulate the rule and frustrate court proceedings.
Second, the April 15 Letter clearly stated "we have a trial scheduled in this
matter for May 14th and 15th, 2014." The letter also provided mediation was
required prior to trial and Homer would move to compel mediation if Dorothy
appeared at trial, but did not contradict any of the information in the Clerk's notice
regarding the trial date, time, and location. Instead, the letter reiterated the trial
date and merely notified Dorothy of her mediation obligations in an attempt to
encourage her to participate. Thus, even when considering the local rule and the
April 15 Letter, the notice Dorothy received from the Clerk was "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [her] of the pendency of the
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No. 77104-3-1/9
action and afford [her] an opportunity to present[her] objections." Himes, 136
Wash. 2d at 736-37.
Consequently, the trial court neither violated Dorothy's due process rights
nor erred in declining to vacate the decree.
Accordingly, we affirm.
9.
WE CONCUR:
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