DocketNumber: No. 30220-5-I
Citation Numbers: 70 Wash. App. 875
Judges: Baker
Filed Date: 7/12/1993
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/23/2022
Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (Lumbermens) appeals the trial court's order forfeiting its appeal bond for John L. Darwin (Darwin). We find that the bond should not have been forfeited, and reverse.
Facts
Lumbermens, as surety, posted the bond for Darwin's release during his appeal of a criminal conviction on charges of drug manufacturing. Following the execution of the bond,
I want them to know about conditions, because if I'm going to be forfeiting the bond or some [other] judge is going to be forfeiting the bond, I don't want them to say, 'Well, these were unusual conditions or something we aren't used to'.
The following week, the court approved the bonds, subject to confirming letters from the bonding companies. Even before the court received the confirming correspondence, both Darwins were released subject to the additional conditions. The next week, Lumbermens sent a letter to the court confirming its acceptance of the conditions of bail for Darwin. "It is understood, and a matter of course, that the appearance of the Defendant... is guaranteed by the Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company, the Surety."
This court affirmed the Darwins' convictions, and sentencing was scheduled for June 20,1991. State v. Darwin, 60 Wn. App. 1018, review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1022 (1991). On June 14, 1991, a search was conducted of the Darwins' home, and drug manufacturing paraphernalia was discovered. They were immediately returned to custody.
A hearing was then held before a different trial judge
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in its decision to forfeit the appeal bond and hold the surety hable when the defendant had already been returned to custody.
The object of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused before the court at such times as the court may direct. It is not a revenue measure in lieu of a fine, or a method to punish sureties. State v. Jackshitz, 76 Wash. 253, 136 P. 132 (1913). A bonding company, by undertaking to guarantee the presence of the defendant, may accept certain conditions of release, as was the case here. By doing so, the surety is guaranteeing the accused's presence in court, should any of the conditions be violated and the court call for the presence of the accused. It defies logic to suggest that by accepting those conditions, the surety is guaranteeing that the accused will not violate any of those conditions. The surety has no means of guaranteeing the accused's behavior, short of locking him up. We have found no cases where the surely contracted to guarantee the behavior of the defendants, at the risk of forfeiting its bond.
The trial judge's statements at the hearings, and the conditions of release contained in the order, are consistent with this interpretation. He probably would not have agreed with the prosecutor that bonding companies do not care what the conditions are if he was holding the bonding company financially responsible for the defendant's compliance with those conditions. A reasonable reading of his order is that the bonding companies were to guarantee, in writing, that the Darwins would appear in court if their appeal was unsuccessful, or earlier if they violated any of the conditions of
In any event, the bond was not subject to forfeiture without a clear agreement on the part of the surety that its bond could be forfeited if any conditions of release were violated. In this case, the evidence does not clearly establish such an undertaking. Therefore, the bond should not be forfeited for the defendant's failure to comply with the conditions. The defendant was in custody at the appropriate titile, and the bond should be exonerated.
Reversed.
Pekelis, A.C.J., and Scholfield, J., concur.
In the meantime, the original trial judge, Marshall Forrest, had been elected to the Court of Appeals.