State Of Washington v. Fen Shou Chen

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 2, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52801-1-II
Respondent,
v.
FEN SHOU CHEN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Fen Shou Chen pleaded guilty to one count of manufacture of a controlled
substance and was released from custody on credit for time served. His plea avoided a potential
high end sentence of 10 years had he proceeded to trial. Upon his release, he was detained by the
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Chen then moved to withdraw his guilty plea on two grounds. First, he argued that he was
denied an adequate interpreter when he entered the plea because he was only provided a Mandarin
interpreter for his plea proceedings, even though his primary dialect is Fuzhou. Second, he argued
that his attorney inadequately advised him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty
because she told him that it was unlikely that ICE would immediately detain him when he was
released from jail. He contends that the lack of a Fuzhou interpreter also impacted his ability to
understand his attorney’s advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial
court denied Chen’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Chen appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion, raising
the same arguments that he did below. We affirm.
No. 52801-1-II
FACTS
In December 2017 Chen was arrested and charged with one count of manufacture of a
controlled substance, marijuana, and one count of unlawful use of a building for drug purposes.
On his attorney’s advice, Chen decided to plead guilty to the marijuana charge so that he would
be released immediately with credit for time served. The other charge was dismissed.
At least a week before pleading guilty, Chen informed his attorney that his first language
was the Fuzhou dialect of Chinese, rather than the Mandarin dialect spoken by the interpreters they
had been using. Chen said he understood 75-80 percent of conversational Mandarin, but not legal
terminology.
At the change of plea hearing, Chen nevertheless had a Mandarin interpreter. At the
beginning of the hearing, the interpreter confirmed that he had spoken with Chen that morning and
was satisfied that Chen understood and could communicate well with him. The trial court did not
ask Chen if he understood the immigration consequences of his plea. However, the trial court did
ask Chen if he understood his plea agreement and if it had been translated for him, and Chen said
yes. Chen also affirmed that he understood the proceedings and did not have any further questions,
other than asking about the return of some of his personal belongings.
The plea agreement that Chen signed included a clause advising him that pleading guilty
to a crime under state law is grounds for deportation. The plea agreement also included an
interpreter certification that the Mandarin interpreter signed under the penalty of perjury, stating
that Chen understood Mandarin and that he “has acknowledged his . . . understanding of both the
translation and the subject matter of this document.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 7-8.
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The trial court accepted Chen’s change of plea to guilty and sentenced him to time already
served. Upon Chen’s release, ICE immediately detained him and placed him in deportation
proceedings. Chen then moved to withdraw his guilty plea with the assistance of a new attorney.
In her declaration supporting Chen’s motion to withdraw, Chen’s original defense counsel
stated that although she thought she advised Chen that ICE might detain him, she has come to
believe that he misunderstood and was left with the impression that he would not be subject to
immigration consequences if he pleaded guilty. In hindsight she came to understand that Chen “did
not understand a good portion of things that [they] discussed, particularly the potential immigration
consequences.” CP at 56. Even if she had been clearer in communicating with Chen, she believed
“there is a good chance that he would not have understood” without a Fuzhou interpreter. Id.
In his declaration, Chen stated that he was not accurately informed of the likelihood that
ICE would detain him upon his release from jail and that defense counsel had told him there was
“‘little to no’” chance of facing any immigration consequences from his guilty plea. CP at 49. At
the hearing on Chen’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he stated unequivocally that he would
not have pleaded guilty had he known that he would have been picked up by ICE upon release
from custody. In his declaration, Chen stated that he would not have pleaded guilty had he fully
understood the immigration consequences of the plea.
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, Chen had a Fuzhou interpreter participating by
telephone. The trial court ordered Chen’s original defense counsel to attend. Both parties agreed
that the trial court did not need to place her under oath because she was an officer of the court. She
and the trial court had the following exchange about her meetings with Chen:
THE COURT: Thank you. And during these meetings, when you asked
such questions, did you receive responses from Mr. Chen that were responsive?
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No. 52801-1-II
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. There were times when he would ask to
rephrase the question, but did respond appropriately.
THE COURT: So, is it fair to say that during these meetings in December
and January and February, that you felt you were able to effectively communicate
with Mr. Chen, and him with you?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
THE COURT: . . . Tell me how you came to learn that Fuzhou was his first
dialect, first language.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe he was explaining to the interpreter why
he couldn’t understand something that had happened in court. In their discussion,
he said that his first language was Fuzhou, and so, her and I both contacted the court
administrator and let them know that.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (July 6, 2018) at 20.
Defense counsel explained to the trial court that Chen decided to plead guilty in part
because there was no ICE hold on him at the time and he knew his offense was deportable, so he
wanted to get out of custody quickly before ICE would have a chance to seize him from jail. In
addition, it had become clear that the State was adding aggravators and that if convicted after a
trial, Chen was facing a possible maximum sentence of 10 years, which was a “major contributor”
to his decision to plead guilty. Id. at 24.
Counsel explained that she told Chen early on that the crimes he had been charged with
were deportable offenses but that she did not know the process or the likelihood that ICE would
seize Chen when he was released. She then explained:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He asked me if there was a hold on him, an ICE
hold, and there was not. And he asked me, like, where the facility was, and if there
was a process. And I said that there would be hearings, and there is a procedure to
get representation there. And he asked me if I thought he would get picked up, and
I said I don’t know.
THE COURT: In the declaration filed by Mr. Chen in support of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, he states, and I am going to read a portion of the
declaration to you. [Defense counsel] told me, from my limited understanding of
Mandarin, that there was, quote, little to no, closed quote, chance of me facing any
immigration consequences for my guilty plea. Do you believe that you made that
statement to him?
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe that I said that I thought there was little
chance of him getting picked up upon his release from custody.
Id. at 28-29.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the trial court also confirmed that Chen
understood that if he were found guilty at trial, he could be sentenced to 10 years in prison and that
one consequence of withdrawing his plea could be a 10-year sentence. Chen confirmed he wanted
to proceed with his motion.
The trial court denied Chen’s motion. The trial court concluded that the record did not
support Chen’s contention that he could not communicate with his interpreters or counsel. The
trial court noted that counsel was able to communicate with Chen about questions he had regarding
his immigration status. At the change of plea hearing, “Chen was able to understand the translation
and to communicate well with the interpreter.” CP at 78. And during a lengthy colloquy at the
change of plea hearing, Chen’s responses to the trial court’s questions were “entirely consistent
with him having a clear understanding of the words that were being spoken.” Id.
The trial court also concluded that counsel adequately advised Chen of the immigration
consequences of his plea. The trial court reasoned:
The deportation consequences attached to the guilty plea entered by Mr. Chen were
clear. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C., [§] 1227, a conviction for the unlawful manufacture of
marijuana is deportable. Mr. Chen's counsel so advised him of that consequence. The
defendant asserts that his attorney was unclear regarding the timing of the deportation
proceedings and how quickly he might be transferred to federal custody. However,
such details are not part of the effective assistance of counsel regarding immigration
consequences.
CP at 77.
Chen appeals.
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ANALYSIS
Chen argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
because he was not provided a qualified interpreter who spoke his dialect, his attorney did not
effectively apprise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and he did not
understand the immigration consequences because of the lack of a Fuzhou interpreter. We
disagree. Although there is conflicting evidence in the record, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw.
A. Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea and Standard of Review
Under CrR 4.2(f), a trial court “shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea
of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” “Where, as here, a criminal defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea after judgment
has been entered, CrR 7.8 governs CrR 4.2(f).” State v. Martinez-Leon, 174 Wash. App. 753, 759,
300 P.3d 481 (2013). Under CrR 7.8(b)(5), “the trial court may relieve a party from a final
judgment for ‘[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting CrR 7.8(b)(5)). CrR 7.8 motions are subject to the one-year time
bar for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence imposed by RCW 10.73.090. Id. Because
Chen filed his motion within a year of entry of his judgment and sentence, the motion was timely.
“For purposes of CrR 4.2, there are four per se nonexclusive instances where a manifest
injustice exists: where (1) the defendant did not ratify the plea, (2) the plea was not voluntary, (3)
the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, or (4) the plea agreement was not kept.”
State v. Wilson, 162 Wash. App. 409, 414-15, 253 P.3d 1143 (2011) (footnote omitted). “The
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No. 52801-1-II
defendant generally bears the burden of establishing the necessity for withdrawing” a guilty plea.
State v. Quy Dinh Nguyen, 179 Wash. App. 271, 282-83, 319 P.3d 53 (2013).
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion. State v. Teshome, 122 Wash. App. 705, 709, 94 P.3d 1004 (2004). We likewise “review
a trial court’s ruling on a CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion.” Martinez-Leon, 174 Wash. App.
at 759. We “defer to the trial court’s determinations on conflicting testimony, witness credibility,
and the persuasiveness of the evidence.” State v. Fry, 153 Wash. App. 235, 239, 220 P.3d 1245
(2009). “But when a trial court bases its otherwise discretionary decision solely on application of
a court rule or statute, the issue is one of law that we review de novo.” Martinez-Leon, 174 Wn.
App. at 759.
B. Qualified Interpreter at the Change of Plea Hearing
Chen first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because he was not provided a qualified Fuzhou interpreter and so his guilty plea
was involuntary. Chen explains that for the majority of his proceedings he worked only with
Mandarin interpreters, but he speaks only conversational Mandarin and his first language is the
Fuzhou dialect of Fujian Province, where Chen is from. We disagree and hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.
In Washington, “‘the right of a defendant in a criminal case to have an interpreter is based
upon the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses and the right inherent in a
fair trial to be present at one’s own trial.’” State v. Ramirez-Dominguez, 140 Wash. App. 233, 243,
165 P.3d 391 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v.
Gonzales-Morales, 138 Wash. 2d 374, 379, 979 P.2d 826 (1999)). RCW 2.43.010 further secures the
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right of non-English speakers in Washington to the assistance of qualified interpreters in legal
proceedings.
“In Washington, a defendant’s right to an interpreter means a right to a competent
interpreter.” Teshome, 122 Wash. App. at 711. The standard for competence relates to whether the
rights of non-English speakers have been protected, even where there is some evidence that the
interpretation has not been entirely accurate. Ramirez-Dominguez, 140 Wash. App. at 244.
Chen does not argue that his interpreters were unqualified, but rather that, due to the
differences between the Mandarin and Fuzhou dialects of Chinese, he could not understand the
formal or legal form of Mandarin used by his interpreters.
In Ramirez-Dominguez, the defendant claimed on appeal that he could not adequately
understand his Spanish interpreter during trial because his primary language was Mixteco. 140
Wash. App. at 243. We held that the defendant’s rights were adequately protected because the record
showed that any confusion on his part flowed from his lack of familiarity with the judicial
proceeding, and not from an inability to understand his interpreter. Id. at 246. We distinguished
the case from two federal cases where the record was replete with evidence that the defendant in
fact did not understand the interpreter, including instances where the defendants or the interpreters
in those cases told the court that the defendant did not understand. Id. at 245-47 (citing Perez-
Lastor v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 208 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2000); Amadou v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 226 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Here, as in Ramirez-Dominguez, the record does not support Chen’s contention that he did
not understand his interpreter, the guilty plea proceedings, or the consequences of his guilty plea.
Chen entered his guilty plea with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter, and never raised any
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concerns about the quality of the interpretation during that proceeding. Chen affirmed that he
understood the contents of his guilty plea and his plea agreement, and he repeatedly affirmed that
he understood the consequences of the plea. When the trial court asked Chen if he had any
questions, Chen asked only for the return of his car and other personal belongings and did not raise
any concerns about his ability to understand the proceedings.
Although Chen informed defense counsel that his first language was the Fuzhou dialect
about a week before Chen pleaded guilty, he did not indicate at that time or during entry of his
plea that he did not understand his Mandarin interpreters or the proceedings. Chen swore in his
declaration that he understood “about 75-80% of conversational Mandarin,” although he said he
did not understand legal terminology. CP at 48. But as in Ramirez-Dominguez, Chen “did not
express any difficulty understanding the questions he was asked and did not ask for clarification
due to interpretation problems.” 140 Wash. App. at 246-47; see also State v. Aljaffar, 198 Wash. App.
75, 84, 392 P.3d 1070 (2017) (no Sixth Amendment violation for use of uncertified interpreter
because neither the defendant nor his attorney “ever indicated there had been any
misunderstandings with the interpreter or a breakdown in communication”).
In addition, Chen’s interpreter signed a certification at the end of the plea agreement
swearing that the interpreter had translated the agreement into Mandarin, and that this was a
language that Chen understood. At the very beginning of the hearing to change Chen’s plea to
guilty, the interpreter confirmed that he had spoken with Chen that morning, and the interpreter
was satisfied that Chen understood and could communicate well with him. Chen told the judge
during the hearing that the plea agreement had been translated for him, he understood it, and he
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did not have any questions about it. And he responded to questions posed to him during the change
of plea hearing in a logical way.
We accordingly hold that Chen’s rights were adequately protected when he changed his
plea to guilty. Because Chen has not shown that he failed to understand the plea he entered or that
his plea was otherwise involuntary, he has not shown a manifest injustice. It was within the trial
court’s discretion to deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on this basis. See Teshome, 122
Wash. App. at 717.
C. Immigration Consequences of the Guilty Plea
Chen next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea because defense counsel did not effectively counsel him on the immigration consequences
of his plea. He also asserts that the lack of a Fuzhou interpreter impacted his communications with
his attorney. The State counters that defense counsel properly advised Chen that his offense was
deportable and she was not required to give Chen an informed answer about the timing of
deportation proceedings. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although there
is conflicting evidence in the record about what Chen understood, the trial court weighed that
evidence and we will not disturb the trial court’s resulting conclusion on appeal.
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel and counsel’s duty to advise of immigration
consequences of pleading guilty
“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the plea
process.” State v. Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d 163, 169, 249 P.3d 1015 (2011). To determine whether a
guilty plea was involuntary or unintelligent because of counsel’s inadequate advice, we apply the
two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984). To demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Chen must show both
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that defense counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in
prejudice. Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d 169.
Defense counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness. State v. Estes, 188 Wash. 2d 450, 458, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). We strongly presume
that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient. State v. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 755, 278
P.3d 653 (2012).
With respect to immigration consequences, if the applicable immigration law is clear that
an offense is deportable, the defense attorney must advise the defendant that pleading guilty makes
the defendant deportable. Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d at 170. “If ‘the law is not succinct and
straightforward,’ counsel must provide only a general warning that ‘pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.’” Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356, 369, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010)). With respect to counsel’s use of interpreters,
counsel’s performance is not deficient if the defendant did not indicate to counsel that they were
having trouble communicating. In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez, 180 Wash. 2d 337, 353-54, 325 P.3d
142 (2014).
Where a defendant seeks to withdraw their guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective
assistance, they must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s faulty advice, they
would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. Sandoval, 171
Wash. 2d at 174-75. Because both prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test must be met,
the failure to demonstrate either prong will end our inquiry. State v. Classen, 4 Wash. App. 2d 520,
535, 422 P.3d 489 (2018).
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No. 52801-1-II
2. Chen’s counsel was not deficient in discussing with Chen the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea or using a Mandarin interpreter for this discussion
Here, defense counsel properly informed Chen that the crimes he was charged with
included a deportable offense. Chen nevertheless claims he was ineffectively counseled because
defense counsel told him “there was ‘little to no’ chance of Chen facing any immigration
consequences for his guilty plea,” and yet he was immediately detained by ICE upon his release
from jail. Br. of Appellant at 12 (quoting CP at 49). Defense counsel explained that she told Chen
that she “thought there was little chance of him getting picked up upon his release from custody”
in part because ICE had not issued an immigration hold to the jail. VRP (July 6, 2018) at 23, 29.
An equally pressing issue, therefore, is not whether defense counsel informed Chen of the
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, but whether her advice as to when ICE might detain
him constituted deficient performance.
In Sandoval, defense counsel advised the defendant to plead guilty because he would not
immediately be deported and would have sufficient time to retain an immigration attorney to
ameliorate any potential immigration consequences of the guilty plea. 171 Wash. 2d at 167. The
defendant was then put in deportation proceedings while he awaited release from jail. Id. The
Washington Supreme Court held that defense counsel’s “categorical assurances nullified the
constitutionally required advice about the deportation consequences of pleading guilty.” Id. at 174.
“The required advice about immigration consequences would be a useless formality if, in the next
breath, counsel could give the noncitizen defendant the impression that he or she should disregard
what counsel just said about the risk of immigration consequences.” Id. at 173. “That Sandoval
was subjected to deportation proceedings several months later, and not ‘immediately’ as his
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No. 52801-1-II
counsel promised, makes no difference. Sandoval’s counsel’s advice impermissibly left Sandoval
the impression that deportation was a remote possibility.” Id.
In his declaration, Chen stated that he was never able to communicate effectively with
defense counsel using a Mandarin interpreter. And defense counsel acknowledged that, in
hindsight, Chen might not have fully understood their conversations.
But at the hearing on the motion to withdraw, defense counsel described her thinking, as
well as Chen’s when deciding to change his plea to guilty:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . And so, he was concerned about getting out
of custody, and whether he would be deported. And so there was no ICE hol[d] on
him, and we knew the offense was deportable, and so he wanted to get out of
custody, and made the decision to plea[d] guilty.
THE COURT: And [the interpreter] participated in this meeting that you
had with Mr. Chen where you reviewed the plea agreement offer from the
prosecuting attorney; is that correct?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
VRP (July 6, 2018) at 23.
This case is somewhat similar to Sandoval in that, according to Chen, defense counsel left
Chen with the impression that deportation was a remote possibility when in fact it was not. 171
Wash. 2d at 174. But unlike the attorney in Sandoval, Chen’s counsel did not intend to leave Chen
with the impression that deportation was a remote possibility altogether, but rather apparently
informed him it was unlikely to occur exactly on the day of his release. Defense counsel correctly
advised Chen that he would be subject to deportation, but was wrong about the timing of
deportation. The problem arose not from counsel’s advice, but from Chen’s claimed
misunderstanding of that advice interpreted for him in Mandarin. Chen claims he understood that
there was little chance of ICE detaining him at all, as opposed to little chance of ICE detaining
him that day.
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In Gomez, the defendant claimed she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
her attorney’s failure to adequately consult with her through an interpreter. 180 Wash. 2d at 353. The
Supreme Court rejected her argument, noting that the attorney used an interpreter for most of their
conversations, the defendant never informed anyone of any ongoing problems communicating
with her attorney, and the trial transcript showed that both counsel and the court respected her need
for an interpreter. Id. at 353-54. No one indicated that Gomez did not understand the proceedings.
Id.
Similar facts are present here in that Chen never indicated that he did not understand what
was happening or the implications of pleading guilty, and defense counsel believed throughout
their interactions that Chen understood her through the Mandarin interpreters. Although Chen did
eventually tell counsel that his primary dialect was Fuzhou, there is no indication in the record that
he told her that he was having problems communicating in Mandarin. Moreover, defense counsel
described to the trial judge how she and Chen approached his change of plea. They evaluated the
likely 10-year sentence if he were convicted after a trial, which counsel described as a “major
contributor,” the fact that his crime was deportable, and the lack of an immediate immigration
hold. See VRP (July 6, 2018) at 23-25. And defense counsel did not recognize any problems with
Chen’s ability to understand at the time.
This situation is also similar to that in People v. Vicente-Sontay, 2014 COA 175, 361 P.3d
1046, a persuasive Colorado case. There, defense counsel used Spanish interpreters to
communicate with the defendant, despite the fact that the defendant was a native speaker of K’iche
from a specific area of Guatemala, and he only understood about 25 percent of the Spanish-
translated court documents he had received. Id. at 1049. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
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No. 52801-1-II
counsel’s failure to obtain a K’iche interpreter did not constitute ineffective assistance because the
defendant “spoke sufficient Spanish to engage in meaningful communications,” “appeared in court
with Spanish interpreters numerous times, and neither he nor any of the interpreters indicated any
communication difficulties. To the contrary, [the defendant’s] answers to questions posed to him
were consistently responsive and appropriate.” Id. at 1055. Therefore, “[g]iven the evidence that
[the defendant] understood the substance of his conversations with trial counsel and his answers
during the providency hearing, trial counsel had no duty to inquire further as to whether he
sufficiently understood Spanish.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th
Cir. 1994) (attorney’s failure to obtain interpreter not deficient performance because the defendant
“never indicated to the court that he was experiencing major difficulty,” his answers to questions
were “consistently responsive,” and the record did not reflect any misunderstanding as a result of
language barrier).
Here, defense counsel properly advised Chen that his offense was deportable and, unlike
in Sandoval, did not advise Chen that deportation was a remote possibility altogether. And the
record does not suggest that counsel failed to adequately consult Chen through an interpreter,
because Chen never gave her any reason to suspect at the time that he was not understanding her.
Even when he informed counsel that Fuzhou was his preferred dialect, he apparently did not
indicate that he had been having trouble understanding his Mandarin interpreters up to that point.
Although Chen and defense counsel both submitted declarations stating that Chen did not fully
understand their communications regarding immigration consequences, those declarations were
made with the benefit of hindsight. Defense counsel confirmed for the trial court at the plea
withdrawal hearing that when she had conversations with Chen using a Mandarin interpreter prior
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to the change of plea hearing, he responded appropriately to questions and asked questions when
he did not understand something. Her recitation of the factors that they considered, including the
10-year potential sentence if Chen went to trial, as well as the lack of an immigration hold, were
not things that she thought he misunderstood.
Without Chen indicating at that time that he was having trouble understanding her or his
interpreters, it was reasonable for counsel to proceed with the Mandarin interpreters and explain
Chen’s immigration risks the way she did. Moreover, the trial court heard evidence from defense
counsel at the withdrawal hearing that supported its conclusion that the Mandarin interpretation
was adequate and counsel did not perform deficiently. We strongly presume counsel was not
deficient, Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 755, and we conclude that her decision to proceed with a Mandarin
interpreter was objectively reasonable. We also conclude that there was evidence in the record to
support a conclusion that Chen understood the relevant immigration consequences. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw in light of defense counsel’s
description at the hearing of her discussions with Chen.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Chen’s motion
to withdraw the guilty plea and we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Glasgow, J.
We concur:
Maxa, P.J.
Cruser, J.
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