State Of Washington v. Larry Tarrer

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 9, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 45998-1-II
Respondent,
v.
LARRY TARRER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Larry Tarrer appeals his jury convictions of one count of murder in the
first degree, one count of attempted murder in the first degree, and one count of manslaughter in
the first degree for a 1991 shooting. We hold (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Tarrer’s motions for continuance because it had tenable grounds and reasons to deny his
motions, (2) Tarrer fails to show evidence of the trial court’s actual or potential bias, (3) the trial
court did not comment on the evidence because the trial court’s attitude is not reasonably inferred
from its remarks, (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Tarrer’s expert witness
because it had tenable grounds and reasons to exclude the evidence under ER 702, (5) the
prosecutor’s errors do not amount to such pervasive error that they could not have been cured by
proper instruction, (6) Tarrer was not prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance, (7) the
trial court correctly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, (8) there was no cumulative error, and
(9) we need not determine whether this matter should be assigned to a different judge on remand
because we are not remanding for a new trial. We affirm.
45998-1-II
FACTS
I. OVERVIEW
In January 1991, Claudia McCorvey was six months pregnant. McCorvey’s apartment
served as a location for using and dealing crack cocaine. Bishop (Slim) Johns dealt crack cocaine
out of McCorvey’s apartment on January 8, 1991. Johns brought Lavern Simpkins and Larry
Tarrer to McCorvey’s apartment. Following an argument about Tarrer’s missing cocaine, Tarrer
left the apartment and went to a car. He retrieved a pistol and walked back to McCorvey’s
apartment.
McCorvey saw Tarrer point the pistol at her. He shot her twice. As a result, McCorvey
was rendered a paraplegic. Her baby, Marquise McCorvey, was surgically delivered and lived for
less than one hour. Tarrer also fatally shot Simpkins.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1991, Tarrer entered an Alford/Newton1 plea to amended charges of murder in the second
degree and assault in the first degree. In 2004, while serving his sentence, Tarrer filed a CrR 7.8
motion to vacate his conviction. The trial court denied the motion. Tarrer appealed and we
reversed and remanded to the trial court consistent with In re Pers. Restraint of Andress, 147
Wash. 2d 602, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), and In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 Wash. 2d 853, 100 P.3d 801
(2004).2 The State then withdrew the 1991 amended information.
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); State v. Newton,
87 Wash. 2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976).
2
State v. Tarrer, noted at 130 Wash. App. 1010, 2005 WL 2746678.
2
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In 2009, the State filed an amended information charging Tarrer with premeditated murder
in the first degree, attempted murder in the first degree, and manslaughter in the first degree. The
State added three sentencing aggravators3 to the attempted murder in the first degree charge.
The case went to trial in 2009 and resulted in a mistrial. The State retried the case in 2010,
resulting in convictions on all counts. We reversed and remanded the case for prosecutorial
misconduct.4 The Honorable Katherine Stolz presided over both trials.
III. TARRER’S THIRD TRIAL
A. Motions for Recusal and Continuance
In September 2013, before his third trial, Tarrer moved the trial judge to recuse herself
because, he argued, she was not impartial. Tarrer argued that the judge’s comment during
sentencing following the second trial that “[t]his court is going to do its best to make sure you
never get out of prison alive” demonstrated actual bias and violated the appearance of fairness
doctrine. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 121. The trial court found that Tarrer failed to establish actual
bias “because the court did nothing untoward in making its comments at the last sentencing
hearing.” CP at 125. The trial court additionally found that “[Tarrer] made this same argument
during the appeal from his conviction . . . [and] [t]he court of appeals rejected that request.” CP
at 125. The judge accordingly denied Tarrer’s motion.
On December 12, 2013, Tarrer moved for a continuance of the trial date. Although five
weeks earlier Tarrer’s counsel represented to the court that he would be ready for trial, he argued
3
They are: “[T]he victim’s injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to
satisfy the elements of the offense”, “the current offense was a violent offense, and the defendant
knew that the victim of the current offense was pregnant,” and “the offense involved an invasion
of the victim’s privacy.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 76.
4
State v. Tarrer, noted at 174 Wash. App. 1029, 2013 WL 1337943.
3
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that his ongoing investigation revealed the identity of another possible shooter. In denying the
motion, the trial court noted that defense counsel had been investigating the case for seven months,
the issues in Tarrer’s case were established, trial was to be held in one month, and Tarrer had
speedy trial rights.
On January 10, 2014, three days before trial, Tarrer again moved for a continuance to seek
more time to create his witness list and prepare motions in limine. The trial court denied Tarrer’s
motion and noted that the witness lists were past due.
B. Pretrial
Tarrer moved in limine to exclude and limit the suggestibility of the eyewitness
identification. In support of his motion, Tarrer submitted briefing. On the day of trial, Tarrer
requested that the trial court allow Dr. Geoffrey Loftus to testify on the unreliability of eyewitness
identification.5 Tarrer argued that the trial court should consider new case law, which Tarrer
included in his brief. The trial court responded:
Well, you’re going to have to get some sort of a synopsis of what you think
Dr. Loftus is going to testify to; but again, you know, I took a look through your
memorandum I got this morning; and I went back and pulled up the case, you know,
Section B, admission of eyewitness identification. . . . I went through all of it. I
mean, that ruling was affirmed. That is the state of the law in this case. Whatever
prospectively the Supreme Court might rule or the Court of Appeals might rule in
the future, that’s not where we are right now. Irrespective of whatever New
Hampshire, New Jersey, or some other state has done, this state, our Court of
Appeals, Division II, has allowed that identification, both by the photomontage and
in court, to stand; so you know, I don’t really intend—you know, you can argue it
again; but you already know how I’m going to rule.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 67-68.
5
We affirmed the admissibility of eyewitness identifications of Tarrer based on a photo montage
in State v. Tarrer, 2013 WL 1337943 at *10-11.
4
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Tarrer also moved in limine to limit the State’s closing argument based on our opinion
reversing Tarrer’s convictions because of prosecutorial misconduct. Prior to argument on these
motions, the State noted that it might waive closing argument. The trial court responded, “[The
State] can basically cut and paste his closing argument to avoid offending the Court of Appeals.”
RP at 85. The State notified the trial court that it did not intend on giving “any form of the declare-
the-truth argument” during closing. RP at 102. The trial court granted Tarrer’s motion to preclude
the State from making a declare-the-truth argument in closing, but denied his motion to preclude
the State from arguing that the jury should render a true verdict. The trial court stated:
I think there’s a distinction between searching for the truth, or the truth is what you
decide, and the instruction about render a true verdict. Since we do instruct them
on that, I would assume that the appellate court, if they felt that was an inappropriate
instruction from the Court, would have taken time to reverse it in their opinion.
RP at 103. The trial court also deferred its ruling on whether the State could use puzzle analogies
during closing argument “until or when and if we actually get to some sort of argument regarding
a puzzle.” RP at 109.
Prior to its opening instructions to the jury, the trial court advised the parties that it was
going to emphasize the seriousness of juror misconduct and that it would point out a recent mistrial
resulting from juror misconduct in King County. Tarrer responded, “That’s fine.” RP at 180.
During preliminary jury instructions, the trial court told the jury:
We cannot emphasize strongly enough that you are not to discuss the case or
conduct any research . . . by yourself on the subject of this trial. This is very
important because it can lead to a mistrial. That has recently happened both in King
and Snohomish Counties where . . . the jurors have committed misconduct during
deliberation by researching the issues in the case. That means the county has to try
the case. In the . . . King County case, it was a rape case which means the victim
will have to testify again. In the Snohomish case, it was a child rape case which
meant that, ultimately, the Prosecutor’s Office dealt with the case because they did
not want the five-year-old victim to have to testify again; so it’s very important that
you not conduct any research.
5
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RP at 182-83.
C. Trial
McCorvey testified at Tarrer’s trial. During redirect examination of McCorvey, the State
asked if she recalled Tarrer asking her if drug dealing was dangerous and if drug dealers could
have their drugs stolen. The State then asked, “[Tarrer] thought his drugs were stolen that night;
right?” RP at 688. Tarrer objected. Outside the jury’s presence, Tarrer argued that the State was
trying to characterize him as a drug dealer.
THE COURT: Well, considering I’ve heard Mr. Tarrer testify before that
he was a drug dealer, I mean—
[THE STATE]: You can’t know that, Judge.
THE COURT: I know I can’t know that. I mean, not officially. Personally,
yes, I know that. All right.
RP at 689. The State made an offer of proof that Johns would testify that Tarrer was a drug dealer
and that the State would offer part of Tarrer’s prior testimony in which he admitted he was a drug
dealer. The trial court overruled Tarrer’s objection.
Tarrer sought to introduce testimony from Dr. Eric Kiesel, a forensic pathologist. Tarrer
made an offer of proof that Dr. Kiesel would testify regarding the size of entrance and exit wounds
and what that typically meant. He would also testify that the medical records he reviewed were
consistent with entrance wounds in McCorvey’s back and exit wounds in her front. Dr. Kiesel had
not examined McCorvey, and his testimony would be based on his review of her medical records.
The trial court excluded Dr. Kiesel’s testimony, finding that Dr. Kiesel had not examined
McCorvey or her bullet wounds and his generalized opinion about bullet wounds was “not an
opinion with any certainty.” RP at 894. The court also determined that Dr. Kiesel’s proposed
testimony seemed to be an attempt to circumvent our previous ruling upholding exclusion of expert
testimony about other doctors’ opinions of McCorvey’s wounds.
6
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D. Closing Argument
During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the jury should balance
Tarrer’s rights with the rights of his accusers. He stated,
There was an early United States Supreme Court [J]ustice whose name was
Benjamin Cardozo who said, [j]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the
accuser, too; We are to keep the balance true; and I tell you that because—while
the defendant has every right to a fair trial, that doesn’t mean that while you
deliberate the evidence in this case, you should not be mindful of Claudia
McCorvey, Lavern Simpkins, Marquise McCorvey, and the others who have been
affected by this case. It goes without saying, I think, that 23 years is a very long
time to wait for some final justice to come in this case; but it is almost here.
RP at 1271. The prosecutor also argued that Dr. Loftus’s testimony was presented to “distract”
and “confuse” the jury, and to make it “hesitant about reaching a verdict.” RP at 1272. Tarrer
objected and argued the State mischaracterized the evidence. The trial court overruled the
objection.
The prosecutor further stated:
A reasonable doubt arising from the lack of evidence is the question of: Do
you have enough? Again, there will always be more. . . . Do you wish you had
DNA evidence . . . shoe prints . . . the gun and the ballistics . . .? I mean, all of
these things are stuff that you could have that you don’t have; and I’m going to
suggest to you that the law doesn’t let you think about those things when you decide
if the case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. What you look at is: Is the
evidence that was actually presented enough?
RP at 1297-98.
E. Verdict
The jury found Tarrer guilty of murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the first
degree with two aggravating factors, and manslaughter in the first degree. The trial court imposed
an exceptional sentence above the standard range of 896 months’ confinement. Tarrer appeals.
7
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ANALYSIS
I. MOTIONS FOR CONTINUANCE
Tarrer argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions for
continuance, infringing on his right to counsel because his lawyer did not have time to adequately
prepare. We disagree.
A. Standards of Review
The trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for continuance. State v.
Downing, 151 Wash. 2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). We review a trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 272. We will not reverse
the trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance unless a defendant shows that the trial court’s
decision was manifestly unreasonable or rested on untenable grounds or reasons. Downing, 151
Wash. 2d at 272. The trial court weighs many factors when considering a motion for continuance,
including “surprise, diligence, redundancy, due process, materiality, and maintenance of orderly
procedure.” Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 273.
We review claims of a denial of Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to counsel,
de novo. State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 719, 230 P.3d 576 (2010); State v. Iniguez, 167 Wash. 2d
273, 280-81, 217 P.3d 768 (2009). The constitutional right to assistance of counsel includes a
reasonable time for consultation and preparation.6 State v. Hartzog, 96 Wash. 2d 383, 402, 635 P.2d
6
Although Tarrer alleges the trial court’s ruling denying a continuance violated his right to
counsel, this allegation does not change the standard of review. As an example, our Supreme
Court reviewed a trial court’s ruling requiring a defendant attend trial in shackles for an abuse of
discretion where the defendant alleged a violation of his right to a fair trial. State v. Finch, 137
Wash. 2d 792, 852-53, 975 P.2d 967 (1999); Hartzog, 96 Wash. 2d at 401; State v. Dye, 178 Wash. 2d
541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). Not only do we agree with this approach, Tarrer argues that we
should review this alleged error under an abuse of discretion standard.
8
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694 (1981). As stated above, a motion for continuance will only be overturned if the trial court
abused its discretion. Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 272. “In determining whether a trial court has
abused its discretion, a reviewing court can find abuse only ‘if no reasonable person would have
taken the view adopted by the trial court.’” State v. Barker, 35 Wash. App. 388, 397, 667 P.2d 108
(1983) (quoting State v. Henderson, 26 Wash. App. 187, 190, 611 P.2d 1365 (1980)). “The test is
the same even though the constitutional issue of effective assistance of counsel is involved.
Moreover, ‘[t]he decision to deny the defendant a continuance will be disturbed on appeal only
upon a showing that the defendant was prejudiced or that the result of the trial would likely have
been different had the motion been granted.’” Barker, 35 Wash. App. at 396-97 (internal citation
omitted) (quoting State v. Kelly, 32 Wash. App. 112, 114, 645 P.2d 1146 (1982)).
B. No Abuse of Discretion
Here, the trial court had tenable grounds and reasons to deny both motions for continuance.
At a pretrial hearing, Tarrer’s counsel assured the trial court that he would be prepared by the time
of trial. Approximately five weeks later, defense counsel moved to continue the trial because his
ongoing investigation revealed there may be another possible shooter. The State argued that this
merely speculative information did not justify further delaying trial. The trial court denied Tarrer’s
motion. It noted that defense counsel had been investigating the case for seven months, it had been
tried twice previously, and trial was scheduled to commence in one month. The trial court stated
that the previous seven months provided Tarrer’s counsel “more than adequate time to prepare,
given the fact that his case has gone to trial twice.” RP at 33.
Thus, the trial court weighed many factors, including both Tarrer’s rights and trial
maintenance. After so weighing, the trial court denied the motion to continue the trial. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion. See Downing, 151 Wash. 2d at 273.
9
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Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Tarrer’s second motion for
continuance. Three days before trial, defense counsel again moved to continue the trial, but on a
different basis than it previously relied. This time, defense counsel sought more time to create his
witness list and prepare motions in limine. The State noted that defense counsel did not state with
particularly what issues would require more time, especially in light of the fact that counsel could
review the complete testimony of all witnesses from two previous trials. The State also informed
the trial court that the witnesses already indicated they did not wish to be interviewed again, and
that any such interviews would be redundant of previous interviews. The trial court denied this
motion for continuance of the trial date.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying this second motion for continuance
because Tarrer presented no compelling reasons to grant the motion. Despite having the benefit
of two previous trials to work from, and despite having had eight months to prepare, Tarrer cited
his general need for more time. Tarrer failed to show that the trial court’s decision to deny this
late motion for continuance rested on untenable grounds or reasons.
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying either of the motions for
continuance, we need not go further. Tarrer fails to establish either an abuse of discretion or a
violation of his right to counsel. His claim fails.
II. JUDICIAL BIAS
A. Standard of Review
Criminal defendants have a due process right to a fair trial by an impartial judge. U.S.
CONST. amends. VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; In re Pers. Restraint of Swenson, 158 Wn.
App. 812, 818, 244 P.3d 959 (2010). Impartial means the absence of bias, either actual or apparent.
State v. Moreno, 147 Wash. 2d 500, 507, 58 P.3d 265 (2002). “The law goes farther than requiring
10
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an impartial judge; it also requires that the judge appear to be impartial.” State v. Madry, 8 Wn.
App. 61, 70, 504 P.2d 1156 (1972).
We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Vance, 168 Wash. 2d 754, 759, 230 P.3d
1055 (2010). Claims of judicial bias are reviewed under the appearance of fairness doctrine that
states “‘a judicial proceeding is valid only if a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer would
conclude that all parties obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.’” State v. Bilal, 77 Wn.
App. 720, 722, 893 P.2d 674 (1995) (quoting State v. Ladenburg, 67 Wash. App. 749, 754-55, 840
P.2d 228 (1992)). But the party who argues that a judge has a bias must support the claim with
evidence. Bilal, 77 Wash. App. at 722. A claim unsupported by such evidence is without merit.
State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 619, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). Thus, before we will apply
the appearance of fairness doctrine, Tarrer must show such evidence of a judge’s actual or potential
bias. Post, 118 Wash. 2d at 619; State v. Carter, 77 Wash. App. 8, 11, 888 P.2d 1230 (1995).
A defendant who has reason to believe that a judge should be disqualified because the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned “must act promptly to request recusal and
‘cannot wait until he has received an adverse ruling and then move for disqualification.’” Swenson,
158 Wash. App. at 818 (quoting State v. Carlson, 66 Wash. App. 909, 917, 833 P.2d 463 (1992)). A
party must use due diligence in discovering possible grounds for recusal and then act upon this
information by promptly seeking recusal. Sherman v. State, 128 Wash. 2d 164, 205 n.15, 905 P.2d
355 (1995). To satisfy the threshold requirement for review, Tarrer must identify constitutional
error and show how this alleged error resulted in actual prejudice to his rights that makes it
“manifest.” State v. Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d 918, 926-27, 155 P.3d 125 (2007).
11
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B. No Bias7
Tarrer first argues that the trial court’s remarks, “‘Well, considering I’ve heard Mr. Tarrer
testify before that he was a drug dealer’” and “‘I know I can’t know that. I mean, not officially.
Personally, yes, I know that’” show a bias against him. Br. of Appellant at 23 (quoting RP at 689).
Tarrer argues that the trial court’s remarks demonstrate that it was ready to overrule Tarrer’s
objection based on evidence from previous trials and that it did not perform its duties impartially.
The trial court’s remarks do not provide evidence of actual or potential bias against Tarrer.
The State’s offer of proof, made immediately after the trial court’s remarks, clearly shows what
the trial court anticipated: that the State would offer evidence that Tarrer was a drug dealer. As
Tarrer concedes, the trial court based its ruling on the State’s offer of proof that evidence would
establish that Tarrer was a drug dealer; Tarrer does not assign error to the trial court’s ruling.
Evidence at his third trial did establish that Tarrer was a drug dealer.8 The trial court’s remarks
demonstrate its anticipation of the State’s offer of proof and do not provide evidence of actual or
potential bias against Tarrer.
Tarrer next argues that the trial court showed bias against him by refusing to consider new
case law on the issue of eyewitness identification and by making a ruling before considering
Tarrer’s arguments. Yet, the record demonstrates that, contrary to Tarrer’s argument, the trial
court considered Tarrer’s argument, reviewed applicable case law, and then disagreed with Tarrer
on the legal issue. The trial court’s decision does not provide evidence of actual or potential bias
7
Prior to trial, Tarrer moved the trial court to recuse itself because it lacked impartiality. The trial
court denied Tarrer’s motion by written order, and Tarrer does not appeal that denial. The issues
he raises on appeal relating to bias and appearance of fairness are different from those he raised
below.
8
McCorvey’s earlier testimony also established that she overheard Tarrer discussing losing drugs.
12
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against Tarrer, but rather shows legal determinations against Tarrer’s interest. See In re Davis,
152 Wash. 2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).
Tarrer next argues that the trial court showed bias when it commented that, “‘[The State]
can basically cut and paste his closing argument to avoid offending the Court of Appeals.’” Br. of
Appellant at 25 (quoting RP at 85). Tarrer argues that this comment makes light of the
prosecutorial misconduct during Tarrer’s previous trial, “suggesting that the only problem with the
prosecutor’s previous arguments was that the Court of Appeals found them offensive.” Br. of
Appellant at 25. The comment acknowledges that Tarrer’s previous convictions were reversed on
the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and seems to express frustration with us, but it does not
express favor towards the State. The trial court’s comment is not evidence of bias.
Tarrer further argues that the trial court “reveal[ed] a lack of concern for Tarrer’s right to
a fair trial” when it denied Tarrer’s motions to limit the State’s closing argument. Br. of Appellant
at 26. Tarrer does not assign error to the trial court’s rulings, but argues that the rulings
demonstrate “an absence of suitable interest in ensuring Tarrer received a fair trial.” Br. of
Appellant at 27. Again, the trial court’s decisions do not provide evidence of actual or potential
bias against Tarrer, but rather show legal determinations against Tarrer’s interest. See Davis, 152
Wash. 2d at 692-93.
Because Tarrer fails to show evidence of the trial court’s actual or potential bias, we will
not apply the appearance of fairness doctrine, and Tarrer’s claim fails. See Post, 118 Wash. 2d at
619; Carter, 77 Wash. App. at 12.
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III. COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review
Article IV, section 16 of the Washington Constitution prohibits judges from commenting
on evidence. State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250, 275, 985 P.2d 289 (1999). We review constitutional
questions de novo. State v. Cubias, 155 Wash. 2d 549, 552, 120 P.3d 929 (2005). A trial judge is
prohibited from making even implied comments on the evidence in order “to prevent the jury from
being unduly influenced by the court’s opinion regarding the credibility, weight, or sufficiency of
the evidence.” State v. Sivins, 138 Wash. App. 52, 58, 155 P.3d 982 (2007). A trial court’s conduct
violates the constitution only if its attitude is “‘reasonably inferable from the nature or manner of
the court’s statements.’” Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d at 276 (quoting State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256,
267, 525 P.2d 731 (1974)); see also State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 283, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988)
(“An impermissible comment on the evidence is an indication to the jury of the judge’s personal
attitudes toward the merits of the cause.”).
B. No Comment on the Evidence
Tarrer argues that the trial court’s opening instructions to the jury regarding juror
misconduct which, if happened, would require victims to testify again was an impermissible
comment on the evidence because it “aligned the trial court on the side of victims and against
defendants, implying that the jurors should share this view.” Br. of Appellant at 29. The trial
court remarked about victims in other cases in the context of admonishing the jury to avoid
misconduct. The trial court referred to examples of juror misconduct that resulted in mistrials to
emphasize the consequences of juror misconduct and the need to avoid it. The statements were
not made in reference to Tarrer or the witnesses in this case. The trial court’s attitude towards the
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merits of Tarrer’s case are not reasonably inferred from the nature or the manner of the trial court’s
statements. The trial court did not comment on the evidence.
IV. EXPERT WITNESS EXCLUSION
Tarrer argues that the trial court violated his right to present a defense when it excluded his
expert witness. The State argues that the trial court did not err, but that even if it erred, the error
was harmless. We agree with the State.
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s admission or exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of
discretion.9 State v. Willis, 151 Wash. 2d 255, 262, 87 P.3d 1164 (2004). The trial court’s discretion
is broad, and we reverse the trial court’s decision only if it rests on unreasonable or untenable
grounds. State v. Rafay, 168 Wash. App. 734, 783-84, 285 P.3d 83 (2012).
The federal and state constitutions’ guarantee a defendant the right to present a defense.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash. 2d
467, 474, 880 P.2d 517 (1994). But, this constitutional right is not absolute and does not extend
to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350, 362-63, 229 P.3d 669
(2010); State v. Maupin, 128 Wash. 2d 918, 925, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). Thus, the right to present a
defense is implicated only if the trial court excludes admissible evidence.
B. No Abuse of Discretion
ER 702 governs the admission of expert testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
9
Tarrer argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony and that this error
violated his right to defend himself. “Alleging that a ruling violated the defendant’s right to a fair
trial does not change the standard of review.” Dye, 178 Wash. 2d at 548.
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as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Expert testimony is admissible under ER 702 if “‘(1) the witness qualifies as an expert, (2) the
opinion is based upon an explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific community, and
(3) the expert testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.’” State v. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d 613, 655,
790 P.2d 610 (1990) (quoting State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312 (1984), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
Under CrR 4.7(b)(1), the defense must produce the names, addresses, and testimony of
witnesses no later than the omnibus hearing. The trial court has sound discretion to manage the
discovery process, and in extraordinary cases, it may exclude evidence that was presented in
violation of the rules. State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wash. 2d 863, 882, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Tarrer’s expert because its
decision rested on tenable grounds. The request to admit Dr. Kiesel’s testimony first occurred
during the third week of trial, it lacked foundation, and it appeared to be a tactic to introduce
inadmissible evidence.
First, the trial court noted that Tarrer first sought to introduce Dr. Kiesel’s testimony three
weeks into trial. The exclusion of evidence that violates court discovery rules is an extraordinary
remedy, but the trial court has sound discretion to manage discovery. Hutchinson, 135 Wash. 2d at
882.
Second, the trial court also excluded Dr. Kiesel’s testimony because it appeared to lack
foundation. The trial court noted that Dr. Kiesel had not examined McCorvey or her bullet
wounds, so his opinion on the wounds lacked foundation. All Dr. Kiesel could testify to were the
statements and opinions of the other doctors who did examine McCorvey’s wounds. Thus, the
trial court concluded that Dr. Kiesel’s highly generalized opinion about bullet wounds was “not an
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opinion with any certainty that we’re going to bring into this courtroom.” RP at 894. The trial
court properly considered this factor.
Finally, the trial court noted that Dr. Kiesel’s proposed testimony appeared to be an attempt
to circumvent our previous ruling about the underlying medical records. We upheld the exclusion
of expert testimony about other doctors’ opinions of whether McCorvey’s wounds were entrance
or exit wounds. See Tarrer, 2013 WL 1337943, at *10. Because the trial court relied on tenable
grounds and tenable reasons to exclude Dr. Kiesel’s testimony, it did not abuse its discretion and
therefore, Tarrer’s argument that he was denied a fair trial fails.
C. Harmless Error
Tarrer argues that the exclusion of his expert witness constituted a constitutional violation
of his right to present a defense and that the error entitles him to a new trial.10 Error of
constitutional magnitude can be harmless if it is proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Error is harmless
“if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the
same result without the error.” State v. Smith, 148 Wash. 2d 122, 139, 59 P.3d 74 (2002) (citing State
v. Whelchel, 115 Wash. 2d 708, 728, 801 P.2d 948 (1990)).
Here, even if the trial court erred in excluding Tarrer’s expert witness’s testimony, we are
still convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same
result even with Dr. Kiesel’s testimony. His testimony would have merely shown that doctors
sometimes misclassify entrance and exit wounds. Thus, Dr. Kiesel may have called into doubt
McCorvey’s testimony that she was shot in the front. However, this testimony would not have
10
Although the exclusion of testimony is not constitutional, we rely on the higher harmless error
standard since Tarrer alleges a constitutional violation of his right to present a defense.
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impeached McCorvey’s testimony that Tarrer shot her and Simpkins or countered the medical
records that indicated that McCorvey was shot in the front. Because of the overwhelming amount
of evidence supporting Tarrer’s conviction, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, even
with Dr. Kiesel’s testimony, any reasonable jury would have convicted Tarrer.
V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Tarrer argues that he did not receive a fair trial because numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument “eased the State’s burden of proof and destroyed the
presumption of innocence.” Br. of Appellant at 36. Although the prosecutor did err in a few
instances, the errors do not require reversal.
A. Standard of Review
A defendant who alleges prosecutorial misconduct must first establish that the prosecutor’s
conduct was improper. State v. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 759, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). Once a
defendant meets this threshold, we must determine whether the defendant was prejudiced. Emery,
174 Wash. 2d at 760. A defendant is prejudiced if there is a substantial likelihood that the misconduct
affected the jury’s verdict. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673
(2012). “We review a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument in the context of the total
argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury instructions.”
State v. Boehning, 127 Wash. App. 511, 519, 111 P.3d 899 (2005).
If the defendant objected at trial, we determine if there was a substantial likelihood that the
prosecutor’s misconduct prejudiced the defendant by affecting the jury’s verdict. Emery, 174
Wash. 2d at 760. If the defendant did not object at trial, he “is deemed to have waived any error,
unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not
have cured the resulting prejudice.” Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760-61. When reviewing a claim that
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prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal, we review the statements in the context of the entire
case. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43 (2011).
B. Appealing to Jury’s Sympathy
Tarrer claims that two of the prosecutor’s arguments improperly influenced the jury. The
first is when the prosecutor quoted Benjamin Cardozo and told the jury to balance Tarrer’s rights
with the accusers’ rights. The next is when the prosecutor stated, “‘It goes without saying . . . that
23 years is a very long time to wait for some final justice to come in this case.’” Br. of Appellant
at 41 (quoting RP at 1271). Tarrer argues that the prosecutor’s remarks diminished the jury’s role,
lowered the burden of proof, and suggested to the jury that it should convict on improper grounds.
Tarrer did not object at trial.
The prosecutor misstated the law in both instances. The role of the jury is not to balance
the rights of the accused and the accuser, rather, the “jury’s job is to determine whether the State
has proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760. And
both of the prosecutor’s remarks improperly appeal to the jury’s sympathy. See State v. Pierce,
169 Wash. App. 533, 555, 280 P.3d 1158 (2012). Reference to the amount of time between the
crimes and “final justice” served no purpose other than to appeal to the jury’s sympathy. It was
not relevant to Tarrer’s guilt.
Even though the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, Tarrer cannot show that the remarks
were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that a curative instruction would be ineffective. Here, the
prosecutor correctly argued the State’s burden of proof. If the defense had objected to the two
comments, curative instructions could have cured any prejudice.
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C. Reasonable Doubt Standard
Tarrer next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he discussed the
reasonable doubt standard and stated that the law did not let the jury consider a lack of evidence,
i.e. that it did not have DNA evidence, shoe prints, or the gun and the ballistics. Essentially, Tarrer
claims the prosecutor suggested that the jury could not consider a lack of evidence in its
deliberations. Tarrer did not object to the argument. After making this argument, the prosecutor
shortly thereafter correctly told the jury that a reasonable doubt may arise from a lack of evidence.
The prosecutor erred in suggesting to the jury that it could not look at the lack of evidence.
However, this error was not so flagrant and ill-intentioned that a curative instruction would not
have cured any resulting prejudice.
D. Disparaging the Defense
Tarrer next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging the defense
when he argued that “‘[Dr.] Loftus’s entire testimony was designed to make you think that it’s
impossible for any eyewitness to ever accurately identify . . . somebody who committed a crime
against them.’” Br. of Appellant at 40-41 (quoting RP at 1272). On appeal, Tarrer argues that the
prosecutor “implied that the defense used trickery, distraction, and confusion.” Br. of Appellant
at 41. Tarrer objected below, arguing that the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence, and the
trial court overruled his objection.
It is misconduct for the prosecutor to impugn the role or integrity of defense counsel. State
v. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d 423, 431-32, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). For example, a prosecutor commits
misconduct by referring to the defense’s case as “bogus” or “involving ‘sleight of hand’” because
such language implies “wrongful deception or even dishonesty in the context of a court
proceeding.” Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 451-52. But here, the prosecutor’s remarks were directed
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at the weight of Loftus’s testimony. The prosecutor was merely drawing a permissible inference
from the evidence about the credibility of a witness, not disparaging the defense.
E. Cumulative Misconduct
Finally, Tarrer argues that these alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct were so
pervasive that they affected the outcome of the trial and could not have been cured with proper
instruction. We disagree.
Although “‘the cumulative effect of repetitive prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct may be
so flagrant that no instruction or series of instructions can erase their combined prejudicial effect,’”
such is not the case here. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d at 707). Here, the only two instances of improper argument that Tarrer
establishes are the prosecutor’s appeals to the jury’s sympathy. Each argument was distinct and
each could have been easily cured by proper instruction to the jury. Additionally, they were two
relatively minor comments in the context of the State’s argument as a whole. We hold that the
two errors do not amount to such pervasive error that they could not have been cured by proper
instruction.
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Standard of Review
“Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law
and fact, which we review de novo.” State v. McLean, 178 Wash. App. 236, 246, 313 P.3d 1181
(2013); In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d 853, 865, 16 P.3d 610 (2001). To prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, Tarrer must show that (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient
that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced him. State v. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987) (citing Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Failure to establish
either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
There is a strong presumption that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient. State v.
McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). To establish prejudice, Tarrer must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced his case. See Fleming, 142 Wash. 2d at 865.
B. Expert Witness Deadline
Tarrer first argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to timely disclose Dr. Kiesel
as an expert witness. Defense counsel has a duty “to bear such skill and knowledge as will render
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Failing to disclose an
expert witness by the discovery deadline falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Therefore, Tarrer’s counsel’s performance was deficient. However, Tarrer cannot demonstrate
prejudice. As discussed above, the trial court properly excluded Dr. Kiesel’s testimony for several
reasons, including lack of foundation and that the proposed testimony appeared to be an attempt
to circumvent our previous ruling about the underlying medical records. Tarrer cannot show that
the deficient performance affected his case because he cannot demonstrate that the trial court
would have admitted Dr. Kiesel’s testimony but for the missed discovery deadline. Because no
prejudice exists, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
C. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
Tarrer next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
improper closing argument. Even if his counsel’s performance was deficient, Tarrer again fails to
demonstrate prejudice. As discussed above, though some of the prosecutor’s comments were
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improper, the errors do not amount to such pervasive error that they could not have been cured by
proper instruction. Tarrer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because there was no
prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
VII. REASONABLE DOUBT MANDATORY JURY INSTRUCTION
In a supplemental assignment of error, Tarrer argues that the “reasonable doubt” jury
instruction was constitutionally deficient because it required the jury to articulate a reason for
having a reasonable doubt. But, Tarrer concedes that the trial court followed our Supreme Court
when it used WPIC 4.01, 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 4.01, at 85 (3d ed. 2008), to instruct the jury. The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that WPIC 4.01 is “the correct legal instruction on reasonable doubt.” State v.
Kalebaugh, 183 Wash. 2d 578, 585-86, 355 P.3d 253 (2015). The trial court did not err.
VIII. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERROR
The defendant bears the burden of proving an accumulation of error of sufficient magnitude
that retrial is necessary. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wash. 2d 296, 332, 868 P.2d 835, cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 849 (1994). Cumulative error may warrant reversal, even if each error standing
alone would otherwise be considered harmless. State v. Greiff, 141 Wash. 2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390
(2000). The doctrine does not apply where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the
outcome of the trial. State v. Weber, 159 Wash. 2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006). Where no
prejudicial error is shown to have occurred, cumulative error cannot be said to have deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. 478, 498, 794 P.2d 38 (1990). If any error
occurred in the trial, it was harmless; therefore, there was no cumulative error.
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We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Johanson, C.J.
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