Personal Restraint Petition Of Kyle Christopher Buckingham

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
Petition of No. 78894-9-I
KYLE CHRISTOPHER BUCKINGHAM, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner. FILED: January 27, 2020
VERELLEN, J. — In this personal restraint petition, Kyle Buckingham seeks
relief from a trial court order entered more than ten years ago revoking his
suspended special sexual offender sentence alternative (SSOSA) sentence.
Buckingham contends that he is entitled to a new hearing because, more than
eight years after the revocation, some of his SSOSA conditions were determined
to be unconstitutional or invalid. But the revocation was largely based on
Buckingham’s violations of sex offender treatment requirements, SSOSA
conditions that were not invalidated. In these circumstances, Buckingham
cannot meet his burden to establish constitutional error that has resulted in actual
and substantial prejudice, or nonconstitutional error that has resulted in a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.
We deny the petition.
No. 78894-9-1/2
FACTS
In 2007, the State charged 21-year-old Kyle Buckingham with rape of a
child based on allegations that he raped his girlfriend’s 4-year-old daughter.1
The trial court convicted him after he agreed to a bench trial upon stipulated
documentary evidence.
In March 2008, consistent with the recommendation in the presentence
investigation report, the court imposed a SSOSA sentence with a minimum term
of 93 months. The court ordered 12 months of confinement and suspended the
remaining 81 months. Following the term of confinement, the judgment provided
for Buckingham to be placed on community custody under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections (DOC). The judgment and sentence also required
Buckingham to undergo and successfully complete two years of sex offender
treatment. In an appendix attached to Buckingham’s judgment and sentence, the
court imposed 29 conditions of sentence.
On March 8, 2009, a year after he was sentenced, Buckingham was
released from jail. He enrolled in a sex offender treatment program. Less than
two months later, Buckingham’s community corrections officer (CCC) filed a
notice of violation alleging 15 separate violations of sentencing conditions.
According to the report, Buckingham violated his SSOSA conditions by using a
controlled substance, Vicodin, without a prescription, leaving the county without
permission, accessing a computer, accessing the Internet, having an unapproved
Many of the underlying facts are derived from our decision in
1
Buckingham’s prior collateral proceeding. See In re Pers. Restraint Petition of
Buckinqham, No. 74697-9, noted at 198 Wn. App. 1060 (2017).
2
No. 78894-9-1/3
cellphone, viewing pornography on two occasions, staying overnight at an
unapproved residence, and violating curfew. The report also alleged that
Buckingham violated conditions of his sexual offender treatment contract by
having undisclosed and unapproved romantic relationships and sexual contact,
by accessing telephone sex lines, and engaging in sexual text messaging.
Finally, the report alleged that Buckingham was suspended from his sexual
offender treatment program. The violations were based on Buckingham’s
admissions during a polygraph examination.
A violation hearing took place in superior court on April 30, 2009.
Buckingham was represented by counsel and admitted guilt as to each of the
violations. With regard to the sanction, Buckingham’s CCC recommended jail
time followed by a period of GPS monitoring and a requirement that Buckingham
reenter sex offender treatment. The State agreed but urged the court to impose
300 days of sanction time, whereas the CCC recommended 150 days. The
defense agreed with the CCO’s recommended sanction.
The court rejected the recommendations and revoked Buckingham’s
SSOSA:
did have a chance prior to the hearing to review in detail all
of the report from the Department of Corrections. As counsel
knows, when I hand down a SSOSA, I typically inform the
defendant that this is their opportunity for treatment and, if they do
not take advantage of it, they in fact will be going to prison.
These are not technical violations. These go to the heart of
whether or not he has accepted the court’s admonition in terms of
remaining away from pornography, following all the rules of the
treatment provider, following the rules of the DCC, and it’s
extremely disturbing to this court that it’s less than a month after he
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No. 78894-9-1/4
was in jail for almost a year that he has some 15 separate
violations.
I can’t in good conscious continue to say, well, we’ll give him
another lengthy jail time and he will learn his lesson somehow
better the second time around. I look at somebody who just doesn’t
get it in terms of I meant what I said. You either follow the rules or
you go to prison.~2~
On May 5, 2009, the court entered an order revoking Buckingham’s
sentence.
More than seven years later, Buckingham filed a post-conviction motion,
challenging several SSOSA conditions as unconstitutional or facially invalid. The
State conceded error with respect to several conditions, and this court granted
relief. In October 2017, on remand, the trial court entered an order striking four
conditions of Buckingham’s SSOSA in full and striking portions of two additional
conditions.
Specifically, the court struck the following SSOSA conditions on remand:
6. Do not frequent areas where minor children are known to
congregate, as defined by the supervising Community Corrections
Officer.
9. Do not possess or control any item designed or used to
entertain, attract or lure children.
18. Do not access the Internet on any computer in any
location, unless such access is approved in advance by the
supervising Community Corrections Officer and your treatment
provider. Any computer to which you have access is subject to
search.
22. You may not possess or maintain access to a computer,
unless specifically authorized by your supervising Community
Corrections Officer. You may not possess any computer parts, or
peripherals, including but not limited to hard drives, storage
2 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Apr. 30, 2009) at 6.
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No. 78894-9-1/5
devices, digital cameras, web cams, wireless video devices or
receivers, CD/DVD burners, or any device to store [or] reproduce
digital media or storage.[3J
The court also struck the following sentence from condition No. 7: “Do not
possess or access pornographic materials, as directed by the supervising
Community Corrections Officer” and a reference to plethysmograph examinations
in condition No. 26.~
In 2018, Buckingham filed a motion in superior court seeking a new
revocation hearing. He argued that revocation was largely based on violations of
the condition prohibiting him from viewing or accessing pornography—one of the
conditions that was stricken from his judgment and sentence in 2017.
Buckingham characterized the other violations as “minimal.”5 He pointed out that
the trial court did not indicate that it would have revoked his sentence based
solely on his violation of conditions that were not subsequently invalidated. The
superior court transferred the motion to this court for consideration as a personal
restraint petition.6
ANALYSIS
In a personal restraint petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proof.7
Generally, to obtain relief by means of a personal restraint petition, a petitioner
must “establish that a constitutional error has resulted in actual and substantial
~ Buckinqham, No. 74697-9 at 3.
4kL at 6,8.
~ Mtn. for New Revocation Hrg. at 3.
6 See CrR 7.8(c)(2).
~ In re Pers. Restraint of Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 819, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982).
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No. 78894-9-1/6
prejudice, or that a nonconstitutional error has resulted in a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”8 Where there has
been no prior opportunity for judicial review, a petitioner need only demonstrate
restraint under RAP 16.4(b) and that the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c).9
In this case, Buckingham had a prior opportunity for judicial review of the
revocation of his SSOSA, although he did not appeal the 2009 court order.1°
Accordingly, Buckingham must meet the usual standard of demonstrating actual
and substantial prejudice stemming from a constitutional error or
nonconstitutional error that inherently results in a fundamental defect and
complete miscarriage of justice.
As to the threshold procedural issue of timeliness, the parties both
assume that RCW 10.73.090 applies and take different positions as to when
Buckingham’s criminal judgment and sentence became final. RCW 10.73.090(1)
provides that a collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case
must be filed within one year after the judgment becomes final. But we need not
resolve the issues of whether and how RCW 10.73.090 might apply here
because, even assuming Buckingham’s petition is not time barred, he fails to
establish a basis for relief.
8 In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 2 Wn. App. 2d 904, 909, 413 P.3d 1043(2018) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 298, 88 P.3d
390 (2004)).
~ In re Pers. Restraint of Cashaw, 123 Wn.2d 138, 148, 866 P.2d 8(1994);
RAP 16.4.
10 See RAP 2.2; State v. Hand, 173 Wn. App. 903, 908, 295 P.3d 828 (2013)
(involving untimely appeal of an order revoking SSOSA sentence).
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No. 78894-9-117
RCW 9.94A.670 allows a “court [to] suspend the sentence of a first-time
sexual offender if the offender is shown to be amenable to treatment.”11 Our
courts have acknowledged that the loss of a SSOSA sentence is a “significant
consequence” to a defendant.12 But even so, the governing statute,
RCW 9.94A.670(11), provides broad authority to the court to revoke a suspended
SSOSA sentence upon finding violations of SSOSA conditions or failure to make
the requisite progress in treatment:
The court may revoke the suspended sentence at any time during
the period of community custody and order execution of the
sentence if: (a) The offender violates the conditions of the
suspended sentence, or (b) the court finds that the offender is
failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment.
A trial court’s decision to revoke a SSOSA suspended sentence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.13 A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or
reasons.14 Our case law illustrates the broad discretion of courts to revoke a
suspended SSOSA sentence based on any established violations of conditions
of the sentence.15
~ State v. Miller, 159Wn. App. 911, 917, 247 P.3d 457 (2011).
12 State v. Sims, 171 Wn.2d 436, 443, 256 P.3d 285 (2011).
13 State v. Miller, 180 Wn. App. 413, 416-1 7, 325 P.3d 230 (2014).
14 kI. at 417 (quoting State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 706, 213 P.3d
32 (2009)).
15 For instance, in State v. Miller, the defendant violated a condition of his
suspended sentence by engaging in a romantic relationship with a woman whose
minor son was blind and autistic without disclosing the relationship to his COO.
Miller, 159 Wn. App. at 915-16. Miller appealed the revocation of his SSOSA
sentence, and we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, even
though the revocation occurred nine years into the defendant’s ten-year
suspended sentence. Miller, 159 Wn. App. at 919. And in McCormick, 166
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No. 78894-9-I/S
Buckingham fails to allege, much less establish, that the court committed
a constitutional error in revoking his sentence that resulted in actual and
substantial prejudice. Nor does he identify a nonconstitutional error that resulted
in a fundamental defect and complete miscarriage of justice. Instead, he
suggests that the underpinnings of the trial court’s decision to revoke his SSOSA
are “suspect,” given that conditions related to pornography, Internet and
computer access, and other conditions were subsequently stricken or
amended.16
But a petitioner’s burden on collateral review generally requires more than
a showing of mere “possibility of prejudice.”17 And, as explained, Buckingham
conceded guilt as to all 15 violations. The majority of those violations, 10 out of
15, relate to conditions not implicated by the amendment of Buckingham’s
judgment and sentence. Six of the ten unaffected violations involved
Buckingham’s failure to comply with sex offender treatment and his ultimate
suspension from his treatment program. The conditions of Buckingham’s
SSOSA sentence required him to “[p]articipate and make progress in sexual
deviancy treatment” and to “[f]ollow all conditions outlined in [his] treatment
contract.”18 Far from being “minimal,” the repeated violations of his treatment
Wn.2d at 705, our Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking the defendant’s SSOSA sentence after he on several
occasions violated a condition prohibiting him from frequenting locations where
minors are known to congregate.
16 Supp. Br. of Pet. at 8.
17 Hagler, 97 Wn.2d at 825 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982)).
18 Judgment & Sentence, App. A. (Mar. 19, 2008) at 2 (Condition 23).
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contract went to the core of Buckingham’s compliance with the SSOSA. The key
to the court’s decision to revoke Buckingham’s SSOSA was the court’s opinion
that he was failing to take advantage of the opportunity for treatment provided by
the SSOSA. The subsequent order amending Buckingham’s sentence does not
undermine this rationale.19
To the extent Buckingham suggests that the order revoking his SSOSA is
not supported by sufficient evidence in light of the invalidated conditions, we
disagree.
Disregarding the five violations pertaining to invalidated conditions,
Buckingham does not challenge the court’s findings that he committed ten
violations of conditions of sentence by consuming drugs, having unapproved
overnight visits, violating curfew, committing numerous violations of his sex
offender treatment contract, and being suspended from treatment. These
findings are verities on appeal.2° Most importantly, within two months of
engaging in sexual deviancy treatment, Buckingham admitted to six violations of
his treatment contract and was suspended from treatment. None of those
19 Buckingham’s analogy to sentencing errors on direct review is
misplaced. See, e.g., State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 517, 859 P.2d 36 (1993)
(requiring resentencing where exceptional sentence premised on multiple factors
and it was unclear whether the court would have departed from the standard
range based on valid factor alone). The fact that the trial court did not expressly
state that it would have revoked the SSOSA sentence based solely on the ten
violations of SSOSA conditions not invalidated does not establish actual and
substantial prejudice stemming from a constitutional error or nonconstitutional
error resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. Of course, a defendant
challenging a sentence on direct review does not bear these additional burdens
associated with collateral review.
20 See State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).
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No. 78894-9-1/10
conditions were invalid. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
Buckingham’s sentence based on his violations of SSOSA conditions and failure
to make satisfactory progress on treatment. Under these facts, Buckingham has
failed to meet his burden to establish that he is entitled to collateral relief. We
deny his petition.
WE CONCUR:
L~0~ o~
10