State Of Washington v. Marcques Elijha Crawford

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 73131-9-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MARCQUES E. CRAWFORD,
Appellant. FILED: August 8, 2016
Appelwick, J. — Crawford was convicted of rape of a child in the third
degree and delivery of methamphetamine. The court sentenced him to a standard
range sentence of 18 months on the rape conviction and 61 months on the delivery
conviction. He argues that the trial court erred by considering the allegations of
promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor in imposing these sentences. We
affirm.
FACTS
Marcques Crawford was charged with promoting commercial sexual abuse
of a minor, rape of a child in the third degree, and violation of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW—delivery of methamphetamine
(meth) to a minor. The charges stemmed from Crawford's relationship with a
No. 73131-9-1/2
female minor, 15 year old N.J. The State alleged that Crawford had a sexual
relationship with N.J., supported her commercial sexual abuse and profited from
it, and that he supplied her with methamphetamine.
The case proceeded to trial, and N.J. testified. N.J. explained that during
the summer of 2013, she ran away from home. During that summer, she met
Crawford on a website. N.J. began spending time with Crawford. They smoked
methamphetamine together, which Crawford obtained for them. Shortly after they
met, Crawford began talking to N.J. about working as a prostitute. And, they
started having sexual intercourse.
N.J. testified that Crawford continued bringing up the subject of prostitution.
Eventually, N.J. agreed, because she believed Crawford would keep asking her.
Over several months, N.J. engaged in prostitution by walking the streets and using
Internet ads, and she gave Crawford the money she received.
In December, N.J. became afraid that Crawford would hurt her. She called
911 to tell the police that Crawford was pimping juveniles and that he had a gun.
The police arrived at Crawford's apartment, and he was arrested that day.
The jury convicted Crawford of the rape and delivery charges. However,
the jury could not reach a verdict on the promoting charge. The State agreed to
dismiss this charge.
The trial court proceeded to sentence Crawford. It imposed standard range
sentences of 18 months for the rape conviction and 61 months for the delivery
conviction. Crawford appeals.
No. 73131-9-1/3
DISCUSSION
Crawford argues that the trial court relied on the unproved allegations of
promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor to impose his sentences for rape
and delivery. He asserts that by doing so, the court violated the real facts doctrine.
Generally, sentences within the standard sentence range are not
appealable. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481, 139 P.3d
334 (2006). The trial court has discretion to sentence a defendant within the
sentence range, and so long as the sentence falls within the standard sentence
range, there can be no abuse of discretion as to the sentence's length. RCW
9.94A.530(1); State v. Williams. 149 Wn.2d 143, 146-47, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003). A
defendant may appeal a standard range sentence only if the sentencing court
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, or constitutional requirements. State v. Osman, 157
Wn.2d at 481-82. Cases permitting such a procedural challenge to a standard
range sentence have typically involved errors in calculating the appropriate
standard range. State v. Mail, 65 Wn. App. 295, 298, 828 P.2d 70 (1992), affd,
121 Wn.2d 707, 845 P.2d 1042 (1993).
Crawford argues that his standard range sentence is appealable, because
the trial court committed a procedural error by considering facts relating to the
unproved promoting charge. He relies on RCW 9.94A.530(2), which sets out the
real facts doctrine. That provision of the SRA provides,
In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the
standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than
is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or
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proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing, or proven pursuant to
RCW 9.94A.537. Acknowledgment includes not objecting to
information stated in the presentence reports and not objecting to
criminal history presented at the time of sentencing. Where the
defendant disputes material facts, the court must either not consider
the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point. The facts shall
be deemed proved at the hearing by a preponderance of the
evidence, except as otherwise specified in RCW 9.94A.537. On
remand for resentencing following appeal or collateral attack, the
parties shall have the opportunity to present and the court to consider
all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal
history not previously presented.
RCW 9.94A.530(2).
This doctrine limits sentencing decisions to the facts that were
acknowledged, pleaded to, or proven. State v. Houf. 120 Wn.2d 327, 332, 841
P.2d 42 (1992). And, it ensures that sentencing courts do not base exceptional
sentences on unproved or uncharged crimes. State v. Morreira, 107 Wn. App.
450, 458, 27 P.3d 639 (2001).
Crawford points to evidence in the record to show that the court relied on
the facts relating to the promoting charge to sentence him. The State
recommended a sentence toward the higher end of the range, given Crawford's
overarching behavior and the fact that the hung jury voted nine in favor of
conviction, three infavor of acquittal. Crawford objected, because these facts were
related to the dismissed charge of promoting. The court did not explicitly rule on
this objection. In announcing its decision, the court addressed Crawford:
The crimes you're convicted of are really serious, though, and it's
really important—I realize you disagree with a lot of the facts and it's
your right to do that, but the actions that you took, even if I only
considered the crimes that you were convicted of, really had a
profound effect on [N.J's] life. And that's true even if she was already
addicted to meth when she met you, that was true even if she was
involved in various sexual activities before she met you. . . . And
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there isn't really anything the court can do that's going to make all
this right, but Ithink it's really important that you acknowledge, ifonly
to yourself, that you played a significant role in harming this young
woman.
The court continued by telling Crawford that he would have to make choices about
what kind of relationship he would have with other people, including women, going
forward. The court ultimately decided that neither a low end nor a high end
sentence was appropriate considering the facts of the case.
From these statements, Crawford asserts that the trial court violated the real
facts doctrine. He contends that by stating "even if I only considered the crimes
that you were convicted of," the court acknowledged that it was considering the
promoting charge as well as the rape and delivery convictions. He suggests that
by mentioning N.J.'s sexual activities before she met Crawford, the court alluded
to N.J.'s prior acts of prostitution. And, he asserts that the court's warning that
Crawford will have to make choices about the relationships he will have with
women meant that he will have to decide whether he can stop treating women as
objects from which he can profit.
We disagree that these statements signaled consideration of the promoting
charge. Rather, they indicated that the court would not consider the facts
underlying that charge as the State had urged. The court imposed a sentence
based on only the crimes for which Crawford was convicted. Crawford does not
allege an error in calculating the range itself. And, the cases he relies upon to
assert a violation of the real facts doctrine all involve exceptional sentences, rather
than standard range sentences. See, e.g., Morreira. 107 Wn. App. at 454-55;
State v. Tiernev. 74 Wn. App. 346, 350, 872 P.2d 1145 (1994); State v. Houf, 120
No. 73131-9-1/6
Wn.2d 327, 328, 841 P.2d 42 (1992). We hold that Crawford's standard range
sentence is not appealable.
In his reply brief, Crawford asserts that appellate costs should not be
imposed. Crawford's argument relates to this court's recent decision in State v.
Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. 380, 367 P.3d 612 (2016). In Sinclair, we noted that RAP
15.2(f) created a presumption of continued indigency throughout review. 192 Wn.
App. at 393. Because there was no finding that Sinclair's financial condition had
improved and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of indigency, we ruled
that appellate costs were not appropriate, jd.
We follow Sinclair here. The trial court found that Crawford lacked sufficient
funds to pursue an appeal and determined that he was entitled to appellate counsel
at public expense. The State has not overcome the continuing presumption of
indigency. Therefore, we conclude that appellate costs should not be awarded to
the State.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
dL
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