State Of Washington v. Darren Gene Law

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 78677-6-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DARREN GENE LAW,
Appellant. FILED: March 23, 2020
APPELWICK, C.J. — Law appeals his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to manufacture or deliver. He argues that the trial
court violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict, because it failed to instruct the
jury that it had to unanimously agree on which of two acts supported the conviction.
He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge
based on governmental misconduct. And, he asserts that the provision in his
judgment and sentence imposing interest on nonrestitution LFOs must be struck.
We affirm Law’s conviction, but remand to the trial court to strike the provision
requiring interest accrual on nonrestitution LFO5.
FACTS
On August 15, 2017, Everett police engaged in an “open-air drug market
interdiction.” As a part of this effort, Officer Oleg Kravchun conducted surveillance
at Clark Park. He saw Darren Law arrive at the park and approach an individual
lying in a grassy area. As Law approached, the individual got up. Law then
No. 78677-6-1/2
reached into his right cargo shorts pocket, retrieved a powdery substance, and
sprinkled the substance into the individual’s hand. The substance appeared white
or clear. At that point, the two bumped fists, and the individual immediately left the
park.
After that exchange, a second individual entered the park and approached
Law. Law gave the individual something small from the same right cargo shorts
pocket, and the individual ran out of the park. A third individual then entered the
park. When he made contact with Law, Law reached into the same right pocket
and sprinkled a substance into the individual’s hand. The third individual quickly
left the park as well. Law then gave two more individuals something small from
the same right pocket. During the last exchange, Law was given a green, folded
up paper that Kravchun believed to be currency. Law then left the park.
Police arrested Law nearby. In a search incident to arrest, they found a
loose crystal substance that appeared to be methamphetamine in his right cargo
shorts pocket. They also found a sandwich bag containing a substance that
appeared to be methamphetamine in his left front pocket. The sandwich bag was
tied off at the end. The substance in the sandwich bag in Law’s left pocket later
tested positive for methamphetamine. The loose crystal in his right pocket was
never tested.
Police also searched a backpack Law was carrying. Inside, they found a
digital scale and about half a dozen small, ziplock style “baggies.” The baggies
were empty, and consistent with the type that police often find in the drug trade.
2
No. 78677-6-1/3
Last, police found that Law had a cell phone on him. A case report describing the
arrest indicated that they intended to obtain a search warrant for the phone.
On August 18, 2017, the State charged Law with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. On August 22, an attorney filed a
notice of appearance on Law’s behalf. Defense counsel received a copy of the
case report mentioning the intent to obtain the search warrant.
On October 3, 2017, Kravchun filed an affidavit for a search warrant for
Law’s cell phone. The affidavit described different methods that could be used to
conduct the search:
JTAG [(Joint Test Action Group)], ISP [In-System Programming)]
and “chip off’ are separate processes that may be performed on
damaged devices, security protected devices (prohibiting access to
the device), devices that do not have debugging mode enabled,
and/or devices not fully supported by non-destructive forensic tools
or software and/or when a logical extraction is not sufficient.
JTAG and ISP are non-destructive processes in which the device’s
memory is accessed via points located on the mainboard. The
memory is then extracted using a supported memory box, reader or
adaptor.
A “chip off” examination is a destructive process in which the physical
memory is removed from the mainboard of the device, cleaned, and
the binary memory is extracted using a supported memory box,
reader, or adaptor.
The “chip off” process involves the use of heat to physically remove
the chip from the seated area on the board and permanently renders
the device inoperable. Mobile electronic devices are extremely
complex so there is always a risk that the memory chip may be
permanently damaged and rendered unreadable during a chip off
examination.
JTAG and ISP are usually attempted prior to performing a “chip off’
extraction; however not all devices are supported.
3
No. 78677-6-1/4
A judge issued a warrant the same day, authorizing the JTAG, ISP, and chip off
methods. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel received notice of the
application motion nor issuance of the warrant at the time.
Detective Steve Paxton proceeded to conduct a search of Law’s cell phone.
The JTAG and ISP search methods were not successful. Therefore, he used the
chip off method. The chip off was successful. But, Paxton was unable to read the
memory chip or extract any data stored within the chip, effectively ending his
examination. The procedure rendered Law’s phone inoperable. Paxton and
Kravchun both completed case reports concerning the search. Kravchun uploaded
his report to the Everett Police Department’s computer system. He thought that a
detective would send the report to the prosecutor’s office. However, this never
occurred.
Before trial, defense counsel interviewed Kravchun. Defense counsel did
not ask Kravchun any questions about whether he had obtained a search warrant
for Law’s cell phone, and Kravchun did not raise the subject. By uploading his
report about the search, Kravchun believed that the prosecutor, who was at the
interview, already had this information. Neither the prosecutor nor defense
counsel received information about the search before trial.
Trial began on February 5, 2018. That day, defense counsel cross
examined Kravchun about his intention to obtain a search warrant for Law’s cell
phone:
Q. One of the items that you entered into evidence in this case is
a phone, a cellular phone; right?
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No. 78677-6-1/5
A. Yes.
Q. And you attributed ownership of that phone to Mr. Law; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said that it was your plan to seek a search warrant
for the contents of that phone; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And the reason you wanted to seek a search warrant for the
contents of that phone is that you wanted to see if people were
asking Mr. Law for drugs; right?
A. Correct.
Q. To see if there were any text messages in that phone
requesting drugs; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. No search warrant was ever granted in this case; right?
A. Itwas.
Defense counsel then asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury.
He and the prosecutor both told the trial court that they knew nothing about the
search of Law’s cell phone. The court took a recess so that the prosecutor could
speak with Kravchun. During the recess, the prosecutor learned that Kravchun
had completed a follow up report that he did not receive. The prosecutor explained
this to the court, and defense counsel received a copy of the search warrant within
a few minutes. He also received copies of Paxton’s and Kravchun’s reports about
the search. Law then moved for a mistrial. The court granted his request, and set
the case for retrial on April 27, 2018.
5
No. 78677-6-1/6
On April 24, 2018, Law moved to dismiss the case. He relied in part on CrR
8.3(b), which allows the trial court dismiss a criminal prosecution due to arbitrary
action or governmental misconduct. The court denied Law’s motion. At the
hearing on the motion, it explained,
I don’t think I can find that the failure to disclose rises to the
level of government misconduct. I certainly can’t find that there was
anything intentional about it. So there would have to be such gross
mismanagement that that establishes misconduct. And I don’t think
I have found that on the record I have. I’m going to admit there are
some gaps I think in exactly what happened, but I don’t think I can fill
them in by assuming something improper happened without more.
So then, you know, the question has to be more a question of
the issue, more a question of whether or not the destruction of the
ability to ever access what was on the phone rises to some level that
the defendant is entitled to have this case dismissed.
Again, I don’t think that the case law supports finding that
simply because again, it’s not as if I can find they intentionally
--
destroyed the phone. I don’t think that was their intent. I think the
record makes it pretty clear they hoped to get inculpatory evidence.
And I think you’re right, what you’re saying is the more appropriate
way to handle it, that you can cross-examine about it, you may be
entitled to some instruction about it.
The new trial began on May 22, 2018. Kravchun and Paxton both testified.
During Kravchun’s direct examination, he testified that he had obtained a search
warrant for Law’s cell phone, but that Paxton was not “able to get much information,
anything that [he] could use, off of the phone.” Defense counsel cross-examined
Kravchun regarding his failure to inform the prosecutor that he was seeking a
search warrant for the phone, and that he had received authorization to search the
phone. Paxton testified that, despite the successful chip off procedure, he was
unable to get any data from the phone’s chip.
6
No. 78677-6-117
After the State rested, the trial court read the following instruction to the jury:
“The State introduced evidence of an untested substance, to wit: a crystal, found
in Mr. Law’s right cargo shorts pocket. This evidence is not sufficient on its own to
support a finding that Mr. Law possessed a controlled substance.” The court also
instructed the jury, “[l]f you find that the State has allowed to be destroyed or lost
any evidence whose content or quality are an issue, you may, but are not required
to, infer that the lost evidence is against the State’s interest.”
The jury found Law guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to 85
months of confinement and 12 months of community custody. It also imposed a
$500 victim assessment. Law’s judgment and sentence provided that the legal
financial obligations (LFOs) imposed “shall bear interest from the date of the
judgment until payment in full.”
Law appeals.
DISCUSSION
Law makes three main arguments. First, he argues that the trial court
violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict, because it failed to instruct the jury
that it had to unanimously agree on which act supported conviction. Second, he
argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge based
on governmental misconduct. Third, he argues that the provision in his judgment
and sentence imposing interest on nonrestitution LFOs must be struck.
7
No. 78677-6-1/8
I. Unanimity Instruction
Law argues first that the trial court violated his right to a unanimous jury
verdict. He contends that the evidence described two distinct acts, the prosecutor
relied on both acts, and the instructions did not require the jury to unanimously
agree on which act supported conviction.1
“Where the State presents evidence of several distinct acts, any one of
which could be the basis of a criminal charge, the trial court must ensure that the
jury reaches a unanimous verdict on one particular incident.” State v. Handran,
113 Wash. 2d 11, 17, 775 P.2d 453 (1989). But, this rule applies only where the State
presents evidence of several distinct acts. ki “[T]he State need not make an
election and the trial court need not give a unanimity instruction if the evidence
shows the defendant was engaged in a ‘continuing course of conduct.” State v.
Fiallo-Lopez, 78 Wash. App. 717, 724, 899 P.2d 1294 (1995) (quoting Handran, 113
Wash. 2d at 17).
To determine whether criminal conduct constitutes one continuing act, we
evaluate the evidence in a commonsense manner. Handran, 113 Wash. 2d at 17.
“[E]vidence that the charged conduct occurred at different times and places tends
1 Law failed to raise this alleged error below. A party may raise for the first
time on appeal a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3). This
court has previously held that, “[b]ecause . .the test for determining whether an
.
alleged error is ‘manifest’ is closely related to the test for the substantive issue of
whether a Petrich [unanimity] instruction was required, we conflate these two
analyses.” State v. Knutz, 161 Wash. App. 395, 407, 253 P.3d 437 (2011) (citing
Statev. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984), overruled on other cirounds
~ State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). Accordingly, we reach
the issue under Knutz.
8
No. 78677-6-1/9
to show that several distinct acts occurred.” Fiallo-Lopez, 78 Wash. App. at 724. On
the other hand, evidence that a defendant engaged in a series of actions intended
to secure the same objective supports a continuing course of conduct. j~
Law relies on State v. King, 75 Wash. App. 899, 878 P.2d 466 (1994). There,
police stopped a car in which King was a passenger. King, 75 Wash. App. at 901.
As King stepped out of the car, one of the officers saw him toss something away.
kL The officer also saw that his fanny pack was open, despite having been closed
just moments before. k~. As the driver stepped out of the car, another officer saw
him make a throwing motion in the direction of the car’s interior. ki. One of the
officers then searched between the driver and passenger seats, and found a
Tylenol container with rock cocaine inside. j~. They arrested King as a result.2
ki. Upon arrival at the police station, an officer found another piece of rock cocaine
in King’s fanny pack. j.çj. The State charged King with only one count of
possession of cocaine. j~ At trial, King requested a written unanimity instruction.
j~ at 903. The trial court denied his request due to “the State’s avowed intention
to make an election in argument.” ki. However, the State offered both the Tylenol
bottle and the fanny pack as a basis for conviction. ki. A jury found King guilty as
charged. jçj~ at 902.
On appeal, this court found that the State’s evidence did not tend to show
a continuing course of conduct. ki. at 903. It explained, “The State’s evidence
tended to show two distinct instances of cocaine possession occurring at different
2 Police had already arrested the driver based on an outstanding warrant.
King, 75 Wash. App. at 901.
9
No. 78677-6-I/I 0
times, in different places, and involving two different containers-the Tylenol bottle
and the fanny pack. One alleged possession was constructive; the other, actual.”
jç~ Because the State did not elect to rely on either the Tylenol bottle or the fanny
pack as a basis for conviction, this court could not “say that the jury acted with
unanimity as to one act of possession.” j~ Thus, it held that the trial court’s failure
to issue a unanimity instruction amounted to constitutional error. ki.
Law also attempts to distinguish this case from Fiallo-Lopez and State v.
Love, 80 Wash. App. 357, 908 P.2d 395 (1996). In Fiallo-Lopez, Lima delivered a
sample of cocaine to a police informant at a restaurant. 78 Wash. App. at 720. The
two then met at a Safeway parking lot, where Lima delivered a bag of cocaine. ki.
at 722. Lima later agreed to work with police and told them that Fiallo-Lopez
supplied the cocaine for these transactions. j~ at 721, 723. The State charged
Fiallo-Lopez with one count of delivery of cocaine, and one count of possession of
cocaine. jçj. at 723. A jury found him guilty as charged. On appeal, Fiallo
Lopez argued that he was entitled to a unanimity instruction as to the delivery
charge. ki This court disagreed, holding that “the testimony and other evidence
show that the drug transaction was a continuing course of conduct.” Id. at 725. It
noted that “the fact that the two deliveries here occurred at different times and
places is outweighed by the commonsense consideration that they were both
intended for the same ultimate purpose, delivery of cocaine by Fiallo-Lopez to [the
informant].” Id. at 726.
10
No. 78677-6-I/Il
In Love, police were conducting surveillance of Love’s residence in
preparation to execute a search warrant, when Love exited the residence. 80 Wn.
App. at 358. Police stopped him a few blocks away, and arrested him after finding
5 rocks of cocaine inside a container in his pocket. ki. at 359. In a subsequent
search of Love’s residence, police found 40 additional rocks of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia. j~ The State charged Love with one count of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver. j.~ at 362. A jury found him guilty as
charged. at 360.
On appeal, Love argued that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a
unanimity instruction. jçL This court disagreed, distinguishing the case from King.
~ at 362-63. It explained,
Love’s possession of five rocks of cocaine on his person and the forty
rocks in his residence, when considered in conjunction with the other
evidence of an ongoing drug trafficking operation found at Love’s
residence, reflect his single objective to make money by trafficking
cocaine; thus, both instances of possession constituted a continuous
course of conduct.
Id. at 362. This court further explained that, in King, a rational juror could have
believed that the cocaine found in the car belonged to the driver, and that the
cocaine found in the fanny pack belonged to King. ki. at 363. In contrast, an
equally rational juror could have believed that King constructively possessed the
cocaine found in the car, and that, as King claimed, the police planted the cocaine
in his fanny pack. j~ Love had also argued that the police planted the cocaine
found in his pocket and at his residence. ki. But, as this court noted, the jury was
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No. 78677-6-1/12
left “with no rational basis to distinguish the cocaine found on Love from that at his
home.” Id.
This case is more like Fiallo-Lopez and Love. While at the park, Law
sprinkled a substance from his right pocket into multiple individuals’ hands. He
also gave multiple individuals something small from the same pocket. At one point,
Law was given a folded up paper that appeared to be currency. After he left the
park, police arrested him nearby. They found a loose crystal substance in his right
pocket that appeared to be methamphetamine. They found a tied off sandwich
bag in his left pocket with methamphetamine inside. They also found a digital scale
and half a dozen small, ziplock style baggies in his backpack.
This evidence indicates that Law engaged in a series of actions intended to
achieve a single objective: make money by selling methamphetamine. Despite
their placement in different pockets, Law possessed the methamphetamine and
untested crystal at the same time and place. A jury could infer that Law would
eventually use the methamphetamine in his left pocket to refill the drugs he was
handing out from his right pocket. Viewing the evidence in a commonsense
manner, the methamphetamine found in Law’s left pocket and the crystal found in
his right pocket were part of a continuing course of conduct. As a result, a
unanimity instruction was not required.3
~ In the alternative, Law argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to alert the trial court to the need for a Petrich unanimity instruction. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based
on consideration of all the circumstances, and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
12
No. 78677-6-1/13
II. Motion to Dismiss for Governmental Misconduct
Law argues second that the trial court erred in denying his CrR 8.3(b)
motion to dismiss the charge. He asserts that the State failed to notify him that (1)
it had sought and obtained a warrant to search his cell phone, and (2) it was
“preparing to engage in an invasive procedure that would render the phone and
data inaccessible.” He contends that this failure constituted governmental
mismanagement warranting dismissal.
Two things must be shown before a trial court can dismiss a charge under
CrR 8.3(b). State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wash. 2d 515, 520, 192 P.3d 360 (2008). First,
“a defendant must show arbitrary action or governmental misconduct.” ki.
Second, “a defendant must show prejudice affecting the defendant’s right to a fair
trial.” j.~ Washington courts have maintained that dismissal is an “extraordinary
remedy to which the court should resort only in ‘truly egregious cases of
mismanagement or misconduct.” State v. Wilson, 149 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 65 P.3d 657
(2003) (quoting State v. Duggins, 68 Wash. App. 396, 401, 844 P.2d 441, affd, 121
Wash. 2d 524, 852, P.2d 294 (1993)). We review a trial court’s decision on a motion
to dismiss charges for manifest abuse of discretion. Puaruaga, 164 Wash. 2d at 520-
21.
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Nichols, 161 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007).
If one of the two prongs of the test is absent, this court need not inquire further.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; State v. Foster, 140 Wash. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726
(2007). Because a unanimity instruction was not required, defense counsel’s
failure to request one did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Accordingly, Law’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
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No. 78677-6-1/14
Law relies primarily on State v. Brooks, 149 Wash. App. 373, 203 P.3d 397
(2009), to support that the State’s failure to notify constituted governmental
misconduct. In Brooks, the State failed to provide discovery required under CrR
4.7 before the defendants’, Natalie’s and Jason’s, omnibus hearings. 149 Wn.
App. at 383, 386. Specifically, the State did not provide g~y discovery, including
the names and addresses of its witnesses or any witness statements, before the
first scheduled hearing date. ki. at 386. Further,
The State failed to timely provide Jason’s statement. The State failed
to follow the local practice of making essentially all of the police file
available to the defense by the omnibus date. . . The State
.
mismanaged the first CrR 3.5 hearings by failing to issue subpoenas
for its witnesses. The State continued to provide stacks of discovery
on the mornings of the rescheduled hearings, thus forcing the trial
court to continue the hearings multiple times. The trial court
continued Natalie’s trial twice and Jason’s trial once to allow the
State to complete its discovery obligations, which it still did not do.
Id.
The trial court found that “the lag time between the date of the incident and
the date the officers transcribed the report and witness statements was beyond the
prosecutor’s control.” ki. In some cases, this lag time was about a month and a
half. Id. at 382. But, the court indicated that “there was no evidence that the
prosecutor’s office attempted to work with the sheriff’s office to resolve the lag
time.” ki. at 386. Also, the State took nine more days from the time it received
several officer statements before providing those statements to defense counsel.
ki. The trial court found governmental misconduct and prejudice under CrR 8.3(b),
and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice. j~ at 383. On
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No. 78677-6-1/15
appeal, this court held that, “[e}ven without considering the time that the sheriff’s
office controlled the requested documents, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by finding governmental misconduct.” Id. at 387.
There is no dispute that the State failed to notify Law that police had
obtained a search warrant for his phone until the first trial, and that the chip off
procedure rendered the phone inoperable. The record does not explain why the
prosecutor did not follow up regarding the status of a search warrant, despite
Kravchun’s statement that police intended to seek one. But, the trial court’s ruling
emphasized that nothing in the record showed that any mismanagement by the
State was intentional. Yet, CrR 8.3(b) does not require that governmental
misconduct be intentional.
The State’s failure to notify Law about the search warrant does not appear
as egregious as failing to provide ~j~y required discovery before a court
proceeding. At the defense interview before trial, defense counsel did not ask
about Kravchun’s statement in his report that police intended to seek a search
warrant for Law’s phone. And, under CrR 4.7(a)(4), the State’s discovery
obligations are limited to “material and information within the knowledge,
possession or control of members of the prosecuting attorney’s staff.” The record
indicates the existence of the search warrant was unknown to the prosecutor and
his staff until the first trial. They could not produce what they did not have.
But, even if the State’s actions had constituted governmental misconduct,
Law has failed to show prejudice as a result of this misconduct. Once Law learned
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No. 78677-6-1/16
of the search warrant, the trial court granted him a mistrial. At the new trial,
Kravchun testified that he had obtained a search warrant for Law’s cell phone, but
that Paxton was not “able to get much information, anything that [he] could use, off
of the phone.” Defense counsel cross-examined Kravchun about the lack of
communication between police and the prosecutor. Paxton testified that, despite
the successful chip off procedure, he was unable to get any data from the phone’s
chip. Thus, the jury was able to consider this evidence, including the State’s failure
to get any information off of Law’s phone.
Law argues that the chip off procedure destroyed material evidence,
thereby prejudicing his right to a fair trial. He points out that his phone could have
contained exculpatory evidence, and that, even if the phone contained “nothing”
relating to the charge, “that too would be exculpatory evidence.”4 But, the
misconduct at issue has to do with the State’s failure to notify Law of the warrant
and resulting search of his phone—not Paxton’s use of the chip off procedure. A
judge issued a warrant authorizing use of the procedure. Even if Law knew of the
warrant before Paxton conducted the search, he cites no rule that would have
prevented police from using the procedure to search Law’s phone.
And, the State’s case against Law originated from police surveilling “open
air drug market” transactions. The State did not claim that Law engaged in any
prearranged transactions. Law has not identified information that the phone may
have provided that was material to a defense to the charges. Accordingly, the
~ Nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel attempted to obtain
evidence from Law’s phone that could have been exculpatory before the first trial.
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No. 78677-6-1/17
absence of information about prearranged transactions on Law’s phone would not
materially affect the case against him.
Law also asserts that he “was prejudiced because he was forced to choose
between having prepared counsel and proceeding with a speedy trial.” CrR 3.3(h)
provides, “No case shall be dismissed for time-to-trial reasons except as expressly
required by this rule, a statute, or the state or federal constitution.” This court has
previously held that “[t}he plain and unambiguous language of CrR 3.3 prohibits
dismissal of a case under CrR 8.3(b) for violation of a defendant’s time-for-trial
rights under CrR 3.3 unless a defendant can show a violation of CrR 3.3, a statute,
or the state or federal constitution.” State v. Kone, 165 Wash. App. 420, 436, 266
P.3d 916 (2011). Further, “CrR 3.3(b) provides the exclusive means to challenge
a violation of the time-to-trial rule.” ~ at 437. Law has not asserted a specific
violation of CrR 3.3. Nor has he asserted a violation of a statute or his
constitutional rights. Therefore, he is precluded from raising his time-to-trial
argument under CrR 8.3(b).
Because Law has failed to show prejudice as a result of governmental
misconduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to
dismiss.
Ill. Legal Financial Obligations
Law argues last that the trial court erred in imposing interest on
nonrestitution LFOs. He cites RCW 10.82.090(1), which provides, “As of June 7,
2018, no interest shall accrue on nonrestitution legal financial obligations.” Law
17
No. 78677-6-1/18
was sentenced on July 5, 2018. The State concedes that remand is appropriate
to strike the provision in his judgment and sentence requiring interest accrual on
nonrestitution LFOs. We accept the State’s concession and remand for the trial
court to strike the provision.
We affirm Law’s conviction, but remand to the trial court to strike the
provision requiring interest accrual on non restitution LFOs.
WE CONCUR:
18