K.c. And L.m., V Good Samaritan Hospital

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 28, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
KC and LM, No. 48029-8-II
Respondents,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
DONNA JOHNSON, GOOD SAMARITAN
HOSPITAL, PATRICK SHEEHY PhD, and
LINDA WILLIAMS, M.S.W.,
Petitioners,
STATE OF WASHINGTON and
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL & HEALTH
SERVICES,
Defendants.
BJORGEN, C.J. — KC and LM brought a negligence action against the Department of
Social and Health Services (DSHS), Good Samaritan Hospital, Patrick Sheehy, Ph.D., and Linda
Williams, M.S.W. (GSH), for allegedly failing to prevent KC’s and LM’s sexual abuse at the
hands of their stepfather. On discretionary review, GSH challenges three summary judgment
rulings by the trial court, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly denied summary judgment
dismissing KC’s claim on collateral estoppel grounds, (2) the trial court improperly denied
summary judgment dismissing LM’s claim on statute of limitations grounds, and (3) the trial
No. 48029-8-II
court improperly granted KC’s and LM’s motion for summary judgment striking GSH’s statute
of limitations affirmative defense.
We hold that (1) the trial court properly decided that KC’s claims were not collaterally
estopped by a prior decision on the statute of limitations applicable to those claims, (2) the trial
court properly denied summary judgment requesting dismissal of LM’s claim under the statute of
limitations because there are genuine disputes of material fact, and (3) the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment striking GSH’s statute of limitations affirmative defense because
there are genuine disputes of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
In 2012, KC began reviewing court records to determine if her mother, Donna Johnson,
was eligible for certain benefits on account of her mother’s marriage to her ex-husband, Carl
Walter Johnson.1 While reviewing those records, KC learned that Johnson had been permitted to
live with Donna and her then young children, including KC and her sister LM, even though he
had been convicted of molesting his own daughters. It was in the period after Johnson moved in
that he sexually abused KC and LM. KC told her sister LM about the records she discovered,
and on April 23, 2013, KC and LM filed a complaint against the State of Washington and DSHS,
alleging negligent screening, investigation, and monitoring of Johnson.
A. Facts Pertaining to Johnson
In 1980, Johnson pled guilty to indecent liberties stemming from different incidents of
sexual contact with his biological daughters and received a deferred five year sentence on the
1
Because Donna Johnson and Carl Johnson have the same last names, we refer to Donna by her
first name; we refer to Carl as Johnson. No disrespect intended.
2
No. 48029-8-II
condition that he comply with probation requirements. In 1981, Johnson’s probation officer
wrote a memo to the trial court, requesting advice regarding whether to permit Johnson to move
into Donna’s home. The memo noted that Johnson’s treatment provider determined that he
could safely move into Donna’s home if he continued to comply with his treatment schedule, but
also expressed concern based on information from Johnson’s prior treatment provider, Dr. H.R.
Nichols, who identified problems with his treatment progression. Although the record does not
contain the court’s response to the probation officer’s questions, the record does indicate that
Donna and Johnson were married on November 23, 1981, and that he was permitted to move into
Donna’s residence sometime in 1981 or 1982.
B. Facts Pertaining to Abuse of KC and LM
KC and LM were both sexually abused by Johnson after he moved into Donna’s
residence. He would molest the girls while they were alone or at night and eventually involved
one of KC and LM’s brothers in the abuse. Both girls recall the abuse beginning when each was
about 4 years old. In the period the abuse was occurring, KC attempted to harm herself, and both
girls’ academic performance declined. By age 12, LM became sexually active with older
partners and became pregnant by age 15 by her boyfriend. KC and LM’s biological father was
investigated on suspicion of molesting the girls and he grew resentful toward them as a result of
the accusations, leading to a deterioration of their relationship.
Both KC and LM attempted to disclose the abuse at different times but were not believed.
Even after KC disclosed the abuse in November 1990 and child protective services (CPS)
investigated, the abuse continued. Although Donna eventually forced Johnson to leave the
family home, he continued to abuse LM when he drove her to medical appointments. Johnson
died of a heart attack when LM was 15 and KC was 13, just after LM had run away from home.
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No. 48029-8-II
C. DSHS Trial
In this proceeding, held before the Honorable Katherine Stolz, DSHS filed a summary
judgment motion requesting that KC’s complaint be dismissed under the statute of limitations,
RCW 4.16.340(1)(c), because KC stated in her deposition that she had been experiencing
emotional symptoms as a consequence of her sexual abuse for her entire adult life. RCW
4.16.340(1)(c) states:
(1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any
person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse shall be commenced within the later of the following periods:
....
(c) Within three years of the time the victim discover[s] that the act caused the
injury for which the claim is brought.
DSHS also identified KC’s “trouble coping with every-day life, suicial attempts in her early
years, ongoing suicidal thoughts throughout her adult life, and depression and anxiety as part of
her PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] diagnosis” as evidence that KC had correlated her
injuries to her childhood sexual abuse more than three years before filing her negligence suit.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 32. KC responded that none of the evidence offered by DSHS
demonstrated that she had connected her symptoms with childhood sexual abuse.
After hearing argument, the trial court granted summary judgment to DSHS, explaining:
[Court]: I’ll grant the summary judgment motion, you know. The
bottom line is that it was very – a lot of this is predicated on some sort of, you know,
speculation as to what somebody should have, could have, or would have done; and
we are also talking [sic] a climate regarding sex abuse that is, you know, over 30
years ago, you know, in some of these references; and you know, things were a lot
different then than they are now. I mean, you can’t go and retroactively apply the
standards of what they do today to what they did 30-odd years ago; so you know,
at this point, given the fact that we – you know, there’s a good reason why things
have statute of limitations is because, you know, records don’t exist, memories have
faded, individuals are dead; so there’s really no way to reconstruct what happened
with anything other than speculation as to what someone could have or should have
done. I’ll grant the summary judgment motion.
....
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No. 48029-8-II
[Court]: Okay. [Plaintiff’s] [c]ounsel, I understand; but, you know,
again, this is too old – this case is too old. There’s too many gaps, too many
people who can’t come in to testify as to about what they did or did not do, what
they did or did not know.
[P]: But that’s not the legal standard.
[Court]: I am finding, Counsel, that, you know, there isn’t enough
here to give to a jury, so I’ve granted the summary judgment motion; so let’s go
ahead and get the order ready to sign.
....
[P]: Your Honor, so I can explain to my clients, the basis of the
Court’s ruling is to say that we’re speculating –
[Court]: That’s not the only basis.
[P]: -- and that the case is just really old.
[Court]: It’s not the only basis, but, you know, I’m granting the
summary judgment motion. It’s, you know, been too long. It’s outside the statute
of limitations for one of them, KC; but the bottom line is: You don’t have the
individuals who can actually verify the documents; so a lot of this is would be just
hearsay, anyway. I mean, unless you can start questioning someone to say this is
what we did, this is why we did it, this is what actually happened, you know, you
don’t have the ability to prove a case because you can’t dump a lot of documents
on a jury and ask them to reconstruct them.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Sept. 26, 2014) at 16, 20-22. That same day, the court
entered an order dismissing all of KC’s and LM’s claims against DSHS with prejudice, and KC
and LM filed a notice of appeal.
On September 30, 2014 KC and LM filed a motion to recuse Judge Stolz based on her
past representation of KC and LM’s biological father, Delbert Melby, in a family law dispute
against their mother, Donna. KC and LM also filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary
judgment order on the same day. DSHS responded in part by arguing that the trial court no
longer had jurisdiction over the motions because the case had been appealed. On October 10,
Judge Stolz denied the motion to recuse, and KC and LM amended their complaint to add Donna
as a defendant in the case. On October 13, KC and LM withdrew their appeal of Judge Stolz’s
summary judgment ruling.2
2
We dismissed the appeal on October 29, and issued the mandate for this case on December 8.
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No. 48029-8-II
On October 15, KC and LM made a motion to have the presiding judge consider the
impartiality of Judge Stolz on reconsideration. On October 17, Judge Stolz transferred the case
to another department due to Donna’s addition as a defendant, but reaffirmed her order
dismissing KC’s and LM’s claims against DSHS. Judge Stolz’s order also noted that KC and
LM had agreed to strike their motion to reconsider the summary judgment order dismissing their
case. On October 31, Judge van Doorninck denied KC and LM’s motion to reconsider Judge
Stolz’s refusal to recuse herself, and on November 14 Judge Culpepper denied KC and LM’s
motion to reconsider Judge van Doorninck’s ruling on reconsideration.
D. Good Samaritan Hospital Trial
On November 19, 2014, KC and LM filed their second amended complaint, adding Good
Samaritan Hospital, Patrick Sheehy, Ph.D., and Linda Williams, M.S.W. (GSH) as defendants.
KC and LM alleged that GSH was negligent in the provision of counseling services. GSH and
KC and LM filed summary judgment motions and made oral arguments before Judge Hogan on
July 10, 2015.
In its motion for summary judgment, GSH argued that KC’s and LM’s claims were
barred by the statute of limitations and that KC was collaterally estopped from relitigating the
issue of whether her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. With respect to KC, GSH
made similar arguments to those made by DSHS based on KC’s statements that she had been
experiencing her symptoms for her entire life. GSH also noted that “[b]ased on the same facts,
Judge Stolz previously ruled that KC’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations,” and
argued that KC’s claims should be dismissed under the statute of limitations. CP at 1415.
As to LM, GSH argued that, like KC, she had experienced mental health issues for her
entire life, and consequently, her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. GSH also
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No. 48029-8-II
argued that LM’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations because her medical records
showed that she was diagnosed with PTSD in 2010 and that she had already begun making
connections between her symptoms and past abuse by July 2011, more than three years prior to
adding GSH to the lawsuit in November 2014.
LM responded that the medical records were conjoint marital counseling sessions, rather
than “individual psychotherapy” sessions, as claimed by GSH. CP at 1442. While the record
reflects that LM attended many sessions with her partner, records from other sessions indicate
that LM attended some sessions by herself. LM also contended that the medical reports only
reflected the impressions of the counselor, not LM, and therefore the information contained in
the medical reports did not correlate to LM’s subjective understanding of the connection between
her abuse and her symptoms for the purpose of the statute of limitations. GSH responded that it
would be “absurd” to suppose that LM’s counselor would be able to identify “[symptoms] of
sadness, loss, grief, and PTSD due to extensive [history] of childhood abuse,” without
participation from LM. CP at 1566.3
In her oral rulings, Judge Hogan denied GSH’s motion to dismiss KC’s claim on the
grounds of collateral estoppel, reasoning that “[t]here [was] a new record before [the] Court.”
CP at 1628. The court also denied GSH’s summary judgment motion to dismiss KC’s and LM’s
claims on statute of limitations grounds and granted their summary judgment motion to preclude
Good Samaritan from arguing a statute of limitations affirmative defense at trial. When asked
during argument whether the court knew when KC’s and LM’s causes of action accrued, Judge
Hogan responded, “I don’t.” CP at 1634.
3
Additionally, some of the relevant medical records contain LM’s signature, which could
indicate that she examined the documents.
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No. 48029-8-II
GSH sought discretionary review of the trial court’s summary judgment rulings rejecting
application of collateral estoppel to KC, denying GSH’s motion to dismiss LM’s claims as
barred under the statute of limitations, and precluding GSH from raising a statute of limitations
affirmative defense at trial. Our commissioner granted review.4
ANALYSIS
I. RCW 4.16.340
RCW 4.16.340 establishes the statute of limitations for claims based on childhood sexual
abuse. As set out above, the heart of this statute is a limitations period of three years from the
time the victim discovers that the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought. The
legislature passed this statute in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Tyson v. Tyson, 107
Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986). See, ENGROSSED SECOND H.B. 2058 Digest. In Tyson, the
court held that the three year statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s claim, despite the fact
that the plaintiff had repressed memories of her sexual assault. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75, 79-80.
When the legislature amended RCW 4.16.340 in 1991, it commented:
In addition to the cases in which a victim may suffer injuries, but does not know
that the sexual abuse caused the injury due to suppressed memory of the sexual
abuse, a victim may remember the sexual abuse but may have a delayed reaction to
the abuse. The victim may experience significant suffering from the abuse later in
life. A victim may have experienced some trauma from abuse when the abuse
occurred but the trauma may not have been severe enough to prompt the victim to
sue within three years of the victim’s 18th birthday.
....
The Legislature finds that sexual abuse is a pervasive problem that affects the safety
and well-being of many citizens. Childhood sexual abuse is traumatic and the
damage is long-lasting. Victims may not only repress the memory of the abuse for
many years, but may also be unable to connect being abused with any injury until
4
Although the commissioner granted review on the issue of whether some or all of KC’s and
LM’s claims were time barred by the statute of limitations, on appeal GSH has limited its
argument on this issue to whether LM’s claims are time barred.
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No. 48029-8-II
later in life. Although the victim may be aware of the sexual abuse, more serious
reactions to the abuse may develop later.
....
The Legislature also intends that the discovery of minor injuries from sexual abuse
does not trigger the statute of limitations for injuries that were not discovered or
did not manifest themselves until later years.
ENGROSSED SECOND H.B. 2058 Digest (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court has clarified that RCW 4.16.340 encompasses negligence claims
brought against third parties who allegedly failed to protect children from abuse. In C.J.C. v.
Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, the court reasoned that because RCW 4.16.340(1)
applied to “‘all . . . causes’” or claims that were “‘based on intentional conduct,’” the legislature
did not intend to limit application of the statute to intentional acts. 138 Wash. 2d 699, 709, 985
P.2d 262 (1999) (quoting Am. Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla, 116 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 802
P.2d 784 (1991)). The court explained that “intentional sexual abuse is the predicate conduct
upon which all claims are based, including the negligence claims,” because “the injury resulting
from the abuse ‘forms the grounds’ for the claims.” Id. at 709-10.
II. 2015 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Walston v. Boeing Co., 181
Wash. 2d 391, 395, 334 P.3d 519 (2014) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is granted only if,
given the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion. Walston, 181 Wash. 2d at
395. Our court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court, with questions of law reviewed de
novo and the facts and all reasonable inferences from the facts viewed in the light most favorable
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No. 48029-8-II
to the nonmoving party. Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wash. 2d 299, 305, 96
P.3d 957 (2004).
B. Collateral Estoppel as to KC
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of an issue in a subsequent
proceeding involving the same parties. Id. at 306. The collateral estoppel doctrine “promotes
judicial economy and serves to prevent inconvenience or harassment of parties,” by reducing
repetitive litigation and providing for finality as to particular issues. Id. (citation omitted).
Whether collateral estoppel applies to bar relitigation of an issue is reviewed de novo. Id. at 305.
A party invoking collateral estoppel must demonstrate that:
(1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented
in the later proceeding, (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits,
(3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity
with a party to, the earlier proceeding, and (4) application of collateral estoppel
does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied.
Id. at 307.
GSH asserts that KC is collaterally estopped from relitigating whether her claim is time
barred by the statute of limitations based on Judge Stolz’s prior ruling that KC’s claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. KC and LM dispute each factor with regard to this claim of
collateral estoppel.
1. Identity of Issue
KC and LM argue that the trial court properly concluded that differences in the
evidentiary records before Judge Stolz and Judge Hogan precluded application of collateral
estoppel. At oral argument before Judge Hogan, KC claimed that several of KC’s specific
harms, education impairments, early pregnancy, and substance abuse were “never brought before
Judge Stolz.” CP at 1616. The record belies KC’s and LM’s assertions. In making her ruling,
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No. 48029-8-II
Judge Hogan considered KC’s 2015 declaration, which included statements from KC and
excerpts from a forensic examiner discussing KC’s problems with substance abuse, education,
and pregnancy. Judge Stolz considered KC’s 2014 declaration in her summary judgment ruling,
which is entirely identical to KC’s 2015 declaration. Both declarations were signed “this 15th
day of September, 2014,” are addressed to “HONORABLE KATHERINE M. STOLZ,” and in
all other respects are the same, aside from the filing date. CP at 442, 1039. Having reviewed
KC’s 2014 declaration, Judge Stolz would have been aware of KC’s problems involving early
pregnancy, substance abuse, and education. Therefore, despite KC and LM’s argument in
briefing that “Judge Hogan’s ruling was based upon a different evidentiary record,” we find that
the issue in this case is identical to the issue litigated before Judge Stolz for the purpose of
collateral estoppel. Br. of Resp’ts at 23.
2. Judgment on the Merits
KC and LM maintain that collateral estoppel requires finality and there have never been
any final rulings on the pending motions before Judge Stolz. However, GSH seeks application
of collateral estoppel only with respect to Judge Stolz’s order granting summary judgment. A
grant of summary judgment “‘constitutes a final judgment on the merits and has the same
preclusive effect as a full trial of the issue.’” Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 178 Wash. App. 850,
870, 316 P.3d 520 (2014) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Nw. Youth Servs.,
97 Wash. App. 226, 233, 983 P.2d 1144 (1999)). Furthermore, a judgment becomes final for the
purpose of collateral estoppel at the beginning of the appeals process rather than the conclusion.
Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 85 Wash. App. 249, 254-55, 931 P.2d 931 (1997)
(citations omitted). Therefore, we find that Judge Stolz’s summary judgment order was a final
judgment on the merits.
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No. 48029-8-II
3. Identity of Party
KC and LM contend that collateral estoppel is not appropriately applied to KC because
“[GSH] and DSHS are different parties, with different legal obligations, and different damages
were caused by their differing involvement.” Br. of Resp’ts at 23. However, this argument
inverts the proper standard, that “the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a
party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding.” Christensen, 152 Wash. 2d at 306
(emphasis added). In this case, GSH argues that collateral estoppel should be applied to KC,
who was a party in the summary judgment proceeding before Judge Stolz. Therefore, we find
that the identity of the party is identical for the purpose of collateral estoppel.
4. Injustice
KC and LM allege that Judge Stolz’s representation of Melby, KC and LM’s biological
father, in a 1984 family law dispute involving Donna, their mother, creates an appearance of bias
that requires us to set aside Judge Stolz’s ruling. Application of collateral estoppel does not
work an injustice where a party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted “‘had an
unencumbered, full, and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in a neutral forum.’” Nielson, 85
Wash. App. at 255 (quoting Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 666, 674 P.2d 165 (1983)). In the
context of collateral estoppel, “‘[i]njustice’ means more than that the prior decision was wrong.
When faced with a choice between achieving finality and correcting an erroneous result,” the
court generally opts for finality. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Avery, 114 Wash. App. 299,
306, 57 P.3d 300 (2002) (citations omitted).5
5
At least one court has articulated a four-factor test to determine whether application of
collateral estoppel would work an injustice. Avery, 114 Wash. App. at 306. Those factors are: (1)
the character of the court issuing the judgment; (2) the scope of the original court’s jurisdiction;
(3) procedural informality; and (4) procedural safeguards, including appeal. Id. at 306-09.
Because neither party has briefed or argued these factors, or otherwise argued that the underlying
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No. 48029-8-II
Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a judge must recuse herself “if [she] is biased
against a party or [her] impartiality may reasonably be questioned.” State v. Dominguez, 81 Wn.
App. 325, 328, 914 P.2d 141 (1996). However, a party claiming bias must produce “[e]vidence
of a judge’s actual or potential bias . . . before the appearance of fairness doctrine will be
applied.” Id. at 328-29. A judge’s prior representation of a party in an unrelated matter does not
necessarily raise the specter of potential bias. Id. at 329. In Dominguez, the trial court judge had
previously both prosecuted and defended the defendant in unrelated criminal matters. Id. The
court held that “the mere fact that the judge earlier acted once for [the defendant] and once
against him, both times in his professional capacity as an attorney, does not establish potential
bias.” Id. In this instance, Judge Stolz’s alleged bias is more attenuated than the claimed bias of
the trial judge in Dominguez, because Judge Stolz’s former client is not a party to the current
dispute. Therefore, application of collateral estoppel would not result in an injustice on this
basis.
However, the injustice prong of the collateral estoppel analysis also contemplates
whether application of the doctrine would contravene public policy. In Christiansen, our
Supreme Court noted that “the injustice factor [of collateral estoppel] ‘recognizes the significant
role of public policy.’” 152 Wash. 2d at 309 (quoting State v. Vazquez, 148 Wash. 2d 303, 309, 59
P.3d 648 (2002)). Examining the case of State v. Dupard, 93 Wash. 2d 268, 609 P.2d 961 (1980),
the court in Christiansen explained:
proceeding contained procedural or jurisdictional defects, we decline to address these factors
specifically.
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No. 48029-8-II
In Dupard, the issue was whether collateral estoppel would be applied in a criminal
prosecution where the charges were based on conduct that had been the subject of
a parole revocation decision by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. The court
concluded that the legislature contemplated that new crimes would be processed
initially in the criminal justice system and not in a parole revocation hearing. The
court specifically noted that RCW 9.95.120 provided a parole hearing within 30
days for violations other than felonies or misdemeanors.
Christiansen, 152 Wash. 2d at 309. The court concluded that “[t]his indicator of legislative intent
weighed against application of collateral estoppel,” and that “[i]f a legislative body indicates its
intent on the matter of preclusion, that intent generally controls whether the judicially applied
doctrine of collateral estoppel will apply.” Id. at 309, 314. However, the court also noted that
“simply because a subject implicates public policy does not mean that application of collateral
estoppel contravenes public policy,” and that the analysis is still concerned primarily with
procedural fairness. Id. at 315-16.
In this instance, KC and LM have made essentially identical claims against GSH, and
GSH has asserted the same affirmative defense against both KC and LM. The statute of
limitations issue for both KC and LM revolves around when each discovered or should have
discovered that her harm was caused by the abuse. RCW 4.16.340. With such profound
similarities, application of collateral estoppel to bar KC’s claim on statute of limitations grounds
while LM’s nearly identical claim proceeds under the same statute of limitations would result in
injustice; it would contravene the legislative intent to afford child victims of sexual assault
meaningful relief notwithstanding the general three year statute of limitations. ENGROSSED
SECOND H.B. 2058 Digest. Statute of limitations “are procedural rules that are properly the
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No. 48029-8-II
realm of the Legislature.” Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wash. 2d 325, 330-31, 815 P.2d
781 (1991); Hutton v. State, 25 Wash. 2d 402, 405, 171 P.2d 248 (1946).6
Given the unique circumstances of this case and the legislative intent embodied in RCW
4.16.340(1)(c), we hold that application of collateral estoppel to KC would contravene public
policy, and thereby result in injustice. As such, we affirm the grant of summary judgment
dismissing GSH’s collateral estoppel argument as applied to KC.
C. Statute of Limitations as to LM
GSH argues that based on the medical records they submitted, no reasonable jury could
conclude that LM’s claim is not time barred.
RCW 4.16.340(1)(c) provides that a childhood sexual assault victim’s three year statute
of limitations is tolled until “the victim discovered that the act caused the injury for which the
claim is brought.” We have previously acknowledged that this statutory tolling provision “‘is
unique . . . it specifically focuses on when a victim of sexual abuse discovers the causal link
between the abuse and the injury for which the suit is brought.’” B.R. v. Horsley, 186 Wash. App.
294, 299, 345 P.3d 836 (2015) (quoting Korst v. McMahon, 136 Wash. App. 202, 208, 148 P.3d
1081 (2006)). The statute of limitations does not begin when a victim identifies an injury, but
rather when a victim associates an injury with prior abuse. Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
Therefore, LM’s claim is timely if she correlated her harms to her abuse less than three years
before filing her claim. Id. at 299-300.
6
However, at least one case has characterized a statute of limitations as “both substantive and
procedural.” Stikes Woods Neigh. Ass’n v. City of Lacey, 124 Wash. 2d 459, 466, 880 P.2d 25
(1994).
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No. 48029-8-II
While GSH has produced medical records suggesting that LM could have associated her
harms with her abuse more than three years before she filed her claim, all reasonable inferences
must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment. Christensen, 152
Wash. 2d at 305. More specifically, Korst, 136 Wash. App. 202, illustrates well, although obliquely,
the demanding showing under this standard needed to sustain summary judgment against a
plaintiff based on this statute of limitations. In Korst, the trial court granted defendants’ motion
for a directed verdict and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim as time barred based in part on a letter
that the plaintiff wrote to her abuser. Korst, 136 Wash. App. at 204-05. The plaintiff’s letter
expressed anger and frustration at her assailant for sexually abusing her and lamented the pain
that the experience caused. Id. at 209. We reversed the trial court, reasoning that the plaintiff’s
letter “merely states that the original pain . . . has not gone away, but it does not prove that [the
plaintiff] knew her father’s sexual abuse had caused her more serious physical and emotional
symptoms.” Id. at 210.
Viewing all the evidence in favor of LM, a jury could reasonably conclude that LM
associated her harms with her abuse less than three years before filing her complaint. Although
GSH provided records pertaining to LM that mention childhood abuse, these records do not
conclusively establish that LM connected her abuse to her harms. Similarly, LM’s statement that
“[this abuse] has affected my life for as long as I can remember,” is similar to the plaintiff’s
expression of pain in Korst.7 CP at 1366. As such “a jury must resolve the factual issues and
determine whether the statute of limitations bars her claim.” B.R., 186 Wash. App. at 306
7
“I was just a kid, what 13-14 when I was raped by Dad. Do you know for the victim (me) Its
[sic] something that never goes away. . . . It’s just constant hurts.” Korst, 136 Wash. App. at 209
(alteration in original).
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No. 48029-8-II
(citations omitted). For these reasons, we affirm the trial court order denying GSH’s summary
judgment as to LM.
D. Statute of Limitations Affirmative Defense
GSH argues that the trial court erred in granting KC and LM’s summary judgment
motion precluding GSH’s statute of limitations affirmative defense. As discussed in the
preceding section, the determination of when a victim associated a particular harm with earlier
abuse is a question of fact for the jury. B.R., 186 Wash. App. at 306 (citations omitted). At the
July 10, 2015 summary judgment hearing, both parties disputed when KC and LM associated
their harms with their abuse, and Judge Hogan stated that she did not know when their claims
accrued. Precluding GSH from arguing a statute of limitations affirmative defense would
effectively remove the determination of a question of fact from the jury: the question of when
KC and LM discovered that the abuse caused the harm. Given the conflicting evidence on this
issue and Judge Hogan’s admitted uncertainty as to when the claims accrued, we reverse the
grant of summary judgment striking GSH’s statute of limitations affirmative defense.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the summary judgment motion requesting dismissal
of KC’s claims as collaterally estopped. We also affirm the trial court’s denial of the summary
judgment motion requesting dismissal of LM’s8 claims under the statute of limitations, and we
reverse the trial court’s summary judgment ruling precluding GSH’s statute of limitations
8
As noted, GSH does not argue on appeal that KC’s claims are barred under the statute of
limitations.
17
No. 48029-8-II
affirmative defense. Finally, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BJORGEN, C.J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, J.
MELNICK, J.
18