Personal Restraint Petition Of Nicholas Edward Anderson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint No. 78611-3-I
of
DIVISION ONE
NICHOLAS EDWARD ANDERSON,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
COBURN, J. — Nicholas Edward Anderson seeks relief from restraint
following his guilty pleas in 2000 for murder in the first degree and attempted
robbery in the first degree. He contends, under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, that he is entitled to resentencing because the
sentencing court failed to consider any mitigating qualities of his youth.
Anderson has since been released on parole. We deny his personal restraint
petition (PRP) under RAP 16.4(d) because he has received an adequate remedy.
FACTS
Anderson was 16 years old when he committed the crimes of murder in
the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree while armed with a
firearm. He pleaded guilty to those crimes in June 1999. Anderson was
sentenced to 443 months, which included two weapons enhancements. The
court noted that Anderson was remorseful and accepted responsibility for the
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 78611-3-I/2
crime and should therefore receive the same sentence as his codefendant.1
Anderson did not appeal his convictions and they became final in
February 2000. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a).
In December 2017, Anderson filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from
judgment in Snohomish County Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred
by failing to consider his youth as a mitigating factor. The court concluded that
Anderson’s motion was untimely since it was filed more than a year after his
sentence became final and transferred it to our court for review as a PRP. See
CrR 7.8(c)(2).
This court stayed Anderson’s PRP as the Washington Supreme Court
considered Matter of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). The court
issued a second stay in March 2020 until the Washington Supreme Court
decided two additional cases: In re Personal Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220,
474 P.3d 507 (2020), and In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196
Wn.2d 255, 474 P.3d 524 (2020). Prior to the stay being lifted in January 2021,
1 The sentencing court ruled:
[It] doesn’t sit well with me that your sentence would exceed the
sentence of [your codefendant]. And the only reason it does is for
your priors that you had. I recognize you[’re] accepting
responsibility[.] . . . I think the sentence for [you both] should be the
same, and that is the reason I impose it.
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Anderson was released on parole.2
DISCUSSION
Anderson argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the
sentencing court failed to consider any mitigating qualities of his youth. The
State contends that though the law has changed since Anderson’s sentencing,
he is not entitled to relief through a PRP because he has an adequate remedy
having been released on parole. We agree with the State.
Eligibility for Review under RCW 10.73.100(6)
RCW 10.73.090(1) requires individuals to file a motion for collateral attack
of their judgement and sentence within one year after the judgement becomes
final. The time limit does not apply, however, where there has been a “significant
change in the law” that is both material to a conviction and retroactive. RCW
10.73.100(6).
The State concedes that the law has changed such that Anderson’s PRP
meets the time bar exemption under RCW 10.73.100(6). See Ali, 196 Wn.2d at
233-36 (recognizing that State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409(2017), is a significant change in the law requiring trial courts to consider
2Anderson was released on parole under RCW 9.94A.730, which permits
a person who committed crime(s) prior to age 18, to petition the indeterminate
sentence review board for early release after serving 20 years of imprisonment
so long as they meet certain eligibility criteria. RCW 9.94A.730(1).
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mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and holding that the new substantive
constitutional rule announced in that case must be applied retroactively);
Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 262-266.
The State does not dispute that Anderson has demonstrated prejudice
required to warrant resentencing.3 See Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 268(holding that “a petitioner establishes actual and substantial prejudice when a
sentencing court fails to consider mitigating factors relating to the youthfulness of
a juvenile tried as an adult and/or does not appreciate its discretion to impose
any exceptional sentence in light of that consideration”).
Adequate Alternative Remedy
Despite its concessions, the State contends Anderson’s PRP must be
dismissed because he has already received an “adequate remedy” precluding
relief through a PRP. Under these facts, we agree.
We may only grant relief through a PRP if “other remedies which may be
available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances.” RAP 16.4(d).
In State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018), the Supreme
Court addressed whether RCW 9.94A.730’s parole provision was an “adequate
remedy” precluding a petitioner from seeking relief through a PRP. Scott was
3Anderson’s sentence followed a plea agreement. The parties do not
raise any issues related to that fact.
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convicted of premeditated murder in the first degree, a crime he committed at
age 17. Id. at 588. Scott filed a PRP in 2016, by which time the United States
Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles
violate the Eighth Amendment. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). At the time of his PRP, Scott had
unsuccessfully petitioned the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) for
release under RCW 9.94A.730 (“Miller fix statute”). Scott, 190 Wn.2d at 598-99.
Scott argued that the appropriate remedy for the Miller violation was to
remand his case for resentencing in consideration of youth. Id. at 592. The
Supreme Court rejected Scott’s argument, stating that
[w]hile Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders, the Court reiterated that [a] State is not required
to guarantee eventual freedom, but must provide some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.
Scott, 190 Wn.2d at 593 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)
(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479)). The court concluded that the parole provision
in Washington’s “Miller fix statute,” RCW 9.94A.730—despite Scott’s
unsuccessful attempt to obtain parole—was “an adequate remedy for a Miller
violation, rendering unnecessary the resentencing of a defendant who long ago
received a de facto life sentence as a juvenile.” Scott, 190 Wn.2d at 588.
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Subsequent to the 2018 Scott decision, the Supreme Court clarified that
while RCW 9.94A.730 may provide an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, it
might not be an adequate remedy for a Houston-Sconiers violation under all
circumstances. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 246.
In Ali, the court concluded that RCW 9.94A.730 was not an adequate
remedy where the petitioner was still ineligible for parole for several years.4 Ali,
196 Wn.2d at 226, 229, 246. In Domingo-Cornelio, the Supreme Court
concluded that RCW 9.94A.730 would not provide adequate relief for the
petitioner because the statute would require him to serve 20 years before
becoming eligible for release, the same term as his 240-month sentence.
Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 269 n.8.
In the instant case, Anderson entered state custody in June 1999. By the
time he filed his PRP in 2018, Anderson had nearly become eligible for parole.
Anderson has since been released after serving 20 years imprisonment and after
being recommended for release by the ISRB in 2020 under RCW 9.94A.730.
Similar to Scott, Anderson was eligible to obtain the benefit of RCW 9.94A.730
and went one step further than Scott in successfully petitioning for release.
Unlike the petitioners in Ali and Domingo-Cornelio, Anderson is not waiting for
4 Ali’s crime was committed in 2008 and he was sentenced to 312 months.
Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 226, 228. He filed his PRP in 2017. Id. at 229.
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the possibility of parole several years in the future; he has been released from
incarceration for over a year.
Anderson contends we should not rely on Scott because that decision only
applied the rule announced in Miller (applying to juveniles sentenced to
mandatory life without parole) but not the broader rule announced in Houston-
Sconiers (applying to all juveniles regardless of sentence length). But Miller and
Houston-Sconiers do not operate separately. Both decisions are based on the
Eighth Amendment.5 Miller, 567 U.S. at 470; Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at
19. And the Washington Supreme Court decided Scott after Houston-Sconiers,
specifically rejecting Scott’s argument that Houston-Sconiers supported
resentencing in his case. Scott, 190 Wn.2d at 594-95. Additionally, the court
stated in Houston-Sconiers that RCW 9.94A.730 “may provide a remedy on
collateral review.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23. Anderson fails to show
how his case is distinct from that of the petitioner in Scott, particularly in light of
the fact that Anderson has actually received the benefit of RCW 9.94A.730.
5 Three justices in Scott agreed with the majority that the Eighth
Amendment provides a remedy for a Miller violation, but in a concurrence noted
that Washington’s Constitution article I, section 14 is more protective of individual
rights than the Eighth Amendment, and it is an “open question” whether RCW
9.94A.730 is an adequate remedy under Washington’s State law. Scott, 190
Wn.2d at 602 (McCloud, J., concurring). As Anderson does not raise an article I,
section 14 challenge, we do not address it here.
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Anderson further argues that he is entitled to resentencing that considers
the mitigating qualities of youth in determining the length of his parole term. We
acknowledge that Anderson is still subject to the supervision of the Department
of Corrections, potentially through the length of his court-imposed sentence.
RCW 9.94A.730(5). However, that observation merely describes the nature of
being on parole. If being eligible for parole, but denied parole under the Miller fix
statute is an adequate remedy, then certainly being granted parole with the risk
of it being revoked would be no different.
CONCLUSION
Under these circumstances, and in accordance with RAP 16.4(d), we
conclude that RCW 9.94A.730 provided Anderson an adequate remedy. We
deny his petition.
WE CONCUR:
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