Office of Lawyer Regulation v. George W. Curtis, Jr.

2018 WI 13
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP1567-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against George W. Curtis, Jr., Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
George W. Curtis, Jr.,
Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CURTIS, JR.
OPINION FILED: February 15, 2018
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2018 WI 13
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP1567-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against George W. Curtis, Jr., Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant,
FEB 15, 2018
v. Diane M. Fremgen
Acting Clerk of
George W. Curtis, Jr., Supreme Court
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report of the referee,
Richard M. Esenberg, regarding the Office of Lawyer Regulation's
(OLR) complaint in this matter against Attorney George W.
Curtis, Jr. At all times relevant to this matter, Attorney
Curtis operated the Curtis Law Office in Oshkosh, Wisconsin
(hereafter, the "firm"), as a sole proprietorship. The referee
recommended that Attorney Curtis be suspended for 120 days in
connection with his willful failure to pay his personal income
No. 2015AP1567-D
taxes for several years and for various trust account violations
committed at his firm. The referee recommended the dismissal of
three counts of misconduct: one related to his trust account
record keeping, another related to his failure to remit employee
and employer contributions to his law firm's 401(k) plan, and
another related to his failure to remit payroll taxes for his
firm's employees. The referee proposed that the court place
certain conditions on Attorney Curtis' post-suspension practice
of law, and that the court reduce the full costs of this
proceeding ($16,886.87 as of October 31, 2017) by one-quarter.
The OLR did not seek the payment of restitution in these
proceedings, and the referee did not recommend it.
¶2 Because no appeal has been filed, we review the
referee's report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).
After conducting our independent review of the matter, we adopt
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree
with the referee that Attorney Curtis' license to practice law
in Wisconsin should be suspended for a four-month period. We
also agree with the referee that Attorney Curtis should be
required to pay three-quarters of the costs of this proceeding,
which will result in a cost assessment of $12,665.15. We impose
certain conditions upon the reinstatement of Attorney Curtis'
license to practice law in Wisconsin. Finally, we decline to
order restitution for reasons explained below.
¶3 Attorney Curtis was admitted to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1962. His law license is currently in good
2
No. 2015AP1567-D
standing. He has not been the subject of any previous
disciplinary proceedings.
¶4 On August 3, 2015, the OLR filed the underlying
complaint against Attorney Curtis, raising seven counts of
misconduct. Count 1 concerned his willful failure to pay
personal income taxes for 2007, 2008, and 2009, culminating in
his federal conviction of three misdemeanor counts of failure to
pay income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Count 2
concerned his failure to pay to the federal government employee
payroll taxes withheld from his firm's employees' paychecks for
the third and fourth quarters of 2013, and all four quarters of
2014. Counts 3 through 6 concerned various trust account
problems. Count 7 concerned the administration of funds that
were to have been paid into his firm's 401(k) plan.
¶5 Attorney Curtis answered the complaint and admitted
three counts of misconduct (Counts 3,1 4, and 6), denied three
counts of misconduct (Counts 1, 2, and 5), and pled the Fifth
Amendment in response to Count 7 and its background allegations.
¶6 The referee held an evidentiary hearing on December 5
and 9, 2016. Both parties submitted post-hearing briefs.
1
In his answer, Attorney Curtis invoked the Fifth Amendment
in response to Count 3. In post-hearing briefing before the
referee, Attorney Curtis clarified that he had erroneously
invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to Count 3, and that his
intention was instead to "admit the violation and affirmatively
allege the violation was unintentional."
3
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶7 On September 26, 2017, the referee submitted a report
containing his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommendation for discipline. The findings of fact and
conclusions of law are summarized below.
Willful Failure to Pay Income Tax (Count 1)
¶8 Count 1 concerns Attorney Curtis' willful failure to
pay income taxes——a problem that was long in the making and that
culminated in a conviction, following a federal district court
jury trial in January 2014, on three misdemeanor counts of
willfully failing to pay the taxes he owed for 2007, 2008, and
2009, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. See United States v.
Curtis, 1:13-cr-00113-WCG (E.D. Wis.). The amount of unpaid
tax, with interest and penalties, was $387,233. The district
court sentenced Attorney Curtis to six months in prison and one
year of supervised release, both of which he has now completed.
The court also ordered Attorney Curtis to pay the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) $5,000 per month until the total tax
liability for the three years was paid in full.
¶9 Attorney Curtis' tax difficulties began years before
his conviction. In 1996 and 1997, he filed returns reporting
significant tax obligations, but he made no payments toward
those debts. Over the ensuing years, Attorney Curtis entered
into installment payment plans with the IRS, but he did not
fully comply with them; he made payments for a period of time,
and then stopped. Attorney Curtis also continued to file yearly
tax returns showing significant tax liabilities that he had paid
nothing toward at the time of filing. Eventually the IRS ran
4
No. 2015AP1567-D
out of patience and referred the matter for criminal
investigation. His conviction followed, which Attorney Curtis
appealed, unsuccessfully. See United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d
904 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit wrote that there was a
"sea of . . . damning evidence demonstrating Curtis' intent" to
not pay his taxes, such as the facts that:
. . . during the three charged years, Curtis had
adjusted gross income of more than $1.4 million but
paid none of it toward his corresponding tax
liabilities of approximately $378,000 for that same
time period. Instead, he spent more than $1.1 million
on personal expenses that included $142,916 in life
insurance premiums; $43,266 for a new Lincoln
Navigator luxury SUV; $17,730 worth of wine; $32,775
in donations and political contributions; $6,945 on
jewelry; and $10,891 on his pets. Presented with
these expenditures and a list that also included
gifts, firearms, restaurants, department stores, and
other purely discretionary spending, any jury would
conclude that Curtis had the money to pay his taxes
(at least in part) and simply chose not to.
Id. at 911.
¶10 The referee concluded that Attorney Curtis' long-
standing failure to pay his taxes reflected adversely on his
fitness as a lawyer in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b),2 in that it
showed a disregard for his legal obligations and reflected
adversely on his legal judgment and expertise.
Failure to Remit Payroll Taxes (Count 2)
2
SCR 20:8.4(b) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects.
5
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶11 Count 2 concerns the undisputed fact that Attorney
Curtis' firm failed to remit to the federal government the
payroll taxes for his law firm's employees for the third and
fourth quarters of 2013 and all of 2014. The OLR alleged that
this conduct was a form of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).3
¶12 The referee recommended the dismissal of this charge,
citing an overall "paucity of evidence." On the one hand, the
referee found that Attorney Curtis became aware, at some point,
that his firm had not remitted the payroll taxes that it had
withheld from its employees during part of 2013 and all of 2014.
But the referee credited Attorney Curtis' testimony at the
disciplinary hearing that the firm fell behind on remitting
payroll taxes because the IRS's garnishment of firm accounts
left him unclear as to whether the seized funds were being
applied toward payroll taxes. In the referee's view, the record
was too unclear to permit him to conclude that Attorney Curtis
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). As such, the referee recommended
the dismissal of Count 2.
Trust Account Violations (Counts 3-6)
¶13 These misconduct charges concern the disarrayed state
of the firm's trust account. Since 1999, Attorney Curtis has
3
SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."
6
No. 2015AP1567-D
been the sole partner in the firm; for many years before that,
he practiced in partnership with one or more lawyers. Since
1999, Attorney Curtis was the attorney primarily responsible for
supervising and managing the firm's trust account, as well as
for supervising the trust account-related work of the firm's
office manager, bookkeepers, and other staff.
¶14 As a firm largely engaged in the representation of
plaintiffs, the firm would receive settlement and judgment
payments and deposit these funds in a trust account, pending a
determination of how the funds should be disbursed. It was
Attorney Curtis' practice (and apparently that of the lawyers
who oversaw the firm's trust account before Attorney Curtis
began doing so) to hold in the trust account any potentially
disputed portions of settlement and judgment payments (e.g.,
funds that could be subject to subrogation claims) pending
resolution of the claims or the expiration of any applicable
statute of limitations, which Attorney Curtis understood to span
six years from the firm's receipt of the funds. If the claimant
was not currently pursuing the claim, Attorney Curtis would
advise his client to simply wait and not "wake up" the claimant
by attempting to resolve the matter; that way, Attorney Curtis
believed, his client might ultimately collect more money than
they would have otherwise received had the claim been resolved.
Because many clients followed his advice, more money was held in
trust than would have been the case had these claims been
resolved soon after receipt of the funds. And because the firm
failed to periodically review the trust account to ensure that
7
No. 2015AP1567-D
releasable funds were, in fact, released, the funds languished
in the firm's trust account for many years.
¶15 This practice led to an impossibly jumbled trust
account. In 2009, while converting the firm from a paper to an
electronic accounting system, firm employees discovered that a
substantial amount of money had been held in trust for longer
than the six-year statute of limitations that Attorney Curtis
believed governed them. The firm began an effort to identify
and locate clients to whom these funds belonged——a task that
proved difficult and, in some instances, unworkable. Some of
the clients had moved. Others could not be found. Others had
died, sometimes requiring that an estate be opened or reopened.
There were some funds held in trust for which the client could
not be identified. As a result, a substantial amount of money
remained unpaid to its owners. As of April 2014, the firm trust
account held a total of $1,059,218.09. Of that amount, at least
$105,235.59 related to cases that had been closed prior to April
2008; some funds had been held since as far back as 1978. The
firm has made some progress in disbursing these funds; by April
2015, the firm disbursed $42,865.41 of the $105,235.59 related
to cases that had been closed prior to April 2008. As of
January 2015, there remained $23,487.94 held in trust with
respect to which the owners could not be identified.
¶16 Based on these facts and on Attorney Curtis'
admissions (see n.1), the referee determined that Attorney
Curtis failed to ensure the prompt notice and delivery of funds
to clients and third parties, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b), in
8
No. 2015AP1567-D
effect between October 1, 2000 and June 30, 2004, and former SCR
20:1.15(d)(l), effective as of July 1, 2004 (Count 3).4
¶17 Based on the above facts and on Attorney Curtis'
admissions in his answer, the referee determined that Attorney
Curtis failed to regularly reconcile his trust account in
4
Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S.
Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1,
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.
Former SCR 20:1.15(b), in effect between October 1,
2000 and June 30, 2004, provided:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person in writing.
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the
client or third person, shall render a full accounting
regarding such property.
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1), in effect between July 1,
2004 and June 30, 2016, provided:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
9
No. 2015AP1567-D
violation of SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g (Count 4),5 and failed to
adequately supervise his staff's management of the trust account
in violation of SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in effect between October
1, 2000 and December 31, 2009, and SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in
effect as of January 1, 2010 (Count 6).6
5
Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)g, in effect between January
1, 2010 and June 30, 2016, provided:
For each trust account, the lawyer shall prepare
and retain a printed reconciliation report on a
regular and periodic basis not less frequently than
every 30 days. Each reconciliation report shall show
all of the following balances and verify that they are
identical:
1. the balance that appears in the transaction
register as of the reporting date;
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts,
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance
in the financial institution's monthly statement and
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions
from the balance in the monthly statement.
6
Former SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b), in effect between
October 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009, provided that,
with respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer;
(continued)
10
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶18 The referee determined, however, that the OLR had not
proven that Attorney Curtis failed to maintain and retain
complete records of trust account funds in violation of
SCR 20:1.15(e), in effect between October 1, 2000 and June 30,
2004 and SCR 20:1.15(e)(6), in effect since July 1, 2004 (Count
5).7 According to the referee, the record was unclear as to
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyer.
Current SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b) provide that, with
respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or
together with other lawyers possesses comparable
managerial authority in a law firm shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the
person's conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority
over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyer.
7
Former SCR 20:1.15(e), in effect between October 1, 2000
and June 30, 2004, provided: "Complete records of trust account
funds and other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and
shall be preserved for a period of at least six years after
termination of the representation."
Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(6), in effect between July 1, 2004
and June 30, 2016, provided: "A lawyer shall maintain complete
records of trust account funds and other trust property and
shall preserve those records for at least 6 years after the date
of termination of the representation."
11
No. 2015AP1567-D
whether Attorney Curtis' trust account problems were the result
of a failure to keep the records required by SCR 20:1.15, or a
failure to properly reconcile the records he kept. The referee
therefore concluded that the OLR had failed to prove trust
account misconduct independent of that charged in Counts 3, 4,
and 6.
401(k) Issues (Count 7)
¶19 This misconduct charge concerned the firm's payment
(or non-payment) of funds into the 401(k) plan that it
maintained for its employees. Both firm employees and the firm
itself would make contributions to the plan, which was
administered by a third party. Attorney Curtis determined the
amount of the firm's contribution to the plan.
¶20 The OLR claimed that the firm did not remit to the
401(k) plan the amounts that had been withheld from employee
paychecks for that purpose, nor did the firm make its promised
contributions to the plan. The OLR claimed that these actions
displayed dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). In his answer to the OLR complaint
and in his hearing testimony, Attorney Curtis invoked the Fifth
Amendment in response to allegations and questions about the
401(k) plan.
¶21 The referee recommended the dismissal of this
misconduct charge, again citing a paucity of evidence in the
record. The referee maintained that the record did not show why
amounts withheld from employee checks were not promptly paid to
the 401(k) plan; whether Attorney Curtis was involved in the
12
No. 2015AP1567-D
nonpayment of employee funds to the 401(k) plan; what
representations Attorney Curtis made to employees regarding the
401(k) plan; how any such representations related to the status
of the 401(k) plan at the time they were made; and whether the
firm was current on its own contributions to the plan. The only
established facts regarding the 401(k) plan, according to the
referee, were that: (1) while delayed, all amounts that the
firm withheld from employee paychecks were eventually paid into
the 401(k) plan; and (2) Attorney Curtis pled the Fifth
Amendment in response to allegations and questions about the
401(k) plan. The referee reasoned that neither of these facts,
viewed together or in isolation, constituted sufficient proof of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to warrant a
determination of an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation. Although an
attorney's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a disciplinary
proceeding permits an inference to be drawn on issues involving
grounds for discipline, State v. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 416–
17, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972), the referee wrote that the OLR was
"asking the possibility of a negative inference do too much
work" in this case.
¶22 As for the amount of discipline required to address
the above-described misconduct, the referee noted various
mitigating and aggravating factors. On the mitigating side of
the ledger, the referee noted that Attorney Curtis did not
attempt to conceal his tax obligations; rather, he filed yearly
tax returns informing the government what he owed, though he did
not pay the amount owed. Attorney Curtis served time in prison,
13
No. 2015AP1567-D
without practicing law, for his failure to pay income taxes.
The referee also noted that the trust account violations did not
benefit Attorney Curtis, were not intentional, and did not
involve misrepresentation or dishonesty. Attorney Curtis also
tried to locate the clients to whom money was owed. The referee
further noted that Attorney Curtis had practiced law for 55
years without prior discipline, and is now 81 years old.
¶23 On the aggravating side of the ledger, the referee
noted that the length of time during which Attorney Curtis was
delinquent on his taxes and the size of the delinquency itself
were quite considerable. Likewise, the dollar amount of the
undisbursed trust account funds and the length of time during
which those funds languished in the trust account were
significant.
¶24 Given all of the above considerations, the referee
proposed that a 120-day license suspension was in order. The
referee also recommended that, as a condition of Attorney
Curtis' practice of law following his suspension, he must
disburse the funds held in trust to the proper recipients, and
he must certify to the OLR that he has a system in place that:
(1) provides periodic reports to clients regarding amounts held
in trust; (2) flags amounts that have remained in trust for more
than a specified period since receipt of the funds and since the
last review by an attorney; and (3) requires an attorney in the
firm to review these funds on an annual basis to determine
whether they should be disbursed.
14
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶25 Because no appeal has been filed from the referee's
report and recommendation, we review the matter pursuant to
SCR 22.17(2). When reviewing a referee's report and
recommendation, we affirm the referee's findings of fact unless
they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the appropriate level
of discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case,
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from
it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34,
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶26 This is a difficult case. The referee's task was
undoubtedly complicated by the polar opposite positions taken by
the parties before him: the OLR demanded the revocation of
Attorney Curtis' license, and Attorney Curtis insisted that no
discipline was warranted whatsoever. In a lengthy report, the
referee resisted any temptation to make a middle-ground
recommendation, instead proposing a 120-day suspension——a result
from which neither party appealed, leaving us to decide this
matter without the benefit of automatically ordered briefing.8
8
We could have ordered the parties to file briefs with us
on our own motion. See SCR 22.17(2). But we have not done so,
as the issues are not so insurmountable as to justify the
further expense and delay of additional briefing in this long-
pending matter.
15
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶27 Adding another layer of complexity, Attorney Curtis
declined, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer any allegations
or questions regarding his firm's 401(k) plan (Count 7), but
also introduced evidence at the disciplinary hearing to suggest
that the plan's finances were in order. This litigation
strategy was entirely permissible: our rules permit a
respondent-lawyer to invoke his or her right against self-
incrimination, SCR 22.03(7), and this right is unaffected by
assertions of innocence. See Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21
(2001). It was then incumbent on the OLR to make a strong case
against Attorney Curtis on the subject of the 401(k) plan from
independent sources——a task that, the record shows, the OLR
might have done better. For example, the record is largely
devoid of records relating to the 401(k) plan, such as the
plan's accounting and tax records, or its standard quarterly and
annual reports, or any regular correspondence between the firm
and the plan's third-party administrator. All said, this court
is left with a challenging task in determining, on the facts,
the magnitude of Attorney Curtis' misconduct and the amount of
discipline necessary to prevent its recurrence, either by him or
other lawyers.
¶28 We start by addressing the easiest issue to dispose
of: whether Attorney Curtis' willful failure to pay income
taxes reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) (Count 1). The answer is a clear
yes.
16
No. 2015AP1567-D
¶29 Attorney Curtis' position before the referee seemed to
be that his tax woes didn't amount to professional misconduct
given that he filed accurate tax returns——he simply didn't pay
the taxes owed, which was a purely personal failing that didn't
abuse his professional status as a lawyer, or violate any
professional norms, or harm any clients, or (he claimed) tarnish
his reputation in the legal community. We disagree, as did the
referee. Given his federal conviction, upheld on appeal,
Attorney Curtis cannot meaningfully dispute that he
intentionally failed to pay any of the taxes he owed for the
years 2007 through 2009 despite having adjusted gross income of
more than $1.4 million over those years, and despite having
spent significant sums on extravagances——$17,730 on wine, for
example. See Curtis, 781 F.3d at 911. As Attorney Curtis
himself told the district court during his sentencing
allocution,9 "my whole system was wrong. . . . I had the concept
that it was my money and it isn't my money. Unfortunately I
never really thought about it." This sort of blinkered thinking
raises a red flag as to Attorney Curtis' fitness as lawyer——one
that he, in this proceeding, seems unable or unwilling to
acknowledge: during his disciplinary hearing, he blithely
compared the jury's verdict that he willfully failed to pay his
taxes to "historical verdicts that the world was flat. I got
9
The transcript of Attorney Curtis' sentencing hearing from
his federal tax case is included in the record of this
disciplinary matter, along with various other documents from
that case.
17
No. 2015AP1567-D
beat." On these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that
Attorney Curtis' criminal act reflects adversely on his fitness
as a lawyer.
¶30 We move next to Count 2, which alleged that, by
failing to remit to the federal government the payroll taxes10
that had been withheld from employee paychecks during the third
and fourth quarters of 2013 and all of 2014, Attorney Curtis
engaged in a form of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). As described
above, the referee recommended the dismissal of this charge,
citing ambiguity in the record as to whether Attorney Curtis
understood that the firm's payroll taxes were not being paid.
On the one hand, the referee found that Attorney Curtis became
10
On the subject of payroll taxes, the Seventh Circuit has
explained:
The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to
withhold income and Federal Insurance Contribution Act
taxes from their employees' wages. The amounts
collected from the employees' wages are considered to
be held by the employer in trust for the United
States, and must be paid over quarterly. See Slodov
v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 244, 98 S. Ct. 1778,
1783–84, 56 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1978) (citing 26 U.S.C. §
7501(a)). While it is not always required that these
funds be segregated by the employer prior to being
paid over to the IRS, the law is clear that the funds
may not be used by the employer for any other
obligations, including but not limited to operating
expenses. Id.; see also Purdy Co. of Illinois v.
United States, 814 F.2d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (7th Cir.
1997).
18
No. 2015AP1567-D
aware, at some point, that his firm had not remitted the payroll
taxes that it had withheld from its employees during part of
2013 and all of 2014. But the referee credited testimony at the
disciplinary hearing that the firm fell behind on remitting
payroll taxes because the IRS had garnished firm accounts, which
in turn left Attorney Curtis unclear as to whether the seized
funds were being applied toward payroll taxes. These facts, the
referee wrote, preclude a determination that Attorney Curtis'
conduct rose to the level of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit that
constituted an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation. As such, the referee
recommended the dismissal of Count 2.
¶31 We accept the referee's recommendation to dismiss
Count 2. Neither party has challenged any of the referee's
findings of fact or legal conclusions underlying the referee's
recommended dismissal of this count. Our own review of the
matter leads us to accept the referee's findings of fact——in
particular his credibility determination that Attorney Curtis
was unclear as to whether funds seized by the IRS were being
applied toward payroll taxes. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Nunnery, 2009 WI 89, ¶40, 320 Wis. 2d 422,
769 N.W.2d 858 ("The referee is best situated to judge the
credibility of witnesses.") We also note, as did the referee,
the absence from the record of certain documentary evidence that
would have been helpful in analyzing this misconduct count;
e.g., the firm's payroll tax returns, payroll accounting
records, employee payroll stubs, etc. Based on the referee's
unchallenged factual findings of fact and on the state of the
19
No. 2015AP1567-D
record, we agree with the referee's conclusion that the OLR
failed to establish that Attorney Curtis engaged in dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation sufficient to warrant a
misconduct determination on Count 2.
¶32 We move next to Counts 3 through 6, which concern
trust account problems. Attorney Curtis admitted in his answer
that he failed to regularly reconcile his trust account (Count
4), and he failed to adequately supervise his staff's management
of the trust account (Count 6). Attorney Curtis admitted in his
post-hearing briefing that he failed to ensure the prompt notice
and delivery of funds to clients and third parties (Count 3).
Given Attorney Curtis' misguided practice of trying to wait-out
subrogated claims by letting subrogated funds lay dormant——and
untracked——in his trust account, we have no difficulty accepting
his admissions on these counts.
¶33 We also agree with the referee's recommendation to
dismiss Count 5, which alleged that Attorney Curtis failed to
maintain and retain complete records of trust account funds.
According to the referee, the record is unclear as to whether
Attorney Curtis' trust account problems were the result of a
failure to keep the records required by SCR 20:1.15, or a
failure to properly reconcile the records he kept. The referee
therefore concluded that the OLR had failed to prove trust
account misconduct independent of that charged in Counts 3, 4,
and 6. Neither party has appealed from this determination. We
conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous, and thus we uphold the referee's conclusion of law
20
No. 2015AP1567-D
that Attorney Curtis' conduct did not violate former and current
SCR 20:1.15(e)(6).
¶34 We move next to Count 7, which alleged that Attorney
Curtis engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) by virtue of his
failure to deposit in the firm's 401(k) plan the amount of funds
that his firm withheld from employee paychecks and the amount of
funds that his firm had committed to pay into the fund. As
mentioned above, Attorney Curtis pled the Fifth Amendment with
respect to any allegations regarding this count during the
discovery, pleadings, and disciplinary hearing stages of this
matter. We have previously held that although a respondent-
lawyer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment "is not in itself a
ground for disbarment," we may draw a negative inference from
that invocation. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d at 417. The referee
concluded that this negative inference constituted the entirety
of the OLR's case in support of Count 7——not enough to support a
misconduct charge, and thus the referee recommended its
dismissal.
¶35 The referee's discussion of this issue lacks a
recommendation on whether Attorney Curtis properly invoked the
Fifth Amendment. Fifth Amendment protection "must be confined
to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend
danger from a direct answer." Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951). "The witness is not exonerated from
answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself——his say-so does not of itself establish the
21
No. 2015AP1567-D
hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his
silence is justified, and to require him to answer if 'it
clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.'" Id.
(citations omitted). Thus, the "trial court has a clear
responsibility to make a full record that the witness' fear of
incrimination is valid, real and appreciable, and not
speculative or merely an imaginary possibility of incriminatory
danger." State v. Harris, 92 Wis. 2d 836, 844–45, 285
N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
¶36 The referee was to have made such "a full record"
here. See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge
trying a civil action and shall conduct the hearing as the trial
of a civil action to the court.") The referee did not do so; it
appears that the parties and the referee alike simply assumed
that Attorney Curtis' silence regarding the 401(k) funds was
justified. Thus, at no point in the record before us did
Attorney Curtis articulate a reason why responding to
allegations or questions regarding the 401(k) plan could subject
him to criminal liability, nor did the referee make a
determination of the proper scope and legitimacy of his Fifth
Amendment claim. Such an unchecked use of the Fifth Amendment
rests uneasily alongside our method of maintaining the integrity
of the bar by requiring attorneys to fully cooperate with OLR
investigations. See SCR 20:8.4(h), SCR 21.15(4),
SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), and SCR 22.04(1).
¶37 Nevertheless, it takes little imagination to see the
"real and appreciable" fear that presumably motivated Attorney
22
No. 2015AP1567-D
Curtis' invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 664 (criminalizing theft or embezzlement from an employee
benefit plan). At this point, requiring Attorney Curtis to
trace the path of his employees' 401(k) withholdings from
paycheck-to-plan might improperly compel him "to surrender the
very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee."
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. Thus, we conclude that Attorney
Curtis properly asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid
answering allegations and questions about his firm's payment of
401(k) funds.
¶38 The referee's discussion of the 401(k) issue is
lengthy and appropriately critical of the ambiguous nature of
much of the testimony and exhibits received on the issue. Based
on the evidence submitted, the referee found that, for an
unknown period of time, an unknown amount of employees' 401(k)
withholdings were delinquent from the firm's 401(k) plan, but
the firm cured this delinquency by no later than August 2015.
Citing a shortage of evidence, the referee wrote that he was
unable to make findings as to why employees' 401(k) withholdings
were delinquent from the firm's 401(k) plan, or what
representations Attorney Curtis made to employees related to the
plan, or whether Attorney Curtis was even involved with the
401(k) withholdings. The referee opined that the delay in
remitting employees' 401(k) withholdings to the 401(k) plan,
along with the adverse inference drawn from Attorney Curtis'
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, were not enough to
demonstrate an SCR 20:8.4(c) violation; additional evidence of
23
No. 2015AP1567-D
"the circumstances of [the funds'] delay" was necessary, the
referee wrote.
¶39 We agree. Given the OLR's failure to submit all
relevant information about the delinquent 401(k) contributions
(answering the essential inquiries of who, what, where, when,
why, and how), we cannot conclude that Attorney Curtis' actions
rose to the level to the level of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).
We agree with the referee's observation that the OLR was asking
the adverse inference drawn from Attorney Curtis' assertion of
his Fifth Amendment privileges to do "too much work."
¶40 We turn next to the issue of the appropriate
discipline for Attorney Curtis. The referee recommended a 120-
day suspension of Attorney Curtis' law license, along with a
variety of trust account related reinstatement conditions. We
agree that a four-month suspension is sufficient, as it is well
within the wide range of discipline this court has imposed for
arguably similar misconduct. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Washington, 2007 WI 65, 301 Wis. 2d 47, 732
N.W.2d 24 (18-month suspension for conduct resulting in federal
conviction for one count of tax evasion); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against McKinley, 2014 WI 48, 354 Wis. 2d 717, 848
N.W.2d 295 (60–day suspension for conduct resulting in two state
misdemeanor convictions for filing a false tax return); In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Usow, 214 Wis. 2d 596, 571
N.W.2d 162 (1997) (six-month suspension for misrepresentation
and trust account violations that were found to be committed
24
No. 2015AP1567-D
without intent and due to a failure to properly supervise office
staff).
¶41 We turn next to the various conditions of
reinstatement recommended by the referee. We agree that certain
conditions are appropriate to foster Attorney Curtis' compliance
with trust account requirements, though we do not impose the
exact conditions suggested by the referee. Rather, we simply
direct Attorney Curtis, following reinstatement, to submit to
OLR trust account monitoring for a period of three years, or
until such time as this court enters an order ending monitoring.
¶42 We turn next to the issue of costs. Citing his view
that the OLR failed to prove the misconduct alleged in three of
the seven alleged counts (Counts 2, 5, and 7), the referee
recommended that Attorney Curtis be ordered to pay three-
quarters of the cost of this proceeding, which will result in
Attorney Curtis being required to pay costs of $12,665.15.
Neither Attorney Curtis nor the OLR challenges this
recommendation. We agree with the referee and the parties that
a one-quarter reduction in costs is warranted. Our
determination is not the result of the application of a precise
mathematical formula, but is based on our thorough consideration
of the record, the manner in which this case developed, and the
factors set forth in SCR 22.24(1m).
¶43 Finally, we turn to the issue of restitution. The OLR
has not sought restitution, citing two reasons: (1) as part of
his criminal judgment, the district court ordered Attorney
Curtis to make $5,000 monthly payments until his overdue income
25
No. 2015AP1567-D
taxes are fully paid, making a restitution award related to
Count 1 unnecessary; and (2) the remaining counts not
recommended for dismissal by the referee concern trust account
problems of such age and complexity that there is no reasonably
ascertainable amount of restitution.
¶44 We agree with the OLR's reasoning. As for Attorney
Curtis' back taxes, there is no need for this court to order
restitution that would duplicate that already ordered in the
federal court system. As for Attorney Curtis' trust account
violations, we note that, according to the record, thousands of
dollars remain in the firm's trust account with respect to which
the owners have not been identified, despite the firm's
substantial efforts to do so. Given the OLR's plausible
inability to determine whether any particular client or third
party is owed any particular amount of money by Attorney Curtis,
we will accede to the OLR's request not to award restitution in
this matter. However, as both part of Attorney Curtis' sanction
and as a condition of reinstatement, we will require him to
disburse all funds in his trust account to their rightful
owners, and if the rightful owners cannot be located, he must
transfer the funds to the state treasurer's office as unclaimed
or unidentifiable property.
¶45 IT IS ORDERED that the license of George W. Curtis,
Jr. to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of
four months, effective March 29, 2018.
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W. Curtis, Jr. shall
distribute all funds in his trust account to their rightful
26
No. 2015AP1567-D
owners. If the rightful owners cannot be located, George W.
Curtis, Jr. shall transfer those funds to the state treasurer's
office as unclaimed or unidentifiable property. George W.
Curtis, Jr. shall provide documentation to the OLR that all
funds in his trust account have been so distributed.
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reinstatement of his
license to practice law, George W. Curtis, Jr.'s trust account
shall be subject to monitoring by the Office of Lawyer
Regulation for three years or until further order of this court.
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, George W. Curtis, Jr. shall pay to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $12,665.15.
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W. Curtis, Jr. shall
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of
an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.28(2).
27
No. 2015AP1567-D
1