Linden v. Babcock

Fairchild, J.

The appellants insist that all county officials are to have their offices at the county seat, but with the exception of the officers named in sec. 59.14 (1), Stats., that has not been the custom; as the statute does not require the office in question to be at the county seat the ruling below was correct. No reason appears for continuing the restraining order. Appellants’ proposition is, in effect, that the amendment of sec. 59.14 (1) by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, did not' recognize that except as to’ those officials specifically named in sec. 59.14 (1) the county board had the power, based on sec. 59.07, to determine where county offices should be. In amending sec. 59.14 (1) by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, the distinction was recognized as existing between the named officials and others. The part of the section referring to sheriff, clerk of the circuit court, etc., is related to the offices of those officials and fixes them at the county seat. The further provision is applicable to other “elective or appointive county officials” whom the county board also may require to1 keep their offices .at the county seat. This law now accommodates the develop ments of county needs, making it possible to co-ordinate certain agencies and locate them where the demands upon them can be met most efficiently. That the legislature did not intend a change in an existing practice except as the county board desired is evidenced by the fact that they phrased the amendment in permissive terms.

There would be no meaning to ascribe to the words written into sec. 59.14 (1), Stats., by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, unless it was the intention of the legislature that officers other than the sheriff, the clerk of the circuit court, the register of deeds, county treasurer, register of probate, and county clerk were from time to time to be permitted to have their offices at such places as met with the approval of the county board.

By the Court. — -Order affirmed.