Citation Numbers: 10 N.W.2d 206, 243 Wis. 231
Judges: WICKHEM, J.
Filed Date: 4/15/1943
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Upon reconsideration of the record, I find myself unable to concur in the decision the court in this case for the reasons hereinafter stated: I concurred in the decision in the case of IndependenceIndemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra, without realizing as I should have done that it in principle overruled the MarylandCasualty Co. Case, supra. I do not question the general rule that a decision of this court considerately made should not be overruled except for strong and compelling reason. On the other hand, when the court is convinced that a prior *Page 243 decision is erroneous, in my opinion it should not hesitate to admit its error and correct it at the first opportunity except in cases where the decision has become a rule of property. It has been my observation that judges are in favor of overruling cases which they are convinced are erroneous but are very strongly opposed to overruling a case which in their judgment was correctly decided. In the end it comes down to a matter of opinion. I am of the view that the overruling of the Independence Case, supra, would do justice in this and similar cases and accomplish what was sought to be accomplished by enactment and amendment of ch. 102, Stats.
Nor can I concur in the view that a decision of this court construing a statute and so becoming a part of the statute is thereby placed beyond the reach of subsequent reconsideration by the court. For this position there exists what seems to me to be ample authority.
The case of Swift v. Tyson,
"This court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the constitution to the several states."
In our own court, in the case of Reiter v. Grober,
All members of the court concur in the view that at the time of his injury and death, Kenneth was an employee of the plaintiffs within the meaning of the compensation act.
It is also apparent that the plaintiffs as parents of Kenneth by reason of his death sustained the same loss that they would have sustained if Kenneth had been killed while in the employment of a third person. The right to recover against the insurer is denied them on the ground that because it is said, they cannot be legally liable to themselves and therefore they have no right to a death benefit under the provisions of sec.
"If the deceased employee leaves no one wholly dependent upon him for support, partial dependency and death benefits therefor shall be as follows:
"(1) An unestranged surviving parent or parents, residing within any of the states or District of Columbia of the *Page 245 United States, shall receive a death benefit of twelve hundreddollars. . . ."
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as passed in 1911, the employer was not required to carry insurance. The act (now ch. 102, Stats.) was amended by ch. 599, Laws of 1913. Sec. 2394-24, 2, provided:
"An employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure payment of such compensation in some company authorized to insure such liability in this state. . . ."
That provision ever since has been and still is a part of the Workmen's Compensation Act and is found in sec.
Sec.
"the right to enforce in his own name, in the manner providedin this act, the liability of any insurance company which mayhave insured the liability for such compensation," etc.
Sec.
"Every contract for the insurance of the compensation herein provided for, or against liability therefor, shall be deemed to be made subject to the provisions of this act, and provisions thereof inconsistent with the act shall be void. Such contract shall be construed to grant full coverage of all liability of the assured under and according to the provisions *Page 246 of the act, notwithstanding any agreement of the parties to the contrary," etc.
The contract issued by the insurer in this case provides:
This insurer "does hereby agree with this employer, named and described as such in the declarations forming a part hereof, as respects personal injuries sustained by employees, including death at any time resulting therefrom as follows:
"I (a) To pay promptly to any person entitled thereto, under the Workmen's Compensation Law and in the manner therein provided, the entire amount of any sum due, and all instalments thereof as they become due.
"(1) To such person because of the obligation for compensation for any such injury imposed upon or accepted by this employer under such of certain statutes, as may be applicable thereto, cited and described in an indorsement attached to this policy, each of which statutes is herein referred to as the Workmen's Compensation Law, and
"(2) . . .
"It is agreed that all of the provisions of each Workmen's Compensation Law covered hereby shall be and remain a part of this contract as fully and completely as if written herein, so far as they apply to compensation or other benefitsfor any personal injury or death covered by this policy, whilethis policy shall remain in force."
There can be no doubt that if Kenneth had survived the accident in which he met his death, he would have been entitled to recover compensation for his injuries from the defendant insurer in a proceeding brought directly against it. The policy further provides:
"This agreement is subject to the following conditions: . . .
"D The obligations of paragraph I (a) foregoing are hereby declared to be the direct obligations and promises of the company to any injured employee covered hereby, or, in the event of his death, to his dependents; and to each such employee or such dependent the company is hereby made *Page 247 directly and primarily liable under said obligations and promises. This contract is made for the benefit of such employees or such dependents and is enforceable against the company, by any such employee or such dependent in his name or on his behalf, at any time and in any manner permitted by law, whether claims or proceedings are brought against the company alone or jointly with this employer. . . ."
If under the provisions of the statutes above referred to and in accordance with the terms of the contract hereinbefore set out the employee can maintain an action directly against the insurance carrier, I see no reason why the plaintiffs who are unestranged surviving parents may not recover the statutory death benefits provided for in sec.
The principal reason why I cannot agree with the opinion of the court is that the court has placed a construction upon certain sections of the Workmen's Compensation Law which in my opinion unduly limits and restricts them. The sections are as follows:
"102.28(2) An employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure payment of such compensation in some company authorized to insure such liability in this state. . . ."
"(4) If it appears by the complaint or by the affidavit of any person in behalf of the state that the employer's liability continues uninsured there shall forthwith be served on the employer an order to show cause," etc.
"102.30(1) Nothing in sections
"102.31(1) . . . Such contract shall be construed to grant full coverage of all liability of the assured under and according to the provisions of sections
Because of the words "such liability" in sec.
"In case of liability for the increased compensation or increased death benefits provided for by section
This section was introduced into the Workmen's Compensation Law by a revision law which became sec. 1, ch. 624, Laws of 1917. This chapter provided that compensation and death benefits under the act should be treble the amount otherwise recoverable, (a) in case the injured employee be a minor of permit age and had no permit; (b) if the injured employee be a minor of permit age, or over, or permitted to work at prohibited employment.
The provision that the liability of the employer should be primary and not secondary, was intended to make the employer bear the burden of violating the law in the respects stated.
If the legislature had been of the view that the liability of the employer was primary and that of the insurance carrier was merely one of indemnity it would not have enacted sec.
"From a consideration of the whole statutory scheme we conclude that the provisions of the statute relating to insurance are principally for the purpose of securing to the employee payment for compensable injuries. The statute not only gives him a right against his employer, but when the right has been vindicated and the amount of compensation ascertained, it seeks to secure payment to him of the compensation. Therefore, when an insurance company undertakes to write workmen's compensation insurance it assumes the employer'sobligation to pay compensation. The measure of its liability under its policy and the statute is the employer's liability to the injured employee. It is permitted to make no defense which will impair the employee's right to payment of compensation.Its liability is in effect primary. It is not a mereindemnity. It is therefore considered that a controversy relating to compensation insurance is, within the meaning of the provisions quoted in the original opinion, a dispute or controversy concerning compensation."
If as the court now holds, a contract of the insurer is a mere indemnity contract, the court would have adhered to its original position. The Independence Case, supra, in principle but not in terms overruled the Maryland Casualty Co.Case, supra, and so the error crept into the law. The IndependenceCase was decided as it was because too much weight was given to labels reminiscent of common-law liability and too little weight given to the clear language of the statute and the contract.
The insurer in this case contracted to pay to the person entitled thereto all benefits. It did not make its contract to pay contingent upon the employer's liability. The liability of the employer is a measure of the insurer's liability, not the source of it. The statute already quoted provides that under the circumstances of this case the plaintiffs "shall receive a death *Page 251 benefit of twelve hundred dollars." It does not say that they shall receive it upon any condition whatever.
In the Maryland Casualty Co. Case, supra, the court said (p. 209):
"A study of the Workmen's Compensation Act (ch. 102, Stats.) convinces us that with respect to insurance the statutory scheme was intended to do more than merely protect the employer against liability on account of injuries sustained by his employees. The quite evident purpose of the whole scheme is to guarantee payment of compensation in accordance with the terms of the act to the injured employee. Instead of providing for a fund to be administered by the state, the act requires the employer to `insure payment of such compensation in some company authorized to insure such liability in this state unless such employer shall be exempted from such insurance by the industrial commission.'"
The statute requires the insurer to insure "liability," in effect to insure payment of liability and not merely to save the employer harmless. It seems to me that to deny the plaintiffs the right to benefits in this case violates the language as well as the spirit and purpose of the compensation act.
In my opinion the Independence Case, supra, should be overruled; the judgment appealed from reversed; and the record remanded to the trial court with directions to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the statute.
I cannot concur in the construction placed by the court upon sec.
In order to present the statutory situation, it is necessary to have the two sections in juxtaposition. The material part of sec.
"If a deceased employee leaves no one wholly dependent upon him for support, partial dependency and death benefits therefore shall be as follows:
"(1) An unestranged surviving parent or parents residing within any of the states or District of Columbia of the United States, shall receive a death benefit of twelve hundred dollars. . . .
"(2) In all other cases the death benefit shall be such sum as the commission shall determine to represent fairly and justly the aid to support which the dependent might reasonably have anticipated from the deceased employee but for the injury. To establish anticipation of support and dependency, it shall not be essential that the deceased employee made any contribution to support. . . ."
Sec.
"In each case of injury resulting in death, leaving no person wholly dependent for support, the employer or insurer shall pay into the state treasury such an amount, when added to the sums paid or to be paid on account of partial dependency, as shall equal the death benefit payable to a person wholly dependent, such payment to the state treasury in no event to exceed two thousand dollars. . . ."
The provisions made by statute in the event that the employee dies leaving one wholly dependent upon him for support are as provided in secs.
The dependency referred to in sec.
Under the facts of this case, the most that the state could possibly be entitled to would be the difference between $1,200 and $2,000. The state is not entitled to the $1,200 because there is no one wholly dependent and the unestranged parents are partially dependent. In my opinion the parents are entitled to receive this $1,200. The court holds that the parents are not entitled to receive the $1,200 because of the IndependenceCase, supra, which, as I have already said, in my opinion was wrongly decided.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice MARTIN and Mr. Justice BARLOW concur in this opinion.