Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nathan E. DeLadurantey

2023 WI 17SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2020AP1616-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Appellant,
v.
Nathan E. DeLadurantey,
Respondent-Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DELADURANTEY
OPINION FILED: March 3, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2023 WI 17NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2020AP1616-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey,
Attorney at Law:
FILED
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
MAR 3, 2023
Complainant-Appellant,
Sheila T. Reiff
v. Clerk of Supreme Court
Nathan E. DeLadurantey,
Respondent-Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly
reprimanded.
¶1 PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
appeals Referee Robert E. Kinney's report, as amended,
recommending that the court dismiss the remaining charges in the
disciplinary complaint filed against Attorney Nathan E.
DeLadurantey alleging that Attorney DeLadurantey violated the
Attorney's Oath in Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 40.15,1 which is
1SCR 40.15 (Attorney's Oath) provides in relevant part: "I
will abstain from all offensive personality . . . ."
No. 2020AP1616-D
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g),2 by failing to abstain from
"offensive personality."
¶2 This court issued an initial opinion in this case on
July 8, 2022. As explained below, because we were unaware of
the referee's submission of errata pages for his report that
eliminated much of the legal basis for our initial opinion, we
withdrew that opinion by order dated July 12, 2022. The
discovery of those errata pages caused us to further review the
basis upon which the parties had requested the referee to accept
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and upon which the
referee had made factual findings in his report. Having asked
for and received responses from the parties regarding their
agreement as the factual basis for the plea, and having
reconsidered the record in this matter, we now issue this
revised opinion. We conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey did
engage in "offensive personality" in one incident that he
admits, and we determine that the appropriate discipline for
that misconduct is a public reprimand. We also determine that
Attorney DeLadurantey should be required to pay costs of this
disciplinary proceeding in the amount of $17,570.10.
¶3 In order to review the legal conclusion in the
referee's amended report, we first need to clarify the
procedural context in which this case comes to us on appeal
because that informs what we are reviewing and how we can
2SCR 20:8.4(g) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to violate the attorney's oath."
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No. 2020AP1616-D
proceed. This further requires us to provide some background on
the use of no-contest pleas in attorney disciplinary cases, and
the procedural history of the proceedings before the referee in
this case.
¶4 Supreme Court Rule 22.14(2)3 contemplates that in a
respondent attorney's answer to a complaint filed by the OLR,
the attorney may "plead no contest to allegations of misconduct
in the complaint." Although this rule speaks only in terms of
pleading no contest in the respondent's answer, we have
regularly upheld the entry of a no-contest plea entered at any
stage of the proceedings before the referee, even if the
respondent attorney's answer initially denied some or all of the
complaint's factual allegations and claims of misconduct. See,
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2019 WI 55,
386 Wis. 2d 719, 927 N.W.2d 525 (no-contest pleas entered
pursuant to stipulation after respondent attorney filed answers
to original and amended complaints); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Hudec, 2019 WI 39, 386 Wis. 2d 371, 925
N.W.2d 540 (no-contest pleas entered pursuant to stipulation
after respondent attorney filed unsuccessful motion to dismiss
and an answer that denied all allegations of misconduct); In re
3SCR 22.14(2) provides: "The respondent may by answer plead
no contest to allegations of misconduct in the complaint. The
referee shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to
each allegation to which no contest is pleaded and for which the
referee finds an adequate basis in the record. In a subsequent
disciplinary or reinstatement proceeding, it shall be
conclusively presumed that the respondent engaged in the
misconduct determined on the basis of a no contest plea."
3
No. 2020AP1616-D
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heins, 2017 WI 93, 378 Wis. 2d
27, 902 N.W.2d 257 (referee construed stipulation entered after
completion of discovery and just prior to final evidentiary
hearing to be entry of no-contest pleas to all counts in
complaint).
¶5 In the criminal context, a circuit court has
discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a
no-contest plea. State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470
N.W.2d 900 (1991) (". . . a court has discretion whether or not
to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas . .
."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872(1972) ("The trial court earlier rejected a plea of nolo
contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion
to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19
N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a
plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts."); Brozosky
v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of
nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court").
Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action,
rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule
would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary
proceeding. First, referees in such matters generally have the
powers of a circuit court judge trying a civil action.
Moreover, our rules both explicitly authorize the entry of no-
contest pleas in attorney disciplinary proceedings and use
language that tracks the rules for accepting pleas in criminal
cases. See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge
4
No. 2020AP1616-D
trying a civil action . . . ."); SCR 22.14(2) (authorizing entry
of no-contest pleas and providing requirements for accepting
such pleas). Thus, it is logical to interpret the plea entry
rule in disciplinary proceedings to give the referee the same
discretion in deciding whether to accept a plea that a circuit
court possesses in a criminal case.
¶6 Rule 22.14(2) states that when a no-contest plea is
included in the answer (or offered later in the proceeding), the
referee "shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to
each allegation to which no contest is pleaded," but only if
"the referee finds an adequate factual basis in the record" to
support the plea. Id. This tracks the language in the statute
that governs the entry of pleas in criminal cases, Wis. Stat.
§ 971.08(1)(b), which requires a circuit court, before accepting
a guilty or no-contest plea, to "[m]ake such inquiry as
satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime
charged."
¶7 We have said in the criminal context that how a plea-
taking judge makes that inquiry and what the judge uses in the
record as the factual basis is left to the judge's discretion.
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶¶19-22, 232 Wis. 2d
714, 605 N.W.2d 836. However the plea-taking judge makes the
inquiry and whatever portion of the record the judge ultimately
relies on, the judge must satisfy the two purposes of the
factual basis requirement: (1) that the defendant is aware of
the elements of the crime, and (2) that the defendant's conduct,
as established by the record, meets those elements. Id., ¶22.
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No. 2020AP1616-D
Moreover, the plea-taking judge "must ensure that a defendant
realizes that his or her conduct does meet the elements of the
crime charged." Id., ¶21 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 467 (1969)). We see no reason why those statements of
the law of pleas in the criminal context would not apply to the
requirement to find a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea in
an attorney disciplinary proceeding. The use of similar
language in the disciplinary rule regarding the need to
establish a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea by an attorney
supports this conclusion.
¶8 With this background in mind, we now turn to the facts
of this case. Attorney DeLadurantey was admitted to practice
law in Wisconsin in 2007. Since 2008, he has been the owner of
DeLadurantey Law Office, LLC in Brookfield. Since 2013, the
primary focus of Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm has been
consumer litigation. Attorney DeLadurantey has not previously
been disciplined.
¶9 The OLR's complaint in this proceeding focused on the
relationship between Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., the
grievant, during the time period that H.M. worked as an
associate attorney for Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm.
Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. graduated from the same law
school and met at an alumni function. Attorney DeLadurantey
subsequently hired H.M., and her employment with his law firm
extended from February 2012 until October 2017.
¶10 The OLR's complaint alleged that the law firm's
growing consumer litigation practice required H.M. and Attorney
6
No. 2020AP1616-D
DeLadurantey to work evenings and weekends, and to often travel
together for interviews, depositions, and court proceedings.
The complaint further alleged that over the course of H.M.'s
employment, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. "established a
friendship outside the office, including going to a gym to work
out, playing online games, sharing meals together when working,
and participating in social activities while traveling for Firm
business such as snorkeling, going to the beach, and watching
Netflix." The complaint alleged, however, that during this time
period Attorney DeLadurantey had "engaged in a pattern of
behavior that was inappropriate and at times constituted sexual
harassment." The OLR's complaint proceeded to allege a number
of incidents and statements that were a part of the alleged
pattern of inappropriate and harassing behavior. The complaint
alleged multiple violations of two ethical rules arising from
"each instance" of subjecting H.M. to physical contact, sexual
advances, and comments regarding her physical appearance: (1)
violations of SCR 20:8.4(i) (harassment),4 and (2) violations of
the "offensive personality" clause in the Attorney's Oath in SCR
40.15. In other words, the complaint alleged that each instance
of such conduct summarized in the complaint had violated both of
those ethical rules. Consequently, although the OLR's complaint
listed only a single count and the parties and the referee have
4 SCR 20:8.4(i) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age,
creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual
preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's
professional activities."
7
No. 2020AP1616-D
often spoken of a single charge under each ethical rule in this
case, the OLR's complaint actually alleged multiple counts of
misconduct under each of two separate rules. We will therefore
refer to "charges" in the plural for each rule.
¶11 Attorney DeLadurantey's answer to the complaint
admitted that the two attorneys had worked together on evenings
and weekends and had often traveled together. His answer denied
that he had engaged in harassment prohibited by SCR 20:8.4(i)
and that he had violated the "offensive personality" clause of
the Attorney's Oath. With the exception of what we will
reference as the "San Francisco incident," which we will
describe in detail below, Attorney DeLadurantey's answer and
subsequent deposition testimony denied at least some portion of
the allegations surrounding each of the various incidents or
comments described in the complaint. Given the nature of the
proceedings for the taking of Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest
plea and his denial of many of the allegations of the complaint,
we will not set forth in detail those other alleged incidents
and comments. We will include in the factual recitation only
facts that are uncontested.
¶12 It is undisputed that while H.M. was employed by
Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M.
traveled together on a number of business trips. On some of
those trips, the two stayed in a two-bedroom, Airbnb
accommodation, with each occupying their own bedroom. It is
undisputed that one such trip occurred in February 2016, when
the two attorneys traveled to San Francisco for depositions.
8
No. 2020AP1616-D
¶13 Five paragraphs of the OLR's complaint (¶¶17-21)
addressed the San Francisco incident. Attorney DeLadurantey's
answer admitted some portions of those paragraphs, but denied
some portions. In his deposition testimony, however, he
clarified that he had only vague and generalized recollections
of the events of that evening because he had been highly
intoxicated. He therefore essentially indicated that he could
not dispute the allegations of the complaint about the San
Francisco incident, which had been based on H.M.'s statements to
the OLR. Also, in the statement of facts in Attorney
DeLadurantey's appellate brief, he says that he conceded before
the referee at the plea hearing that "his conduct relating to
the San Francisco incident referred to in the complaint
constituted offensive personality." His brief then quoted the
five paragraphs of the complaint addressing the San Francisco
incident in his statement of facts, indicating that he does not
dispute those factual allegations for purposes of this case,
although he also included an extended excerpt from his
deposition setting forth his limited recollection of the events
of that evening. Consequently, we use the allegations of
paragraphs 17-21 of the complaint to describe the events of the
San Francisco incident.
¶14 On the evening of February 3, 2016, H.M. was in a
common space watching television. Attorney DeLadurantey
approached her and began to rub her back, arms, and legs in a
suggestive manner. H.M. left the common area and went to her
9
No. 2020AP1616-D
bedroom. H.M. was upset and afraid, to the extent that she felt
physically ill.
¶15 Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently texted H.M. and
attempted to explain his inappropriate behavior. In the ensuing
text exchange between the two, Attorney DeLadurantey asked if he
could "try and fix the awkwardness." H.M. responded, "I'm
pretty sure I'm going to throw up shortly – I'm struggling not
to."
¶16 Later in the evening, H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey
had a face-to-face conversation in the kitchen of the rental
unit. Despite H.M.'s earlier expression of being upset due to
Attorney DeLadurantey's suggestive conduct, during the
conversation Attorney DeLadurantey told H.M. that he wanted to
"take her upstairs to her bedroom and hold her." H.M. told
Attorney DeLadurantey that would not happen. She also told him
during the conversation that she may have to leave Attorney
DeLadurantey's law firm.
¶17 At the end of the conversation, Attorney DeLadurantey
left the kitchen, went upstairs, and got into the bed in H.M.'s
bedroom. When she discovered Attorney DeLadurantey in her bed,
H.M. told him that she was not going to share a bed with him.
He then left the bedroom.
¶18 The next morning, Attorney DeLadurantey admitted to
H.M. that his actions the prior evening had been inappropriate,
and he apologized for them.
¶19 Although we will not comment on specific alleged
incidents, it is undisputed that the working relationship
10
No. 2020AP1616-D
between H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently deteriorated
and that H.M. left Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm in October
2017.
¶20 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey denied many of
the allegations in the OLR's complaint about other incidents, at
least in part. He continued to deny those allegations in his
deposition testimony.
¶21 The parties appeared before the referee for the
evidentiary hearing in this matter on May 17, 2021. The referee
noted that there were a number of pending motions in limine that
needed to be resolved.5 Before doing so, however, the referee
met with the attorneys representing the OLR and Attorney
DeLadurantey. The result of that off-the-record discussion was
an apparent agreement that the OLR would dismiss the charges6 of
harassment on the basis of sex under SCR 20:8.4(i) and that
Attorney DeLadurantey would plead no-contest to the charges7 of
engaging in offensive personality under SCR 40.15 and 20:8.4(g),
5The referee noted that he had received and read copies of
the parties' voluminous trial exhibits, except for the
deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., which
counsel for the parties had asked him not to read in advance of
the evidentiary hearing.
6As noted above, the OLR's complaint alleged that "each
instance" of physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about
H.M's appearance constituted a separate violation of SCR
20:8.4(i).
7The OLR's complaint also alleged that "each instance" of
physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about H.M's
appearance constituted a violation of the offensive personality
clause of the Attorney's Oath and therefore of SCR 20:8.4(g).
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No. 2020AP1616-D
with the parties jointly requesting the imposition of a private
reprimand.
¶22 Unfortunately, neither the attorneys nor the referee
specified on the hearing transcript precisely what facts the
referee was to use as the factual basis for Attorney
DeLadurantey's plea. It is not even clear whether they fully
understood precisely what was within the scope of their
agreement. Counsel for the OLR initially said that Attorney
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea would be "supported by the
allegations of the complaint." In response, however, counsel
for Attorney DeLadurantey responded that while he did not have
an objection to the description of the agreement described by
OLR's counsel, he said that there were "other provisions of the
agreement" that should also be placed onto the record,
indicating that the OLR's counsel had not described the full
agreement of the parties. Specifically, Attorney DeLadurantey's
counsel stated that the referee should consider the record in
the case as a whole, which would include the proposed hearing
exhibits and the deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey
and H.M.8 OLR's counsel did not dispute this clarification.
This meant that the parties asked the referee to rely not only
on the factual allegations of the complaint, but also on a
8Actually, Attorney DeLadurantey's proposed hearing
exhibits included the transcript of an interview that H.M. gave
to an OLR investigator that was not under oath. Attorney
DeLadurantey's counsel asked that the transcript of H.M.'s
deposition be substituted for that interview transcript. There
was no objection by OLR's counsel to this substitution.
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No. 2020AP1616-D
record that contained express denials of allegations in the
complaint and competing affirmative assertions of fact.
¶23 The referee then initiated a plea colloquy with
Attorney DeLadurantey. As part of that colloquy, the referee
noted that, in order to accept Attorney DeLadurantey's no-
contest plea, he was required to find an adequate factual basis
for the plea and he clearly indicated that he found such an
adequate factual basis in the record as a whole, not just in the
allegations of the complaint:
The rule that I alluded to a minute ago requires that
I find that there is "adequate factual basis" in the
record, unquote, to support your plea. And I want to
make sure that it's clear that I have reviewed
hundreds of pages of discovery materials, and I have
no difficulty finding that there is an adequate
factual basis to support the plea of no contest to
that charge.
Having also found that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, the referee accepted the plea. The parties agreed to
submit simultaneous legal memoranda in support of their sanction
request.
¶24 After receiving the parties' sanction memoranda, the
referee prepared his report and recommendation. Although he had
accepted Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea to the
"offensive personality" charges at the plea hearing, he
13
No. 2020AP1616-D
concluded in his report that the "offensive personality" charges
should be dismissed.9
¶25 The referee's conclusion of no "offensive personality"
violations stemmed from his subordinate legal conclusion that in
order to engage in "offensive personality" in the context of
allegations of sexual conduct, the OLR was required to prove at
least one element of a sexual harassment employment
discrimination claim—that Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual
advances to H.M. and alleged comments about her appearance were
"unwelcome," which the referee characterized as the "gravamen"
of any sexual harassment claim. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
¶26 In his report, the referee did not consider just the
allegations of the OLR's complaint. Consistent with the
parties' agreement expressed at the plea hearing, he reviewed
the totality of the record, including photographs of the two
attorneys together, communications between them, and their
testimony about their various interactions, which he discussed
in a section of his report entitled "Additional Facts." From
some of that record evidence, which he believed to be not in
dispute, the referee found that the two attorneys had a platonic
personal relationship as well as a professional one. From his
findings about their personal relationship, the referee further
9 Alternatively, the referee stated that if the court
disagreed with his conclusion and found a violation of the
Attorney's Oath, he recommended that the court impose a private
reprimand and that the case file should be sealed "for the
benefit of both parties."
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No. 2020AP1616-D
found that the OLR would have been unlikely to have proven that
Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct during the San Francisco
incident or in the other instances alleged in the complaint was
objectively "unwelcome," as that term is used in sexual
harassment law. Since he concluded that a reasonable person in
Attorney DeLadurantey's position would not have known that his
conduct was "unwelcome," the referee further concluded that the
same conduct could not be "offensive" under the Attorney's Oath.
Thus, he determined that the remaining "offensive personality"
charges should be dismissed.
¶27 The OLR appealed from the referee's report and
recommendation. In the Statement of Facts portion of the OLR's
appellate brief, it did not cite to the complaint as the source
of its factual statements. It did, however, repeatedly cite to
Attorney DeLadurantey's and H.M.'s deposition transcripts as
support for its factual assertions.10 Indeed, in at least one
instance, the OLR's brief described an incident as Attorney
DeLadurantey had done in his deposition, rather than as the OLR
had alleged in its complaint, indicating its belief that the
entire record, not just the complaint, was to be considered in
reviewing the referee's report.
¶28 The heading for the first argument in the OLR's
appellate brief was that "[t]he record supports by clear,
10In the factual section of the brief, which occupied
roughly five pages, the OLR cited Attorney DeLadurantey's
deposition transcript 16 times and it cited H.M.'s deposition
transcript four times. It cited the complaint zero times. It
followed this same pattern in the argument section of its brief.
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No. 2020AP1616-D
satisfactory and convincing evidence that [Attorney]
DeLadurantey engaged in offensive personality and violated the
Attorney's Oath." OLR Brief at 12 (emphasis added). In that
section the OLR essentially urged the court to find or rely on a
sizable number of "facts" from the record that the referee had
not found in his report, but which the OLR contended support a
conclusion that Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in multiple acts
of "offensive personality."
¶29 The OLR also argued in its brief that the referee had
made an error of law in concluding that the ethical rule against
sexual harassment is violated only by proving a violation of
federal employment law against sexual harassment in the
workplace. Similarly, the OLR argued that the referee legally
erred in concluding that because H.M. had occasionally requested
non-sexual physical contact (shoulder rubs), Attorney
DeLadurantey's request for more intimate and sexual contact
during the San Francisco incident was not "unwelcome" under both
federal law and Wisconsin's ethical rules.
¶30 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey's response brief
indicated, at least implicitly, that his agreement to plead no-
contest was primarily based on the allegations of the portion of
the complaint relating to the San Francisco incident. He
argued, however, that his no-contest plea did not prevent the
referee from making a recommendation to dismiss the offensive
personality charges that was based on the referee's review of
the record as a whole. Moreover, he further asserted that the
referee's recommended dismissal of the remaining "offensive
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No. 2020AP1616-D
personality" charges was based on the referee's factual findings
from the record which were not clearly erroneous.
¶31 Our initial opinion in this matter focused on what
appeared to be a clear contradiction in the referee's report.
Although the ultimate conclusion and recommendation of the
report was that the evidence did not support a determination
that Attorney DeLadurantey had engaged in "offensive
personality," the second page of the report, as initially filed,
contained a Finding of Fact #3 that the complaint did contain an
adequate factual basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest
plea to the charges of "offensive personality." That page also
contained a single "conclusion of law" that Attorney
DeLadurantey "did engage in the misconduct charged,
specifically, he did not abstain from all offensive personality"
(emphasis added). This factual finding and this legal
conclusion appeared to conflict with the report's subsequent
"additional facts," legal analysis, and recommendation that the
"offensive personality" charges should be dismissed. We adopted
the initial Finding of Fact #3 and accepted the initial
conclusion of law in the referee's report, treating the
referee's report as having confirmed the acceptance of Attorney
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and affirming the referee's
initial determination at the plea hearing that there was a
sufficient factual basis in the complaint as a whole for
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea. We essentially
concluded that the remainder of the referee's report was
factually and legally faulty, and we therefore disregarded it.
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No. 2020AP1616-D
¶32 When we issued the initial opinion, however, we were
not aware of the fact that the referee had submitted errata
pages for his report, which had deleted both Finding of Fact #3
and the legal conclusion on page two of the report.11 In the
cover letter accompanying the errata pages, the referee
explained that after writing the first few pages of his report,
including Finding of Fact #3 and the initial legal conclusion on
page two, he had engaged in further review and research, which
had led him to conclude ultimately that Attorney DeLadurantey
had not engaged in "offensive personality." This explanation
clarified that, although the referee had initially accepted
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, he had ultimately
rejected the no-contest plea in his final report because he had
concluded that the facts in the record as a whole showed that
Attorney DeLadurantey's actions toward H.M. were not
"unwelcome," as that term is used in employment sexual
harassment statutes and case law.
¶33 The referee's deletion of Finding of Fact #3 and the
initial legal conclusion on page two of his report eliminated
the basis for our initial opinion, which implicitly upheld
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea. Our further review of
the plea hearing transcript, the referee's report, and the
The referee's cover letter accompanying the errata pages
11
directed that the attached errata pages be substituted for pages
two, six, and 22 of the referee's report. The clerk's office,
however, did not substitute those pages as requested by the
referee. It simply filed the referee's submission as a letter,
leaving the report unchanged.
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No. 2020AP1616-D
parties' appellate briefs demonstrated that there was confusion
among the referee and the parties as to what the parties had
agreed should be the factual basis for the no-contest plea and
therefore what should be the factual basis for this court's
opinion.
¶34 The changes to the referee's report in the errata
raised a number of questions. If the referee determined that he
needed to withdraw his interlocutory acceptance of Attorney
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, on what basis did he make
factual findings in his report, since there was no evidentiary
hearing at which he could weigh the credibility of witnesses?
Did the parties agree that the allegations of the entire
complaint (and only those allegations) could serve as the
factual basis for the plea? Did they agree, as Attorney
DeLadurantey's appellate brief implies, that only the five
paragraphs of the complaint regarding the San Francisco incident
constituted the factual basis for his plea? Alternatively, did
they agree that both the allegations of the complaint and the
record as a whole should be used by the referee as the factual
basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea? If the last
of those scenarios was accurate, what was the effect of the fact
that parts of the record (e.g., Attorney DeLadurantey's answer
and his deposition testimony) disputed many of the allegations
of the complaint, at least in part, and the fact that Attorney
DeLadurantey never withdrew his denials?
¶35 Given these questions, we ordered the parties to
submit supplemental legal memoranda addressing the issue of what
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No. 2020AP1616-D
they had agreed should serve as the factual basis for the no-
contest plea, as well as the issue of whether the matter should
be remanded to the referee for further proceedings. The OLR's
supplemental memorandum initially claimed that only the
complaint had served as the factual basis for the no-contest
plea, but it subsequently acknowledged that the referee had been
asked at the plea hearing to review the record as a whole.
Attorney DeLadurantey's supplemental memorandum indicated that
he had agreed that the five paragraphs of the complaint relating
to the San Francisco incident, which he acknowledged he could
not materially dispute in his deposition testimony, could be
used as the factual basis for the plea, along with the record as
a whole. Both parties urged this court not to remand the matter
to the referee for further proceedings, given the additional
time and expense that would result.
¶36 Ordinarily, when we review a referee's report that is
prepared following the entry of a comprehensive stipulation of
facts or following a full evidentiary hearing, we affirm a
referee's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,
and we review a referee's legal conclusions on a de novo basis.
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5,
305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. If we conclude that the
attorney has engaged in professional misconduct, we then
determine the appropriate level of discipline to impose given
the particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's
recommendation, but benefiting from it. In re Disciplinary
20
No. 2020AP1616-D
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660
N.W.2d 686.
¶37 In this case, however, there was no comprehensive
stipulation of facts or an evidentiary hearing at which the
referee could weigh credibility. There was a no-contest plea.
If the referee had continued to accept that plea and had
submitted a report based on that plea, we would review whether
the referee had properly exercised his discretion in accepting
the plea. Cf. State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d
758, 960 N.W.2d 888 (circuit court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea in a criminal case is reviewed under an
erroneous exercise of discretion standard); White v. State, 85
Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (same).12
¶38 In this case, however, it is clear from the referee's
report, as amended, that he reconsidered his acceptance of
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and ultimately refused
to accept that plea because he concluded that the
The usual procedural path of pleas in criminal cases is
12
different from the path in attorney disciplinary cases. In most
instances, there is no appellate review of the circuit court's
acceptance of a guilty or no-contest plea. What is reviewed
normally on appeal is a circuit court's denial of a defendant's
request to withdraw a plea. In the attorney disciplinary
context, however, this court reviews every case in which a plea
is entered, whether or not the respondent attorney subsequently
sought to withdraw the plea or appealed from the referee's
report following the acceptance of the plea. Thus, when the
respondent attorney does not seek plea withdrawal and the
referee's report confirms the acceptance of the plea, we review
the acceptance of the plea for an erroneous exercise of
discretion.
21
No. 2020AP1616-D
"uncontroverted" facts he found from the record as a whole
demonstrated that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct did not
constitute "offensive personality" in violation of the
Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g) because his conduct was not
objectively "unwelcome." His ultimate report is therefore more
in the nature of a report in a case where no plea is entered,
and we will utilize the standards of review for such cases, as
summarized above.
¶39 There are two primary problems with the referee's
report, which preclude us from accepting the referee's findings
or legal conclusions.
¶40 First, the case was presented to the referee as being
resolved through a no-contest plea. The referee initially
followed the proper procedure for the entry of that plea and
exercised his discretion to accept it. He then reconsidered the
entry of the plea and determined that it should not be accepted.
This is permissible in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.
Referees in attorney disciplinary proceedings generally have the
powers of a judge trying a civil action. SCR 22.16(1). This
would include the ability to reconsider an interlocutory
decision, such as in this case accepting a no-contest plea to a
charge of misconduct, and then, after further consideration,
reaching the opposite conclusion in a subsequent report.
Although it is unusual, this is not the first time it has
happened. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark,
2016 WI 36, 368 Wis. 2d 409, 878 N.W.2d 662 (following
attorney's entry of a no-contest plea to a charge in a
22
No. 2020AP1616-D
disciplinary complaint, the referee concluded that the OLR had
failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to that charge).
¶41 What we do find troubling is that, once the referee
determined that the no-contest plea should not be accepted, he
proceeded to make findings of fact that served as the basis for
his ultimate legal conclusion of no "offensive personality"
violations. As an initial matter, it is clear from the record
of this case, both before the referee and on appeal, that the
parties and the referee were not on the same page as to
precisely what was the universe of facts that should serve as
the factual basis for the plea. That would have been
problematic even if the referee had continued to accept the
plea.13
This case is a cautionary tale for referees and lawyers
13
who appear in attorney disciplinary proceedings. When a
respondent attorney decides to enter a no-contest plea, the
lawyers and the referee need to be clear regarding what universe
of facts will serve as the factual basis for the plea,
especially when the record contains disputes as to the
underlying events or the context of those events. Moreover, one
cannot agree to have one set of facts (e.g., the allegations of
the complaint) serve as the factual basis for a no-contest plea
and then ask the referee to consider a broader set of
conflicting factual assertions (e.g., the record as a whole) in
making a recommendation as to the appropriate level of
discipline. In the context of a no-contest plea, a referee
cannot make factual findings from disputed record evidence to
support a discipline recommendation without a hearing at which
the referee can assess witness credibility, especially when
those factual findings conflict with the facts used to support
the plea. Finally, both referees and practicing lawyers need to
understand that clarity as to the facts relied on by referee to
accept a no-contest plea is necessary to permit this court to
review the referee's acceptance of the plea and to write a full
opinion deciding the case.
23
No. 2020AP1616-D
¶42 Once the referee rejected the plea, however, there was
no express stipulation of the parties as to any facts. The case
at that point reverted to the status of any other case prior to
an evidentiary hearing. There was a complaint containing many
factual allegations, and there was an answer that disputed many
of those factual allegations. There were also deposition
transcripts for H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, but both of
those consisted of out-of-court declarations that the referee
had not observed in order to make credibility determinations.
Moreover, the deposition testimony of both of those witnesses
was certainly not the full testimony that those witnesses would
have presented at an evidentiary hearing. H.M. and Attorney
DeLadurantey answered only those questions that were asked by
opposing counsel, and those questions did not cover every aspect
of the various incidents alleged in the complaint. Moreover,
even with respect to the documentary exhibits that the parties
submitted and asked the referee to review, H.M. and Attorney
DeLadurantey were not given the opportunity to explain their
contents or put them in context. This case was not about the
language of a contract or an insurance policy or a deed, which
could be interpreted on its face by a referee or by this court
on review; it involved various interactions between two people,
some of which were captured in paper form (e.g., printouts of
text messages), but many of which depended on the testimony of
H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, as well as any other third party
who might have witnessed their interactions.
24
No. 2020AP1616-D
¶43 In this situation, we cannot see how the referee could
make the large number of factual findings that he did about
various aspects of the relationship between Attorney
DeLadurantey and H.M. Once there was no longer an accepted no-
contest plea to resolve the case, the referee should have
proceeded either to obtain a comprehensive stipulation of facts
from the parties or to conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which
he could observe the demeanor of the witnesses and make
credibility determinations. At that point, he could then have
made factual findings based either on the stipulation or on the
testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing.
¶44 While the referee stated that he was making only
factual findings that were "uncontroverted," it is clear that
there were still many disputes of fact about a wide range of
incidents. The OLR's appellate brief included a statement of
facts that was very different from the factual recitation in the
referee's report. Given the presence of ongoing factual
disputes and the lack of a basis for the referee to make factual
findings in the absence of an opportunity to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses, we cannot accept the referee's
"additional" findings of fact in his report. The failure to
follow the proper procedure for making findings of fact was an
error of law, which invalidates those additional factual
findings.
¶45 The second foundational problem with the referee's
report is another error of law. Although the referee stated in
his report that a charge of "offensive personality" is "neither
25
No. 2020AP1616-D
a watered-down version of sexual harassment nor a lesser
included offense of it," it is clear that he conflated sexual
harassment under SCR 20:8.4(i) and engaging in "offensive
personality" under SCR 20:8.4(g). He began the discussion
section of his report with an extended discussion of what
constitutes sexual harassment under employment discrimination
law, stated that the "gravamen" of a claim of sexual harassment
is whether the conduct at issue was "unwelcome," and then
reasoned that conduct that would not be considered "unwelcome"
under sexual harassment law also cannot be "offensive" under the
"offensive personality" clause of the Attorney's Oath. Indeed,
he analyzed whether both Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual advances
during the San Francisco incident and his alleged comments about
H.M.'s appearance at other times were "unwelcome," concluding
from what he believed to be the context of their personal, as
well as professional, relationship that neither type of conduct
was objectively unwelcome.
¶46 Although it is possible that the same conduct could
constitute both harassment on the basis of sex and "offensive
personality," they are separate ethical violations. The
requirement to "abstain from all offensive personality" is one
of a number of standards to which attorneys must conform when
they enter the practice of law in this state. Such standards
apply not only to the direct practice of law, but also to the
business of law, and to the lawyer's conduct beyond the practice
or business of law. See, e.g., SCR 20:4.1 (requiring a lawyer
to avoid knowingly making a false statement of a material fact
26
No. 2020AP1616-D
or law to a third party when representing a client); SCR
20:4.4(a) (when representing a client, a lawyer may not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
delay, or burden a third party); SCR 20:6.1 (every lawyer has a
professional responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay); SCR 20:8.4(b) (lawyer has duty to avoid
committing any criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer,
whether or not the act occurs during the provision of legal
services); SCR 20:8.4(c) (lawyer has duty to avoid engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation). Similarly, the duty to abstain from
"offensive personality" can apply to conduct that occurs outside
the direct practice of law. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding
Against Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998). This
does not mean, however, that all personal conduct of a lawyer
that is "offensive" violates the Attorney's Oath. The
prohibition in SCR 20:8.4(g) against engaging in "offensive
personality" applies to offensive conduct that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Id. at 122.
When offensive conduct reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness
to practice law, this court, on behalf of the state, has a
legitimate interest in prohibiting such actions and disciplining
attorneys who engage in such conduct in order to protect the
public and the administration of justice.
¶47 Contrary to the referee's conflation of the charges of
"offensive personality" and employment discrimination through
27
No. 2020AP1616-D
sexual harassment, we have previously held that inappropriate
language and conduct may constitute offensive personality in
violation of the Attorney's Oath in a number of situations
involving sexual conduct that did not constitute employment
discrimination. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 722 N.W.2d 385(using state's email system to send and receive sexually
explicit email messages and making inappropriate comments to a
county employee who was not the attorney's subordinate in a work
environment); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bruckner,
161 Wis. 2d 385, 467 N.W.2d 780 (1991) (trading surreptitiously
taken photographs of nude minors without their consent); see
also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis.
2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 (1992) (although the court indicated that
repeatedly asking divorce clients explicit questions about their
sexual behavior qualified as "offensive personality," it relied
on the attorney's disobedience of a prior court order against
such conduct as an alternative basis for finding such actions to
be professional misconduct). Consequently, the referee's legal
analysis that relied on the "welcomeness" element of employment
sexual harassment claims was legally erroneous, which
invalidates his legal conclusion of no "offensive personality"
violation and his ultimate rejection of Attorney DeLadurantey's
no-contest plea.
¶48 Having concluded that the referee made errors of law
in ultimately rejecting Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea,
the question becomes what should the next step be in this case.
28
No. 2020AP1616-D
Ordinarily, because the decision to accept a no-contest plea is
a discretionary one initially committed to a referee and there
is a need for an evidentiary basis for the referee to make
affirmative factual findings (as opposed to finding an adequate
factual basis for a plea in an agreed-upon set of facts), we
would remand the matter back to the referee for further
proceedings—either a new plea based on a more specifically
defined set of facts or a full evidentiary hearing.
¶49 In this unique instance, however, we choose not
to do so. First, the parties have urged us not to remand the
matter in light of the additional time and expense that would be
involved. Second, there is a set of agreed-upon facts here that
permit us to render a proper judgment. Sending the matter back
to the referee for further proceedings would not change those
particular facts and would not change the ultimate outcome in
this proceeding. Thus, in this unique circumstance, it is
proper for us to proceed at this time with rendering a final
decision in this disciplinary proceeding.
¶50 Specifically, although we do not address the other
incidents alleged in the complaint because there are still
disputes as to some portion of those incidents in the record as
a whole, Attorney DeLadurantey has admitted that he cannot
contest the allegations of the complaint regarding the events of
the San Francisco incident because his intoxication at the time
has left him with no real memory of those events.
¶51 As summarized above, there is no dispute that while on
a business trip, a senior lawyer and employer, while
29
No. 2020AP1616-D
intoxicated, made repeated sexual advances toward a subordinate
attorney employee that were clearly and repeatedly rebuffed.
Indeed, even after H.M. told Attorney DeLadurantey that his
physical contact had made her physically ill and then had
refused his request to go to her bedroom, Attorney DeLadurantey
still went into H.M.'s bedroom and crawled into her bed, which
can be interpreted only as a persistent demand for sexual
activity despite H.M.'s refusal to consent. We have no
hesitation in holding that such conduct constituted "offensive
personality" that not only reflected adversely on Attorney
DeLadurantey's professional judgment and fitness to be a member
of the legal profession, but also reflected adversely on the
reputation and integrity of the legal profession generally.
Regardless of any personal relationship that had developed, H.M.
was a subordinate attorney whose professional success and
continued employment were, in large part, subject to Attorney
DeLadurantey's control. This was not a matter solely of
Attorney DeLadurantey's private affairs and personal morality.
Consequently, Attorney DeLadurantey's offensive conduct in
pressuring a subordinate employee to engage in unwanted sexual
activity during the San Francisco incident constituted a clear
violation of the Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g).
¶52 We now turn to the question of the appropriate
sanction for Attorney DeLadurantey's professional misconduct.
We weigh the seriousness, nature, and extent of the misconduct;
the level of discipline needed to protect the public; the need
to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct;
30
No. 2020AP1616-D
and the need to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14,
269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. Sources of guidance in
determining appropriate sanctions are: prior case law;
aggravating and mitigating factors; and the American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 279
Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.
¶53 Both Attorney DeLadurantey and the OLR have requested
a private reprimand in this proceeding, and the referee agreed
that a private reprimand would be the appropriate level of
discipline if we reject his legal conclusion that the "offensive
personality" charges should be dismissed. In prior cases, a
lawyer's sexually offensive language and conduct has often
received a private or public reprimand, unless it was coupled
with other misconduct. See, e.g., Beatse, 297 Wis. 2d 292,
¶¶16-17 (public reprimand); Private Reprimand No. 1991-6
(consensual private reprimand imposed on lawyer who, while
awaiting the return of a jury, approached a female law
enforcement officer at a courthouse and made statements that she
interpreted as sexually aggressive, subsequently grabbed her
shoulders and attempted to embrace her, and later approached a
different female officer, pushed her against a wall and made
suggestive and disparaging remarks); Private Reprimand No. 2008-
38 (consensual private reprimand imposed on attorney who made
sexually suggestive comments to a co-worker over a period of
several years and, on one occasion, kissed the co-worker without
31
No. 2020AP1616-D
consent); Private Reprimand No. 2015-2 (imposing consensual
private reprimand on attorney who grabbed the breast of a female
employee of a bar, made several sexually suggestive comments to
her, followed her from the bar, was arrested, and completed a
deferred prosecution agreement after being charged with fourth-
degree sexual assault). We note that the private reprimands
cited above were consensual reprimands that were issued by
referees without this court's review pursuant to our rules.
While we recognize that similarly situated respondents should
receive comparable levels of discipline, we take this
opportunity to advise members of the bar that we are applying
increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct. Compare In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396
Wis. 2d 509, 957 N.W.2d 540. We do so because sexual harassment
comes at a heavy price for victims who can suffer significant
psychological effects as well as job-related costs, including
job loss, reputational harm, impairment of professional
opportunities, and irreparable damage to interpersonal
relationships at work. Attorneys should be on notice that
sexual misconduct by attorneys, whether directed toward fellow
lawyers, clients, or others, is not taken lightly. Ritland, 396
Wis. 2d 509, ¶39.
¶54 This court has the responsibility to oversee the
practice of law in this state. Consequently, it is our
responsibility to determine what is the appropriate level of
discipline in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. While the
facts of each case are unique, in light of existing precedent,
32
No. 2020AP1616-D
we conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey should be publicly
reprimanded. His misconduct is at least as serious as the
conduct in Beatse, where we also imposed a public reprimand on
an attorney who downloaded pornographic images onto a work
computer, sent and received sexually explicit messages on a work
email system, and made inappropriate sexual comments to female
government employees. Here, a supervising lawyer engaged in
unwanted sexually suggestive physical contact with a subordinate
employee, repeatedly asked the employee for sexual activity even
in the face of clear refusals, and then escalated the situation
by climbing into the employee's bed. A private reprimand would
unduly depreciate the seriousness of such misconduct. Moreover,
we conclude that a public reprimand is necessary to put other
members of the bar on notice that such actions will not be
tolerated.
¶55 We next address the question of costs, which were
$20,530.47 as of November 4, 2021, at the completion of
appellate briefing. Attorney DeLadurantey filed an objection to
costs, arguing that SCR 22.24(1m) supports a reduction of the
costs imposed on him. Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) articulates
six factors we consider when evaluating a costs challenge.
First, we consider the number of counts charged, contested, and
proven. In Attorney DeLadurantey's view, the OLR's "major
focus" was the sexual harassment charges that the OLR eventually
dismissed. He argues that because the OLR dismissed these
charges, no costs should be assessed in connection with the
OLR's pursuit of these alleged violations. Second, we consider
33
No. 2020AP1616-D
the nature of the misconduct. Attorney DeLadurantey says that
had the "offensive personality" charges been the only alleged
violations from the outset of this matter, the costs incurred
would have been substantially lower. Third, we consider the
level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the
referee. The parties ultimately requested a private reprimand,
and the referee recommended a dismissal of the remaining
charges. Fourth, we consider Attorney DeLadurantey's
cooperation with the disciplinary process. It is undisputed
that Attorney DeLadurantey cooperated throughout the
disciplinary process. Fifth, we consider prior discipline.
Attorney DeLadurantey has no prior disciplinary record.
Finally, we consider "other relevant circumstances." Attorney
DeLadurantey contends that the "sexual harassment claim was
poorly based in fact from the start and all costs in furtherance
of the OLR's attempts to satisfy that claim should not be
assessed." He suggests we impose ten percent of the total
costs, or $2,053.05.
¶56 The OLR maintains that the sexual harassment and
offensive personality claims were intertwined, meaning that the
OLR's counsel's time was spent concurrently pursuing both. The
OLR reminds us that, traditionally, costs are not reduced even
when a respondent prevails on some, but not all, counts, and it
cites several cases in support of this assertion.
¶57 We generally agree with the OLR on this issue. We
decline to deviate from our long-standing disinclination to
apportion costs based solely on the number of counts proven or
34
No. 2020AP1616-D
unproven.14 We note, moreover, that the referee found the pre-
appellate costs to be both reasonable in amount and necessarily
incurred, stating:
Having read and made notes on the hundreds of pages of
exhibits provided by both counsel, and having
performed many hours of research, I am in a good
position to assess the work that went into this case.
I find that the sum of $18,311.47 is reasonable, and
the costs enumerated were necessarily incurred by the
[OLR] in this matter.
¶58 We acknowledge that Attorney DeLadurantey has, by all
accounts, cooperated completely with this disciplinary
investigation and proceeding. He ultimately entered a no-
contest plea to the "offensive personality" charges, but the
referee undertook a lengthy analysis and issued a problematic
report, resulting in the OLR's appeal. The referee billed
$5,920.74 for the time spent writing his report which,
unfortunately, complicated this matter. We therefore reduce the
costs billed for writing the report by 50 percent ($2,960.37).
This matter has also been made unnecessarily complex by the
parties' lack of precision in specifying what facts could serve
as the factual basis for the no-contest plea. This lack of
clarity required us to order the parties to submit supplemental
14See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (declining
respondent's request to apportion costs according to the number
of misconduct counts that resulted in determinations of
professional misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (rejecting
argument that costs not be assessed because he would have agreed
to a public reprimand, which the referee ultimately recommended
as discipline).
35
No. 2020AP1616-D
legal memoranda. Because this was caused in part by the OLR and
was not corrected by the referee, we do not require Attorney
DeLadurantey to pay the OLR's costs of preparing its
supplemental legal memorandum. Consequently, we direct Attorney
DeLadurantey to pay costs of $17,570.10.
¶59 Finally, we reject the referee's unsupported
recommendation that we "seal" the record in this case. Our
rules require that once a disciplinary complaint is filed, the
disciplinary proceeding and all papers filed in it are public
documents, except where a specific rule or other law mandates
confidentiality, or where the court determines that sealing or
redaction of a document in a disciplinary proceeding is
necessary. SCR 22.40(1).15 There is nothing in this proceeding
that mandates that the record be sealed. It is true that the
filings in this proceeding may be embarrassing for everyone
involved, but that is not a legal basis for sealing a case
record. We recognize that keeping the record in the case open
to the public may cause distress to H.M., but the public has a
15 SCR 22.40(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in
this chapter, all papers, files, transcripts, and communications
relating to an allegation of attorney misconduct, an
investigation pursuant to SCR Chapters 10, 22, and 31, and
monitoring compliance with conditions, suspension, or revocation
imposed by the supreme court, are to be held in confidence by
the director and staff of the office of lawyer regulation, the
members of the district committees, special investigators, the
members of the special preliminary review panel, and the members
of the preliminary review panel. Following the filing of a
complaint or petition, the proceeding and all papers filed in it
are public, except where expressly provided otherwise in this
chapter, by court order, or by law."
36
No. 2020AP1616-D
right to learn and understand the process by which this court
renders decisions in attorney disciplinary proceedings and we
have attempted to minimize the impact of this published opinion
by using her initials. There is nothing in this case that
overcomes the public's right to observe its government in
action.
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline for his professional
misconduct and violation of SCR 40.15, enforced via
SCR 20:8.4(g), Nathan E. DeLadurantey is publicly reprimanded.
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Nathan E. DeLadurantey shall pay to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation $17,570.10 for the costs of this proceeding.
37
¶62 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). Although I do not
join the per curiam opinion, I concur with the level of
discipline it imposes.
1