Sauk County v. S. A. M.

2022 WI 46SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2019AP1033
COMPLETE TITLE: In the matter of the mental commitment of
S. A. M.:
Sauk County,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
S. A. M.,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 523, 950 N.W.2d 690(2020 – unpublished)
OPINION FILED: June 23, 2022
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 28, 2022
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Sauk
JUDGE: Patrick J. Taggart
JUSTICES:
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Elizabeth G. Rich and Rich Law SC, Plymouth. There was
an oral argument by Elizabeth G. Rich.
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief filed by
Douglas B. Raines and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee.
There was an oral argument by Douglas B. Raines.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball,
assistant state public defender, with whom on the brief was
Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender, for the Office of the
State Public Defender. There was an oral argument by Colleen D.
Ball.
2
2022 WI 46NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2019AP1033
(L.C. No. 2017ME102)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the matter of the mental commitment of
S. A. M.:
Sauk County, FILED
Petitioner-Respondent, JUN 23, 2022
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
S. A. M.,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
¶1 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J. This case involves the ability
of involuntarily committed persons to receive appellate review
of their commitment orders. Frequently, appellate courts
dismiss these appeals as moot because the underlying commitment
order expires before the court issues a decision on its merits.
No. 2019AP001033
Such routine dismissals result in the validity of these liberty-
depriving orders largely evading review.
¶2 S.A.M. is among those committed citizens whose appeal
went unaddressed because the order extending his commitment
(also called "recommitment") expired before the court of appeals
could decide the merits of his appeal. He argues the court of
appeals erred in dismissing his appeal as moot because either
the order's ongoing collateral consequences render it not moot
or an exception to mootness applies. He further asks that if we
rule in his favor on the mootness issue, that we then review the
merits of his due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenges.
¶3 Though in Portage County v. J.W.K. we concluded that
the expiration of the recommitment order rendered the appeal
moot, that holding was expressly "limited to situations
where . . . no collateral implications of the commitment order
are raised." 2019 WI 54, ¶28 n.11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927
N.W.2d 509. Collateral consequences having been raised here, we
hold that at least two such consequences render an appeal of an
expired recommitment order not moot: (1) the restriction of
one's constitutional right to bear arms; and (2) the liability
for the cost of one's care. On the merits, we hold that
S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges
fall short. For those reasons, we reverse the court of appeals'
dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal and affirm S.A.M.'s recommitment
order.
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No. 2019AP001033
I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Wisconsin's legal framework governing involuntary
mental-health commitments is important to understanding this
case. Before initially committing a person to the state or
county's care, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is: (1) mentally ill;1 (2) a proper
subject for treatment; and (3) currently dangerous under at
least one of five standards. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e)
(2019-20).2 Those five standards are:
 First Standard: there is a substantial probability of
physical harm to one's self evidenced by recent threats
of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm;
 Second Standard: there is a substantial probability of
physical harm to others evidenced by recent homicidal or
other violent behavior, or a recent overt act, attempt or
threat to do serious physical harm that placed others in
reasonable fear of serious physical harm;
 Third Standard: there is a substantial probability of
physical impairment or injury to one's self or others
evidenced by a pattern of recent acts or omissions
manifesting impaired judgment, and there is either no
reasonable provision for one's protection in the
1 The state or a county may also civilly commit a person who
is drug dependent or developmentally disabled, but this opinion
will focus on mental illness because that was the basis for
S.A.M.'s commitment.
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.
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No. 2019AP001033
community or a reasonable probability that one will not
avail himself or herself of those services;
 Fourth Standard: there is a substantial probability that
death, serious physical injury, serious physical
debilitation, or serious physical disease will imminently
ensue that makes one unable to satisfy basic needs as
evidenced by recent acts or omissions, and there is
either no reasonable provision for one's treatment and
protection in the community or a reasonable probability
that one will not avail himself or herself of those
services; and
 Fifth Standard: (1) there is a substantial probability
both that one needs care or treatment to prevent further
disability or deterioration and that, if left untreated,
one will lack necessary services and suffer severe
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in
the loss of one's ability to function independently in
the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional
control over one's thoughts or actions; (2) either (a) an
incapability of expressing an understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or
treatment and the alternatives after such were explained,
or (b) a substantial incapability of applying such an
understanding to one's mental illness to make an informed
choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or
treatment; and (3) either no reasonable provision for
one's care or treatment in the community or a reasonable
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No. 2019AP001033
probability that one will not avail himself or herself of
those services.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.3 Upon sufficient evidence of both a treatable
mental illness and at least one of these forms of dangerousness,
the circuit court must order the person initially committed for
no more than six months. § 51.20(13)(a), (g)1. It must then
also issue a firearms ban, i.e. "order the individual not to
possess a firearm, [and] order the seizure of any firearm owned
by the individual." § 51.20(13)(cv)1.
¶5 The government may thereafter seek to extend the
initial commitment. Recommitment again requires clear and
convincing evidence of the same three elements required for the
initial commitment: mental illness, treatability, and current
dangerousness under at least one of the five standards outlined
above. Recommitment proceedings can differ from initial
commitment proceedings in one significant way. In an initial
commitment proceeding, the government may prove dangerousness
only with evidence of recent acts, omissions, or behavior. In a
recommitment proceeding, though, the government may
alternatively prove dangerousness by "showing that there is a
substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual's
treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject
for commitment [under one of the five dangerousness standards]
if treatment were withdrawn." § 51.20(1)(am). If the
3 This summary of the statutory dangerousness standards
omits elements not relevant to S.A.M.'s case and thus is not
applicable to every civil commitment.
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No. 2019AP001033
government presents clear and convincing evidence that the
committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous
under one of the five standards (whether by recent conduct or
via the § 51.20(1)(am) alternative showing), then the court must
order that person recommitted for a period not to exceed one
year, along with another firearms ban. § 51.20(13)(cv)1.,
(g)1. & (g)3.
¶6 Given these orders' limited duration, timely appellate
review before their expiration proves difficult. The court of
appeals reports that between 2018 and 2020, it issued no
decision regarding an initial six-month commitment before the
order expired. Recommitment orders, which last for generally
one year, fared somewhat better; the court of appeals decided 40
percent of those appealed before their expiration. Though the
reasons for delay vary, rarely does fault lie with the person
committed——as is certainly the case for S.A.M.
¶7 S.A.M. is diagnosed with bipolar disorder with
psychotic features. In late 2017, S.A.M. was subjected to an
emergency detention after his father reported that he made
statements about wanting to die. His father informed the
responding sheriff that S.A.M. had been homeless for some time.
S.A.M. displayed signs of malnourishment and suffered from
trench foot due to not changing his shoes for long periods of
time. An examining psychiatrist noted that S.A.M. had
discontinued taking previously prescribed medication and had a
long history of such noncompliance. S.A.M. admitted to acts of
self-harm and substance abuse, predominantly alcohol but illicit
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No. 2019AP001033
drugs as well. In January 2018, in statements to his sister,
S.A.M. threatened self-harm and told her he wanted to die.
Based on this behavior, Sauk County ("the County") successfully
petitioned to have S.A.M. involuntarily committed to its care
for six months of compelled treatment. This initial commitment
order included a firearms ban that would "remain in effect until
lifted by the court" and survive the commitment order's
expiration. S.A.M. did not appeal this initial commitment
order.
¶8 Before the initial commitment order expired, the
County petitioned to extend S.A.M.'s involuntary commitment.
The petition contained two relevant representations from
psychiatrist Dr. Linda DiRaimondo: (1) S.A.M. suffers from a
"chronic mental disorder" (bipolar disorder); and (2) though
currently medication compliant, S.A.M. "has not been in the past
when not on commitment and has regressed to an acute psychotic
state and required hospitalization." On those bases,
Dr. DiRaimondo opined that there is "a substantial likelihood,
based on [S.A.M.'s] treatment record, that if treatment were
withdrawn, [he] would regress and become a proper subject for
commitment." The day before the recommitment trial, S.A.M.
filed a motion asking, in part, for the circuit court4 to order
the County to "elect under which standard of dangerousness it
seeks to proceed" and preclude it "from presenting evidence as
to other forms of dangerousness."
4The Hon. Patrick J. Taggart of the Sauk County Circuit
Court presided.
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No. 2019AP001033
¶9 The circuit court addressed S.A.M.'s motion at the
start of the trial. S.A.M. argued that the petition "clearly
enunciated" only one method of proving dangerousness——the
recommitment alternative under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) that
there was a substantial likelihood S.A.M. would be a proper
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. According
to S.A.M., that theory was contradicted by the County's proposed
order, which did not include the language of § 51.20(1)(am) but
instead broadly stated that S.A.M. was "dangerous because the
subject evidences behavior within one or more of the standards
under §§ 51.20(1) or (1m), Wis. Stats. (except for proceedings
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., Wis. Stats.)." S.A.M. argued these
imprecise filings violated his right to due process by providing
inadequate "notice of what he's up against." The County stood
by its petition's reliance on § 51.20(1)(am) and asserted,
"there's a substantial likelihood that [S.A.M.] would be a
proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. And
that's what the county intends to show today." The circuit
court accepted the County's assertion, inviting S.A.M.'s
objection if the County began to introduce evidence supporting a
different theory of dangerousness.
¶10 The circuit court then proceeded with the trial.
Dr. DiRaimondo and S.A.M.'s social worker, Brigette Chizek, both
testified in favor of recommitment; S.A.M. testified against it.
Dr. DiRaimondo repeated her bipolar disorder diagnosis of S.A.M.
and affirmed it was treatable. As to S.A.M.'s dangerousness,
she opined that S.A.M. "would not take his medication if he were
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No. 2019AP001033
not on a court order" based on his treatment record, which
showed that when not in a supervised setting, "he has stopped
his medication" and that he "recently told his case manager"
that "he does not feel he needs . . . medication."
¶11 Chizek then testified to S.A.M.'s history of substance
abuse, medication noncompliance, and resulting mental-health
instability and self-harm ideations. She averred that S.A.M.,
after being told of the services available to him to assist his
independence, "talks about not wanting those," with the
exception of the community support program in which he was
currently participating. She stated his post-commitment plan
was to stay with his grandmother and then at a motel until he
could find a place to live. But she recounted how he had
previously disappeared from his grandmother's home, which led to
the events underlying his initial commitment discussed above.
She expressed her concern that a similar scenario would play out
if treatment were withdrawn and affirmed that he currently
needed a structured setting. She also recounted that S.A.M. had
recently urinated in his pants and refused to change out of the
soiled clothing. Finally, she acknowledged that as recently as
the past month, S.A.M. told her he would continue his
medications if released from his commitment.
¶12 Taking the witness stand last, S.A.M. reaffirmed his
statement about staying medication compliant post-commitment and
agreed that the medication benefited him in managing his mental
illness. He explained that he hoped to start working as a
laborer, as he has in the past. He further testified that he
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No. 2019AP001033
would not repeat his past mistake of going off medication,
chalking his recent lapse up to the "hard times" he was
experiencing six months prior.
¶13 The circuit court, after recounting all of this
evidence, found grounds for a six-month recommitment order. The
recommitment order also provided that S.A.M. "is prohibited from
possessing any firearm. . . . This prohibition shall remain in
effect until lifted by the court. Expiration of the mental
commitment proceeding does not terminate this restriction."
¶14 S.A.M. timely filed his notice of intent to pursue
post-commitment relief. An unfortunate series of events then
delayed his appeal. First, the State Public Defender was unable
to appoint S.A.M. post-commitment counsel until more than four
months into his six-month commitment (nearly three months after
the deadline to appoint appellate counsel). Then, it took
another two months for the full record, including transcripts,
to be transmitted to appointed counsel——just as the recommitment
order was expiring. Next, S.A.M.'s attorney delayed filing his
notice of appeal, albeit with good cause. Additional months
passed before the court of appeals received the record.
¶15 By this time, S.A.M.'s appeal had been expired for
over six months. Consequently, the court of appeals directed
the parties to brief whether the case was moot. The court of
appeals finally rendered its decision in September 2020——over
two years after the circuit court issued the six-month
recommitment order. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033,
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020). The court
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No. 2019AP001033
of appeals dismissed S.A.M.'s appeal as moot, concluding that
the order neither caused ongoing collateral consequences nor
presented an issue triggering a mootness exception. Id.
¶16 We granted S.A.M.'s petition for review on the
mootness issue as well as the merits issues he raised. We
additionally asked the parties to brief the following issue:
Whether this court has the authority, through its
"superintending and administrative authority over all
courts" (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its
authority to "regulate pleading, practice, and
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts" (Wis.
Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to
expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat.
ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that
appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal
that addresses the merits of the appellants'
contentions?
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 This case presents issues of mootness, procedural due
process, and sufficiency of the evidence. Both mootness and
procedural due process present questions of law we review de
novo. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶16, 390 Wis. 2d 50,
937 N.W.2d 901 (mootness); Teague v. Schimel, 2017 WI 56, ¶19,
375 Wis. 2d 458, 896 N.W.2d 286 (procedural due process).
Whether the County presented clear and convincing evidence to
justify recommitment is a mixed question of fact and law.
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶24, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942
N.W.2d 277. S.A.M. challenges only the legal application of the
undisputed facts to the statutory standards, which we review de
novo. Id., ¶25.
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No. 2019AP001033
III. ANALYSIS
¶18 Our analysis begins with the mootness question,
focusing on whether the collateral consequences of expired
recommitment orders render appeals of such orders not moot.
Because we determine that the ongoing collateral consequences of
recommitment do render these appeals not moot, we turn to the
merits of S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence
claims.
A. Mootness
¶19 In Wisconsin, dismissal of a case as moot is an act of
judicial restraint rather than a jurisdictional requirement.
See D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶19. A case is moot when the
resolution of an issue will have no practical effect on the
underlying controversy. See id. This means an appeal from an
order like S.A.M.'s is not moot when the direct or collateral
consequences of the order persist and vacatur of that order
would practically affect those consequences. See id., ¶23
(citing State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635(1976)). Here, S.A.M. posits that three collateral consequences
from his now-expired recommitment order render his appeal not
moot: (1) the firearms ban; (2) the liability for the cost of
his care while committed; and (3) the stigma associated with a
mental-health commitment.
¶20 We recently explained that whether a collateral
consequence renders an appeal not moot turns on the existence of
a "causal relationship" between a legal consequence and the
challenged order. See id., ¶¶23-25 (quoting Theoharopoulos, 72
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No. 2019AP001033
Wis. 2d at 333). We conclude such a causal relationship exists
between a recommitment order and at least two collateral
consequences: (1) the firearms ban; and (2) the liability for
the cost of care. We address each in turn.
1. Firearms ban
¶21 Two terms ago, we held that an appeal of an expired
initial commitment order is not moot because the order
collaterally subjects the committed person to a continuing
firearms ban. See id., ¶25. We recognized that this firearms
ban constitutes an ongoing impairment of the person's
constitutional right to bear arms, which we deemed to be "no
minor consequence." Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend II; Wis.
Const. art. I, § 25; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008); Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017
WI 19, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233). We also explained that
prevailing in an appeal of an expired initial commitment order
voids the firearms ban. Id. Because voiding the firearms ban
is a "practical effect" that has a "causal relationship" to the
successful appeal of an expired initial commitment order, we
deemed the appeal not moot. Id.¶22 The question before us is whether that same rationale
applies to recommitment orders. The court of appeals concluded
it did not. In its view, with which the County agrees, vacating
the recommitment order and voiding its corresponding firearms
ban would have no practical effect because the separate ban
attached to S.A.M.'s unchallenged initial commitment order would
still be in effect. S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, at ¶¶8-12.
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No. 2019AP001033
¶23 We disagree. The court of appeals is correct that the
firearms ban attached to an initial commitment will continue to
bar the committed person from possessing a firearm even if we
vacate a subsequent recommitment order. But that fact does not
mean prevailing in a recommitment appeal would have no
"practical effect" on restoring one's constitutional right.
Prevailing on appeal would vacate the recommitment order and
practically alter a committed person's "record and reputation"
for dangerousness, a factor a reviewing court must consider when
weighing a petition to cancel a firearms ban.
§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b. Additionally, if a committed person
succeeds in vacating an expired recommitment order, the fact
that the recommitment order no longer exists might influence the
reviewing court's weighing of whether restoring gun rights would
be consistent with the "public interest." Id. Even if
marginal, these practical effects on a committed person's
ability to restore a constitutional right remain "no minor
consequence." D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25. Thus, the "causal
relationship" between these practical effects and our vacatur of
an expired recommitment order renders an appeal of such orders
not moot.
2. Cost of care liability
¶24 Likewise, a person's mandatory liability for the cost
of the care received during a recommitment is a collateral
consequence that renders recommitment appeals not moot. Under
Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2), a committed person like S.A.M. "shall be
liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and
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No. 2019AP001033
supplies" related to each commitment period. If the underlying
commitment order is vacated, however, the liability tied to that
particular commitment period no longer exists. See Jankowski v.
Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431, 438-40, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981);
Ethelyn I.C. v. Waukesha County, 221 Wis. 2d 109, 120-21, 584
N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1998). For that reason, a direct causal
relationship exists between vacating an expired recommitment
order and removing the liability it creates, sufficient to
render recommitment appeals not moot.
¶25 The court of appeals' contrary position, again adopted
by the County, is that S.A.M. failed to show "actual monetary
liability" because he presented no evidence of collection
efforts against his debt by the time of the appeal. See S.A.M.,
No. 2019AP1033, at ¶14. This position misses the mark for two
related reasons. First, it is irrelevant whether collection
efforts have begun because, regardless, S.A.M. remains liable
solely by virtue of § 46.10(2)'s mandatory language ("shall be
liable"). And second, it is enough to overcome mootness when
there is the "potential" for collection actions because of the
liability. See State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537, 424
N.W.2d 411 (1988) (holding that a deceased defendant's appeal
was not moot because his conviction may lead to "potential
collateral consequences" for his estate); see also D.K., 390
Wis. 2d 50, ¶24 (applying to ch. 51 commitment orders the same
collateral-consequences rationale used in criminal cases). The
threat of potential collection actions to recoup the costs
associated with S.A.M.'s recommitment care may follow S.A.M.
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No. 2019AP001033
unless and until his recommitment order is vacated or the
liability is satisfied. See Jankowski, 104 Wis. 2d at 438.
¶26 We are also not persuaded by the County's argument
that a committed person's liability is contingent on a person's
ability to pay. That is simply not the law. A "liable
person['s] ability to pay" only informs to whom collection
efforts should be directed, see § 46.10(3), and what, if any,
settlement or agreement might be appropriate to satisfy the
debt, see § 46.10(7). Neither of those considerations, however,
extinguish the liability. And in fact, this liability permits
the government to continually probe S.A.M.'s financial condition
to reevaluate his ability to pay. See § 46.10(8)(c). Thus,
vacating a recommitment order will have the practical effect of
removing the order's attached liability, regardless of the
person's ability to pay.
¶27 Accordingly, we conclude an appeal of an expired
recommitment order is not moot because vacating the order would
still have practical effects on two of the order's collateral
consequences——the ability to restore a constitutional right and
the liability for the cost of care received while subject to the
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No. 2019AP001033
recommitment order.5 Because S.A.M.'s appeal is not moot, we
turn to the merits of his appeal.
B. Due Process
¶28 On the merits, S.A.M. first argues the County's
imprecise pretrial filings violate his due-process right to
adequate notice as to which specific theory of dangerousness
justified his recommitment.6 S.A.M.'s argument relies solely on
our recent D.J.W. decision. There, we required
"clarity . . . regarding the underlying basis for a
recommitment," such that "going forward circuit courts in
recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2.
on which the recommitment is based." D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶40, 42. According to S.A.M., due process demands
that recommitment petitions provide the same type of "clarity."
¶29 S.A.M.'s reliance on D.J.W. is misplaced for two
reasons. First, D.J.W. addressed a circuit court's legal
responsibility to facilitate meaningful appellate review, not a
5Given this holding, we refrain from addressing S.A.M.'s
stigma argument. See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010
WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15. And because his
appeal is not moot, we need not address any exceptions to
mootness. See id. For related reasons, we determine this case
is not the proper vehicle in which to address our constitutional
and statutory authority to expedite review of appeals from civil
commitment orders.
6The government may not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," which
includes a procedural right to notice. See Wis. Const. amnd.
XIV, § 1; Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶23, 377
Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303.
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No. 2019AP001033
county's pretrial notice responsibilities. And second, our
April 2020 D.J.W. decision indicated relief under its holdings
would be prospective; its holding does not reach back to
S.A.M.'s 2018 recommitment trial. See id., ¶59. Because S.A.M.
relies only on the inapt D.J.W. to support his due-process
claim, we cannot say the County's notice violated his procedural
due-process rights. See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v.
Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not
step out of our neutral role to develop or construct arguments
for parties." (citing State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶26, 374
Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848)).
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶30 S.A.M. next challenges whether the evidence
sufficiently establishes his dangerousness under any standard.7
To be sufficient, the evidence must be clear and convincing that
an individual is currently dangerous; it is not enough to show
only that a person once was dangerous. D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶34 (citing J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶24). In a
recommitment proceeding, the evidence may take the form of
either: (1) recent acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting
dangerousness; or (2) evidence that if treatment were withdrawn
the person would be substantially likely to engage in the types
of dangerous acts, omissions, or behaviors that meet one of the
five dangerousness standards. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.,
(1)(am).
S.A.M. does not challenge the circuit court's conclusions
7
that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment.
18
No. 2019AP001033
¶31 S.A.M. levels two sufficiency arguments. First, he
contends that the evidence under either evidentiary pathway is
insufficient. Second, he contends that the County's witnesses
failed to recite the statutory standards being applied with near
exactness as Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, allegedly requires. We disagree
with both contentions.
1. Sufficient evidence
¶32 We are persuaded that the evidence sufficiently
establishes that S.A.M. is dangerous under the Third Standard by
way of the recommitment alternative. See Wis. Stat.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., (1)(am). Under those two provisions, the
County's burden was to show a substantial likelihood, based on
S.A.M.'s treatment history, that if treatment were withdrawn he
would again face "a substantial probability of physical
impairment or injury to himself" and that there is either no
"reasonable provision for [his] protection . . . available in
the community" or that S.A.M. would not, to a "reasonable
probability," "avail himself . . . of these services." Id.¶33 The circuit court aptly summarized much of the record.
It recounted Dr. DiRaimondo's testimony about S.A.M. telling his
case manager "that he didn't need [his medication]," as well as
her own opinion that "if there's no court order, [S.A.M.] won't
take his medications." The circuit court then reiterated the
social worker's testimony that when S.A.M. is off medication and
"on his own, he is unstable, threat[ens] to harm himself, [and
is] not compliant when he's in the group home." Though S.A.M.
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No. 2019AP001033
promised he would maintain medication compliance absent a court
order, the circuit court was skeptical about S.A.M.'s
explanation that his recent noncompliance and resulting
dangerousness were solely the result of "hard times":
Certainly the Court understands hard times, but those
hard times certainly may and may be likely to continue
in the future. Whether one is on a court order or
not, hard times happen. And the Court has a duty to
make sure that if they happen, that [S.A.M.] has the
proper treatment to deal with, with those hard times
when he would be on his own.
It is evident the circuit court found S.A.M. not credible on
this point, a finding to which we defer. See Metro. Assocs. v.
City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶61, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905
N.W.2d 784 ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it
is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and
of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony." (quoting
Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct.
App. 1998)). Instead, the circuit court expressly agreed with
the two professionals' shared "concern that this situation may
happen all over again if the Court does not grant
the . . . extension," i.e. if compelled treatment is withdrawn.
¶34 The evidence further addresses the likelihood that
S.A.M. would avail himself of community resources available for
his protection. S.A.M.'s social worker testified that "[w]hen
talking about what services are available"——including services
that would assist his living independently——"he talks about not
wanting those." Moreover, the circuit court recounted her
testimony about S.A.M. disappearing from his grandmother's home—
20
No. 2019AP001033
—leading to the events underling his initial commitment——"under
somewhat of the same circumstances that he proposes now to live
with his grandmother, move to a motel and get a job." While the
circuit court acknowledged "that's a good plan," it also
recognized that "as recently as six months ago that plan didn't
work out" and failed to provide for his protection. Taken
together, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently proves
S.A.M. is dangerous under the Third Standard via the
§ 51.20(1)(am) recommitment alternative.
2. Melanie L.
¶35 S.A.M.'s reliance on Melanie L. is also unavailing.
Melanie L. involved a county expert's "failure to answer
questions using the terms in the statute." 349
Wis. 2d 148, ¶91. The expert opined that "Melanie was incapable
of applying an understanding of the medication 'to her
advantage.'" Id. By contrast, the statutory standard demanded
that she be "substantially incapable of applying an
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives
to his or her mental illness . . . to make an informed choice as
to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment." Wis.
Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b. Because there was conflicting evidence
on this standard, we concluded that the expert's deviation from
the statutory terms cast doubt on whether the expert "was
applying the standard or changing the standard."
Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶90-91. As such, the County failed
to meet its clear-and-convincing burden. Id., ¶94.
21
No. 2019AP001033
¶36 We face a different record here than we did in
Melanie L. The record before us shows the circuit court,
parties, and witnesses all in accord regarding the statutory
standards they were applying. The County made clear at the
outset that it "intends to show today" that "there's a
substantial likelihood that the individual would be a proper
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn," as
§ 51.20(1)(am) requires. Though no witness recited the Third
Standard with exactness, the experts' repeated references to
S.A.M. both reporting and threatening self-harm make clear to
this court that they were properly assessing the "probability of
physical impairment or injury to himself" if the commitment
ended. We therefore conclude the evidence on S.A.M.'s
dangerousness sufficiently justified his recommitment.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶37 Though S.A.M.'s recommitment order expired, the
ongoing collateral consequences causally related to it could be
practically affected by a favorable decision, rendering his
appeal not moot. The merits of his appeal, however, do not
warrant vacating the recommitment order. As such, we reverse
the court of appeals' dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal but affirm
the circuit court's recommitment order.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed.
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No. 2019AP1033.akz
¶38 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (concurring in part,
dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the
recommitment order should be affirmed. I dissent from the
majority opinion because it upends the longstanding mootness
doctrine in a recommitment appeal. To the extent the court is
disappointed with the delay in this case, so am I. However, the
volume of similar cases that will await the appellate system in
the future because of this opinion does not bode well for better
case processing. With no moot appeals in these cases, the
appellate system will be flooded.
¶39 It would be one thing had the court concluded that an
exception to the mootness doctrine was fulfilled because this
issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade review.
However, the court did not. Instead, the court inexplicably
chose this case to overturn the mootness doctrine. Spending
most of its analysis on doing away with the mootness doctrine in
recommitment cases, the court decides that S.A.M. faces
"collateral consequences."1 Of course there can be consequences
of a commitment——direct and collateral. In and of themselves,
The term "collateral consequences" is a term of art in the
1
criminal context. See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶¶60-61, 237
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (explaining in the plea withdrawal
context that a "direct consequence [of a conviction] . . . is
one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic
effect," while "[c]ollateral consequences are indirect and do
not flow from the conviction" such as consequences that "rest[]
not with the sentencing court, but instead with a different
tribunal or government agency"). This meaning does not fit well
within the commitment context. See Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020
WI 8, ¶¶23-25, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (analyzing
"collateral consequences," including firearms bans, in the
commitment context).
1
No. 2019AP1033.akz
the existence of potential and unproven collateral consequences
alone have never been determinative of mootness or lack thereof.
Restrictions on the ability of S.A.M. to possess a firearm
because of this recommitment and uncertain and unpursued
potential financial liability as a result of the recommitment
order are nothing more than theoretical possibilities. The
relevant order expired. We ought not presume collateral
consequences that do not exist. Here there are none. I am
concerned about the unintended consequences of the court's
error.
¶40 I agree that this case took far too long to process,
but that defect should not cause the court to dismantle the
established law on collateral consequences or the doctrine of
mootness. A theoretical and unproven collateral consequence has
never been a standalone reason to conclude that a case is not
moot. There are many potential consequences of being committed,
yet in the past we have nonetheless correctly concluded that
cases are moot. Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (concluding that a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge to a Chapter 51 recommitment was moot
when the order expired). Apparently the court sub silentio
overrules J.W.K. and every other case that deemed a commitment
or recommitment appeal to be moot. The majority fails to answer
what if any limits might apply. The majority does not and
cannot differentiate S.A.M.'s firearms ban or possible financial
liability from that of any other commitment or recommitment.
The majority makes no mention of the practical effect of a
2
No. 2019AP1033.akz
firearms ban or possible liability on S.A.M. that might be
different from any other recommittee. See State ex rel. Riesch
v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶11, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219(holding that a case is moot where the litigants fail to
demonstrate that resolution of the case would have a "practical
effect" on the case and parties).
¶41 In fact, S.A.M. faces a firearms ban regardless of his
recommitment, and there is no indication the government has or
will pursue recovery in his initial commitment let alone this
recommitment. The majority fails to analyze why this case, as
opposed to any other, is an exception to the mootness doctrine.
The opinion is devoid of any explanation why these facts are
unique or what the practical effect is for S.A.M. that would not
be the exact same for any other. Because the law on the
mootness doctrine and collateral consequences has been upended
and reinvented by the majority opinion, and it needlessly opens
the floodgates to appellate review of all commitments and
recommitments, I dissent.
¶42 Appeals are sometimes moot, and this case is one
example of an appeal that is otherwise moot. Marathon Cnty. v.
D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 ("Mootness
is a doctrine of judicial restraint. An issue is moot when its
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying
controversy. Because moot issues do not affect a live
controversy, this court generally declines to reach them. But
we may overlook mootness if the issue falls within one of five
exceptions: (1) the issue is of great public importance; (2)
3
No. 2019AP1033.akz
the issue involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) the
issue arises often and a decision from this court is essential;
(4) the issue is likely to recur and must be resolved to avoid
uncertainty; or (5) the issue is likely of repetition and evades
review." (Citations omitted.)); id., ¶22 ("We have previously
concluded that an expired initial commitment order is moot."
(citing Winnebago Cnty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, 366
Wis. 2d 1, ¶30, 878 N.W.2d 109).).
¶43 The majority does not decide this case because of any
of the foregoing exceptions to mootness. It does not conclude
that the issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade
review. See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶¶29-30. While a firearms
ban may be considered a "collateral consequence," it is not with
regard to S.A.M.'s recommitment order. In fact, the
recommitment order has no impact on his inability to possess a
firearm. He is otherwise subject to a firearms ban in his
initial order. Nonetheless, the majority somehow concludes that
S.A.M.'s firearms ban in his recommitment order defeats any
claim of mootness. In addition, the majority concludes that
theoretical, speculative, and highly unlikely financial
liability exists for this recommitment, even when there is no
indication it will be pursued and no indication it was pursued
for the initial commitment. Without any mention of
distinguishing facts of S.A.M.'s recommitment, and since these
are consequences of every commitment or recommitment, the
majority opinion leads to the inescapable conclusion that no
4
No. 2019AP1033.akz
commitment or recommitment appeal is ever moot. I respectfully
disagree.
¶44 S.A.M. identifies three potential collateral
consequences that he contends make his appeal not moot. He
contends the firearms ban, the monetary liability for care, and
social stigma are the collateral consequences that save his
appeal. The majority adopts two of the three, without any
supporting evidence of them being actual consequences, and
concludes that they are collateral consequences. S.A.M. does
not demonstrate that either of these are actual or even likely
consequences of his recommitment. This appeal is of his
recommitment, not his commitment.
¶45 A firearms ban has been labeled a collateral
consequence, but it has never been an automatic exception to
mootness in a recommitment hearing. Here, this is the issue to
be decided. In this case, the circuit court prohibited S.A.M.
from possessing any firearms when it ordered his initial
commitment. That prohibition was not lifted. S.A.M. did not
appeal his initial commitment order. He does not argue in this
case that the initial commitment was legally improper,
unsupported by factual evidence, or otherwise subject to
revocation. Thus, it is undisputed that, no matter what the
outcome of the current appeal, S.A.M. will not be able to
possess a firearm and will not be able to do so until he seeks
review of the firearms ban contained in the original commitment
order. S.A.M. has not demonstrated that his right to possess a
5
No. 2019AP1033.akz
firearm is in any way impacted by the firearms ban from his
recommitment order.
¶46 Although S.A.M. speculates that two valid firearms
bans could, at some point in time, impact his ability to lift
the initial firearms ban, he cites no allegation or evidence
that he intends to challenge the initial firearms ban, nor does
he cite any basis for the court to conclude that such a
challenge would somehow be successful. A firearms ban can be
revoked only if the court, in its discretion, determines S.A.M.
is "not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and
[revoking the ban] would not be contrary to public interest."
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b. Moreover, given that S.A.M. was
subject to his initial commitment and recommitment in the same
county, S.A.M. could seek revocation of both the initial
firearms ban and the firearms ban included in his recommitment
order if and when he challenges the initial recommitment order.
§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.a. (stating that individuals may file a
petition to revoke a firearms ban either at the court that
ordered the ban or "in the county where the individual resides
to cancel the order"). When considering whether to revoke the
initial firearms ban, the circuit court would need to review
"the individual's record and reputation." § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b.
S.A.M.'s record would be the same whether the court was
reviewing the initial firearms ban or the ban included in the
recommitment order. I note that this court affirms his
recommitment order.
6
No. 2019AP1033.akz
¶47 It would be pure speculation to predict whether and to
what extent a reversal of the recommitment order here, which has
not happened, would impact how the initial firearms ban would be
reviewed by a circuit court in future proceedings. S.A.M.'s
argument that resolution of this appeal will, at some point,
allow him to own a firearm is mere guesswork, which cannot
overcome mootness concerns. See Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11
(explaining that a case is moot where resolution of the case
would not have a "practical effect" on the case and litigants);
PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶¶30, 49, 317 Wis. 2d 656766N.W.2d 559 (holding that a case was moot where resolution of the
case would not provide the plaintiff any form of effective
relief). I recognize that a firearms ban has profound
consequences and is a collateral or perhaps direct consequence
in most circumstances, but it alone does not control whether an
appeal of a recommitment is moot. Here, S.A.M. has not
demonstrated that the firearms ban in his recommitment is an
exception to mootness.
¶48 Second, as to S.A.M.'s financial argument, Wisconsin
law states that individuals who are involuntarily committed may
be required to pay for their care to the extent they are able.
Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2). However, there has been absolutely no
showing that S.A.M. is in any way liable for his care or that
the government seeks or will seek any such reimbursement. In
fact, the County stated at oral argument that it has no
intention to seek such relief from S.A.M. Why would the
government first seek costs of recommitment when there is no
7
No. 2019AP1033.akz
indication it sought costs in the initial commitment? Plus,
legal protections are in place should such recovery someday be
sought. Recovery for the cost of care would require litigation
on legal claims and issues that are not before us and, up to
this point, have not been advanced in any other court
proceedings.
¶49 For S.A.M. to be held liable for the costs of care,
the County would first have to choose to advance its claims.
There is no available evidence showing that the County will or
is likely to pursue such a claim. In addition, the County would
have to comply with numerous legal requirements before obtaining
a money judgment against S.A.M. By statute, the County must
prove the "costs of the care, maintenance, services and
supplies" provided to S.A.M. § 46.10(2). Furthermore, the
County must conduct an "investigation" and consider S.A.M.'s
"ability to pay." § 46.10(3). "[U]nder all of the
circumstances," the government may collect only from those
individuals and assets that are best able to pay and those the
committee is not "dependent upon." § 46.10(2)-(3). In
addition, this court held in Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104
Wis. 2d 431, 435-38, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981), that the state cannot
collect costs of care for Chapter 51 commitments or detentions
that were illegal or invalid. See, e.g., Waukesha Memorial
Hosp. v. Nierenberger, No. 2013AP480, unpublished slip op.,
¶¶12-15 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2013) (considering whether an
individual could be liable for a hospital bill after a Chapter
51 emergency detention by first reviewing whether the detention
8
No. 2019AP1033.akz
was valid). To recover from S.A.M., the County must overcome
any other defenses S.A.M. may have. See, e.g., § 46.10(11)(a)
("[I]n any action to recover from a person liable under this
section, the statute of limitations may be pleaded in
defense."). Here there is absolutely no indication S.A.M.
himself could be financially responsible for his care.
¶50 To overcome mootness concerns, S.A.M. asks that we
speculate that the state, at some point in time in the future,
will seek to recoup the costs of care, that S.A.M. will have the
ability to pay, that the state fully satisfies Wis. Stat.
§ 46.10, and that S.A.M. will not have any valid defense to
assert. S.A.M.'s argument relies on a series of assumptions,
yet we have absolutely no indication in the record before us
that any of those assumptions are legitimate. The majority's
conclusions have sweeping consequences which are contrary to our
mootness doctrine. See City of Racine v. J-T Enters. of Am.,
Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 701-02, 221 N.W.2d 869 (1974) (holding
that a case was moot in a zoning dispute where a municipality
asked for a ruling on the legality of land use which it believed
would occur in the future, and reasoning that simply because a
legal dispute may occur "at some time in the future" could not
serve to overcome mootness); Ziemann v. Village of N. Hudson,
102 Wis. 2d 705, 708, 710-11, 307 N.W.2d 236 (1981) (concluding
that a case was moot where property owners sued to prevent the
sale of land to a municipality to use the property as a park
when the sale was completed, even though there could be a future
legal dispute over the use of the property as a park); see also
9
No. 2019AP1033.akz
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) ("One
can never be certain that findings made in a decision concluding
one lawsuit will not someday control the outcome of another
suit. But if that were enough to avoid mootness, no case would
ever be moot" (cleaned up).).
¶51 Finally, no Wisconsin court has ever concluded that
social stigma alone is a collateral consequence of commitment
that will defeat the mootness doctrine. In fact, S.A.M. fails
to demonstrate that he has experienced any social stigma, let
alone social stigma as a result of the recommitment. I would
not invariably extend social stigma of a recommitment to the
level of being a collateral consequence. S.A.M. fails to
provide any evidence or describe what negative consequences he
himself has experienced and will continue experiencing as a
result of the recommitment order. Furthermore, S.A.M. does not
dispute that he was mentally ill nor that his initial commitment
was justified. There is simply no evidence or description
showing the extent to which any social stigma S.A.M. experiences
is caused by his admittedly valid initial commitment, the
serious mental health issues he experienced in the past, and the
fact that he was recommitted for an additional six months. It
is by no means a given that those in society who stigmatize
S.A.M. for his mental health history will stigmatize him less if
his recommitment order were reversed on appeal, only after the
recommitment period has terminated. If we concluded that mere
conjecture on social stigma was sufficient to overcome mootness,
we would be forced to revisit many of our prior decisions. See,
10
No. 2019AP1033.akz
e.g., Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11 (holding that a parole
revocation decision on the basis of an alleged failure to
cooperate and violation of jail rules, among other offenses, was
moot where the defendant was discharged from the underlying
conviction and the revocation did not impact any of current
condition of probation). Further, if S.A.M.'s position were
adopted, the status of mootness as an effective legal doctrine
in Wisconsin would be called into serious doubt.
¶52 Even if the merits of S.A.M.'s appeal should be
addressed, as the majority accurately holds, his due process
challenge to his recommitment order fails. Majority op., ¶¶28-
29. Due process does not require that the County identify a
particular subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)
(i.e., 2.a. through 2.e.). Procedural due process requires only
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action" and
"an opportunity to present their objections." Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). S.A.M. does
not contend that he was deprived the "opportunity to
present . . . objections" prior to his recommitment. Id. In
fact, he was appointed an attorney at state expense, who through
motion practice and targeted cross-examination, provided S.A.M.
a substantive defense at his recommitment hearing. Further,
S.A.M. does not claim that the County failed to provide notice
of its intention to pursue recommitment, its petition to the
court, or the time, place, and manner by which recommitment
would be determined. S.A.M. and his counsel were informed of
11
No. 2019AP1033.akz
the County's charge that without commitment he would regress
back to his prior "acute psychotic state and required
hospitalization," thus requiring an extended commitment. They
were also informed that the County would be proceeding under
Chapter 51, and that the County believed if treatment were
withdrawn S.A.M. would be the proper subject for commitment.
Furthermore, S.A.M. was informed via court notice of the experts
the County intended to rely on for in-court testimony, as well
as the subject matter of the experts' testimony.
¶53 The County did not violate S.A.M.'s procedural due
process rights in the civil commitment proceedings below.
Compare DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 774 n.1, 788
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a ticket that cited to the wrong
legal provision and did not include a notice of hearing, in
conjunction with a summons mailed to the plaintiff of the time,
place, and subject matter of a hearing, satisfied due process
even though the plaintiff asserted that he never received the
mailed summons); Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828
F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2016) (notice of "the date, time, and
location" of a legal violation and the possibility of a hearing
was sufficient for procedural due process); Herrada v. City of
Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
notice satisfied due process despite the fact that it contained
false and misleading information on the legal consequences of
the proceedings because the notice nonetheless "clearly state[d]
that a hearing is available to contest the City's allegation
that" the plaintiff committed a violation of law); see also
12
No. 2019AP1033.akz
Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶21, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899
N.W.2d 303 ("Although the text of the [United States] and
Wisconsin constitutional provisions differ, they provide
identical procedural due process protections."). If there were
a legitimate concern as to what subdivision paragraph of Wis.
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) the County was proceeding under, a motion
for more definite pleadings could be made. No such motion was
made in the case at issue. Procedural protections already exist
if there is confusion as to the basis for the recommitment. No
record exists that such confusion was present here. Thus, due
process does not require the County to more specifically
identify the statutory subdivision paragraph under which it
seeks a recommitment order.
¶54 I agree with the majority that the record demonstrates
that both the third standard for dangerousness and the
alternative recommitment standard for dangerousness were
satisfied. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. & 1(am).
Specifically, I agree with the majority that, based on the
available record, S.A.M. would face "'a substantial probability
of physical impairment or injury to himself' and that there is
either no 'reasonable provision for [his]
protection . . . available in the community' or that S.A.M.
would not, to a 'reasonable probability,' 'avail
himself . . . of these services.'" Majority op., ¶¶32, 34
(quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.). Nonetheless, "if a question
becomes moot . . . it will not be determined by the reviewing
court" unless there exists "exceptional or compelling
13
No. 2019AP1033.akz
circumstances." J-T Enters., 64 Wis. 2d at 701-02. This case
is moot, and no collateral consequence sufficient to overcome
mootness resulted from S.A.M.'s recommitment. Thus, the
majority's discussion of the merits, while correct, is in this
case unnecessary and ancillary to the damage done to the
mootness doctrine.
¶55 The majority opinion essentially concludes that the
mootness doctrine never applies in Chapter 51 proceedings. It
does so without even requiring proof of an exception to mootness
or any showing that there is a practical effect to S.A.M. The
majority makes no effort to explain how S.A.M.'s circumstances
are unique so to overcome mootness. The majority in fact does
not in any way explain why S.A.M. is different from any other
committee or recommittee. The majority creates a legal
presumption that collateral consequences always result from a
Chapter 51 commitment, and that the mootness doctrine is
inapplicable in Chapter 51 commitments and recommitments. I
disagree, and would conclude that the mootness doctrine, along
with its exceptions, should remain a viable rubric when
considering a case.
¶56 Finally, as for expedited disposition of Chapter 51
appeals, this court could address and fully vet any such
proposal through administrative rulemaking. In such a hearing,
the court could also consider whether the text of the Wisconsin
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1) grant the court the
authority to mandate any such expedited disposition. The court
should not engage in that debate and conclude the outcome in
14
No. 2019AP1033.akz
this opinion. To the extent that the majority seeks to improve
efficiency in Chapter 51 appeals, its decision today will have
the polar opposite effect. The majority's decision will flood
the appellate system with otherwise moot cases because those
cases too will have a firearms ban and have the potential for
financial liability. We can expect more, not less, delay and
sometimes, justice delayed is justice denied.
¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in
part and dissent in part.
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this writing.
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No. 2019AP1033.akz
1