State v. Christopher D. Wilson

2022 WI 77SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2020AP1014-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Christopher D. Wilson,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 632, 962 N.W.2d 273(2021 – unpublished)
OPINION FILED: November 23, 2022
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: September 12, 2022
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: David L. Borowski
JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by David Malkus, assistant state public defender. There
was an oral argument by David Malkus, assistant state public
defender.
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Anne C. Murphy, assistant attorney general.
2022 WI 77NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2020AP1014-CR
(L.C. No. 2017CM2829)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent, FILED
v.
NOV 23, 2022
Christopher D. Wilson,
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and
cause remanded.
¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Christopher
Wilson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of
appeals affirming both his judgment of conviction and the
circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.1
1State v. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, unpublished slip op.
(Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 2021) (affirming the judgment and order
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, David L. Borowski,
Judge). The appeal was decided by one judge, Judge M. Joseph
Donald, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2017-18).
No. 2020AP1014-CR
Wilson argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when police officers entered his fenced-in backyard without a
warrant.
¶2 Specifically, Wilson contends that the officers'
warrantless entry was not a valid "knock and talk" investigation
because the officers lacked an implicit license to enter his
fenced-in backyard and therefore the entry violated the Fourth
Amendment. He further contends that the officers' warrantless
entry was not justified by the exigent circumstance of hot
pursuit. The State argues to the contrary, advancing that it
had an implicit license to enter and that it was in hot pursuit
of Wilson.
¶3 We conclude that the police officers did not conduct a
valid "knock and talk" investigation because the officers did
not have an implicit license to enter Wilson's backyard.
Additionally, we conclude that the officers' entry into Wilson's
backyard was not permissible under the exigency of hot pursuit
because the officers did not immediately or continuously pursue
Wilson from the scene of a crime and therefore violated the
Fourth Amendment.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and remand to the circuit court with directions to
vacate Wilson's judgment of conviction and grant the motion to
suppress evidence.
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.
2
No. 2020AP1014-CR
I
¶5 On January 16, 2017, South Milwaukee police received a
call from a citizen witness describing a grey BMW driving
erratically and traveling "all over the road." The caller
provided an address at which the car had stopped and described
the driver of the vehicle as wearing a black hat and bright
orange shoes. Further, the caller reported that the driver
exited the vehicle, climbed onto a fence, reached over the fence
to open it, and then entered the yard.
¶6 Officer Nathan Siefert of the South Milwaukee Police
Department responded and arrived at the address the caller had
given. He testified that upon his arrival he observed a "silver
BMW, just as the caller had described, which was parked in the
back parking slab partially on a snowbank." The car was running
and the back tailgate was open. Officer Siefert ran the car's
license plate and discovered that it was not registered to the
address at which it was located.
¶7 Next, Officer Siefert telephoned the caller to confirm
the information given. They discussed the details of the
complaint, including that the car was changing speeds and
driving erratically over the course of about three and a half
miles and the fact that the caller observed the car pull into
the location where Office Siefert eventually found it. Officer
Siefert confirmed with the caller that the caller saw a white
male wearing bright orange shoes climb onto a fence, reach over
the fence, open it, and enter the yard.
3
No. 2020AP1014-CR
¶8 At this point, Officer Siefert testified that he
treated the situation as "possibly an OWI and possibly a
burglary." Specifically, he "believed that this was a burglary
possibly because the vehicle didn't belong anywhere in the area.
It was left running. Perhaps for a quick get-away, the tailgate
was left open, and due to the description of someone climbing
onto the fence and going in."
¶9 The backyard area of the property was surrounded by a
high, solid wooden fence that obstructed any view of the yard.
When Officer Siefert and his partner arrived, the gate was open,
but a large garbage can blocked the entry way. The officers
removed the garbage can from their path, walked through the open
gate into the backyard, and proceeded to knock on the side door
of the unattached garage. At no point prior to entering the
property did the officers obtain a warrant.
¶10 Wilson, who was wearing a black cap and bright orange
shoes as the caller had described, opened the garage side door.
As they conversed, Officer Siefert observed that Wilson had
slurred speech and stumbled on the dry, level, concrete garage
floor. Wilson also stated that he had taken his prescribed
Methadone that day.
¶11 Officer Siefert accompanied Wilson back to the car so
Wilson could retrieve his identification. Upon arriving at the
vehicle, Officer Siefert observed in plain view a handgun inside
the vehicle. Wilson was subsequently found to have a revoked
driver's license, and Officer Siefert placed him under arrest.
In the course of a pat-down search, Officer Siefert found a
4
No. 2020AP1014-CR
prescription pill bottle in Wilson's pocket which was in a name
other than Wilson's.
¶12 Wilson ultimately was charged with one count of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as a second
offense,2 one count of endangering safety by use of a dangerous
weapon under the influence of an intoxicant,3 and one count of
possession of a prescription drug without a valid prescription.4
He subsequently moved to suppress "all statements, physical
evidence, blood samples, and any observations obtained by police
that were derived from" the police's warrantless entry to the
property.
¶13 Specifically, Wilson contended that the officers
impermissibly entered the curtilage of his home without a
warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, he
argued that all evidence gathered as a result of the officers'
unlawful actions must be suppressed. The evidence included his
statements, the suspected prescription drugs, the gun, and the
results of a subsequent chemical test of Wilson's blood.
¶14 After a hearing, the circuit court denied Wilson's
motion. It concluded that the "warrantless entry into the
backyard near Mr. Wilson's garage and the subsequent arrest of
Mr. Wilson on the parking slab outside of the garage were
justified by exigent circumstances of a hot pursuit of a fleeing
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a), 346.65(2)(am)2.
3 Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b).
4 Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h).
5
No. 2020AP1014-CR
suspect who had committed jailable offenses." The circuit court
cited criminal trespass and burglary as the potential jailable
offenses justifying the entry.
¶15 Subsequently, Wilson pleaded guilty to the OWI and
endangering safety counts, and the prescription drug count was
dismissed and read in, enabling it to be considered at
sentencing.5 He was sentenced to a total of four months in jail.
¶16 Wilson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the
circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of the motion
to suppress. State v. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, unpublished
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 2021). However, rather than
echoing the circuit court's hot pursuit rationale, it determined
that the officers' conduct constituted a permissible "knock and
talk" investigation, which if lawfully conducted does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Wilson petitioned for this
court's review.
II
¶17 We are called upon to review the court of appeals'
decision affirming the circuit court's denial of a motion to
suppress. Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question
of constitutional fact subject to a two-step inquiry. State v.
Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56.
5 A "read-in" crime is one that either is not charged or is
dismissed as part of a plea agreement, but that the defendant
agrees the circuit court may consider at sentencing, along with
the underlying conduct. See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b).
6
No. 2020AP1014-CR
¶18 First, we will uphold a circuit court's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Anderson, 2019
WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285. A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence. Id. Second, the application of
constitutional principles to those facts presents a question of
law that we review independently of the decisions rendered by
the circuit court and court of appeals. Id.III
¶19 We begin our analysis by setting forth principles of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This case implicates one of the
core constitutional guarantees found in the United States
Constitution.6 The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated." "It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.'" Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748
(1984) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of
Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). "[W]hen it comes to
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is the
6
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Wilson makes a single reference to this section
in his brief-in-chief. Otherwise, all of his arguments and
analyses are based on the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Accordingly, we address our review based on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
7
No. 2020AP1014-CR
Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.'" Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6
(2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
¶20 Fourth Amendment protections also extend to the
curtilage of one's home, the area "immediately surrounding and
associated with the home." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 180 (1984); State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶26, 231
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. The extent and scope of a home's
curtilage is determined by four factors:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
¶21 In Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, the United States
Supreme Court articulated an investigative technique, the "knock
and talk," that law enforcement may use in entering one's
constitutionally-protected curtilage. A "knock and talk"
investigation is not a search but instead is an investigative
technique premised on the implicit license that a visitor, or
neighbor, would have with regard to entering one's curtilage.
See City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, ¶9 n.5, 330
Wis. 2d 760, 769 N.W.2d 429.
¶22 A warrantless search of a home, on the other hand, is
presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
8
No. 2020AP1014-CR
586 (1980). Nevertheless, this court has recognized that a
warrantless home entry is generally lawful if there are exigent
circumstances together with probable cause. See State v.
Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187;
State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786
N.W.2d 463 (quoting State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 388
N.W.2d 601 (1986)) (noting that "in special circumstances, when
there is an urgent need coupled with insufficient time to obtain
a warrant, 'it would be unrealistic'" to bar a law enforcement
officer's entry into a home). In such an exigent circumstance,
like hot pursuit, the government bears the burden of showing
that the warrantless search was both supported by probable cause
and justified by exigent circumstances. Robinson, 327
Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 (emphasis added).
¶23 Wisconsin has recognized four categories of exigent
circumstances: (1) hot pursuit of a suspect, (2) a threat to
the safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk that evidence will
be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee.
Id., ¶30. Only the first of these circumstances, hot pursuit,
is raised as an issue in this case.
A
¶24 With this framework in mind, we turn next to examine
whether the officers had an implicit license to enter Wilson's
constitutionally-protected curtilage and conduct a "knock and
talk" investigation. There is no dispute here that Wilson's
backyard constitutes protected curtilage under the Fourth
Amendment.
9
No. 2020AP1014-CR
¶25 The test as to whether there exists an invitation or
license to approach an individual's home generally does not
require extensive legal acumen. "Complying with the terms of
that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the
Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters." Jardines, 569 U.S.
at 8. Accordingly, there is a generally recognized implicit
license for visitors "to approach the home by the front path,
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent
invitation to linger longer) leave." Id. Just as an ordinary
citizen may approach the curtilage of one's front porch to knock
on the door, so may the police without a warrant "precisely
because that is 'no more than any private citizen might do.'"
Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).
¶26 The implicit license to approach an individual's home
outlined in Jardines is not confined to that individual's front
door or front porch. In limited scenarios, it also may extend
to an alternative approach to the house or back entryway
depending on the facts of a case. There is no blanket implicit
license to enter a backyard. Rather, the inquiry is highly
fact-specific.
¶27 For example, in Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d
354 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit upheld police officers'
entrance into a backyard as a permissible warrantless entry when
the officers followed a sign pointing to the backyard.
Officers, responding to a complaint of underage drinking, first
approached the front door of the Alvarez home before seeing a
10
No. 2020AP1014-CR
sign in the driveway that read "Party In Back" with an arrow
pointing toward the backyard. Id. at 356-57. The court
observed that "in light of the sign reading 'Party In Back' with
an arrow pointing toward the backyard, it surely was reasonable
for the officers to proceed there directly as part of their
effort to speak with the party's host." Id. at 358-59.
¶28 Similarly, in United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273(9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit upheld police officers'
warrantless entry into a backyard when the back entrance could
be readily believed to be the main, public entrance to the home.
The court concluded that a license to enter a home's curtilage
applies and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated "when
officers go to the back door reasonably believing it is used as
a principal entrance to the dwelling." Id. at 1280. There, the
police entered the back porch area of a home believing it was
the front door of an apartment. The back porch area was
"readily accessible from a public place" and could reasonably be
believed to be the main, public entrance to the home. Id.¶29 In applying the test to the facts of this case, we
agree with Wilson that the court of appeals erred in determining
that the officers conducted a lawful "knock and talk"
investigation. See Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, at ¶18. The
court of appeals concluded that the officers had an implicit
license "to enter the backyard in the middle of the day from the
alley, walk to the side garage door, and knock" because the gate
was ajar, and therefore "there is no clear indication that
visitors were intended to be excluded from entering." Id., ¶23.
11
No. 2020AP1014-CR
It further reasoned that the officer's entry was permissible
because the officers had reason to believe someone was in the
backyard. Id., ¶24.
¶30 We disagree with the court of appeals on both points.
Wilson's backyard was surrounded by a tall, solid wooden fence
and even though the gate to the backyard was open, it was
blocked by a large garbage can. It is hard to believe that a
private citizen in the alley would consider Wilson's fence,
together with the garbage can impeding the opening in the fence,
as an invitation to approach the side door of the unattached
garage. If a private citizen does not have an implicit license
to do this, neither does law enforcement.
¶31 The facts of Garcia are in stark contrast to the facts
of this case. When the officers pulled up to Wilson's alleyway
and entered the backyard from the alley in order to knock on the
side door of the unattached garage they were not under the
impression that they were approaching the front door of Wilson's
home. Unlike in Garcia, Wilson's garage door was not "readily
accessible from a public place" and could not reasonably be
believed to be the main, public entrance to the home. Thus, the
officers did not have an implicit license to conduct a "knock
and talk" by operation of a well-intentioned, yet mistaken,
belief that they were approaching Wilson's main, public
entrance. Stated simply, private citizens would not feel they
had an implicit license to enter the backyard——and neither would
a Girl Scout in the words of the Jardines Court.
12
No. 2020AP1014-CR
¶32 The court of appeals cites Alvarez, 147 F.3d 354, to
support the proposition that the officers could lawfully enter
the backyard without a warrant because the officers believed
someone was in the backyard. Wilson, No. 2020AP1014-CR, at ¶24.
We do not find this contention persuasive for two reasons.
First, the court of appeals interprets Alvarez too broadly.
Contrary to the court of appeals' reading, Alvarez does not give
a blanket license for officers to enter a backyard, even if they
believe someone may be there. Rather, the inquiry is fact-
specific. See Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358.
¶33 Second, the facts in Alvarez are significantly
different from those here. Unlike in Alvarez, here there was no
sign directing the officers, or any other visitor, to the
backyard and there was no indication that a knock on the front
door would go unanswered (such as because the homeowner was
hosting a party in the back). Nothing indicated that the
implicit license to approach the front door to the house here
extended to the tall, gated backyard.
¶34 Accordingly, if officers wished to enter the backyard,
they needed first to obtain a warrant. We thus conclude that
the police officers' "knock and talk" investigation violated
Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights because the officers did not
have an implicit license to enter Wilson's backyard without a
warrant.
B
¶35 Having determined that the police officers' entry was
not a "knock and talk" investigation, but a warrantless
13
No. 2020AP1014-CR
intrusion that implicated the Fourth Amendment, we turn next to
examine whether the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement applies.7 Although the court of appeals did
not address the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, the circuit
court relied on that exception. It concluded that the officers'
warrantless entry into Wilson's backyard was justified by the
exigent circumstance of hot pursuit.
¶36 As noted above, generally, a warrantless entry must be
"supported by probable cause and justified by exigent
circumstances." Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24. The exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies if
the need for a search is urgent and there is insufficient time
to obtain a warrant. State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶39, 383
7 As a threshold matter, Wilson asserts in his reply brief
that the State forfeited any argument that the hot pursuit
doctrine applies because it failed to raise the issue in its
response to Wilson's petition for review.
Even assuming without deciding that the issue was
forfeited, we may still exercise our discretion in addressing
it. The forfeiture rule is not an inexorable command, but is
instead a rule of judicial administration, and thus a reviewing
court may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits of an
unpreserved issue in an appropriate case. State v. Counihan,
2020 WI 12, ¶27, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530. Here, hot
pursuit was the rationale explicitly relied upon by the circuit
court, so that the State may argue hot pursuit should not have
been a surprise to Wilson. In the interest of completeness, we
thus choose to address the issue. See D.L. Anderson's Lakeside
Leisure Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 2008 WI 126, ¶41, 314
Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803 (addressing a "waived challenge to
the jury instructions because that challenge involves important
issues that we wish to address").
14
No. 2020AP1014-CR
Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120; see Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; State
v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621.
¶37 For the exigency of hot pursuit, "[t]he government
bears the burden of showing that the warrantless entry was both
supported by probable cause and justified by exigent
circumstances." Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 (emphasis
added); see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280,
¶17. Given that both prongs of the test must be met, we need
not further address probable cause here, because we determine
that the State's exigent circumstance argument fails.
¶38 As stated, the hot pursuit of a suspect constitutes an
exigency such as to authorize a law enforcement officer's
warrantless entry into a home. Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30.
This exigency recognizes that it would impede effective law
enforcement to bar officers from a home in instances when there
is an urgent need and insufficient time to obtain a warrant.
Id., ¶24. The basic ingredient of the exigency of hot pursuit
is "immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the
scene of a crime." State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶32, 235
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29. "[S]ome sort of a chase" is
required, but it "need not be an extended hue and cry 'in and
about (the) public streets.'" United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 43 (1976).
¶39 The circuit court concluded that the officers'
warrantless entry into Wilson's backyard was justified because
the officers had probable cause that Wilson had committed
jailable offenses and because the exigent circumstance of hot
15
No. 2020AP1014-CR
pursuit applies. Thus, we examine whether the facts here
support "pursuit" that would justify the officers' warrantless
entry.
¶40 The State cites to State v. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524,
which concluded that a warrantless entry was reasonable under
the hot pursuit doctrine.8 Yet, the facts in Richter are
distinguishable from the case at hand. In Richter, the victim
of an attempted break-in saw the suspect run into another
trailer home, which was then validated by the officers' visual
confirmation of broken glass and a window screen lying on the
ground.
¶41 As we explained in Richter, the officers' pursuit of
the suspect was both immediate and continuous:
[The officer] responded to a dispatch and picked up
the trail of a fleeing suspect from an eyewitness
account. His response to the scene of the crime was
immediate, and his pursuit of the suspect was
immediate and continuous upon his arrival on the scene
and rapid collection of information regarding the
whereabouts of the suspect. There is no evidence in
this record of any delay in [the officer's] response
or pursuit that would have interrupted the immediacy
and continuity of the situation and therefore
dissipated the exigency. We conclude that [the
officer's] entry was justified by the exigent
circumstance of hot pursuit.
Id., ¶36.
8State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶41, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612
N.W.2d 29, also concluded that the warrantless entry was
reasonable under the exigency of a threat to the safety of a
suspect or others. This exigency was not raised as an issue in
this case and thus we confine our discussion of Richter to the
exigency of hot pursuit.
16
No. 2020AP1014-CR
¶42 Unlike in Richter, the officers here did not pick up
Wilson's trail and immediately pursue Wilson based on the
contemporaneous collection of information. Instead, they
received a call to go to a particular location. Upon arrival,
the officers delayed in order to gather more information. After
observing the location, the officers ran the vehicle license
plate to obtain vehicle registration information. Next, they
contacted the 911 caller to discuss more details of the
complaint, including the speed of the vehicle, the nature of the
erratic driving, and a description of its three-and-a-half mile
route. Additionally, they discussed what the suspect was
wearing and his conduct upon exiting the vehicle. Although we
do not know the exact amount of time it took the officers to
check the vehicle registration and contact the 911 caller, the
record does not support the proposition that the officers were
acting in hot pursuit. What occurred was neither hot nor was it
a continuous pursuit.
¶43 We find further support in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, for our conclusion that the facts here do not
constitute hot pursuit. In Welsh, a concerned driver called the
police to report an erratic driver who was swerving in the road
and eventually stopped in an open field. Id. at 742. The
erratic driver got out of his car and approached the concerned
citizen, asking him for a ride home. Id. The concerned citizen
suggested waiting for assistance but the driver walked away from
the field, leaving his car. Id. A few minutes later, officers
arrived, checked the registration of the abandoned car, and
17
No. 2020AP1014-CR
proceeded to the suspect's home. Id. at 742-43. The United
States Supreme Court concluded that "the claim of hot pursuit is
unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime." Id. at
753.
¶44 Similarly here, there was no immediate or continuous
pursuit from the scene of the crime. In fact, there was even
less of a pursuit than what occurred in Welsh. Police simply
received a call telling them to go to a specific address and
they went to that location. It was not a real time pursuit of a
suspect.
¶45 After receiving the complaint from the 911 caller, the
officers drove to the alleyway of Wilson's house. The police
did not end up at Wilson's home after following an erratic
driver. Wilson was already inside the property when the police
arrived.
¶46 When the police arrived, an officer performed a
registration check on Wilson's car and then called the citizen
witness to gather more information. The officer discussed with
the caller details of Wilson's erratic driving, the streets on
which he had driven, and how many miles of driving the witness
observed. Additionally, they discussed the details of Wilson's
entry into his backyard and what he was wearing. As discussed
above, the attenuation reflected by these activities does not
support a hot pursuit conclusion.
¶47 Hot pursuit requires "some sort of a chase," and such
an event did not occur here. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
18
No. 2020AP1014-CR
Welsh further instructs that the pursuit must be immediate and
continuous. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. Simply put, police did not
"pursue" Wilson to his home. Thus, there was no "pursuit," much
less a "hot" pursuit, which would justify the hot pursuit
exception to the warrant requirement.
IV
¶48 In sum, we conclude that Wilson's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. The police officers' warrantless entry
into Wilson's backyard was not a valid "knock and talk"
investigation because they did not have an implicit license to
enter nor did their entry satisfy the hot pursuit exception to
the warrant requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the decision
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit
court with directions to vacate Wilson's judgment of conviction
and grant the motion to suppress.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
19
No. 2020AP1014-CR
1