Milton Eugene Warren v. Michael Meisner

2020 WI 55
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2019AP567-W
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren,
Plaintiff-Petitioner-Petitioner,
v.
Michael Meisner,
Defendant-Respondent.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OPINION FILED: June 11, 2020
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: March 18, 2020
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Rock
JUDGE: Karl Hanson
JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-petitioner-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Robert N. Meyeroff, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument
by Robert N. Meyeroff.
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Robert G. Probst, assistant attorney general; with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Robert G. Probst.
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin State
Public Defender by Joseph N. Ehmann, regional attorney manager;
with whom on the brief was Kelli S. Thompson, state public
defender. There was an oral argument by Joseph N. Ehmann.
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak and
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee.
2
2020 WI 55
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2019AP567-W
(L.C. No. 2014CF2123)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Milton Eugene
Warren,
Plaintiff-Petitioner-Petitioner, FILED
v.
JUN 11, 2020
Michael Meisner,
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Respondent.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and
remanded.
¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Milton Eugene
Warren, seeks review of an unpublished order of the court of
appeals denying his petition for habeas corpus.1 He filed the
habeas petition after first unsuccessfully seeking Wis. Stat.
1State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, No. 2019AP567-W,
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019).
No. 2019AP567-W
§ 974.06 (2017-18)2 postconviction relief in the circuit court.3
In both the habeas petition and the postconviction motion, Warren
averred ineffective assistance of counsel for alleged errors
taking place after conviction by the failure to raise a claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective.
¶2 Presented with Warren's postconviction motion, the
circuit court concluded that Warren had sought relief in the wrong
forum. Pursuant to State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274,
833 N.W.2d 146, it determined that rather than filing his
postconviction motion in the circuit court, Warren should instead
have filed a habeas petition in the court of appeals.
¶3 Following the circuit court's direction, Warren
subsequently filed a habeas petition in the court of appeals. The
court of appeals denied the petition, concluding that Warren did
not follow the correct procedural mechanism. Specifically, it
determined that he should have filed an appeal of the circuit
court's denial of his postconviction motion rather than a habeas
petition.
¶4 Warren contends that the circuit court and court of
appeals decisions leave him effectively without a forum for
resolution of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that
the proper forum for the claim is in the circuit court. Further,
he asserts, and the State agrees, that language from Starks should
2All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.
3The Honorable Karl R. Hanson, Rock County Circuit Court,
presided.
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No. 2019AP567-W
be withdrawn because it contradicts the established framework for
determining the proper forum for his claim.
¶5 We reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering4 framework remains
the correct methodology for determining the appropriate forum for
a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the alleged
ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction. Both Knight and
Rothering premised their decisions on the forum in which the
alleged ineffectiveness took place. Applying this framework, we
conclude that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for
Warren's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim. Further, we
withdraw paragraph four of Starks because it is contradictory to
this conclusion. Additionally, to the extent language in
paragraphs 30-31, 34-35, and throughout Starks contradicts our
conclusion in this case, it is also withdrawn. Finally, we also
modify paragraph 41 of Starks.
¶6 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions.
I
¶7 Warren was convicted after a jury trial of three drug
related offenses——possession with intent to deliver more than 50
grams of heroin, possession of THC as a second or subsequent
offense, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Following
his conviction, and with the assistance of counsel, Warren appealed
See State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992);
4
State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556
N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
3
No. 2019AP567-W
his judgment of conviction. He pursued a direct appeal without
first filing in the circuit court a motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30.5
¶8 Thus, rather than pursuing a remedy in the circuit court
through a motion for postconviction relief, Warren filed a notice
of appeal from his judgments of conviction, proceeding directly to
the court of appeals. He raised two issues before the court of
appeals. First, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions. Second, he asserted that the circuit
court erred by excluding evidence related to prior bad acts that
Warren wished to use to impeach a witness.
¶9 The court of appeals rejected these arguments and
affirmed Warren's judgments of conviction. State v. Warren, No.
2016AP936-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 2017)
(per curiam). Warren petitioned for review in this court, which
was denied.
5 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h):
The person shall file in circuit court and serve on the
prosecutor and any other party a notice of appeal or
motion seeking postconviction or postdisposition relief
within 60 days after the later of the service of the
transcript or circuit court case record. The person
shall file a motion for postconviction or
postdisposition relief before a notice of appeal is
filed unless the grounds for seeking relief are
sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised.
A postconviction or postdisposition motion under this
section may not be accompanied by a notice of motion and
is made when filed. A notice of appeal filed under this
section shall conform to the requirements set forth in
s. 809.10.
4
No. 2019AP567-W
¶10 Subsequently, Warren filed a postconviction motion in
the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06.6 Although
neither the original nor an amended postconviction motion is in
the record in this case, the circuit court characterized the
arguments made as a contention "that Warren's appellate counsel
was ineffective for not raising a claim for the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel."
¶11 The circuit court denied Warren's Wis. Stat. § 974.06
postconviction motion. It premised its determination on Starks,
observing that "[i]n the case at bar, the procedural posture is
nearly identical to that in Starks." The relevant distinction
that arises from Starks, according to the circuit court, is that
between "appellate counsel" and "postconviction counsel." Because
the circuit court opined that "[t]his is a case that involves a
claim for the ineffective assistance of an appellate attorney, as
that appellation is determined [in Starks,]" it concluded that
Warren's claim should be brought in the first instance in the court
of appeals.
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(1) provides:
After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy
provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court or a person convicted and
placed with a volunteers in probation program under s.
973.11 claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S.
constitution or the constitution or laws of this state,
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
5
No. 2019AP567-W
¶12 Following the denial of this postconviction motion in
the circuit court, Warren filed a petition for habeas corpus, often
referred to as a Knight7 petition, in the court of appeals. Again,
Warren alleged that his counsel on direct appeal "performed
deficiently by failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness."
State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, No. 2019AP567-W, unpublished order
at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019).
¶13 The court of appeals denied Warren's habeas petition
without ordering a response. Observing that "Warren's writ
petition makes no mention of the postconviction motion proceedings
that followed his direct appeal," it determined that "[t]o the
extent Warren seeks relief from the order denying the motion, his
remedy lies not by writ, but by appeal of that order. A petition
for supervisory writ is not a substitute for an appeal." Id.
(citing State ex rel. Dressler v. Cir. Ct. for Racine Cty., 163
Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991)). Warren moved
for reconsideration, which the court of appeals denied, and he
subsequently petitioned for review in this court.
II
¶14 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' order
denying Warren's petition for habeas corpus. In our review, we
are asked to determine the appropriate forum when a defendant
asserts ineffective assistance of counsel for errors that take
7 "Habeas petitions to the court of appeals alleging
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are often referred to
as 'Knight petitions.'" State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI
38, ¶27 n.11, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805; see Knight, 168
Wis. 2d 509.
6
No. 2019AP567-W
place after conviction by the failure to raise the ineffectiveness
of trial counsel. This is a question of law reviewed independently
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of
appeals. See State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 38, ¶16, 354
Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805.
III
¶15 We begin by setting forth the development of our case
law regarding the proper forum for claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel resulting from alleged errors that take place after
conviction. Subsequently, we apply this case law to the facts of
this case. We finally discuss the remedy to which Warren is
entitled.
¶16 This court has previously stated that the traditional
rule "has been that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
premised on errors occurring before the circuit court should be
pursued in the circuit court and claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel premised on errors occurring before the appellate court
should be pursued in the court of appeals." Id., ¶25 (citing State
v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶32, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334).
This framework began its development in the seminal case of State
v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).
¶17 In Knight, the defendant alleged that his attorney on
appeal provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise certain
arguments before the court of appeals. Id. at 513. The court
addressed what was at that time a question of first impression in
Wisconsin: "the proper procedure by which a defendant may assert
7
No. 2019AP567-W
a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . ."
Id. at 514.
¶18 Resolving this question, the Knight court concluded
"that to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, a defendant should petition the appellate court that heard
the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 520. In arriving
at this determination, the court focused on the fact that "[t]he
appellate court will be familiar with the case and the appellate
proceedings." Id. at 521. The appellate court is therefore "a
more appropriate and better suited forum than is the circuit court
to determine whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient
and prejudiced the defendant's appeal." Id.
¶19 The court of appeals added an additional piece to the
Knight framework in State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205
Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam). In
Rothering, the defendant alleged "the failure of postconviction
counsel to bring a postconviction motion before the trial court to
withdraw his plea and raising the issue of ineffective trial
counsel." Id. at 679.
¶20 Just as the court in Knight focused on where the alleged
ineffectiveness occurred, the Rothering court similarly focused
its analysis. "In choosing the appellate court as the appropriate
forum for addressing allegations of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, an admittedly close call, the supreme court [in
Knight] sought to pick the forum where the allegedly ineffective
conduct occurred." Id. Indeed, where ineffectiveness is alleged
8
No. 2019AP567-W
in the court of appeals, it is the appellate court that "has
familiarity with the case and appellate proceedings." Id.
¶21 In Rothering, unlike in Knight, "[t]he allegedly
deficient conduct is not what occurred before [the court of
appeals] but rather what should have occurred before the trial
court by a motion filed by postconviction counsel." Id. It is
the circuit court, and not the court of appeals, that possesses
the necessary background in such a case. Id. at 679-80 (explaining
that the court of appeals "does not have any familiarity with the
claims of ineffective trial counsel and whether the plea should be
withdrawn as they were never raised in [the court of appeals]").
¶22 The court of appeals thus concluded that "a Knight
petition is not the proper vehicle for seeking redress of the
alleged deficiencies of postconviction counsel." Id. at 679.
Instead, "a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel should be raised in the trial court either by a petition
for habeas corpus or a motion under § 974.06, Stats." Id. at 681.
¶23 The key distinction the Rothering court drew was between
"appellate" counsel and "postconviction" counsel. Id. at 678;
Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶32. It offered some guidance in
distinguishing between the two, observing two "principal
manifestations of appellate representation:" briefing and oral
argument. Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 678-79 (quoting Watson v.
United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1057 (D.C. 1987)). However, the
court of appeals also recognized "that often postconviction
counsel and appellate counsel are the same person." Id. at 678
n.4.
9
No. 2019AP567-W
¶24 This court indicated that it was applying the
Knight/Rothering framework in Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, ¶4. In
Starks, the defendant filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction
motion with the circuit court, "alleging that the attorney who
handled his appeal was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims." Id., ¶2.
¶25 At the outset of its opinion, the Starks court observed
what it termed a "procedural problem." Id., ¶4. Specifically, it
stated:
Starks's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, which was filed
with the circuit court, alleged ineffective assistance
of postconviction counsel. However, the attorney who
represented him after his conviction did not file any
postconviction motions and instead pursued a direct
appeal. He was thus not Starks's postconviction counsel
but was rather his appellate counsel. This is
significant because claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel must be filed in the form of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the court of appeals.
By bringing his claim in the circuit court, Starks
pursued his case in the wrong forum.
Id. (citing Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 520).
¶26 Following this court's decision in Starks, both Starks
and the State moved for reconsideration. As explained in a
concurrence to the denial of the motion for reconsideration:
Both parties took issue with the court's discussion in
the above-quoted paragraph 4. Both parties contended
that on the facts of the case, Starks was correct in
challenging the effectiveness of postconviction counsel
and thus correct in filing his § 974.06 motion in the
circuit court. Correspondingly, both parties contended
that this court's characterization of Starks's motion as
a challenge to the effectiveness of appellate counsel
was incorrect and its assertion that Starks should have
10
No. 2019AP567-W
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court
of appeals was thus mistaken.
State v. Starks, 2014 WI 91, ¶21, 357 Wis. 2d 142, 849 N.W.2d 724
(denying reconsideration) (Prosser, J., concurring).8
¶27 The court denied the motion for reconsideration. It
further declined to withdraw the language from its original opinion
in Starks.
¶28 In the present case, in analyzing whether Warren had
properly filed his motion in the circuit court, the circuit court
observed the dissonance between the Knight/Rothering framework and
Starks: "Whereas the Rothering court found that an appellate
attorney who fails to file a postconviction motion is nonetheless
postconviction counsel——at least as to the decision to not file
the postconviction motion——the Starks court found just the
opposite." Following its reading of Starks, the circuit court
thus determined that "[t]he Supreme Court in Starks overruled the
Court of Appeals' holding in Rothering as to when an attorney is
8In addition to this argument, the parties raised two
additional issues on reconsideration. First, Starks argued that
the court should "reconsider its assessment of his substantive
claims 'because that assessment conflicts with controlling and
apparently overlooked legal standards.'" State v. Starks, 2014 WI
91, ¶24, 357 Wis. 2d 142, 849 N.W.2d 724 (denying reconsideration)
(Prosser, J., concurring). Second, the State asserted that
paragraph 41 of the Starks opinion should be modified because it
relied on case law that had been superseded by statute. Id., ¶25;
see State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶41, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833
N.W.2d 146.
The first of these arguments has no bearing on the issues
before us in this appeal and accordingly will not be addressed
further. Modification of paragraph 41 of the Starks opinion is
addressed infra at ¶¶41-43.
11
No. 2019AP567-W
considered appellate counsel" and accordingly concluded that
Warren's claim was filed in the wrong forum.
¶29 This case now presents the court with an opportunity to
examine this language of Starks and in essence revisit one of the
issues presented on reconsideration.
IV
¶30 We turn next to apply the framework created by the above-
cited case law to the facts of this case.
¶31 As a starting point, there is much agreement between the
parties. Neither party seeks to alter the longstanding
Knight/Rothering framework or questions its continued vitality.
Further, the parties agree that the circuit court is the proper
forum for Warren's claim.
¶32 We agree with the parties on both of these points.
First, we reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering framework remains the
correct methodology for determining the appropriate forum for a
criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the alleged
ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction.
¶33 Both Knight and Rothering premised their decisions on
the forum in which the alleged ineffectiveness took place. In
Knight, the court noted that "[t]he appellate court will be
familiar with the case and the appellate proceedings[,]" so it is
a better forum for determining questions of the ineffectiveness of
appellate counsel. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521. Likewise, in
Rothering the court observed that the court of appeals "does not
have any familiarity with the claims of ineffective trial counsel"
and is ill-suited to address "the conduct of postconviction counsel
12
No. 2019AP567-W
and issues which were never preserved for appeal." Rothering, 205
Wis. 2d at 679.
¶34 Such an approach makes eminent sense. The circuit court
reviews allegations of conduct that took place (or should have
taken place) before the circuit court, and an appellate court
examines allegations of conduct that took place (or should have
taken place) before it. This division of labor allows each court
to play to its strengths and to answer questions applying its
unique expertise. See Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521 (explaining that
an appellate court is "better suited . . . than is the circuit
court to determine whether appellate counsel's performance was
deficient and prejudiced the defendant's appeal" because "[t]hese
determinations involve questions of law within the appellate
court's expertise and authority to decide de novo").
¶35 Perhaps some of the confusion that appears to have arisen
regarding this framework is due to the nomenclature that decisions
have used describing "appellate counsel" and "postconviction
counsel." Indeed, these two terms often refer to the same person.
Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 678 n.4.
¶36 Rather than a determination of "who" committed the
error, we think it clearer to focus the inquiry on "where" the
alleged ineffectiveness occurred. If the acts or omissions that
constitute alleged ineffective assistance of counsel took place in
the circuit court, then the circuit court is the proper forum for
such claims to be filed in the first instance. Likewise, alleged
errors occurring in an appellate court are best addressed in the
appellate court where the alleged error occurred.
13
No. 2019AP567-W
¶37 Certain language in Starks contradicts this framework,
and we hereby withdraw paragraph four of that opinion because it
is inconsistent with our determination in the present case. See
Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, ¶4. Specifically, the Starks court
labeled an attorney who "did not file any postconviction motions
and instead pursued a direct appeal" as "appellate counsel." Id.
Therefore, it determined that the claim should have been filed in
the form of a petition for habeas corpus in the court of appeals.
Id.
¶38 Additionally, the State cautions that some language in
paragraphs 30-31 and 34-35 of Starks may also be interpreted to
overrule the Knight/Rothering framework because it refers to
Starks's challenge as one to his appellate counsel rather than
postconviction counsel. To the extent that language in these
paragraphs and any other language throughout Starks contradicts
our holding today, the language cannot stand and is also withdrawn.
¶39 The Starks court's determination that the defendant's
challenge was to "appellate counsel" was incorrect under the
Knight/Rothering framework, which we reaffirm in the present case.
The claim of ineffectiveness made in Starks was that counsel was
ineffective "for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims." Id., ¶2. That is, Starks alleged that counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion for postconviction
relief and seek a Machner hearing.9 This is an error of omission
9See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct.
App. 1979).
14
No. 2019AP567-W
that took place in the circuit court. The time for filing this
motion was prior to the filing of a notice of appeal, and such a
Machner hearing would have taken place before the circuit court.
¶40 Nothing in the Starks opinion provides any indication
that the court intended to modify the Knight/Rothering framework.10
As stated above, such a framework remains the law. Thus, we
withdraw paragraph four in Starks.
¶41 We diverge briefly from the issues as presented by the
parties. The State Public Defender, as amicus, asks us to withdraw
language from paragraph 41 in Starks. In the interest of avoiding
confusion, we grant this request. See Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274,
¶41.
¶42 At paragraph 41, the Starks court wrote, "A defendant
may file a § 974.06 motion only after he has 'exhausted his direct
remedies[,] which consist of a motion for a new trial and [an]
appeal.'" Id. (quoting Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381,
195 N.W.2d 837 (1972)). The State Public Defender contends that
this language incorrectly implies that Wis. Stat. § 974.06
litigation is available only after a person has taken a direct
appeal.
See Starks, 357 Wis. 2d 142, ¶49 (denying reconsideration)
10
(Prosser, J., concurring) ("In any event, no one on the court
disputes the basic correctness of the holdings in Knight and
Rothering as to where to file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel or a
§ 974.06 motion challenging the effectiveness of postconviction
counsel, for not challenging, or deficiently challenging, the
alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.").
15
No. 2019AP567-W
¶43 An examination of the relevant statutes confirms that
amicus is correct. The language in the 1972 Peterson decision, on
which Starks relies, was superseded by a statutory amendment
enacted in 1977. See § 130, ch. 187, Laws of 1977. This amendment
changed the language of Wis. Stat. § 974.06 to provide: "After
the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02
has expired," a postconviction motion pursuant to § 974.06 may be
filed. Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1). As this statute provides that a
§ 974.06 motion may be filed after the time for direct appeal has
expired, and the ability to file such a motion is not tied to a
direct appeal actually being taken, we withdraw the sentence in
paragraph 41 of Starks that suggests otherwise.
¶44 Returning to the parties' issues at hand, we next apply
the Knight/Rothering framework. We agree with the parties that
the proper forum for Warren's claim is in the circuit court. As
the circuit court stated, Warren argued that his counsel after
conviction "was ineffective for not raising a claim for the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel."
¶45 The alleged error is one of omission (failing to file a
motion for postconviction relief) that took place in the circuit
court. Had Warren's attorney on appeal raised a claim that trial
counsel was ineffective, a Machner hearing would have been
requested in the circuit court. No proceedings in the court of
appeals would have immediately resulted had counsel filed a motion
for postconviction relief. The alleged error thus occurred prior
to the filing of the notice of appeal. Pursuant to the established
16
No. 2019AP567-W
and now reaffirmed Knight/Rothering framework, the proper forum
for such a claim is the circuit court.
¶46 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court is the
appropriate forum for Warren's claim that postconviction counsel
was ineffective for failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel
claim.
V
¶47 Having determined that the proper forum for Warren's
claim is the circuit court, we turn next to the proper remedy.
¶48 "Habeas corpus is essentially an equitable doctrine, and
a court of equity has authority to tailor a remedy for the
particular facts." State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276,
288, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977). In fashioning a remedy here, we seek
to fulfill three goals. First, Warren's claim must be heard on
the merits. As analyzed above, the circuit court erroneously
dismissed Warren's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion due to the now-
withdrawn language in Starks. The State agrees that Warren is
entitled to his day in court.
¶49 Second, we must respect the fact that it is the court of
appeals' decision we are reviewing and not the circuit court's.
Although the circuit court's decision is essential to our analysis,
that decision is not before us——this is a writ case, separate and
distinct from Warren's criminal case. See State ex rel. Fuentes
v. Wis. Ct. App., Dist. IV, 225 Wis. 2d 446, 450, 593 N.W.2d 48
(1999) ("Although a habeas corpus petition normally arises out of
criminal proceedings, it is a separate civil action founded upon
17
No. 2019AP567-W
principles of equity."). This case, as it comes to this court,
originated at the court of appeals.
¶50 Third, we must make clear that Warren's initial Wis.
Stat. § 974.06 motion was properly filed. This is important in
relation to Warren's rights to federal habeas review. Indeed, a
"properly filed" postconviction motion tolls the one-year
limitations period for a federal habeas petition: "The time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see
State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶24 n.5, 290
Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900.
¶51 Keeping in mind these three goals, we remand the case to
the court of appeals with directions to remand to the circuit court
for Rock County to construe the habeas petition as a Wis. Stat.
§ 974.06 postconviction motion.11 This remedy provides Warren with
11 Our precedent indicates that this court has the authority
to construe Warren's Knight petition as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06
motion and transfer it to the appropriate court. See State ex
rel. L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, ¶25, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667
N.W.2d 1 (construing petition for habeas corpus as petition for
certiorari and transferring to circuit court); bin-Rilla v.
Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 523-24, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983)
(transferring a habeas petition challenging conditions of
confinement that was filed in the court of appeals to the circuit
court because "the circuit court is better suited than the court
of appeals or this court to process this petition"). (continued)
18
No. 2019AP567-W
a determination on the merits of his claim in the circuit court
and acknowledges that this case originated in the court of appeals.
We determine further that Warren's original Wis. Stat. § 974.06
motion in the circuit court was properly filed.
¶52 In sum, we reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering framework
remains the correct methodology for determining the appropriate
forum for a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the
alleged ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction. Both Knight
and Rothering premised their decisions on the forum in which the
alleged ineffectiveness took place. Applying this framework, we
conclude that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for
Warren's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim. Further, we
withdraw paragraph four of Starks because it is contradictory to
this conclusion. Additionally, to the extent language in
paragraphs 30-31, 34-35, and throughout Starks contradicts our
conclusion in this case, it is also withdrawn. Finally, we also
modify paragraph 41 of Starks.
See also Wis. Stat. § 807.07(2) ("If the tribunal from which
an appeal is taken had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the court to which the appeal is taken has such jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was
commenced in the good faith and belief that the first named
tribunal possessed jurisdiction, allow it to proceed as if
originally commenced in the proper court and shall allow the
pleadings and proceedings to be amended accordingly; and in all
cases every court where objection to its jurisdiction is sustained
the cause shall be certified to some court having jurisdiction,
provided it appears that the error arose from mistake.").
19
No. 2019AP567-W
¶53 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed
and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals with directions.
20
No. 2019AP567-W
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