Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Scott F. Anderson

2020 WI 82
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2018AP1837-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Scott F. Anderson, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Scott F. Anderson,
Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ANDERSON
OPINION FILED: October 28, 2020
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
Per Curiam.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2020 WI 82
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2018AP1837-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Scott F. Anderson, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant, OCT 28, 2020
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Scott F. Anderson,
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report of Referee Kim
Peterson in which she found that Attorney Scott F. Anderson had
committed six counts of professional misconduct with respect to
his handling of two client matters. The referee recommended
that Attorney Anderson's license to practice law in this state
be suspended for a period of 30 days. Upon careful review of
the matter, we uphold the referee's findings and fact and
conclusions of law. Rather than a 30-day suspension, we
conclude that a 60-day license suspension is an appropriate
No. 2018AP1837-D
sanction for Attorney Anderson's misconduct. We further agree
that Attorney Anderson should be required to pay the costs of
this proceeding, which are $19,339.98 as of June 11, 2020.
¶2 Attorney Anderson was admitted to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1985 and practices in Milwaukee. In 1991 he
received a consensual private reprimand. Private reprimand No.
1991-13 (electronic copy available at https://compendium.
wicourts.gov/app/raw/000038.html). In 2004, he received a
consensual public reprimand for misconduct arising out of three
cases. Public Reprimand of Scott F. Anderson, No. 2004-05
(electronic copy available at https://compendium.wicourts.
gov/app/raw/002075.html). In 2005, he received a second
consensual public reprimand. Public Reprimand of Scott F.
Anderson, No. 2005-06 (electronic copy available at
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/001776.html). In 2010,
Attorney Anderson's license to practice law was suspended for 60
days as a sanction for professional misconduct that included
failing to file claims timely and failing to take action on his
client's behalf; failing to respond to his client's reasonable
requests for information and failing to communicate case
developments to his client in a timely manner. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Anderson, 2010 WI 39, 324
Wis. 2d 627, 782 N.W.2d 100.
¶3 On September 26, 2018, the Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) filed a complaint alleging ten counts of misconduct
arising out of two client matters. The first client matter
detailed in the complaint arose out of Attorney Anderson's
2
No. 2018AP1837-D
representation of D.J., who faced felony charges in two separate
Racine County cases. On March 11, 2016, the State Public
Defender's Office (SPD) appointed Attorney Anderson to represent
D.J. in both cases. At that time, a status conference in one
case and a preliminary hearing in the second case had been
scheduled for March 24, 2016.
¶4 On or about March 15, 2016, Attorney Anderson filed a
Demand For Discovery and Inspection with the district attorney.
Attorney Anderson did not send a copy of the discovery demand to
D.J. On March 18, 2016, the SPD informed Attorney Anderson that
D.J. requested to see him prior to the March 24, 2016 status
conference and preliminary hearing. Attorney Anderson did not
meet with D.J. D.J. was in court on March 24, 2016. The court
held the scheduled hearings in both cases and set a pretrial
conference for May 6, 2016. The pretrial conference was later
rescheduled to June 10, 2016.
¶5 Attorney Anderson met with D.J. on April 25, 2016, for
about 1 1/2 hours. On May 17 and June 3, 2016, the SPD informed
Attorney Anderson about D.J.'s growing concern with the lack of
communication from Attorney Anderson. Attorney Anderson was
informed by the SPD that D.J. wanted to see him prior to the
June 10, 2016, pretrial conference. Attorney Anderson had no
communication with D.J. between his April 25, 2016 visit and the
June 10, 2016 pretrial conference. D.J. was not produced for
the June 10, 2016 pretrial, and Attorney Anderson did not inform
him what occurred at the pretrial conference.
3
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶6 D.J. contacted the SPD to learn what had happened at
the June 10, 2016 pretrial conference, to express his continued
dissatisfaction with the lack of communication from Attorney
Anderson, and to raise the possibility of Attorney Anderson's
replacement due to his failure to timely inform D.J. about the
status of his case. On June 13, 2016, the SPD emailed Attorney
Anderson about D.J.'s concerns and asked Attorney Anderson to
meet with D.J.
¶7 On June 17, 2016, Attorney Anderson advised D.J. of
his status conference scheduled for August 9, 2016. Attorney
Anderson did not communicate or meet with D.J. between June 17
and August 8, 2016. In a July 27, 2016 letter to Attorney
Anderson, D.J. expressed his frustration with the lack of
communication, asked about the status of the discovery demand,
requested an in-person meeting, and again raised the possibility
of Attorney Anderson's withdrawal.
¶8 On August 8, 2016, Attorney Anderson met with D.J. for
an hour. D.J. requested that Attorney Anderson file three
separate motions, and he requested that Attorney Anderson file a
Miranda-Goodchild motion or otherwise challenge, via
interlocutory appeal, the circuit court's earlier ruling
permitting the use of D.J.'s statements at trial. Finally, D.J.
requested Attorney Anderson have an investigator interview two
witnesses and obtain the co-defendant's plea/cooperation
agreement.
¶9 Other than the demand for discovery filed on March 15,
2016, Attorney Anderson never filed any motions or appeals on
4
No. 2018AP1837-D
D.J.'s behalf. Until October 11, 2016, Attorney Anderson did
not explain to D.J. why he had not filed any motions or appeals.
Attorney Anderson never had witnesses interviewed and never
obtained a copy of the co-defendant's plea/cooperation
agreement.
¶10 At the August 9, 2016 status conference, the circuit
court set a final pretrial date for October 17, 2016, and it
scheduled the jury trial for November 1, 2016. Between August
9, 2016, and October 4, 2016, Attorney Anderson had no
communication with D.J. and took no action to prepare the case.
¶11 In August 2016, D.J. requested Attorney Anderson to
timely respond as to whether he had filed the requested motions
concerning discovery, the suppression of evidence, and the
Miranda-Goodchild motion. D.J. inquired whether an investigator
had interviewed witnesses or if the co-defendant's video
statement had been reviewed. Attorney Anderson did not respond.
¶12 On September 18, 2016, D.J. filed his own motion
requesting that the court "withdraw legal counsel."
¶13 On October 11, 2016, Attorney Anderson informed D.J.
he would not file any of the motions. Previously, Attorney
Anderson had never discussed with D.J. why he did not file any
of the motions D.J. had requested.
¶14 At the October 17, 2016 final pretrial conference,
D.J.'s request to have Attorney Anderson removed was denied. On
October 18, 2016, Attorney Anderson forwarded D.J. a plea offer
which expired on October 28, 2016. Attorney Anderson promised
to meet with D.J. "to discuss it and all other matters."
5
No. 2018AP1837-D
Attorney Anderson did not communicate or meet with D.J. between
October 18 and October 28, 2016.
¶15 On October 20, 2016, due to Attorney Anderson's lack
of communication and diligence, D.J. attempted to negotiate a
plea directly with the district attorney. On October 28, 2016,
D.J. again unsuccessfully requested the circuit court to appoint
a new attorney.
¶16 On October 30, 2016, Attorney Anderson reviewed the
transcript from D.J.'s Miranda-Goodchild hearing. On October
31, 2016, the day before trial, Attorney Anderson finally
requested from the district attorney any plea/cooperation
agreement of the co-defendant, asked to compare discovery, and
informed the district attorney he would be filing a motion to
withdraw.
¶17 On November 1, 2016, D.J. entered a no contest plea in
one of the Racine County cases. Attorney Anderson withdrew as
D.J.'s counsel prior to sentencing.
¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of
misconduct with respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of
D.J.:
Count 1: By failing to timely consult with D.J. about
the Miranda-Goodchild motion or interlocutory appeal,
by failing to timely advise D.J. he would not file the
requested motions or interview witnesses, and by
failing to timely consult with D.J. about additional
discovery D.J. believed to be outstanding, Attorney
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).1
1SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished."
6
No. 2018AP1837-D
Count 2: By failing to timely communicate with D.J.
on defense strategy and the status of D.J.'s case,
Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).2
Count 3: By failing to timely respond to D.J.'s
reasonable requests for information, Attorney Anderson
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).3
Count 4: By failing to diligently follow up with the
district attorney regarding his discovery demand, by
failing to timely review the transcript from D.J.'s
Miranda-Goodchild hearing so as to provide D.J. an
informed opinion on the merits of refiling the
Miranda-Goodchild motion or pursuing an interlocutory
appeal, and by failing to timely request the co-
defendant's plea/cooperation agreement, Attorney
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.3. 4
¶19 The remaining counts of misconduct detailed in the
OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Anderson's representation
of J.H., who had been charged with first-degree reckless injury
and attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Although
represented by the SPD, J.H. requested to proceed pro se. The
request was granted, and Attorney Anderson was appointed as
standby counsel to assist J.H. in his defense.
¶20 J.H. was also awaiting sentencing in another case in
which he had been charged with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, among other charges. Attorney Anderson was also
appointed as standby counsel in that case.
2SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides: "A lawyer shall keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter."
3SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides: "A lawyer shall promptly
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information."
4SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."
7
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶21 At the March 10, 2016 pretrial conference in the
homicide case, J.H. informed the court he had a handwritten
witness list, a discovery motion, a motion in limine, and one
other partially drafted motion he wanted to file that day. The
court specifically ordered Attorney Anderson to get J.H. the
discovery and assist him in filing "the motions and everything
that [J.H. needed] to get filed here." The court instructed
Attorney Anderson to get copies of the various motions to
everyone promptly.
¶22 Hearings for J.H.'s motions in the homicide case and
his sentencing in the firearm case were scheduled for April 15,
2016. On that date, J.H. was sentenced in the firearm case.
¶23 In the homicide case, between March 10 and April 15,
2016, Attorney Anderson did not prepare, file, or distribute
J.H.'s motions and witness list. Attorney Anderson acknowledged
on the record that he had received J.H.'s motions, and he said
he would have the documents prepared and filed within 10 days.
On April 22 and April 27, 2016, Attorney Anderson billed for
reviewing "Client Prepared Docs" and "Prep of Discovery Demand."
No motions were filed or ever prepared and given to J.H. for
review.
¶24 At the April 28, 2016 status conference in the
homicide case, a pretrial conference was scheduled for August 1,
and a jury trial was scheduled for August 29, 2016. On April
28, 2016, Attorney Anderson told J.H. he would visit him the
following week, but did not do so.
8
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶25 On May 5, 2016, the district attorney sent Attorney
Anderson six pages of additional discovery. Between May 5 and
August 1, 2016, Attorney Anderson did not provide J.H. with the
additional discovery, nor did he advise J.H. he had received it.
¶26 On May 17, 2016, J.H. informed Attorney Anderson he
had the ability to prepare the motions and witness list himself,
and he asked Attorney Anderson to return his handwritten
documents. J.H. also requested "a letter stating that I am on a
deadline for any motions that I will file." J.H. said he needed
the deadline letter "as soon as possible" to acquire time in the
prison's law library to prepare his various motions. J.H. also
asked Attorney Anderson to prepare a "petition" permitting him
to "colloquy" with all witnesses, which witnesses J.H. believed
would be subpoenaed by the court. Attorney Anderson did not
respond to J.H.'s letter, did not prepare the motions, did not
return the handwritten documents, and did not provide J.H. with
the deadline letter. Attorney Anderson took no action on J.H.'s
case between May 25 and August 1, 2016. On June 2, 2016, J.H.
again requested return of the handwritten documents and the
deadline letter, and he requested that Attorney Anderson visit
him. Attorney Anderson did not respond.
¶27 On June 12, 2016, J.H. contacted the Milwaukee County
Clerk of Court requesting information about the deadline for
filing his motions, and he was told to contact his standby
counsel. On June 17, 2016, J.H. contacted Attorney Anderson for
the filing deadline letter so he could prepare his motions.
Attorney Anderson did not respond.
9
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶28 On June 21, 2016, J.H. provided Attorney Anderson with
drafts of several motions and an alibi statement. J.H. wanted
Attorney Anderson to file the motions because his access to the
law library had been denied due to his not receiving the
deadline letter. Attorney Anderson did not respond to J.H. and
did not file the motions.
¶29 On July 11, 2016, J.H. filed a second request for
discovery, seeking the same documents Attorney Anderson had
received from the district attorney on May 5, 2016.
¶30 At the August 1, 2016 pretrial conference, J.H.
informed the court he still had not received all of the
discovery and requested the dismissal of Attorney Anderson. The
assistant district attorney informed the court the discovery had
been given to Attorney Anderson on May 5, 2016. The OLR alleged
that Attorney Anderson falsely represented to the court the
discovery had been sent to J.H. J.H.'s request to dismiss
Attorney Anderson was denied, and a final pretrial conference
was scheduled for August 25, 2016.
¶31 On or about August 14, 2016, J.H. requested that
Attorney Anderson draft and file a motion regarding witness
identification. Attorney Anderson did not respond to the
letter, take the requested action, or advise J.H. why the action
might be unwarranted.
¶32 Attorney Anderson never issued subpoenas for J.H.'s
witnesses, nor did he advise J.H. how to subpoena the witnesses
himself.
10
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶33 J.H. was not produced for the August 25, 2016 final
pretrial conference. J.H. filed five motions on the morning of
the trial. The circuit court commented that J.H. had had since
May 2016 to file the motions. Attorney Anderson failed to
disclose to the court that his lack of diligence prevented
J.H.'s motions and witness list from being timely filed. The
court denied J.H.'s motion to subpoena his witnesses as
untimely. Attorney Anderson denied he ever received J.H.'s
witness list.
¶34 On September 1, 2016, J.H. was convicted, and
sentencing was scheduled for September 27, 2016. At the
sentencing hearing, Attorney Anderson requested to withdraw.
J.H. asserted Attorney Anderson misrepresented information to
the court and said that on March 10, 2016 he had given Attorney
Anderson numerous motions and a witness list to file. Attorney
Anderson denied he was " . . . even on the case" at that time,
even though he had been appointed on March 10, 2016.
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of
misconduct with respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of
J.H.:
Count 5: As standby counsel, by failing to advance
J.H.'s interests in timely preparing and filing J.H.'s
motions, by failing to file J.H.'s witness list, by
failing to provide J.H. with the motion deadline
letter to facilitate J.H.'s use of the prison library,
and by failing to timely provide J.H. with the
discovery documents he received in May 2016, Attorney
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.3.
11
No. 2018AP1837-D
Count 6: By failing to inform J.H. that he had
received additional discovery documents in May 2016,
Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).
Count 7: By failing to timely respond to J.H.'s
reasonable requests for information regarding this
case, Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).
Count 8: By failing to advise J.H. he did not intend
to file any motions, failing to advise J.H. on the
legitimacy of any of the requested motions and failing
to advise J.H. on the defense's obligations and the
procedures to subpoena a witness for trial, so as to
allow J.H., in each instance, to make informed
decisions about the defense of his case, Attorney
Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(b).5
Count 9: By making false and misleading statements to
the court about having provided all discovery
materials to J.H., about draft filings J.H. had given
to him and by stating to the court he wasn't on the
case on March 10, 2016, Attorney Anderson violated
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).6
Count 10: By making false and misleading statements
to the OLR about his receipt of discovery materials,
about having provided all discovery materials to J.H.,
and about his receipt of motions from J.H., Attorney
5 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."
6 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
12
No. 2018AP1837-D
Anderson violated SCR 22.03(6),7, enforceable via
SCR 20:8.4(h).8
¶36 The referee was appointed on December 7, 2018.
Attorney Anderson filed an answer to the OLR's complaint on
December 18, 2018. A three-day evidentiary hearing was held in
December 2019.
¶37 In her report, the referee found that the OLR had met
its burden of proof as to counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 7.
The referee found that the OLR did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Attorney Anderson failed to diligently
follow up with the assistant district attorney about the
discovery demand in D.J.'s case, failed to timely review the
transcript of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing or pursue an
interlocutory appeal on that matter, or failed to timely request
the co-defendant's plea/cooperation agreement. The referee
found that prior to trial, Attorney Anderson had continued
negotiations and discussions with the assistant district
attorney on D.J.'s case and had reviewed the transcript from the
7SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the
investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted
in the grievance."
8SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6),
or SCR 22.04(1)."
13
No. 2018AP1837-D
earlier Miranda-Goodchild hearing. The referee noted that
Attorney Anderson asserted the motions requested by D.J. were
not necessary or appropriate.
¶38 With respect to Attorney Anderson's representation of
J.H., the referee noted that Attorney Anderson was appointed
standby counsel only, and she pointed out Wisconsin has not
specifically addressed the issue of whether standby counsel owes
an ethical obligation to the defendant he or she is assisting.
The referee said it seems logical that a limited attorney-client
relationship was formed when J.H. asked Attorney Anderson to
perform certain tasks and when the circuit court asked Attorney
Anderson to be prepared to take over J.H.'s defense at trial if
requested to do so. The referee reasoned that in order to
accomplish those tasks, Attorney Anderson would have to act with
diligence so that he could be informed about the case prior to
trial and communicate with J.H. about the tasks that were
requested.
¶39 The referee found that Attorney Anderson did not
violate Supreme Court Rules when he failed to inform J.H. about
how to subpoena witnesses or when he failed to send additional
discovery documents to J.H. since those discovery documents were
already in J.H.'s possession and there was no evidence presented
indicating the documents were important to help J.H. prepare his
case for trial. The referee said that J.H. had already received
discovery from prior counsel, who had prepared the case for
trial before having to withdraw. The referee also noted that
14
No. 2018AP1837-D
J.H. had received a complete set of discovery at the pretrial
conference.
¶40 The referee agreed with the OLR that Attorney Anderson
failed to communicate with both of his clients. The referee
said the record was replete with letters that both D.J. and J.H.
sent to Attorney Anderson desperately seeking information about
their cases. Both clients wrote to Attorney Anderson and asked
to meet with him on several occasions. They wrote asking about
specific motions they wanted filed, and Attorney Anderson
ignored most of those letters and requests for information.
While Attorney Anderson acknowledged he could have been better
at communicating, he said that often the information sought by
the clients was not particularly important. The referee said,
"by failing to report to his clients the status of their cases,
even to simply to report that there was no new information, his
clients were left to wonder what was happening in their cases,
often resulting in even more questions and correspondence."
¶41 The referee said even when Attorney Anderson did
communicate with his clients about trial and defense strategies,
the communication was often not effective. The referee said the
lack of communication was especially harmful to J.H. because he
was trying to represent himself and needed Attorney Anderson's
assistance. The referee said both clients had significant
interests at stake in their cases, and J.H. was facing life in
prison, so the clients understandably wanted a lawyer who would
help them, fight for them, and take their cases seriously, which
15
No. 2018AP1837-D
required an attorney who would listen and respond to them.
Attorney Anderson failed to do so.
¶42 The referee found that the OLR did not meet its burden
of proving that Attorney Anderson made misrepresentations to the
circuit court in J.H.'s case. While the OLR asserted that
Attorney Anderson falsely informed the circuit court he had
given all the discovery to J.H. when in fact he did not send
J.H. the inventory control sheets he had received from the
assistant district attorney, the referee said that Attorney
Anderson testified that J.H. had already received all of the
discovery in the case from prior counsel including the inventory
control sheets. The referee said there was no evidence that
Attorney Anderson was knowingly trying to mislead the circuit
court, and although he arguably could have been clearer in
explaining the specifics of the discovery J.H. had received,
that alone did not demonstrate a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
¶43 With respect to the appropriate sanction, the referee
noted that the OLR sought a 120-day license suspension, while
Attorney Anderson argued for a public reprimand. The referee
concluded that a 30-day license suspension was an appropriate
sanction. She said Attorney Anderson's conduct was
disrespectful and unprofessional, causing his clients
unnecessary concern and distress. The referee also said
Attorney Anderson exhibited a pattern of failing to communicate
with clients, and a license suspension was appropriate to
impress upon him that his conduct is unacceptable and needs to
16
No. 2018AP1837-D
be corrected. The referee found as a mitigating factor that
Attorney Anderson has accepted responsibility for his conduct.
The referee also noted that Attorney Anderson works in a
difficult environment representing indigent defendants in high
stakes criminal cases. She said she was confident that a 30-day
suspension would give Attorney Anderson time to reflect and
adjust his practice to ensure he will better respond to his
clients' needs in the future.
¶44 We adopt the referee's findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to Attorney Anderson's professional
misconduct. As to the appropriate sanction, we conclude that a
60-day suspension, rather than the 30-day suspension recommended
by the referee, is an appropriate sanction.
¶45 With rare exceptions, this court has adhered to a
policy of imposing a minimum license suspension of 60 days. See
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2009 WI 38, ¶38,
317 Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775; In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994); In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schnitzler, 140 Wis. 2d 574,
577-78, 412 N.W.2d 124 (1987). ("We conclude that a minimum 60-
day period of suspension serves the needs of the public and of
the legal system when a lawyer's license is suspended for
disciplinary reasons.") We see no reason to depart from that
general policy here, particularly since this is the fifth
occasion on which Attorney Anderson is being sanctioned for
professional misconduct, and he has already received one 60-day
suspension.
17
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶46 Wisconsin generally adheres to the idea of progressive
discipline. As the referee appropriately noted, it has been 10
years since Attorney Anderson's previous 60-day suspension;
however, the 2010 suspension involved misconduct that was
similar in many respects to the misconduct at issue here:
failure to respond to his client's reasonable requests for
information and to communicate case developments to his client
in a timely manner. Although the referee found that Attorney
Anderson has expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for
his conduct, it does not appear that he took the lessons of the
2010 suspension to heart. If the previous suspension were not a
decade old, we may well have considered a suspension longer than
60 days. Under the circumstances, we conclude that a suspension
shorter than 60 days would unduly depreciate the nature of the
misconduct.
¶47 Finally, as is our normal practice, we find it
appropriate to assess the full costs of the proceeding against
Attorney Anderson. The OLR does not seek restitution and we
impose none.
¶48 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Scott F. Anderson to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days,
effective December 9, 2020.
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Scott F. Anderson pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $19,339.98 as
of June 11, 2020.
18
No. 2018AP1837-D
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott F. Anderson shall
comply with SCR 22.26 regarding the duties of a person whose
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.
19
No. 2018AP1837-D
1