State v. Anthony James Jendusa

2021 WI 24SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2018AP2357-LV
COMPLETE TITLE: In the matter of the commitment of:
State of Wisconsin,
Petitioner-Petitioner,
v.
Anthony James Jendusa,
Respondent-Respondent.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OPINION FILED: March 10, 2021
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: October 26, 2020
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: Joseph R. Wall
JUSTICES:
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK,
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the petitioner-petitioner, there were briefs filed by
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general; with whom on the
briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer.
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Dustin C. Haskell assistant state public defender. There was an
oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell.
2021 WI 24NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2018AP2357-LV
(L.C. No. 2016CI5)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the matter of the commitment of:
State of Wisconsin, FILED
Petitioner-Petitioner, MAR 10, 2021
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Anthony James Jendusa,
Respondent-Respondent.
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK,
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
REVIEW of an order of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed and
cause remanded.
¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. Anthony Jendusa seeks
discovery of a Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC)
database in an effort to challenge the sexually violent person
commitment proceeding initiated against him over four years ago.
Jendusa believes that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provides
a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of
No. 2018AP2357-LV
engaging in future acts of sexual violence——a calculation that
may result in a lower estimate of his risk than that advanced by
the State's expert witness. He argues that the database is
discoverable pursuant to both Wis. Stat. § 980.036 (2019-20)1 and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
interpreted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The State
disagrees with Jendusa's interpretation of § 980.036 and the
applicability of Brady. It further argues that disclosing the
DOC database may violate state and federal health-privacy laws.
¶2 This case comes before us as a review of the court of
appeals' denial of the State's petition for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's discovery order.2 We
hold that the court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its
discretion in denying that petition. We nevertheless reach the
underlying merits of that petition and conclude that the DOC
database is discoverable pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5).
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' order and further
conclude that the circuit court did not err when it granted
Jendusa's discovery request. We remand the cause to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.
2 State v. Jendusa, No. 2018AP2357-LV, unpublished order
(Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2019) (denying the State's petition for
leave to appeal a non-final order of the Circuit Court for
Milwaukee County, the Honorable Joseph R. Wall presiding).
2
No. 2018AP2357-LV
I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In December 2016, the State petitioned to commit
Jendusa as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat.
ch. 980. At the probable cause hearing, Dr. Christopher Tyre, a
licensed psychologist employed by the DOC, testified that
Jendusa met the statutory definition of a sexually violent
person.3 Dr. Tyre stated that he assessed Jendusa's likelihood
of engaging in one or more future acts of sexual violence over
Jendusa's lifetime using the Static-99 and Static-99R
assessments (as informed by the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex
Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) and the Sex Offender Treatment
Intervention and Progress Scale (SOTIPS)).4 Dr. Tyre reported
3 "Sexually violent person" is defined as one "who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . and who is
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that
makes it likely that the person will engage in one or more acts
of sexual violence." Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). "Likely," in
turn, means "more likely than not," § 980.01(1m), which courts
interpret to mean the person has a more than 50-percent chance
of engaging in a future act of sexual violence over his or her
lifetime. See State v. Richard, 2011 WI App 66, ¶3, 333
Wis. 2d 708, 799 N.W.2d 509 (citing State v. Smalley, 2007
WI App 219, ¶¶3, 10, 305 Wis. 2d 709, 741 N.W.2d 286).
4 Sex-offender risk assessments generally fall into two
categories: those that measure "static" risk factors, and those
that measure "dynamic" risk factors. The Static-99, the Static-
99R, and the RRASOR are static assessments. The RRASOR assesses
recidivism based on sexual deviance; the Static-99 and
Static-99R consider six additional risk factors to assess
recidivism based on a more general criminal or antisocial
disposition. Dr. Tyre testified that because the Static-99
instruments measure a person's general antisocial disposition,
there is a potential for "noise" in estimating the more
particularized likelihood of committing a future act of sexual
violence. He explained that the RRASOR, with its sexual
deviance focus, helps him address that "noise."
3
No. 2018AP2357-LV
his conclusions in his Special Purpose Evaluation, which was
received into evidence.5
¶4 According to Dr. Tyre, each assessment is based on the
same foundational method. Researchers observed several groups
of sex offenders after their release to see whether they
recidivated.6 The proportion of those who recidivated provided
the researchers with a "base rate," or the general likelihood of
re-offense across the studied population. For the Static-99,
The SOTIPS assesses dynamic risk. Dynamic risk assessments
attempt to adjust the static assessments' estimated likelihood
of future sexual violence by accounting for fluid behavioral
factors, such as adjustment to supervision, self-management,
compliance within an institutional setting, and continued sexual
interests or deviance.
5During the roughly three months between the initial
detention order and the subsequent probable cause hearing,
Dr. Tyre twice updated his Special Purpose Evaluation. Neither
update changed the substance of his conclusion that Jendusa met
the statutory criteria for civil commitment as a sexually
violent person.
6For purposes of the actuarial risk assessments,
"recidivism" is defined as an arrest or conviction for a new sex
offense within a specified time period of 5, 10, or 15 years.
In the ch. 980 context, this definition is imperfect. On the
one hand, the risk assessments underestimate the likelihood of
future sexual violence because numerous sex offenses go
unreported or uncharged and because a ch. 980 commitment is
based on an offender's lifetime risk. On the other hand, this
definition overestimates the likelihood of future sexual
violence because it encompasses sex offenses beyond the narrower
subset of "sexually violent offense[s]" relevant to ch. 980.
See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6). For these reasons, this opinion
differentiates between a "re-offense," which, like recidivism,
refers to a subsequent arrest or conviction for a sex offense,
and a "future act of sexual violence," which encapsulates all
statutorily defined sexually violent offenses regardless of
whether they are reported or result in a criminal complaint.
4
No. 2018AP2357-LV
which studied Canadian and Danish offenders, the researchers
observed that a small subset of the studied groups recidivated
at a higher rate despite similar risk factor scores as those in
the other groups. To account for this variability, the
researchers divided the groups into two comparison
"norms": "routine" and "high-risk/high-needs." Each norm has
its own base rate, with the high-risk/high-needs norm's base
rate being the higher of the two.
¶5 In order to assess an individual using one of these
instruments, an examiner first determines the norm, and thus the
base rate, that is the most apt comparison for the individual.
The examiner then numerically scores the individual based on the
presence and severity of certain risk factors that have been
found to correlate positively with sexual recidivism. The sum
of those scores places the individual into a risk category. The
examiner then cross-references that risk category with the
selected norm's base rate to calculate a range of "absolute"
recidivism rates. These "absolute" rates purport to predict the
likelihood that the assessed individual will commit another sex
offense over future periods of time (e.g., in the next five or
ten years).
¶6 Dr. Tyre testified that he assigned Jendusa the
high-risk/high-needs norm and that Jendusa's total scores placed
him in the high-moderate risk category on the RRASOR assessment
and in the above-average risk category on the two Static-99
assessments. Applying those risk categories to the high-
5
No. 2018AP2357-LV
risk/high-needs norm's base rate, Dr. Tyre predicted that
Jendusa has the following absolute recidivism rates:
 52 percent over 15 years (according to the
Static-99);
 33 to 37 percent over ten years (according to the
Static-99R); and
 17 to 25 percent over five years (according to
the Static-99R).
Dr. Tyre stated that Jendusa's score on the SOTIPS, which
additionally considered several of Jendusa's dynamic risk
factors, indicated that Jendusa's absolute recidivism rate was
likely slightly higher than that estimated by the Static-99 and
Static-99R. Dr. Tyre also acknowledged that certain mitigating
factors, such as Jendusa's age (51 years old) and his
participation in sex-offender programming, slightly reduced
Jendusa's likelihood to engage in future acts of sexual
violence; yet Dr. Tyre ultimately concluded that Jendusa is more
likely than not to engage in a future act of sexual violence.
¶7 On cross-examination, Dr. Tyre revealed that the DOC
maintains a Wisconsin-specific database of individuals that it
has evaluated for sexually violent person commitments and that
he was in the beginning stages of analyzing this data. Dr. Tyre
testified that nearly two years prior, one of his colleagues had
emailed him the preliminary results of that analysis, including
a Wisconsin-specific base rate, but Dr. Tyre claimed he had not
6
No. 2018AP2357-LV
yet reviewed that email.7 Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the
Wisconsin-specific base rate could be lower than the base rates
in the Static-99 or Static-99R, and that a lower base rate may
affect his assessment of Jendusa's likelihood to engage in a
future act of sexual violence.
¶8 Based on Dr. Tyre's evaluation, the circuit court
found probable cause to believe that Jendusa is a sexually
violent person, ordered the DOC to detain him, and bound him
over for trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.04(3).
¶9 Jendusa then moved the circuit court to order the DOC
to disclose its database so that he could have an expert analyze
the Wisconsin-specific base rate citing Wis. Stat.
§ 980.036(2)(h), (2)(j), and (5), as well as the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Jendusa argued that the database is potentially exculpatory
evidence——it either tends to show he does not meet the
commitment criteria or impeaches Dr. Tyre's evaluation——because
the Wisconsin-specific base rate may be lower than the base
rates Dr. Tyre employed to evaluate him. Application of a lower
Wisconsin-specific base rate, in turn, could result in a
7Nearly two years prior to the hearing, Dr. Tyre's co-
researcher compared the names of the offenders in the DOC
database against Wisconsin court records in the Consolidated
Court Automation Programs and produced a de-identified database
containing information on who recidivated and their respective
scores on various actuarial instruments. For purposes of this
opinion, "de-identified" means that all personally identifying
information, such as an individual's name and birthdate, is
removed.
7
No. 2018AP2357-LV
predicted lifetime recidivism risk below 50 percent, undermining
the State's contention that Jendusa is "likely" to engage in
future acts of sexual violence. Jendusa also argued that the
database was exculpatory impeachment material because a
Wisconsin-specific base rate may better capture unique cultural
and social features not present in the Canadian and Danish
samples represented in the Static-99.8
¶10 The State opposed disclosure on three grounds. It
first argued that the database is not in the State's
"possession" because it is in the DOC's possession. Second, the
State argued that the database itself cannot be exculpatory
since only an analysis of that data could reveal a different
base rate, which may or may not be lower than the one used by
Dr. Tyre. The State argued that therefore there is no statutory
or constitutional requirement to disclose the data itself.
Finally, the State claimed that Jendusa has an adequate
alternative remedy via a research request pursuant to the DOC's
Executive Directive #36 ("Directive #36"), "Human Subject
Research Requests Process and Procedure." See https://doc.wi.go
v/DataResearch/ConductingResearch/WIDOCExecutiveDirective36.pdf.
The State maintained that because Directive #36 was developed in
See R. Karl Hanson et al., What Sexual Recidivism Rates
8
Are Associated with Static-99R and Static-2002R Scores?, 28
Sexual Abuse: J. Rsch. & Treatment 218, 241 (2015)
(recommending that evaluators use "local STATIC norms" because
they "can account for the unique cultural and social features of
a specific jurisdiction").
8
No. 2018AP2357-LV
accordance with state and federal health-privacy laws, it is the
exclusive means of accessing such sensitive "medical" data.
¶11 In fact, Jendusa had requested the data under
Directive #36, but to no avail. The DOC's Research Review
Committee approved his request, but later communications between
Jendusa and the DOC's lead research analyst indicated that the
DOC was confused about which database Jendusa had requested.
Their correspondence also revealed that the lead research
analyst was working with Dr. Tyre to identify the database.
Eventually, the DOC told Jendusa that he had to sign a
memorandum of understanding before it could transfer any data to
him and that it was in the process of drafting that memorandum.
The DOC never forwarded that memorandum, and it has yet to
transfer the database to him.
¶12 Jendusa similarly encountered obstacles in court.
After learning that Dr. Tyre had received a preliminary analysis
of a Wisconsin-specific base rate, Jendusa requested by subpoena
duces tecum that Dr. Tyre produce the database and the
preliminary analysis.9 The State made no attempt to quash the
subpoena; yet, on the advice of the DOC's counsel, Dr. Tyre
appeared at the motion hearing without the database or the
preliminary analysis.
¶13 The circuit court then ordered Dr. Tyre to "personally
open and read the spreadsheet containing de-identified
A subpoena duces tecum is a request that the witness
9
produce not only himself or herself for live testimony but also
certain physical evidence.
9
No. 2018AP2357-LV
recidivism data," "familiarize himself with the contents of that
file and be prepared to testify about said contents," and "bring
a copy of the aforementioned de-identified file so as to refer
to the file if need be." Dr. Tyre, again on the advice of the
DOC's counsel but without objecting to the circuit court's
order, did not bring the de-identified database to court. He
did, however, review the database and his colleague's
preliminary analysis. He testified that roughly 7 percent of
the 913 Wisconsin sex offenders in the database were convicted
of a new sex offense. That number, according to Dr. Tyre,
required additional follow-up and refinement to verify. Still,
Dr. Tyre confirmed that this preliminary base rate was roughly
one-third of the base rate he relied on to predict Jendusa's
recidivism risk.
¶14 After hearing Dr. Tyre's testimony, the circuit court
ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to
Jendusa so that Dr. David Thornton, the court-appointed
psychologist and co-creator of the Static-99, could analyze it.
Dr. Thornton's role was limited to analyzing the data to
"determine recidivism information." The circuit court stayed
its order pending resolution of the State's petition for leave
to appeal that non-final order. The court of appeals denied the
State's petition, stating only that the petition "fails to
satisfy the criteria for permissive appeal." State v. Jendusa,
No. 2018AP2357-LV, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. July 16,
2019).
10
No. 2018AP2357-LV
¶15 We granted review of the court of appeals' denial of
the State's petition for interlocutory appeal and further
directed the parties to address the underlying substantive
issues related to the circuit court's discovery order.10
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 We review for an erroneous exercise of discretion the
court of appeals' denial of the State's petition for
interlocutory appeal. See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2); Leavitt v.
Beverly Enters., Inc., 2010 WI 71, ¶42, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784
N.W.2d 683. The court of appeals erroneously exercises its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or makes a
decision not reasonably supported by the facts of record. See
State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60.
¶17 We review de novo the circuit court's interpretation
and application of Wis. Stat. § 980.036 as the basis for
ordering the disclosure of the DOC database. See Moreschi v.
Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 95, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953
N.W.2d 318.
III. ANALYSIS
¶18 We begin by reaffirming our longstanding and sound
practice of typically not reviewing the court of appeals'
We asked the parties to address whether the DOC database
10
was discoverable on grounds outside of Wis. Stat. ch. 980,
including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We also
directed the parties to brief the applicability of Wisconsin and
federal health-privacy laws. Because we uphold the discovery
order under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), we do not address these
additional questions.
11
No. 2018AP2357-LV
discretionary denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal.
Additionally, we clarify that the court of appeals need not
explain why it denied leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
Although we conclude that the court of appeals did not err in
denying the State's petition for interlocutory appeal, we
address the merits of that appeal and determine that the DOC
database is "raw data" that is discoverable under Wis. Stat.
§ 980.036(5).
A. Review of Interlocutory Appeal Denials
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) governs appeals from
non-final orders:
(2) Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if
it determines that an appeal will:
(a) Materially advance the termination of the
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the
litigation;
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or
irreparable injury; or
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the
administration of justice.
The plain language of § 808.03(2) entrusts to the court of
appeals discretion over interlocutory appeals. As a matter of
12
No. 2018AP2357-LV
well-settled practice,11 we respect this legislative choice by
generally not reviewing a court of appeals' decision to decline
a petition for interlocutory appeal. See Leavitt, 326
Wis. 2d 421, ¶47.
¶20 There are several sound reasons for this practice. To
do otherwise would "divest" the court of appeals of a power
explicitly "entrusted to it" by the legislature. Id. (quoting
Aparacor, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 404, 293 N.W.2d 545(1980)). Moreover, by affording litigants two opportunities to
seek leave to appeal non-final orders, we would encourage more
interlocutory appellate practice. Such a practice would
undermine the two purposes of Wis. Stat. § 808.03: "(1) to
11This court has jurisdiction to review a denial of leave
to file an interlocutory appeal under both the Wisconsin
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 808.10(1). See Leavitt v. Beverly
Enters., Inc., 2010 WI 71, ¶46, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784 N.W.2d 683("[T]he Wisconsin Constitution provides that we have 'appellate
jurisdiction over all courts' and we 'may review judgments and
orders of the court of appeals.'" (quoting Wis. Const. art. VII,
§ 3(2)-(3))); see also § 808.10(1) ("A decision of the court of
appeals is reviewable by the supreme court only upon a petition
for review granted by the supreme court."). We acknowledge that
language from our cases decided shortly after the creation of
the court of appeals might be read to mean this court lacks
jurisdiction to review such denials. See Aparacor, Inc. v.
DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 403–04, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980) ("Where the
court of appeals denies permission to appeal from an order
conceded by the parties to be nonfinal, no review by this court
is permitted."); State v. Whitty, 86 Wis. 2d 380, 388, 272
N.W.2d 842 (1978); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 77 n.2, 97D,
288 N.W.2d 114 (1980), modified per curiam on reconsideration,
94 Wis. 2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980). As we clarified in
Leavitt, however, this "strong" language is not a jurisdictional
holding but rather an endorsement of our practice of not
reviewing denials of petitions for interlocutory appeal.
Leavitt, 326 Wis. 2d 421, ¶¶45-47.
13
No. 2018AP2357-LV
protect the trial proceedings by avoiding unnecessary
interruptions and delay caused by multiple appeals[;] and (2) to
reduce the burden on the court of appeals by limiting the number
of appeals to one appeal per case and allowing piecemeal appeals
only under the special circumstances set forth in
[§] 808.03(2)." Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 395–96, 294
N.W.2d 15 (1980). Given these considerable disadvantages, we
reaffirm that this court will generally not review the court of
appeals' denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal.12
The court has routinely declined to encroach upon the
12
court of appeals' discretion regarding certain classes of
interlocutory appeals despite compelling reasons to do so. See
Lassa v. Rongstad, 2006 WI 105, ¶¶84-89, 294 Wis. 2d 187, 718
N.W.2d 673 (declining to require the court of appeals to
categorically grant petitions for interlocutory appeal regarding
discovery orders in defamation cases even where constitutional
privileges are implicated); State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. Ct. of
Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707 (same
regarding denied motions for issue or claim preclusion based on
a final federal judgment despite federal-state court comity
concerns); Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 97A n.1 (as modified per
curiam on reconsideration) (same regarding denied motions to
dismiss based on double jeopardy, despite the substantial and
irreparable harm of subjecting a defendant to an unlawful second
trial).
This court has directed the court of appeals to grant
petitions for interlocutory appeal as a matter of course
pursuant to our constitutional superintending power in only one
circumstance: qualified immunity. See Arneson v.
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996). We reached
that conclusion on exceptionally strong grounds: denial of
those petitions for interlocutory appeal would result in no
adequate remedy for the person seeking immunity and in the
potentially needless cost and hardship of litigating a case
where the defendant is ultimately immune from liability.
Id. at 226–30.
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No. 2018AP2357-LV
¶21 That conclusion also leads us to reject the parties'
request to extend State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 382 Wis. 2d 476,
914 N.W.2d 141. In Scott, we held that, in order to "facilitate
judicial review," the court of appeals must explain the reasons
for its discretionary decisions. Id., ¶¶38-41. But Scott's
rationale is inapposite here; when the court of appeals denies a
petition for interlocutory appeal, there generally is no
judicial review to facilitate. See Leavitt, 326 Wis. 2d 421,
¶47. And in the rare instance that we do review such denials,
we do so for larger policy considerations that transcend the
particulars of any one case and that are unrelated to any
reasons articulated by the court of appeals. See Arneson v.
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996). Therefore,
it is not necessary for the court of appeals to explain why it
denied a party leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
¶22 In this case, the court of appeals concluded "that the
petition fails to satisfy the criteria for permissive appeal,"
citing Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2). As § 808.03(2) is the correct
legal standard governing such decisions and the court of appeals
reasonably determined the petition did not satisfy those
criteria, we conclude that the court of appeals did not
erroneously exercise its discretion. See Avery, 345
Wis. 2d 407, ¶23.
B. The Discoverability of the DOC Database
¶23 We proceed with a de novo review of the circuit
court's order and interpret Wis. Stat. § 980.036 as it applies
to the DOC database. The general discovery provisions set forth
15
No. 2018AP2357-LV
in Wis. Stat. ch. 804 do not apply to a Wis. Stat. ch. 980
proceeding. Wis. Stat. § 980.036(11). In such a proceeding,
§ 980.036 provides the "only methods of obtaining discovery."
Id. Jendusa contends that the DOC database is discoverable
under the following three subsections of § 980.036:
(2) What a Prosecuting Attorney Must Disclose to a
Person Subject to this Chapter. Upon demand, a
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to a person
subject to this chapter or his or her attorney, and
permit the person subject to this chapter or his or
her attorney to inspect and copy or photograph, all of
the following materials and information, if the
material or information is within the possession,
custody, or control of the state:
. . .
(h) The results of any physical or mental
examination or any scientific or psychological
test, instrument, experiment, or comparison that
the prosecuting attorney intends to offer in
evidence at the trial or proceeding, and any raw
data that were collected, used, or considered in
any manner as part of the examination, test,
instrument, experiment, or comparison.
. . .
(j) Any exculpatory evidence.
. . .
(5) Testing or Analysis of Evidence. On motion of a
party, the court may order the production of any item
of evidence or raw data that is intended to be
introduced at the trial for testing or analysis under
such terms and conditions as the court prescribes.
¶24 We focus on the plain language of § 980.036. "If the
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the
inquiry." State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004
16
No. 2018AP2357-LV
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source
omitted). If not specially defined or technical, statutory
language "is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."
Id. We read statutory provisions in context rather than in
isolation and in a way that "avoid[s] absurd or unreasonable
results." Id., ¶46.
¶25 We begin with subsec. (5) because it is the broadest
provision. The first clause of subsec. (5), "[o]n motion of a
party," unambiguously applies to motions by either party. Here,
that clause was satisfied when Jendusa moved the circuit court
for the DOC database's disclosure.
¶26 The second clause, "the court may order the
production," indicates that if the requested item meets the
other criteria in subsec. (5), then the circuit court has
discretion to order its production. That is because we
traditionally interpret "may" as permissive, Waukesha Cnty. v.
S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶36, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140, and to
"impl[y] a discretionary element," Swatek v. Cnty. of Dane, 192
Wis. 2d 47, 59, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995). To that end, subsec. (5)
further empowers the circuit court to order the production of
applicable evidence "under such terms and conditions as the
court prescribes." Read together, these clauses afford the
circuit court wide discretion regarding not only whether a
requested item should be produced but also the manner and
conditions of its production.
¶27 Next, subsec. (5) covers only "item[s] of evidence" or
"raw data." Jendusa contends that the DOC database, at least in
17
No. 2018AP2357-LV
the format that he requests it, is raw data. "Data," according
to its dictionary definition,13 can mean "[f]actual information,
especially information organized for analysis or used to reason
or make decisions" or "information represented in a form
suitable for processing by computer." Data, The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 475 (3d ed. 1992).
The modifier "raw" signifies that the data has "[n]ot . . . been
subjected to adjustment, treatment, or analysis." Raw, American
Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1502. This dictionary definition
of "raw data" comports with the term's common use in the social
science research context as "information that is gathered for a
research study before that information has been transformed or
analyzed in any way."14 Raw Data, Encyclopedia of Survey
Research Methods (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008); see also Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(defining "raw data" as "wholly factual information not
accompanied by any original written expression").
¶28 The DOC database fits the definition of "raw data."
As it is described in the record, the database contains
unprocessed information, such as individuals' names and
13"[W]e may ascertain the term's plain and ordinary meaning
through sources such as dictionaries." E.g., State v. Hager,
2018 WI 40, ¶29, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17.
14"A court 'should assume the contextually appropriate
ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise.'"
State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53, ¶25, 347 Wis. 2d 683, 832
N.W.2d 101 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (2012)).
18
No. 2018AP2357-LV
birthdates, criminal histories, mental health diagnoses, and
scores on various actuarial assessments. That information is
organized by column, and an individual's unique numerical score
in each category is inputted in the intersecting row associated
with that individual. In this form, which is how Jendusa has
requested it, the data will not have been processed or analyzed.
Thus, this matrix of unprocessed, factual information
constitutes "raw data."
¶29 But while satisfying the definition of raw data is
necessary, it is not sufficient. The purview of subsec. (5)
extends only to raw data that is "intended to be introduced at
the trial." Unlike the neighboring subsecs. (2) and (3), both
of which speak to evidence that a specific party intends to
introduce, subsec. (5) contains no similar limitation. Thus,
subsec. (5) must apply to raw data that either party intends to
introduce at trial. See State v. A.L., 2019 WI 20, ¶17, 385
Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 827 ("When the legislature uses
different terms in a statute, the terms are presumed to have
distinct meanings.").
¶30 That leaves a final interpretive question: what does
it mean to intend to introduce raw data at trial? The State
suggests that because Jendusa did not intend to introduce only
the DOC's raw data, subsec. (5) does not apply. That reading is
overly formalistic and disregards the context of ch. 980. We
must instead interpret the plain language of subsec. (5) "in the
context in which it is used." See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.
In the ch. 980 context, raw data is data that informs an
19
No. 2018AP2357-LV
expert's analysis regarding the risk a respondent will engage in
future acts of sexual violence. But without that analysis, the
raw data alone has no probative value. Indeed, the language of
subsec. (5) reflects this reality in that it acknowledges the
purpose of requesting raw data is to subject it to "testing or
analysis." Thus, in the ch. 980 context, the only reasonable
reading of "raw data that is intended to be introduced at the
trial" is that the analysis of the raw data is intended to be
introduced.
¶31 Therefore, Jendusa's intent to introduce an analysis
of the DOC's raw data at trial satisfies the requirement in
subsec. (5) that he intend to introduce the raw data.15 Because
15 The State levels a cursory argument that, under Burnett
v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), the circuit court
can never order a court-appointed expert to perform an analysis
of data. This argument misunderstands the Alt privilege and
ignores the facts of this case. The Alt court announced that
experts have an implied legal privilege to refuse to provide
expert testimony. Id. at 86. So, "absent a showing of
compelling circumstances, an expert cannot be compelled to give
expert testimony whether the inquiry asks for the expert's
existing opinions or would require further work." Id. at 89.
Alt based this privilege on the text of Wis. Stat. § 907.06,
which predicated a court's appointment of an expert witness on
the expert witness' "consent[]." Id. at 86 ("If a court cannot
compel an expert witness to testify, it logically follows that a
litigant should not be able to so compel an expert.").
Alt is of no avail to the State for two reasons. First,
the State concedes in its brief that "Dr. Thornton has no
objection" to this court appointment or to analyzing this data,
and so § 907.06 permits both. Second, only the privilege
holder——here, Dr. Thornton——can invoke the privilege, and he has
not done so. Cf. 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:
Wisconsin Evidence § 504.3, at 410 (4th ed. 2017) ("A party to a
lawsuit cannot invoke the [patient-provider] privilege unless he
or she is the holder . . . .").
20
No. 2018AP2357-LV
the DOC database is discoverable under subsec. (5), there is no
need to address whether it is also discoverable under Wis. Stat.
§ 980.036(2)(h) or (j). See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v.
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15.
¶32 Of course, in addition to the conditions of
subsec. (5), a defendant's request for raw data must also
satisfy the other rules of evidence. In particular, the raw
data requested must be relevant to the case. See Wis. Stat.
§ 904.02. That is, a defendant must show that the raw data has
some tendency to make more probable his claim that he is not
likely to commit future acts of sexual violence. See Wis. Stat.
§ 904.01. After all, subsec. (5) does not authorize a fishing
expedition for any raw data based on speculation that an
analysis of that data might be relevant.
¶33 Here, Jendusa's request for raw data satisfies this
relevance requirement. Dr. Tyre testified that, although he did
not conduct a full analysis of the DOC's data, his colleague's
preliminary analysis indicated that it may be exculpatory.
Jendusa is not required to wait for the State to conduct a full
analysis in order to prove its relevancy. Such an analysis is
likely not forthcoming given that the preliminary analysis
suggests that the DOC may be overestimating the recidivism risk
for offenders such as Jendusa. Dr. Tyre's testimony is
sufficient to establish that the DOC database is relevant to
Jendusa's defense. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit
court permissibly granted Jendusa's motion requiring the DOC to
produce the database for Jendusa to analyze.
21
No. 2018AP2357-LV
¶34 Finally, we reject the State's argument that the
circuit court cannot order the State to turn over the DOC
database because the database is not in the State's possession.16
The thrust of the State's argument is that the DOC "has no
connection" to Jendusa's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding, likening
the DOC to the state hospital in State v. Darcy N.K., 218
Wis. 2d 640, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998). In Darcy N.K., the
court of appeals concluded that a child sexual assault victim's
psychiatric records were not in the State's possession because
the state hospital that held the records played no role in the
defendant's prosecution. Id. at 649-57. The hospital's sole
connection to the prosecution was treating the victim. That
stands in stark contrast to the critical role the DOC has and
continues to play in Jendusa's ch. 980 proceeding. It was a DOC
employee, Dr. Tyre, who evaluated Jendusa and, based on DOC
records, declared him eligible for commitment as a sexually
violent person. The circuit court relied upon that same DOC
employee's Special Purpose Evaluation and testimony to find
probable cause that Jendusa is a sexually violent person. And
it is the DOC who detained Jendusa following the probable cause
determination. Thus, far from having "no connection" to
16Unlike neighboring Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2) and (3),
§ 980.036(5) does not explicitly require that the requested
evidence be "within the possession, custody, or control of the
state." The significance of that phrase's absence in
subsec. (5), however, is left for another day because we
conclude for other reasons that the DOC is "the state" for
purposes of Jendusa's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding.
22
No. 2018AP2357-LV
Jendusa's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding, the DOC is so
inextricably intertwined with this case that it qualifies as
"the state" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 980.036.
¶35 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that Wis.
Stat. § 980.036(5) provides the circuit court the discretion to
order the disclosure of raw data, like the DOC database, when
the respondent moves for such disclosure and intends to
introduce an analysis of that raw data at trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶36 We reaffirm our longstanding and sound practice of
typically not reviewing the court of appeals' discretionary
denial of a petition for interlocutory appeal. We hold that
when the court of appeals denies a petition for an interlocutory
appeal, it need not explain why. We conclude that, here, the
court of appeals did not erroneously exercise its discretion in
denying the State's petition for interlocutory appeal. Lastly,
we conclude that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), the
circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC
database for the purpose of testing or analysis because Jendusa
moved for such disclosure, he intends to introduce an analysis
of that raw data at his ch. 980 trial, and it is relevant to
that trial. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' order
and the circuit court's discovery order and remand the cause to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
23
No. 2018AP2357-LV
By the Court.—The order of the court of appeals is
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
24
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
¶37 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (dissenting). I write
separately because the majority undermines our review of future
cases and misreads the plain language of the statute. The
majority errs when it concludes that the court of appeals does
not need to explain why it denies a party's motion for leave to
file an interlocutory appeal because of our general deference to
the court of appeals in this area. The majority also errs when
it concludes that the Department of Corrections' (DOC) database
is discoverable in this case under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)
because raw data has meaning only in the context of analysis.
These errors will impact not only this case, but will
detrimentally affect our review of the court of appeals in
future cases.
¶38 To reach its conclusions, the majority ignores our
prior cases and the choice of the legislature. It carves out an
exception from a general rule that allows us to review the
decisions of the court of appeals. Moreover, it reads language
into the statute that the legislature did not include.
¶39 I conclude that the court of appeals must explain its
reasoning when it denies a party's motion for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal. I also conclude that the DOC's database
is not discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)'s plain
language. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST EXPLAIN ITS REASONING
WHEN IT EXERCISES ITS DISCRETION.
¶40 When a party moves for leave to file an interlocutory
appeal, the court of appeals is statutorily bound to assess
certain factors in making its determination. See Wis. Stat.
1
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
§ 808.03(2). The court of appeals may hear an appeal of a non-
final order "if it determines that an appeal will":
(a) Materially advance the termination of the
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the
litigation;
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or
irreparable injury; or
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in
the administration of justice.
Id. "It is well settled that petitions seeking review of a
court of appeals' denial of leave to appeal are generally not
permitted." Leavitt v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 2010 WI 71,
¶47, 326 Wis. 2d 421, 784 N.W.2d 683 (quoted source omitted).
However, this general practice does not mean we do not have
jurisdiction to review these denials. Id., ¶5 ("Article VII,
§ 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that this court has
jurisdiction to review an order issued by the court of
appeals.").
¶41 When we exercise our constitutional power to review
discretionary decisions of the court of appeals, we must have
some explanation of the court of appeals' reasoning. State v.
Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶¶35-41, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141(requiring the court of appeals to explain its reasoning when it
exercises its discretion). As we explained in Scott, "[o]ur
jurisprudence governing the proper exercise of circuit court
discretion is instructive in determining whether the court of
appeals must explain the reasons underlying its discretionary
decision-making." Id., ¶38. Accordingly, we may look to the
requirements we have placed upon the circuit courts and
2
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
determine whether those requirements apply to the court of
appeals in the context of the denial of a motion for leave to
file an interlocutory appeal. I conclude that those
requirements do apply.
¶42 "When a circuit court exercises its discretion, it
must explain on the record its reasons for its discretionary
decision 'to ensure the soundness of its own decision making and
to facilitate judicial review.'" Id. (quoting Klinger v. Oneida
Cnty., 149 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989)). We require
this of circuit courts because "a circuit court's discretionary
decision 'is not the equivalent of unfettered decision-making.'"
Id. (quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306
N.W.2d 16 (1981)). This requirement ensures that a circuit
court examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard
of law, and used a rational process to arrive at a conclusion
that a reasonable judge would make. Id., ¶39. Absent an
explanation on the record, we cannot determine whether the
circuit court complied with this standard. Accordingly, as we
have held, "[i]f a circuit court fails to explain its exercise
of discretion on the record, it has erroneously exercised its
discretion." Id.
¶43 We have previously applied this rationale to the court
of appeals. See id., ¶¶40-41. Although we found no case "that
require[d] the court of appeals to explain the reasons
underlying its discretionary decisions," "the justification that
this court has relied upon to require a circuit court to explain
its discretionary decision-making applies equally to the court
3
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
of appeals." Id., ¶40. "The court of appeals should explain
its discretionary decision-making to ensure the soundness of
that decision-making and to facilitate judicial review." Id.
¶44 This case presents us with an opportunity to reaffirm
the principle that we set forth in Scott. Instead of continuing
to require the court of appeals to explain its discretionary
decision-making, the majority balks and carves out an exception
not found in Scott's proclamation. See majority op., ¶¶20-21.
The majority reasons that because we "generally [do] not review
the court of appeals' denial of a petition for interlocutory
appeal," the court of appeals need not explain its reasoning for
a denial. Majority op., ¶20. However, the majority conflates
general deference with actual review. When we afford the court
of appeals or the circuit court deference, we are merely stating
that we will not second-guess their decision unless that
decision cannot be supported by the facts, law, or rationality.
See Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶¶39-40 (applying the standard of
review to the court of appeals); Rechsteiner v. Hazelden, 2008
WI 97, ¶28, 313 Wis. 2d 542, 753 N.W.2d 496 (applying the
standard of review to the circuit court). However, for us to
understand whether a court of appeals' or circuit court's
decision can be supported by the facts, law, or rationality, we
must have that court's explanation of its reasoning. Without
4
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
the reasoning, we have nothing to actually review, and our
constitutional power to review is gutted.1
¶45 This case exemplifies why this is so. Here, the court
of appeals denied, without explanation, the State's motion for
leave to appeal. The court of appeals merely stated that the
State's "petition fails to satisfy the criteria for permissive
appeal." However, when looking at the factors the court of
appeals must consider, at least one of them seems to be
implicated. The State here has alleged that it will face
"substantial or irreparable injury" if it is ordered to release
the DOC database. Presumably, the court of appeals disagreed.
Why? We will never know because the court of appeals never
explained its reasoning. We cannot know whether the court of
appeals examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard
of law, or used a rational process to reach its conclusion. How
then are we to determine whether the court of appeals
erroneously exercised its discretion? We cannot.
¶46 Accordingly, the majority has now given the court of
appeals "unfettered decision-making" power over interlocutory
appeals. See majority op., ¶¶20-21. Without anything to
review, our "general deference" to the court of appeals
transforms into total deference to the court of appeals. Rather
For example, if a circuit court was to deny Jendusa's
1
request to admit certain evidence, but failed to explain its
reasons for denying the evidence, we would be left having to
guess why the circuit court denied Jendusa's request. Rather
than reviewing the circuit court's decision, we would be making
a decision as if we were the circuit court. This would
undermine any deference we afford the circuit court.
5
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
than give the court of appeals total deference, I would require
the court of appeals to explain its reasoning when it denies a
party's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal so that
we have some basis to exercise our constitutional power to
review the court of appeals. Because the court of appeals did
not explain its decision, it erroneously exercised its
discretion.2
II. THE DOC DATABASE CANNOT BE DISCOVERED UNDER
WIS. STAT. § 980.036(5).
¶47 Moving to the underlying merits of the claim, the
majority incorrectly concludes that the State must disclose the
DOC database pursuant to the circuit court's order under Wis.
Stat. § 980.036(5). However, the majority impermissibly reads
language into the statute to reach this conclusion. Based on
the plain language, Jendusa cannot obtain the DOC database
because it was not intended to be introduced at trial.
¶48 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of
the statute." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. "If
The majority does not explain how addressing the
2
underlying merits of this appeal does not "encroach upon the
court of appeals' discretion regarding certain classes of
interlocutory appeals . . . ." Majority op., ¶20 n.12. Indeed,
it seems contradictory to say that we will not encroach upon the
court of appeals' decision not to address the merits of an
appeal, then address the merits of the appeal. Moreover,
addressing the merits of this appeal when affirming the court of
appeals' dismissal is contrary to our longstanding doctrine that
"[w]hen the resolution of one issue disposes of an appeal, we
will not address additional issues." Barber v. Weber, 2006 WI
App 88, ¶19, 292 Wis. 2d 426, 715 N.W.2d 683 (citing Gross v.
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938)).
6
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
the meaning of the statute is plain, [then] we ordinarily stop
the inquiry." Id. We give statutory language "its common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning." Id. We give "technical or
specially-defined words or phrases" their "technical or special
definitional meaning." Id. "Context is important to meaning"
and must be interpreted "as part of a whole." Id., ¶46.
¶49 The legislature has limited the scope of discovery in
chapter 980 proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 980.036(11) ("This
section provides the only methods of obtaining discovery and
inspection in proceedings under this chapter."). Accordingly,
to receive the DOC database, Jendusa must show that it is
discoverable under one of the provisions of § 980.036. The
majority focuses its analysis on § 980.036(5).3 Section
3Because the majority concludes that the DOC's database is
discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5), the majority does
not address the other bases upon which Jendusa argues he may
obtain the data, namely Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2)(h) and (2)(j).
However, Jendusa would still not be able to discover the DOC's
database under either of these provisions.
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.036(2)(h) provides that the
prosecuting attorney must disclose:
[t]he results of any physical or mental examination or
any scientific or psychological test, instrument,
experiment, or comparison that the prosecuting
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial or
proceeding, and any raw data that were collected,
used, or considered in any manner as part of the
examination, test, instrument, experiment, or
comparison.
7
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
980.036(5) provides that "[o]n motion of a party, the court may
order the production of any item of evidence or raw data that is
intended to be introduced at the trial for testing or analysis
under such terms and conditions as the court prescribes."
(Emphasis added.) This language is as clear as it could be——
some party must intend to introduce at trial the raw data
requested. Neither the State nor Jendusa claimed they would
introduce the raw data at trial. As such, under the plain
language of the statute, Jendusa cannot obtain the DOC database
under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5).
¶50 The majority asserts that it is "overly formalistic"
to comply with the plain language of the statute. Majority op.,
¶30. The majority concludes that "the only reasonable reading
of 'raw data that is intended to be introduced at the trial' is
(Emphasis added.) Here, the database was not "collected, used,
or considered in any manner as part of the examination, test,
instrument, experiment, or comparison." The State does not
intend to offer the database, or anything generated from the
database, at the trial or proceeding. Accordingly, the
prosecuting attorney is not required to disclose the DOC's
database to Jendusa under subsec. (2)(h).
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.036(2)(j) provides that the
prosecuting attorney must disclose "[a]ny exculpatory evidence."
Despite Jendusa's claim that the DOC's database may prove that
he does not meet the criteria for commitment, unanalyzed raw
data cannot serve as exculpatory evidence because it is unclear
whether testing "would produce inculpatory, exculpatory, or
inconclusive results," and the defendant cannot put an
"exculpatory spin" on the unanalyzed data to make it
discoverable. State v. Franszczak, 2002 WI App 141, ¶¶21, 23,
256 Wis. 2d 68, 647 N.W.2d 396. Here, the DOC's database is
unanalyzed raw data and thus not exculpatory evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecuting attorney is not required to
disclose the DOC's database to Jendusa under subsec. (2)(j).
8
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
that the analysis of the raw data is intended to be introduced."
Id. The majority is wrong for two reasons. First, it ignores
our basic mandate that when the meaning of the statute is plain,
we stop the inquiry. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. As
explained above, the language could not be any clearer that the
raw data must be intended to be introduced at trial. Second,
the majority commits the basic error of reading language into
the statute. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶20, 353
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 ("We should not read into the
statute language that the legislature did not put in."). The
majority asserts intending to introduce the analysis of raw data
is the same as intending to introduce the raw data itself.
Majority op., ¶30. However, this is not what the statute
states. The statute states that only the "raw data that is
intended to be introduced at the trial" is discoverable. Wis.
Stat. § 980.036(5). The majority's contention is even more
confusing considering an expert's analysis would be "evidence."
As such, an expert's analysis of raw data is already
discoverable under § 980.036(5). Despite the majority's wishing
the language to be in the statute, it is not. The legislature
permitted a party to discover only the raw data that is intended
to be introduced——not its analysis or results of tests from the
raw data.
¶51 The majority's error is even more clear when comparing
Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5) to nearby statutes. See Kalal, 271
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . in
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related
9
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
statutes . . . ."). Pursuant to section 980.036(2), the State
must disclose certain information to an individual subject to a
chapter 980 proceeding. Included in this information are both
the results of any tests and the raw data used in those tests.
Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2)(h) ("The results of any physical or
mental examination or any scientific or psychological test,
instrument, experiment, or comparison that the prosecuting
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial or
proceeding, and any raw data that were collected, used, or
considered in any manner as part of the examination, test,
instrument, experiment, or comparison."). If the legislature
intended an individual to receive raw data that could be used as
part of a test, it could have mirrored the language of
subsection (2)(h) in subsection (5). Instead, the legislature
did not use such language, indicating that it provided for the
discovery of only raw data that is intended to be introduced at
trial, not raw data that could then be part of an expert's
analysis, which may or may not be introduced.
¶52 Following a natural progression, the majority's
conclusion transforms chapter 980 discovery from extremely
limited, as the legislature devised, see Wis. Stat.
§ 980.036(11), to a fishing expedition——allowing an individual
to seek any data from the State that may assist the individual's
case. Certainly when the legislature limited discovery in
chapter 980 cases, it did not incidentally leave open this door.
¶53 I would apply the plain language that the legislature
chose——"intended to be introduced"——and conclude that Jendusa
10
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
may not receive the DOC database under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)
because no party intended to introduce this raw data at trial.
III. CONCLUSION
¶54 To reach its conclusions, the majority ignores our
prior cases and the choice of the legislature. It carves out an
exception from a general rule that allows us to review the
decisions of the court of appeals. Moreover, it reads language
into the statute that the legislature did not include.
¶55 I conclude that the court of appeals must explain its
reasoning when it denies a party's motion for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal. I also conclude that the DOC's database
is not discoverable under Wis. Stat. § 980.036(5)'s plain
language. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶56 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this
dissent.
11
No. 2018AP2357-LV.akz
1