State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes

2023 WI 49SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2021AP809-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Junior L. Williams-Holmes,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 88,978 N.W.2d 523PDC No:2022 WI App 38 - Published
OPINION FILED: June 20, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 23, 2023
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Kenosha
JUDGE: Bruce E. Schroeder
JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender.
There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state
public defender.
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.
2
2023 WI 49NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2021AP809-CR
(L.C. No. 2019CF687)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent, FILED
v. JUN 20, 2023
Junior L. Williams-Holmes, Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and
remanded.
¶1 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. This case concerns a challenge to
a condition of extended supervision and probation that
prohibited Junior Williams-Holmes from living with any women or
unrelated children without the permission of the Court.
Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief, asking the
circuit court to transfer the approval power from the circuit
court to the Department of Corrections (DOC). The circuit court
No. 2021AP809-CR
denied the motion, and suggested that it had the power to
supervise Williams-Holmes through case-by-case approval.
¶2 The question before us is whether the circuit court
had the authority to do so. Wisconsin law empowers circuit
courts to impose conditions of extended supervision and
probation and to modify those conditions through a formal
statutory process. However, actual administration of the
sentence and conditions is entrusted to DOC.
¶3 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court
likely stepped over the line. It all but said it intended to
administer Williams-Holmes' condition through case-by-case
oversight, which it cannot do. Therefore, we reverse and remand
the cause to the circuit court for it to either clarify how the
condition imposed is consistent with the law or to modify its
order accordingly.
I. BACKGROUND
¶4 While on probation for a felony battery conviction,
Williams-Holmes physically assaulted his girlfriend. The State
brought charges and he eventually pled guilty to two counts of
battery, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of bail
jumping, each as a repeat offender. On the battery charges, the
circuit court1 imposed consecutive sentences consisting of one
year of initial confinement and one year of extended
The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of the Kenosha County
1
Circuit Court presided.
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No. 2021AP809-CR
supervision. The court withheld sentence on the bail jumping
and false imprisonment charges, ordering probation for three
years to be served consecutive to his sentences on the battery
charges.2 On both the extended supervision and probation
periods, the court imposed a condition that Williams-Holmes
could not live with any women or unrelated children without the
permission of the Court.3
¶5 Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief. He
asked the circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to
require that permission to reside with women or unrelated
children must come from DOC, not the court.
¶6 The circuit court denied the motion. The court
explained that it "was the practices of the Department of
Corrections which led me initially to impose the requirement for
my approval of the department's practice of residential
placements of offenders with unrelated children." To show an
example of what it saw as DOC's past "practice," the court
attached a 2019 email exchange between a DOC probation and
parole agent and the court. In the example, the court had
imposed a similar condition as in Williams-Holmes' case——the
defendant could not "reside with children unless he received
2The circuit court ordered probation for two years on the
bail-jumping count and three years on the false imprisonment
count concurrent to one other.
3The Judgment of Conviction stated: "Do not reside with
any person in any place in which children reside unless you are
related to them by blood w/o Court's permission. Not to reside
w/ anyone of the opposite sex w/o Court's permission."
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No. 2021AP809-CR
permission from the Court." The agent emailed the court to ask
if it would allow the defendant to live at his girlfriend's
residence with her and several of her family members, including
her young son. In an email response, the court said no. It
explained that it "would not approve the placement which DOC is
proposing without more information" because of the defendant's
history of violence and drug use. This email chain illustrated
why the court believed DOC's practices were "incompatible with
the 'program of probation envisioned by the court.'" Therefore,
the court declined to transfer the authority to regulate
Williams-Holmes' residential placements to DOC.
¶7 Williams-Holmes appealed. In a thoughtful opinion
with which we largely agree, the court of appeals observed that
the circuit court's condition could be administered in one of
two ways. State v. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38, ¶¶17-18,
404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523. The condition could be
effectuated "through the informal,
oversight/'regulation'/'supervision' procedure that the
[circuit] court appears to have utilized" in the past. Id.,
¶17. This would not be lawful, however. Id. Alternatively,
the condition could be effectuated consistent with the law
through the statutorily authorized modification process. Id.,
¶18. The court of appeals then construed the condition as
referring only to the statutory modification process and
affirmed the circuit court's decision on the postconviction
motion on that basis. Id., ¶23. We granted Williams-Holmes'
petition for review.
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II. DISCUSSION
¶8 Circuit courts are granted broad authority to hold
those convicted of crimes accountable for their actions——
including discretion to impose conditions on extended
supervision and probation. Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(5) (2021-22);4
973.09(1)(a); State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶12, 245
Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200. The question in this case,
however, is whether the circuit court's condition transgressed
DOC's statutory authority to administer extended supervision and
probation. Statutory interpretation is "a question of law we
review independently." Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31, ¶3, 401
Wis. 2d 575, 973 N.W.2d 756.
¶9 When a defendant is sentenced to probation, Wis. Stat.
§ 973.10(1) states that this has "the effect of placing the
defendant in the custody of" DOC, and the defendant is under the
"the control of the department under conditions set by the court
and rules and regulations established by" DOC. Under this
statutory structure, then, the court can impose probation and
place conditions upon it, but control over the defendant and
administration of the terms of probation are carried out by DOC.
¶10 A circuit court may also sentence someone to prison,
which includes a mandatory period of extended supervision
following confinement. Wis. Stat. § 973.01. As with probation,
"the court may impose conditions upon the term of extended
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
4
the 2021-22 version.
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No. 2021AP809-CR
supervision." § 973.01(5). And DOC "may not discharge a person
who is serving a bifurcated sentence from custody, control and
supervision until the person has served the entire bifurcated
sentence." § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the
power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and
control thereafter belongs to DOC.
¶11 The broad statutory authority given to DOC in Wis.
Stat. ch. 301 confirms this. It is DOC that
"shall . . . Administer" extended supervision and probation.
Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3). The legislature chose its words
carefully. "Administer" means to "have charge of; manage."
Administer, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 22 (3d ed. 1992). This naturally and logically
includes not just administering DOC's own rules and conditions,5
but those set by the circuit court as well.
¶12 While the circuit court is not involved in the day-to-
day administration of probation or extended supervision, its
role is not necessarily extinguished. The statutes also provide
that conditions imposed by the court for both extended
supervision and probation are not set in stone; they can be
modified. See Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(7m)(a); 973.09(3)(a). This
DOC has established standard rules all defendants on
5
extended supervision or probation must comply with. See Wis.
Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(3) (Oct. 2019). For example,
defendants must obtain permission from a probation agent prior
to changing their residence or place of employment, traveling
out of state, purchasing a car, or borrowing money. § DOC
328.04(3)(h)-(k).
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No. 2021AP809-CR
occurs via a formal process. A party seeking "to modify any
conditions of extended supervision set by the court"——and
modification can be requested by DOC or the person subject to
extended supervision——"may petition the sentencing court" to do
so. § 302.113(7m)(a). The statute then provides various
processes, standards, and restrictions governing the sentencing
court's consideration of the petition.6 Ultimately, the court
can grant the petition only "if it determines that the
modification would meet the needs of the department and the
public and would be consistent with the objectives of the
person's sentence." § 302.113(7m)(c). Similarly, a court "may
extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and
conditions thereof" before the expiration of the probation
period. § 973.09(3)(a). However, the extension or modification
of conditions can only occur "for cause and by order." Id.
¶13 With this in view, we turn to the present dispute:
whether the circuit court lawfully imposed the condition that
Williams-Holmes could not live with any unrelated women or
children without the permission of the Court. The court of
appeals acknowledged the possibility that this condition could
either refer to a type of supervision the statute entrusts to
DOC, or to the statutorily permitted modification process.
Williams-Holmes, 404 Wis. 2d 88, ¶¶17-18. But to "harmonize the
statutes and do so in a manner consistent with the circuit
For example, the statute makes provision for victim
6
notification (Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m)(b)) and a hearing on the
petition (§ 302.113(7m)(c)).
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No. 2021AP809-CR
court's probationary program," the court of appeals affirmed the
circuit court and determined that Williams-Holmes can only
receive the permission of the circuit court through statutory
modification. Id., ¶¶20, 23.
¶14 We take a different approach. While we agree with the
court of appeals' analysis of the statutory scheme, the record
strongly suggests the circuit court intended to administer this
condition of supervision itself, and not leave future permission
to a statutorily authorized modification. In its postconviction
explanation, the circuit court appears to have envisaged
Williams-Holmes (or a probation or parole agent) communicating
with the court directly and as needed to obtain the necessary
approval for him to live with a woman or an unrelated child.
This would constitute impermissible supervision and
administration of the conditions of probation by the court,
which the legislature has entrusted to DOC. The affirmation of
the condition by the court of appeals therefore seems at odds
with the circuit court's own explanation.7 Therefore, we reverse
and remand the cause to the circuit court to afford it an
opportunity to either clarify how the condition imposed is
consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly.
In the dissent's telling, the circuit court clearly
7
intended for its "permission" to come only via statutory
modification. Dissent, ¶¶15, 19. Yet no one other than the
dissent reads the record that way. The court of appeals does
not suggest this. Even the State acknowledged during oral
argument it was unclear. In any event, if the dissent's
interpretation of the condition is correct, our remand order
allows the circuit court to say so.
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No. 2021AP809-CR
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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No. 2021AP809-CR.akz
¶15 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (dissenting). I
dissent because I would simply affirm the court of appeals'
well-reasoned decision. It correctly interpreted the circuit
court's condition as referring to the statutory modification
process. Though the circuit court's use of the phrase "court
permission" in the conditions of extended supervision appears
ambiguous, the record shows that the court was referring to the
statutory modification process under Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(a)
and 302.113(7m), which involves a hearing and modification by
order. The circuit court's order denying post-conviction
relief, beyond citing § 973.09(3)(a), alludes to aspects of the
modification process. This shows that the circuit court
intended for "court permission" to be effectuated through that
statutory process. Accordingly, as the court of appeals
concluded, the circuit court's condition is lawful, and we
should affirm the court of appeals' decision.
¶16 The majority provides a rather cursory interpretation
of the circuit court's order setting conditions for extended
supervision. A more careful reading reveals that the court's
envisioned probationary program conforms to the law. The phrase
"court permission" in the conditions of extended supervision
refers to the modification process.
¶17 We interpret a circuit court's order independently,
"look[ing] to the whole of the decision which was reduced to
judgment." Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 806, 535
N.W.2d 116 (1995). "A court interprets a judgment in the same
manner as other written instruments." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177
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Wis. 2d 539, 546, 502 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1993). "Only when
judgments are ambiguous is construction permitted, allowing the
court to consider the whole record . . . ." Id. at 547.
"Ambiguity exists where the language of the written instrument
is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, either on
its face or as applied to the extrinsic facts to which it
refers." Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 805-06. However, "[w]e defer
to a trial court's interpretation of its own ambiguous order as
long as it is a reasonable interpretation." Thorp v. Town of
Lebanon, 225 Wis. 2d 672, 683, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).
¶18 The circuit court's order contains the condition, "Do
not reside with any person in any place in which children reside
unless you are related to them by blood [without] Court's
permission." The order also restates this condition as
follows: "[n]ot to reside with anyone of the opposite sex
[without] Court's permission." The circuit court's order does
not clearly explain what "court permission" means. At a high
level, it is plain that the condition prevents Williams-Holmes
from residing with unrelated women or children unless the
circuit court affirmatively permits him to do so. But the
condition is silent as to what form this "court permission" must
take. As the court of appeals observed, the condition is
ambiguous regarding whether "court permission" means "a type of
informal, situation-by-situation oversight by the court" or
"modifi[cation] through the mechanisms of Wis. Stat.
§§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a)." State v. Williams-Holmes,
2022 WI App 38, ¶16, 404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523.
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¶19 The circuit court's order denying Williams-Holmes'
motion for post-conviction relief clarifies that "court
permission" refers to the statutory modification process. For
background, two statutes cover modification of probation
conditions: Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), which discusses the
court's ability to modify conditions on its motion; and Wis.
Stat. § 302.113(7m), which discusses a defendant's ability to
petition the court for modification. Under § 973.09(3)(a),
"[p]rior to the expiration of any probation period, the court,
for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period
or modify the terms and conditions thereof." A criminal
defendant may also "petition the sentencing court to modify any
conditions of extended supervision set by the court."
§ 302.113(7m)(a). "The court may conduct a hearing to consider
the petition." § 302.113(7m)(c). The court may also "provide
notice of the petition to a victim of a crime committed by the
person who is the subject of the petition." § 302.113(7m)(b).
At the hearing, the court determines whether "modification would
meet the needs of the [DOC] and the public and would be
consistent with the objectives of the person's sentence."
§ 302.113(7m)(c). If the defendant instead seeks modification
to the term of a bifurcated sentence, the defendant must prove
"by the greater weight of the credible evidence" that
modification would serve the public interest. § 302.113(9g)(e).
¶20 The circuit court's order denying post-conviction
relief confirms that "court permission" refers to the statutory
modification process. In fact, the order expressly references
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No. 2021AP809-CR.akz
the circuit court's ability to modify conditions by order. It
cites our decision in State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 590 N.W.2d
918 (1999), and notes that decision "held 'that Wis. Stat.
§ 973.09(3)(a) allows circuit courts to modify conditions of
probation at any time'" (quoting id. at 69). Additionally,
while discussing how the circuit court "began to cite
governmental statistical data which [the court] felt clearly
justified these conditions," the court noted "the burden is on
the offender, not [the court], to prove the inaccuracy of the
information." This burden the order references most reasonably
seems to be the defendant's burden of persuasion under Wis.
Stat. § 302.113(9g)(e) to prove that modification "would serve
the public interest."
¶21 The majority's conclusory assertion that "the record
strongly suggests the circuit court intended to . . . not leave
future permission to a statutorily-authorized modification"
appears to be based on an email the circuit court included in
its order to illustrate the court's displeasure with the
Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Majority op., ¶¶7, 14. This
email does not serve as an example of the procedure for
obtaining "court permission" the circuit court envisioned.
Quite to the contrary, the circuit court disapproved of nearly
every aspect of the email.
¶22 The circuit court included the email in its order as
"one example of how [DOC] even now approaches this issue." The
first email was sent from DOC to the circuit court asking
whether the court "[w]ould . . . be willing to" permit a
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No. 2021AP809-CR.akz
defendant serving probation to live with the defendant's
girlfriend as well as her son and adult sister. In its
response, the circuit court remarked on the "substantial
information gap about" the defendant and said the court
"definitely would not approve the placement which DOC is
proposing without more information." The court further stated
it "would also want to hear the opinion of the child's father,
if available, so [the court can be made] sure that he
understands the history of the man living with his child."
¶23 The circuit court hardly offered this email as an
example of what it meant by "court permission." The reason the
court included the email in its order was to demonstrate why the
court disapproved of DOC's practices. Its purpose was not to
demonstrate the form of "court permission" the court envisioned.
The majority reads far too much into the email's inclusion in
the order. To the extent the email does reveal what the court
meant by "court permission," it shows that the circuit court
disapproved of how DOC raised the matter. The circuit court's
stated concerns about needing "more information" and possibly
hearing from the child's father indicate that the court expected
to——and quite likely normally does——hold a hearing on whether to
grant permission consistent with the statutory modification
process.
¶24 Our process for interpreting a circuit court's order
yields a clear result: "court permission" as used in the
conditions of extended supervision refers to the statutory
modification process. But the majority eschews this task in
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No. 2021AP809-CR.akz
favor of remanding with direction for the circuit court to
clarify what is already clear. Not only is this remedy
inappropriate and unnecessary, but none of the parties requested
it. Williams-Holmes requested reversal "and remand with
instructions that the judgment of conviction be modified to
require [Williams-Holmes] to obtain agent permission." The
State asked that we affirm the court of appeals and, at oral
argument, pointed out that the circuit court could modify or
clarify the condition on its own motion anyway "without . . . a
needless remand."
¶25 By failing to interpret the circuit court's condition
and imposing a remedy nobody requested, the majority turns its
ruling into an advisory opinion. This court will normally not
"assume various hypothetical states of fact and determine
[lawfulness] prospectively under each of these states of fact."
Waukesha Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 2d 629, 643, 173
N.W.2d 700 (1970). That is exactly what the majority does here.
The opinion is unmoored from any concrete facts being declared
lawful or unlawful. It abstractly declares the law and tells
the parties to go forth and apply it to whatever the facts may
be. I would fully resolve the case at hand, which is what we
agreed to do when we accepted review.
¶26 The court of appeals got this case exactly right, but
the majority adds confusion to the law by reversing a decision
with which it agrees. The circuit court intended for "court
permission" to be effectuated through that statutory process,
which both the court of appeals and the majority agree is
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No. 2021AP809-CR.akz
lawful. Accordingly, we should affirm the court of appeals'
decision.
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.
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