Citation Numbers: 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 211
Judges: BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE, Attorney General
Filed Date: 8/9/1978
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 4/15/2017
GERALD J. FERWERDA, Executive Secretary Elections Board
You have requested my opinion concerning the constitutionality of the ban on corporate financing of election campaigns imposed by sec.
The Bellotti decision held that a Massachusetts law that limited corporate expenditures aimed at influencing referendum votes was unconstitutional under the
Section
"No foreign or domestic corporation, or association organized under ch. 185, may make any contribution or disbursement, directly or indirectly, to any political party, committee, group, candidate or individual for any political purpose or to promote or defeat the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to any public office or any referendum to be submitted to the voters."
Section
Violation of sec.
The Bellotti case involved a Massachusetts law somewhat similar to sec.
". . . for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to *Page 213 the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation . . . ." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
55, sec. 8 (West. Supp. 1977-1978).
The constitutionality of the law was challenged by a number of banks and business corporations which had wanted to spend money to publicize their position on a constitutional amendment proposed as a ballot question at the November, 1976, general election. Massachusetts advanced two principal justifications for the prohibition of corporate speech, i.e., the state's interest in sustaining the role of the individual in the electoral process by preventing undue corporate influence on the outcome of the referendum vote and its interest in protecting corporate shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by the corporation. Indicating that the
"The constitutionality of sec. 8'S prohibition of the `exposition of ideas' by corporations turns on whether it can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction of freedom of speech. Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the process of governing, `the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,' . . . `and the burden is on the Government to show the existence of such an interest.' . . . Even then, the State must employ means `closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment . . . .' . . . ."
98 S. Ct. 1421 .
In its 5-4 decision the Court held that the statutory prohibition at issue failed to meet these standards under the
". . . However weighty these interests may be in the context of partisan candidate elections, they either are not implicated in this case or are not served at all, or in other than a random manner, by the prohibition in sec. 8.
Wisconsin Constitution art.
The reasoning and the conclusions reached in Bellotti are clearly applicable to the provisions of sec.
Having concluded that the sec.
Corporations and cooperatives may be treated as "persons" under the provisions of ch. 11, Stats., see sec.
Any prior opinions of this office construing sec.
BCL:JCM
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 98 S. Ct. 1407 ( 1978 )
Capt. Soma Boat Line, Inc. v. City of Wisconsin Dells , 56 Wis. 2d 838 ( 1973 )
Lawson v. Housing Authority , 270 Wis. 269 ( 1955 )
Opinion No. Oag 55-76, (1976) , 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 145 ( 1976 )
Opinion No. Oag 5-76, (1976) , 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 ( 1976 )
Opinion No. Oag 52-78, (1978) , 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 193 ( 1978 )