Citation Numbers: 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 64
Judges: BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE, Attorney General
Filed Date: 2/28/1979
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
GERALD J. FERWERDA, Executive Secretary Elections Board
In an opinion dated August 9, 1978, 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 211 (1978), I advised you that the ban on corporate financing of referendum elections imposed by sec.
In the request which prompted that opinion, you also sought directions as to what action the Elections Board should take if it determined that the statutory ban could not be constitutionally applied, either in whole or in part. This opinion will answer the question specifically reserved by the earlier opinion.
Your question concerns whether the offending unconstitutional provisions of sec.
The general rule regarding severability is found in Madison v.Nickel,
". . . If a statute consists of separable parts and the offending portions can be eliminated and still leave a living, complete law capable of being carried into effect `consistent with the intention of the legislature which enacted it in connection with the void *Page 65 part,' the valid portions must stand. This is the rule and it has been consistently followed."
Chapter 11, Stats., the Wisconsin Campaign Financing Law, evinces a general legislative intent to restrict and regulate an extraordinarily broad scope of financial transactions undertaken for political purposes. In addition, ch. 11, Stats., regulates many nonfinancial political activities, including the disclosure of the sources of political contributions, disbursements and communications in sec.
The provisions of sec.
Section
No foreign or domestic corporation, or association organized under ch. 185, may make any contribution or disbursement, directly or indirectly, to any political party, committee, group, candidate or individual for any political purpose or to promote or defeat the candidacy of any person for nomination or election *Page 66 to any public office or any referendum to be submitted to the voters.
It is clear that the prohibition created by the last phrase, "or any referendum to be submitted to the voters," is contrary to the decision in Bellotti, supra, and must be severed from the statute to save the statute's validity. When that is done, the statute should be interpreted and applied as if it read:
No foreign or domestic corporation, or association organized under ch. 185, may make any contribution or disbursement, directly or indirectly, to any political party, committee, group, candidate or individual for any political purpose or to promote or defeat the candidacy of any person for nomination or election to any public office.
But simple excision of the offending phrase is not sufficient to conform the statute to the requirements of Bellotti, supra, in light of sec.
In my opinion, it is not necessary, however, that in order to save the statute the phrase, "for any political purpose or," be deemed excised. Such an excision would go beyond the mandate ofBellotti, supra, and remove the restriction on corporate contributors, for example, from acting in support or opposition to a person's present or future candidacy. Further, to cast out the phrase, "for any political purpose or," leaves the preceding portion of the statute so broad and vague as to be subject to further constitutional vulnerability.
Therefore, applying the severability doctrine and striving to maintain legislative intent consistent with the mandate ofBellotti, supra, I *Page 67
conclude that the definitional sec.
Any prior opinions of this office construing sec.
BCL:JEA
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 98 S. Ct. 1407 ( 1978 )
City of Madison v. Nickel , 66 Wis. 2d 71 ( 1974 )
Opinion No. Oag 57-78, (1978) , 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 211 ( 1978 )
Opinion No. Oag 82-76, (1976) , 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 237 ( 1976 )
Opinion No. Oag 55-76, (1976) , 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 145 ( 1976 )
Opinion No. Oag 5-76, (1976) , 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 ( 1976 )