Citation Numbers: 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 68
Judges: BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE, Attorney General
Filed Date: 5/6/1986
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
TOM LOFTUS, Chairperson Assembly Committee on Organization
You have requested my opinion regarding the application of section
First, you have asked whether I concur with the opinions of my predecessors expressed in 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 586 (1913) and 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 48 (1937).
The first of these opinions interprets section 1409d(4), Stats. (1913), which states that if a registered pharmacist "fails to procure a certificate of renewal for sixty days after the secretary of the board shall have given him a second notice of the expiration of his registration, he shall cease to be such a pharmacist within the meaning of this chapter . . . ." Sec. 1409d(4), Stats. (1913). As you can see, the 1913 provision was essentially the same as today's section
The 1913 attorney general opinion noted that the statute did not provide any method for service of the required notice. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 586, 587 (1913). The opinion went on to state that "there can be no question but that the service must be an actual service on the party . . . ." Id. Although the 1913 opinion provided no authority for its assertion that actual notice was required, some justification may be found in the fact that the original statutory language provided for service by mail. Ch. 227, sec. 5, Laws of 1895. Because this requirement was repealed prior to the 1913 version of the law, apparent legislative intent supports the opinion that simply mailing a notice is insufficient and, therefore, actual notice is required. *Page 69
In 1937, the attorney general confirmed this opinion, stating that where a registered mail expiration notice was returned marked "unclaimed," the actual notice requirement was not fulfilled. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 48, 49 (1937). The opinion attributed this result to the 1907 Wisconsin Supreme Court case,Metcalf v. Mutual Fire Ins.,
I must concur with the opinions of my predecessors on this question. Great weight is given an attorney general's opinion when the Legislature amends a statute but makes no changes in the part of the statute interpreted by the attorney general. Town ofVernon v. Waukesha County,
The Town of Vernon court reasoned that the public was justified in relying on an interpretation of a statute where the statute had subsequently been re-enacted without change to the language construed by the attorney general. Id. As of this writing, section
Your second question is whether section
For this reason, both notices must be given after the actual expiration of the pharmacist's license. *Page 70
Finally, you ask whether, if sixty days have elapsed since the date the second notice was given, the Pharmacy Examining Board may waive compliance with the provisions of the statute. Because an administrative agency derives its authority from statutory grant, it has no authority to act contrary to statutory provisions. Racine Fire and Police Comm. v. Stanfield,
Section
Because your remaining question assumed a positive response to the above question, there is no need to address it.
I realize that the current procedures required by statute for renewal of pharmacists' registration may seem antiquated in light of the increase in number and mobility of Wisconsin's pharmacists. Wisconsin law, however, clearly requires the procedures I have enumerated above. Any change in this legislative scheme must come from the Legislature in the form of a revision to the existing statute.
BCL:WHW *Page 71