Citation Numbers: 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 166
Judges: DONALD J. HANAWAY, Attorney General
Filed Date: 10/11/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 4/15/2017
DARWIN L. ZWIEG, District Attorney Clark County
You ask two questions related to your duties under section
It is my opinion that, while a district attorney is statutorily required to exercise his or her discretion upon receipt of such a request in a manner that comports with the purpose of the statute, a district attorney retains limited prosecutorial discretion under section
Section
Duty of district attorney. The town chairman shall forthwith notify the district attorney of the county of every forfeiture which he or she knows, has reason to believe or which he or she has been so informed has been incurred in the town, which cannot be recovered before a municipal court, who shall forthwith cause an action to be commenced for the recovery thereof as well as for the recovery of every forfeiture which he or she otherwise knows or has reason to believe has been incurred; and the district attorney shall attend to and conduct any action so commenced by the chairman, when requested by him or her so to do.
A district attorney's obligations under section
Absent any legislation, the scope of a district attorney's prosecutorial discretion is described in Thompson v. State,
It is clear that in his functions as a prosecutor he has great discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute. There is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute all complaints that may be filed with him. While it is his duty to prosecute criminals, it is obvious that a great portion of the power of the state has been placed in his hands for him to use in the furtherance of justice, and this does not per se require prosecution in all cases where there appears to be a violation of the law no matter how trivial. In general, the district attorney is not answerable to any other officer of the state in respect to the manner in which he exercises those powers.
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon,
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion was not discussed in 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 198, 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 256 or any other prior opinion mentioning the statute. The statutory language must be examined in order to ascertain the extent to which the Legislature has limited the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The factors to be considered in examining the statutory language are as follows: *Page 168
"`In determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory in character, we have previously said that a number of factors must be examined. These include the objectives sought to be accomplished by the statute, its history, the consequences which would follow from the alternative interpretations, and whether a penalty is imposed for its violation. . . . We have also stated that directory statutes are those having requirements "which are not of the substance of things provided for." . . .'"
Cross,
57 Op. Att'y Gen. at 199 does indicate that the purpose of section
On balance, with the two exceptions noted, I conclude that a district attorney retains limited discretion as to whether and how to prosecute a forfeiture action at the request of a town chairman, but that such discretion must be exercised reasonably and in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute so as not to result in a "wholesale refusal to comply with a statutory duty." See 64 Op. Att'y Gen. at 159.
You also request my opinion concerning the validity and application to preexisting Amish burial grounds of a town ordinance regulating cemeteries.
In an opinion to Acting Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel George E. Rice, I recently said:
*Page 170In 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 60, 64 (1987), I declined to decide whether a town's ordinance violated state law because "such a judgment would require a factual analysis as to how the town's ordinance operates in actual practice." More recently, I indicated that "[t]he attorney general has no authority to decide questions of fact, nor can his judgment be substituted for the discretion vested in another state officer. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 4 (1951)." 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 36, 40 (1988). See also 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 416, 421 (1979). Although the meaning of a county ordinance presents a question of law rather than a question of fact, the facts and documents necessary to ascertain the meaning of any municipal ordinance are or should be readily available to that municipality's attorney. And, as a public officer, it is the
function of the municipal attorney to provide legal advice concerning the meaning of the ordinances enacted by that municipality.
For the policy reasons expressed in 77 OP. Att'y Gen. at 40 and in 76 OP. Att'y Gen. at 64, I decline to offer any opinion concerning the meaning or intent of the quoted ordinances. I am also taking this opportunity to advise state and local officials that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the attorney general will not issue opinions concerning the meaning or intent of municipal ordinances.
77 OP. Att'y Gen. 120, 123 (1988) (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted).
I have followed the policy considerations articulated in 77 OP. Att'y Gen. 120 even in connection with opinion requests from the Legislature. See OAG 58-88 (October 12, 1988) (unpublished). I see no reason to depart from them merely because a town is unwilling to establish a municipal court. However, in light of my answer to your previous question, I perceive no abuse of prosecutorial discretion in this instance in requesting a detailed legal opinion from reputable counsel retained by the town before commencing the prosecution of any action for a forfeiture under the town's ordinance.
DJH:FTC *Page 171
State v. Garton , 2 Kan. App. 2d 709 ( 1978 )
State Ex Rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon , 42 Wis. 2d 368 ( 1969 )
Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission , 82 Wis. 2d 565 ( 1978 )
Cross v. Soderbeck , 94 Wis. 2d 331 ( 1980 )
Thompson v. State , 61 Wis. 2d 325 ( 1973 )
Opinion No. Oag 6-88, (1988) , 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 ( 1988 )
Warner v. Department of Transportation , 102 Wis. 2d 232 ( 1981 )
Opinion No. Oag 54-75, (1975) , 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 157 ( 1975 )
Opinion No. Oag 15-87, (1987) , 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 60 ( 1987 )
Opinion No. Oag 123-79, (1979) , 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 416 ( 1979 )