Judges: BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE, Attorney General
Filed Date: 1/20/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
JEFFREY B. BARTELL Commissioner of Securities
You have requested my opinion concerning the effect of ch. 135, Stats., (the "Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law") upon ch. 553, Stats., (the "Wisconsin Franchise Investment Law") which is administered by your office.
You indicate that the relationship between the two chapters becomes relevant to your office by virtue of the fact that a "franchise" as defined in sec.
1. May a "franchisee," defined in sec.
2. Does the Commissioner of Securities have the authority, under sec.
QUESTION ONE
Your question regarding a dealer's (franchisee's) waiver of the provisions of ch. 135 poses four hypothetical examples.
Example One: The central question in situations where parties to an agreement seek a waiver of statutory provisions is whether public policy or public welfare concerns exist within the statute. If they are present, the terms of the statute cannot be waived by the parties to a contract. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Pedrick v. First National Bank of Ripon,(1) the dealer expressly waives and renounces his remedies under ch. 135.
(2) the dealership agreement contains provisions by which the dealer agrees that all aspects of the contract are reasonable, thereby eliminating the protective "good cause" provision of sec.
135.02 (6)(a), Stats.(3) the dealership agreement deviates from the provisions of sec.
135.04 , Stats., which require 90 days prior notice *Page 12 of termination and a 60-day period for rectification of deficiency by the dealer.(4) an explicit provision whereby the parties contract that the dealership agreement will be governed by the laws of a state which has no Fair Dealership Law.
"``An agreement is against public policy if it . . . violates some public statute, . . .' 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, p. 663, sec. 167. ``. . . courts of justice will not recognize or uphold any transaction which, in its object, operation. or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality, or to civic honesty. The test is whether the parties have stipulated for something inhibited by the law or inimical to, or inconsistent with, the public welfare.' . . . Agreements against public policy or prohibited by public law ``. . . cannot be enforced by one party against the other, either directly or indirectly by claiming damages or compensation for breach of them.' 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, p. 715, sec. 209."
In Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
An examination of ch. 135 indicates that, as in Kuhl, it seeks to abolish an inequality between the contracting parties. Section
Example Two: This example differs front the first only in that the waiver is implicit rather than explicit. By agreeing that all terms of the contract are reasonable, the dealer effectively precludes his right to challenge a termination based upon his failure to comply with "reasonable" requirements of the dealership agreement. See sec.
Example Three: Your third example involves a reversal of the statutory notice provision in sec.
Example Four: Your fourth example asks whether the parties can stipulate that the laws of another state shall apply. If the dealership transaction falls within Wisconsin's enforcement jurisdiction then the previously discussed prohibition against waiver would apply. See also Estate of Knippel,
". . . It would be regarded as contrary to sound policy to enforce a bargain that by the domestic law of the forum would not be valid, if the demonstrated purpose of a provision that the law of another state shall be applicable is to enable the citizens *Page 14 of the forum to nullify requirements of the local law." Corbin, Contracts, sec. 1446, pp. 486-487. (Emphasis supplied.)
Once it is determined that Wisconsin public policy is involved in the transaction, and it is further determined that the transaction itself is subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the state, then it can be stated that the parties cannot contractually waive or modify the effect of the statute. To do so would defeat its purpose.
QUESTION TWO
Your second question asks whether the violation of ch. 135 can be used as a basis for denial, suspension and revocation of franchise registrations or exemptions pursuant to sec.
Section
"(h) that the franchisor's enterprise or method of business includes or would include activities which are illegal where performed."
It seems quite clear that a franchisor's franchise agreement involves his "method of business." His income is derived not from retail sales or services but, directly or indirectly, from the various provisions of the agreement. The contractual right to terminate a franchisee would manifestly affect the relationship between the parties and thus the "business" of the franchisor.
The second aspect of the question is whether inserting provisions in the franchise agreement which would violate ch. 135, Stats., is an "illegal activity." Illegal is defined inBlacks Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) at p. 882 as conduct "not authorized by law" or "contrary to law." Chapter 135 is sufficiently explicit in its terms to indicate that noncompliance therewith is illegal as above defined. Section
Note that it is not necessary that the illegal provisions become operative before you may exercise your authority under sec.
It is therefore my opinion that contractual provisions evidencing a violation of ch. 135 would be illegal conduct within the purview of sec.
Since I have found that statutory rights and remedies granted under ch. 135 are not waivable, your question concerning denial and revocation of a franchisor's registration, if they were waivable, need not be answered.
BCL:BAC