State v. Santiago

FINE, J.

(dissenting). The Majority concludes that the trial court's finding that "the Miranda warnings given to Santiago in Spanish were substantially the same as those on the Spanish language card and that, based upon the card and Officer Garcia's testimony, Santiago knowingly and intelligently waived his rights" is "clearly erroneous," Majority op. at 95, because the officer who gave to the defendant the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not have the Spanish Miranda-warning card with him at the time, Majority op. at 95. The Majority, however, ignores the officer's testimony that he fully advised the defendant of the rights protected by the Miranda decision, that the defendant understood those rights, and that the defendant waived those rights voluntarily. This testimony amply supports the trial court's findings. It is not our function to review that finding de novo. Moreover, the Majority's decision imposes a burden on the State that is contrary to established precedent:

Reviewing courts . . . need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably "conve [y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda."

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (citation omitted; brackets by Duckworth). Contrary to the Majority's view, the law does not require that the officer have used the exact words on the Spanish Miranda-warning card; all that is required is that the warning be given in substance. The trial court's finding that that was done here is supported by the officer's testimony.

I respectfully dissent.