DocketNumber: No. 2011AP2565
Citation Numbers: 345 Wis. 2d 351, 2012 WI App 134
Judges: Brennan, Curley, Kessler
Filed Date: 11/27/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/9/2022
¶ 1. Shawn David Schulpius, in July 1996, was civilly committed by the State as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2009-10).
¶ 2. More specifically, Schulpius argues that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) entitles a petitioner to a hearing if, after considering evidence of the petitioner's progress since the date of his initial commitment, the court determines that the evidence shows that a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the petitioner currently fails to meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. Schulpius argues that the circuit court erred by construing the statute to require evidence of a change in the petitioner's status since the date of his last discharge hearing.
¶ 4. Based on our independent review of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), we agree with the State that, while the circuit court must consider all of the evidence in the record when determining whether a discharge hearing is warranted, the petitioner must also produce some new evidence, not previously considered by a trier of fact, which demonstrates that he does not meet the criteria for commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Because Schulpius has not set forth the requisite new evidence — to wit, an expert opinion, based on new facts, new professional knowledge, or new research— demonstrating that he does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person, we affirm the denial of his request for a discharge hearing.
BACKGROUND
¶ 5. The circuit court found Schulpius to be a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in July 1996, based upon predicate offenses that occurred when
¶ 6. On July 19, 2006, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.07, the Department of Health and Family Services ("the Department") filed its annual re-examination report, accompanied by a treatment progress report.
¶ 7. At a June 2007 hearing, the circuit court found probable cause for discharge based upon the experts' reports.
¶ 9. On July 10, 2008, the Department filed its annual re-examination report (this time completed by Department-appointed examiner Dr. Robert Barahal), accompanied by the treatment progress report. In his report, Dr. Barahal: (1) diagnosed Schulpius with pedophilia, which "predisposes him to commit sexually violent actions as defined by Chapter 980"; (2) opined that Schulpius "is still more likely than not to commit additional sexually violent acts" and has not yet progressed sufficiently in treatment; and (3) recommended that the circuit court not consider either discharge or supervised release for Schulpius.
¶ 10. On November 20, 2008, the Department filed an addendum to Dr. Barahal's July 2008 report. In the addendum, Dr. Barahal changed his opinion on whether Schulpius was still dangerous, stating that changes in protocols for scoring the Static-99
¶ 11. Following Dr. Barahal's change in position, the State successfully sought an adjournment. On August 5, 2009, the Department filed its annual reexamination report (again, completed by Dr. Barahal)
¶ 12. The discharge hearing on the 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 annual re-examinations was held before a jury on January 4 through January 6, 2010. Three key witnesses testified on behalf of the State: Dr. Anthony Jurek, Dr. Barahal, and Dr. Richard McKee. Dr. Rosell testified for the defense.
¶ 13. As relevant to Schulpius's appeal, Dr. Barahal testified that he reviewed more than 1000 pages of records and interviewed Schulpius twice before he rendered an opinion. When asked his opinion on whether Schulpius's risk level made it more likely than not that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence, Dr. Barahal said he was "not sure." He added:
I think he has, his risk is in a category, I believe the statutory criterion, as I understand it, is that the offender, it isn't whether he's dangerous or not dangerous. It's whether he's more than 50 percent likely to do it again. And I think he's in a category which probably approaches 50 percent, but may or may not be above that.
Dr. Barahal also testified that he scored Schulpius a six on the Static-99.
¶ 14. Following the experts' testimony, the jury found that Schulpius was still a sexually violent person, and the circuit court denied his petition for discharge. Schulpius's appellate counsel filed a no-merit report with
¶ 15. On July 22, 2010, approximately six months after the January 2010 discharge hearing, the Department filed its annual re-examination report (again, completed by Dr. Barahal) and treatment progress report.
¶ 16. In his July 2010 report, Dr. Barahal concluded, "to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty[,] that... Schulpius does not meet criteria for supervised release under Chapter 980.07(4)." Dr. Barahal also found that:
Schulpius'[s] probability of committing another sexually violent act approaches, but is not clearly above or beneath, 50%. Therefore, it [was Dr. Barahal's] opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that. .. Schulpius'[s] degree of risk does not meet the legal criterion .. . required for continued civil commitment under Chapter 980.
¶ 17. The July 2010 treatment report, completed by staff at Sand Ridge, described the sexually-violent-person treatment program at the institution, explaining that it consisted of three phases, followed by a fourth phase intended to be completed during supervised release. The report noted that Schulpius was in phase one when the report was written and described phase one as providing an "opportunity to improve his general self-management skills and to work to ameliorate personality disorder symptoms or other general factors that may interfere with his effective participation in treatment." One of Schulpius's goals was to work towards moving into phase two. The report stated that during phase two "the patient is expected to identify and learn to refute the kind of thinking that in the past led to him offending."
¶ 19. In August 2010, on the heels of the Department's July 2010 report, Schulpius filed a new petition for discharge on the grounds that he no longer met the criteria for commitment as a sexual violent person. More specifically, he alleged that he "no longer fit the definition of the law" because he was "no longer over 50% likely to reoffend."
¶ 20. Initially, the State did not oppose holding a hearing on Schulpius's petition for discharge. However, in March 2011, the State filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the circuit court deny Schulpius's petition for discharge without a hearing. The State contended that the recently decided Wisconsin Supreme Court case State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513, and two recently decided Wisconsin Court of Appeals cases interpreting Arends, made clear that before a petitioner is entitled to a discharge hearing, he must allege facts from which the court or jury may
¶ 21. The circuit court agreed with the State's position and granted its motion for reconsideration, thereby denying Schulpius's petition for discharge without a hearing. Sehulpius appeals that order.
DISCUSSION
¶ 22. Under Wis. Stat. § 980.09, an individual committed as a sexually violent person may file a petition for discharge at any time. However, before granting the petitioner a hearing, the circuit court must go through a two-step process "aimed at weeding out meritless and unsupported petitions, while still protecting a petitioner's access to a discharge hearing." Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 22.
¶ 23. To begin, under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1),
¶ 24. Under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2),
¶ 25. Here, the parties do not dispute the circuit court's finding under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1) that Schulpius's petition alleges facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that his condition has changed. See id. Rather, the issue on appeal is whether Schulpius met the showing required for a discharge hearing under § 980.09(2). To answer that question, we consider: (1) what showing is required to entitle a petitioner to a discharge hearing under § 980.09(2); and (2) whether Schulpius met that showing here.
I. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) requires a petitioner to bring forth new evidence, not considered by a prior trier of fact, demonstrating that the petitioner currently does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.
¶ 26. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) specifically enumerates what evidence a court should consider when
¶ 27. The parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) and Arends require the circuit court to consider all of the evidence in the record. The issue raised on appeal is whether the petitioner can rely solely on evidence already considered and rejected by a previous trier of fact to meet his burden for a new discharge hearing. Resolution of this debate requires us to interpret § 980.09. The interpretation of a statute raises a question of law that we construe independently of the circuit court. See State v. Pocan, 2003 WI App 233, ¶ 5, 267 Wis. 2d 953, 671 N.W.2d 860.
¶ 28. The supreme court noted in Arends that while Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) requires the circuit court to consider all of the reports filed since the petitioner's initial commitment, the circuit court is still free to weigh the reports as it sees fit, stating: "This is not to say that the court must take every document a party
¶ 29. However, the supreme court in Arends was not asked to apply the "any facts" test to evidence on which a previous factfinder had already concluded that the petitioner met the criteria for initial or continued commitment. That issue was addressed by this court in State v. Combs, 2006 WI App 137, 295 Wis. 2d 457, 720 N.W.2d 684, and State v. Kruse, 2006 WI App 179, 296 Wis. 2d 130, 722 N.W.2d 742. In both Combs and Kruse, we addressed whether a new expert's re-examination opinion, favorable to the petitioner, is actually "new" when it is based solely on evidence considered by other experts at a petitioner's original commitment hearing. Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 1; Kruse, 296 Wis. 2d 130, ¶ 2.
¶ 30. In Combs, we determined that the petitioner's expert's opinion was insufficient to entitle the petitioner to a discharge hearing because the expert's opinion was not based on: (1) any changes in the petitioner's behavior since the initial commitment hearing, id., 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 26; (2) any new method of evaluating whether the petitioner "was a sexually violent person that was not available at the time of the commitment [hearing]," id.-, or (3) new research or professional writings on how to interpret or score the
¶ 31. As such, we determined in Combs that the petitioner's expert's opinion was "new" only in the sense that she was not one of the experts who evaluated the petitioner at the time of his initial commitment hearing. Id., ¶ 27. We held that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) required the petitioner to show "something more than facts, professional knowledge, or research that was considered by an expert testifying in a prior proceeding that determined the person to be sexually violent" before the circuit court was required to hold a discharge hearing. Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
¶ 32. We held similarly in Kruse, relying on Combs, that the petitioner was not entitled to a discharge hearing because his expert's opinion "d[id] not, as required by Combs, depend on any fact or professional knowledge or research that was not considered by experts testifying at the commitment [hearing]." Kruse, 296 Wis. 2d 130, ¶ 42. We noted that although the expert did "take into account events and information that occurred since the commitment [hearing], . . . her opinion that [the petitioner] is not a sexually violent person does not depend upon them. She expressly states that it is 'unlikely' that treatment had 'significantly reduced reoffending risks.'" Id., ¶ 41. Furthermore, while the expert noted that since entering treatment the petitioner "showed some increased insight and remorse, and his behavior with female staff had 'seemingly improved. . .,' [the expert] d[id] not
¶ 33. Schulpius dismisses both Combs and Kruse, arguing that they are no longer good law because they arose under the old "probable cause" version of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) (2003-04). We disagree.
¶ 34. In Arends, the supreme court explicitly stated that Kruse and other pre-2006 Wis. Stat. ch. 980 cases are still applicable, stating: "Although these cases all applied the old 'probable cause' standard, their results would be the same under the new standard." Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 39 n.21. So, not only is Kruse still applicable, but Arends expressly states that Kruse's holding — that a report favorable to a petitioner "based solely on evidence that had already formed the basis for the denial of a previous discharge petition" is insufficient to form the basis for a new discharge hearing— still stands. See Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 39 n.21.
¶ 35. Given the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) and the relevant case law, we hold that, when determining whether to hold a hearing on a petition for discharge, the circuit court must determine whether the petitioner has set forth new evidence, not considered by a prior trier of fact, from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. An expert's opinion that is not based on some new fact, new professional knowledge, or new research is not sufficient for a new discharge hearing under § 980.09(2). See Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 32. This result is the only reasonable one. Permitting a new discharge hearing on evidence already determined insufficient by a prior trier of fact violates essential
II. Schulpius is not entitled to a Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) discharge hearing because the expert's new opinion was not based on new facts, new professional knowledge, or new research.
¶ 36. As we have seen, in order to be entitled to a discharge hearing, the petition materials must show new evidence — new fact, new professional knowledge, or new research — not considered by a prior trier of fact, upon which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner currently does not qualify for commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. As such, we review whether Schulpius has raised new evidence in his August 2010 petition for discharge, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that his condition had changed since the January 2010 discharge hearing.
¶ 37. Schulpius based his August 2010 petition for discharge on the fact that the State's expert, Dr. Barahal, had changed his opinion since he testified in January 2010. At the January 2010 discharge hearing, Dr. Barahal testified that he was "not sure" if Schulpius fit the criteria for a sexually violent person. In his July 2010 re-examination report, Dr. Barahal affirmatively stated that he believed that Schulpius no longer met the criteria for commitment. Schulpius argues that Dr. Barahal based his new opinion on: (1) Schulpius's new, lower score on the Static-9911, from a six to a five;
¶ 38. The State argues that Dr. Barahal's July 2010 opinion is essentially the same as his testimony at the January 2010 hearing. There is no dispute that at the January 2010 hearing Dr. Barahal testified that he was "not sure" if Schulpius met the legal test of "more likely than not he would engage in future acts of sexual violence" and that Schulpius was "in a category which probably approaches 50 percent [to reoffend], but may or may not be above that." In his July 2010 report, Dr. Barahal still opined that Schulpius's "probability of committing another sexually violent act approaches, but is not clearly above or beneath 50%," but in July 2010, Dr. Barahal added that "Schulpius'[s] degree of risk does not meet the legal criterion . . . required for continued civil commitment." Despite Dr. Barahal's changed opinion from "not sure," to "sure," the State argues that his July 2010 report does not support the request for a discharge hearing because there was no real change, and even if there was, the changed opinion was not based on or linked to any change in Schulpius himself, or any new professional knowledge or new research. See Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 32.
¶ 39. We agree with Schulpius that Dr. Barahal's July 2010 re-examination report expresses a new opinion, different from the one he testified to at the January 2010 discharge hearing. But we agree with the State that our inquiry does not end there. Whether a changed expert opinion is enough for a discharge hearing depends on the basis for the change, that is, the new "opinion must depend upon something more than facts, professional knowledge, or research that was consid
By way of example, an opinion that a person is not sexually violent based at least in part on facts about the committed person that did not occur until after the prior adjudication would meet this standard, as would an opinion based at least in part on new professional knowledge about how to predict dangerousness.
Id.
¶ 40. Despite Schulpius's arguments to the contrary, Dr. Barahal's July 2010 report is not based on any new fact about Schulpius, new professional knowledge, or new research. Rather, Dr. Barahal bases his new opinion on his recalculation of Schulpius's Static-99 score, from a six to a five.
¶ 41. In his July 2010 report, Dr. Barahal explained that he lowered Schulpius's score on the Static-99R, from a six in January to a five in July, because upon further reflection, he felt that in his earlier report he had erroneously "considered the victim of [Schulpius's] 1991 index offense a stranger . . ., which would add a scoring point," when in fact Schulpius had "met the child, the son of a female friend, about a month prior to the assault." Dr. Barahal's further reflection on his past scoring is not sufficient for a new discharge hearing because it is not new professional knowledge or research about how to predict dangerousness. See id.
¶ 42. Furthermore, nowhere in his report does Dr. Barahal state that the basis for his new opinion was Schulpius's treatment progress. It is true that Dr. Barahal refers to Schulpius's treatment progress in the body of his report, noting that: "Schulpius was returned to the more 'conventional' treatment track just last December, and while he is seen as progressing well,
¶ 43. Thus, we conclude that Dr. Barahal's July 2010 opinion — that Schulpius no longer meets the criteria of a sexually violent person — is not based on new fact, new professional knowledge, or new research, but rather a recalculation of the Static-99. Accordingly, the report sets forth an insufficient basis for a new discharge hearing. See Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 32. We affirm.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted.
Schulpius's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 case has a long procedural history, including multiple appellate reviews, that need not be detailed here. We include only those details necessary to decide the issue currently before us on review.
The original commitment order was signed by the Honorable John Franke.
Wisconsin Stat. §980.07(6) requires the Department to submit to the court an annual report comprised of the reexamination report and the treatment progress report. The re-examination report is to be prepared annually by an examiner appointed by the Department to examine an individual's mental condition "to determine whether the person has made sufficient progress for the court to consider whether the person should be placed on supervised release or discharged." See § 980.07(1). The treatment progress report is to be completed annually by an individual's treatment provider and is to address a number of factors enumerated by the statute. See § 980.07(4).
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.03(4) (2003-04) authorized the circuit court, at the time of an individual's re-examination, to
At the time the State filed its July 2006 annual report, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) (2003-04) provided that if an individual did not "affirmatively waive" his right to file a petition for discharge after receiving the State's annual report, the court was required to hold a probable cause hearing "to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether the person is still a sexually violent person." Id. Schulpius refused to sign the waiver after receiving the State's 2006 report, and therefore, the court was required to hold a probable cause hearing. This requirement was changed in 2006, 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 123 (eff. Aug. 1, 2006), and the current statute requires an individual to file a petition for discharge to initiate a review for a discharge hearing, and does away with the old probable cause standard. See Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2009-10).
Judge Brash presided over the June 2007 probable cause hearing.
Due to judicial rotation, the Honorable Patricia D. McMahon was assigned to the case and set the date for the discharge hearing.
There are references in the record to both the Static-99 and the Static-99R. The Static-99R is the updated version of the Static-99.
The State now concedes in its respondent's brief on appeal that the two appellate cases it previously relied on, State v. Sugden, 2010 WI App 166, 330 Wis. 2d 628, 795 N.W.2d 456 (filed Nov. 18 2010), and State v. Parrish, 2011 WI App 44, 332 Wis. 2d 317, 797 N.W.2d 935 (filed Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished), do not address the issue of when Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) requires a circuit court to conduct a discharge hearing.
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(1) states:
*363 A committed person may petition the committing court for discharge at any time. The court shall deny the petition under this section without a hearing unless the petition alleges facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person's condition has changed since the date of his or her initial commitment order so that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.
We note that while § 980.09 does not include the (1) designation, the first paragraph of the statute is commonly referred to as (1).
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) states:
The court shall review the petition within 30 days and may hold a hearing to determine if it contains facts from which the court or jury may conclude that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. In determining under this subsection whether facts exist that might warrant such a conclusion, the court shall consider any current or past reports filed under s. 980.07, relevant facts in the petition and in the state's written response, arguments of counsel, and any supporting documentation provided by the person or the state. If the court determines that the petition does not contain facts from which a court or jury may conclude that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment, the court shall deny the petition. If the court determines that facts exist from which a court or jury could conclude the person does not meet criteria for commitment the court shall set the matter for hearing.