DocketNumber: Appeal No. 2017AP1424
Citation Numbers: 918 N.W.2d 644, 2018 WI App 54, 383 Wis. 2d 785
Filed Date: 7/19/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/16/2022
¶ 1 Darnell Hines appeals an order denying his postconviction motion to vacate his sentence. Hines argues that his sentence violates the prohibition in the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions against cruel and unusual punishments. We reject Hines's argument and affirm the order of the circuit court.
¶ 2 In 1996, Hines received a life sentence after he was found guilty by a jury of first-degree intentional homicide, a Class A felony that carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1) and 939.50(3)(a) (1993-94). Hines was seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crime on July 7, 1995, and was waived into adult court. He pursued an appeal, and we affirmed the decision of the circuit court in an opinion issued October 8, 1998. The current appeal arises out of a pro se motion filed by Hines in January 2017, seeking to vacate his sentence. The circuit court denied the motion. Hines now appeals, challenging the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was sentenced. We review the constitutionality of a statutory scheme de novo. State v. Ninham ,
¶ 3 Hines argues that his sentence of life in prison, with parole eligibility after 30 years, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, due to the fact that he was a juvenile at the time of the crime. Hines relies primarily on Miller v. Alabama ,
¶ 4 The State argues that Hines's case is distinguishable from Miller on several levels. We agree. Miller arose from two underlying cases, each of which involved a 14-year-old defendant who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
¶ 5 This court acknowledged the principles of Miller in State v. Barbeau ,
¶ 6 Unlike the statutory schemes at issue in Miller , the statutes under which Hines was sentenced did not mandate a life sentence without parole, except in the case of habitual criminality. See WIS. STAT. §§ 973.014(1) ; 939.62(2m) (1993-94). Like the circuit court in Barbeau , the circuit court in this case had discretion under the applicable statutory scheme to take the defendant's age and individual characteristics into consideration in determining his sentence. The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the court did not specifically reference the fact that Hines was 17 at the time of commission of the crime. However, the court did take into consideration Hines's documented cognitive deficit, which is perhaps even more relevant than his age, given that Hines was almost eighteen at the time of the crime, but that his I-Q was tested around 60, according to the presentence investigation report. The court also considered other mitigating factors, such as the fact that Hines was raised in poverty by a single parent who had a history of substance abuse and criminal behavior.
¶ 7 It is also relevant to note that the penalty scheme under which Hines was sentenced was less severe than the penalties faced by the defendant in Barbeau . Under the sentencing scheme that this court upheld in Barbeau ,
By the Court. -Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.