State v. Collin D. Reimer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 8, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2022AP1874-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF1710
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
COLLIN D. REIMER,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
JENNIFER DOROW, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2022AP1874-CR
¶1 PER CURIAM. Collin D. Reimer appeals from a judgment of the
circuit court entered after his plea of no contest. He contends the court erred when
it denied his motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement and
evidence law enforcement found on his laptop, concluding Reimer voluntarily made
the statements and voluntarily turned over and consented to the search of his laptop.
He also challenges his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Background
¶2 After being charged with possession of child pornography in relation
to images found on his laptop, Reimer brought a motion to suppress statements he
made to two detectives at his residence and incriminating evidence found on his
laptop. Following the hearing on his motion, the circuit court found and ruled as
follows.1
¶3 On November 27, 2019, acting on a cyber tip that then-nineteen-year-
old Reimer may be in possession of child pornography, two plain-clothed armed
detectives made contact at the home of Reimer’s parents, where Reimer resided.
Reimer’s brother permitted the officers to enter the home; the detectives did not
employ any force, threats or coercion to gain entry.
1
Reimer and one of the detectives testified at the suppression hearing. For his appeal,
however, Reimer only provided the transcript of his testimony, arguments by counsel for the
parties, and the circuit court’s oral ruling; he did not provide the transcript of the detective’s
testimony. An appellant has the responsibility to ensure the record is sufficient to address the issues
presented on appeal, and where the appellant does not, like Reimer here, we assume missing
sections of the record support the circuit court’s ruling. See Fiumefreddo v. McLean, 174 Wis. 2d
10, 26-7, 496 N.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, we focus on the circuit court’s findings, because
even if they conflict with Reimer’s testimony at the hearing, we have to assume they are supported
by the detective’s testimony. We also accept the findings as correct because Reimer does not
challenge them on appeal.
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
¶4 While the detectives waited downstairs, the brother went upstairs and
informed Reimer of the detectives’ presence and desire to speak with him. When
Reimer came down to meet with them, the detectives were “upfront” in informing
him they were investigating a cyber tip and wanted to search his “computer or
devices that might still have this suspected child porn on it.” Reimer had had some
prior “exposure and experience with law enforcement on the very same issue that
these detectives were investigating”—when he was fourteen years old, he had been
“taken out of his home, to a police department where he was interviewed or
interrogated by two female detectives … about very graphic images.”
¶5 Reimer was very cooperative, and the “conversation” between him
and the detectives was “very cordial.” While at the home, one of the detectives
asked Reimer if he had any computers, and Reimer retrieved his laptop from a
backpack and provided it and the password to the detectives. Reimer also signed a
“consent to search” form, giving the detectives written permission to search his
computer and acknowledging he was giving his permission voluntarily and with no
promises or threats made by the detectives.
¶6 Reimer cooperated with the detectives and “readily” permitted them
to search his laptop “in part because he wanted to, and he didn’t think he had
anything to hide,” because he “thought none of this stuff would be there, given the
circumstances of when he apparently originally downloaded it and tried to get rid
of it.” When speaking with Reimer, the detectives did not raise their voices, never
touched him or made any threats or promises, and did not place him in handcuffs or
otherwise in custody. The detectives were at Reimer’s residence for no more than
twenty-five minutes.
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
¶7 The circuit court acknowledged that the detectives did “play on
[Reimer’s] emotions,” but added that “[i]t’s a lawful police tactic.” The court found
that nothing at the hearing conflicted with the written permission Reimer provided
the detectives “other than a statement by him that he felt he could not do anything
else.” It recognized he “had an internal … pressure to cooperate,” noting that “[h]e
grew up with respect for law enforcement,” but found that his “feeling” that he was
compelled to cooperate was “a product more to do with maybe his own regret,
remorse, maybe getting it off his chest.” The court concluded that “none of those
internal pressures amount to coercion and make his statements involuntary,” “[w]e
don’t have … anything on this record to suggest that [the detectives] forced, that
they coerced this consent out of Mr Reimer,” and the consent he gave the detectives
to search his laptop “was freely and voluntarily given.”
¶8 Following the denial of his suppression motion, Reimer pled no
contest to one count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to three
years of initial confinement followed by two years of extended supervision. Reimer
appeals.
Discussion
¶9 Reimer contends his statements to the detectives were not voluntarily
made and his consent for them to search his laptop was not voluntarily given. His
statements were voluntarily made if they were “the product of a free and
unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a
conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the
defendant by … the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.” See State v.
Vice, 2021 WI 63, ¶29, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961 N.W.2d 1 (citation omitted). The
State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that Reimer made his
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
statements voluntarily. See State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶55, 363 Wis. 2d 376, 864
N.W.2d 827. Reimer’s consent for the detectives to search his laptop was
voluntarily given if it “was given in the absence of duress or coercion, either express
or implied.” See State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶30, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d
560 (citation omitted). The State must show by clear and convincing evidence that
Reimer’s consent to search was voluntarily given. See id.¶10 “Voluntariness is evaluated in light of all the circumstances
surrounding interrogation and decided under a totality of the circumstances,
weighing the suspect’s personal characteristics against the actions of the police.”
Moore, 363 Wis. 2d 376, ¶56 (footnote omitted). “[T]o justify a finding of
involuntariness, there must be some affirmative evidence” that improper police
practices were employed. Id. We consider the length of the police engagement with
the defendant, general conditions and circumstances, “whether any excessive
physical or psychological pressure was used, and whether any inducements, threats,
methods, or strategies were utilized” by the police. Id., ¶57 (citation omitted).
“The question of voluntariness involves the application of
constitutional principles to historical facts.” We uphold a
circuit court’s findings of historical fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. A finding of historical fact is not clearly
erroneous unless “it is against the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence.” We independently review
the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 (citations
omitted).
¶11 In his appeal, Reimer specifically claims “his statements and
surrender of his computer [were] non-voluntary” because he “felt … he had no
choice but to cooperate with law enforcement.” Although his arguments are not
clear and he has insufficiently developed them, he appears to assert that his
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
statements and his consent for the detectives to search his laptop were involuntary
because he was not read his Miranda2 rights; he was separated from his siblings
when the detectives spoke with him at his home; his parents were not contacted; the
detectives “st[oo]d over him while questioning him”; and the detectives suggested
to him that they were there “merely to have a conversation to ‘clear’ some things
up,” “the matter was not as serious as it was,” and “he could help himself by
cooperating.” Reimer fails to persuade.
¶12 We first note that the detectives were not obligated to read Reimer his
Miranda rights as he was not in custody when they engaged with him at his
residence. See State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, ¶9, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 720
N.W.2d 459 (“[T]he Miranda safeguards apply only to custodial interrogations.”
(citation omitted)). Moreover, when the detectives went over the “consent to
search” form with Reimer, he was informed, as the form stated, “of [his] right[] to
refuse to consent to [the] search, and … that evidence and/or contraband found as a
result of such may be seized and used against [him] in a court of law.” Additionally,
Reimer acknowledged in his own testimony at the suppression hearing that when he
had been previously interrogated, at age fourteen, regarding his possible possession
of child pornography, he was read his Miranda rights. He also conceded he was
otherwise familiar with those rights from crime shows. Reimer knew he had the
right to choose not to speak with the detectives and not to consent to the search of
his laptop; he just chose to cooperate instead.
¶13 We see no concerns with the detectives speaking with Reimer in a
separate room from his siblings. The detectives were questioning him about an
extremely sensitive and embarrassing topic—his possession of child pornography—
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
so having that discussion away from his siblings makes sense. Moreover, according
to Reimer’s own testimony, he was the one who directed the detectives to the
specific living area where the discussion took place.
¶14 As to Reimer’s parents not being contacted, we note that when
considering the questioning of a fifteen-year-old for five and one-half hours, with
the juvenile being with police for eleven hours, the Moore court stated that while it
considered the lack of a parental presence during questioning “as a part of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding Moore’s confession,” it “d[id] not change
the outcome.” Moore, 363 Wis. 2d 376, ¶¶62, 65 n.19. Here, Reimer was a
nineteen-year-old adult, and the interaction with the detectives in his own home
lasted no more than twenty-five minutes. We see no problem, and Reimer has failed
to direct us to any law indicating there might be one.
¶15 In his briefing on appeal, Reimer also criticizes that the detectives
“st[oo]d over him while questioning him.” His actual testimony at the hearing,
however, makes the situation sound less menacing—he testified that after he led the
detectives to the living room area out of earshot of his brother and sister, he “was
sitting on the couch, talking to them, and they were standing”; no imagery of the
detectives standing “over him.” We see nothing coercive about the circumstances
as Reimer described them, nor has he directed us to case law indicating a legal
concern here.
¶16 Reimer also complains that the detectives “suggest[ed] to [him] that
their presence in the home was merely to have a conversation to ‘clear’ some things
up,” “the matter was not as serious as it was,” and he could “help himself by
cooperating.” First, it is simply the truth that the detectives were there to “clear
some things up.” Before the detectives spoke with Reimer and searched his laptop,
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
they only had a “tip” that he may be in possession of child pornography—they could
not have known whether or not such images would be found on any device in his
possession or what statements he might make related to the same. Had Reimer
allowed them to search his laptop and it did not contain child pornography that
certainly would have “cleared things up” also—in Reimer’s favor. Instead, the
detectives were able to clear things up by concluding he was, in fact, in possession
of child pornography, as the cyber tip suggested. Second, Reimer’s first two
complaints here are that the detectives minimized the situation. Our supreme court
has confirmed, however, that the use of minimizing tactics by law enforcement is
“commonly accept[ed]” by the courts. See id., ¶64.
¶17 As to Reimer’s statement that the detectives suggested he could “help
himself by cooperating,” he develops no argument that particular statements by the
detectives amounted to an improper police tactic. The circuit court specifically
found that the detectives made no promises or threats to Reimer, which finding is
consistent with some of Reimer’s own testimony at the hearing as well as the
consent to search form he signed indicating the detectives made no promises or
threats to him. He develops no challenge to the circuit court’s finding in this regard.
¶18 According to Reimer’s own testimony, the detectives certainly were
not attempting to trick him; at his house, they frankly told him “they wanted to …
check out any computer that I might have … just to make sure I wasn’t in possession
of [child pornography].” And, as Reimer further testified, he “said yes,” allowing
them to check his laptop because he thought he had nothing to hide, and he “just …
thought it was the right thing to do.” He thought he had nothing to hide because he
believed he had previously deleted all of the child pornography. Reimer also
testified he felt he “had” to talk to the officers because “that was just like the natural
next step” and he thought he “had” to give them the laptop because “they asked if I
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
had any computers or stuff like that … to give them.” But, as the circuit court
recognized, Reimer’s cooperation was due to his own “internal … pressure to
cooperate,” noting that he “grew up with respect for law enforcement” and that this
pressure was “a product more to do with maybe his own regret, remorse, maybe
getting it off his chest.”
¶19 We see no improper tactics utilized by the detectives in the first
instance, and we conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that
Reimer’s statements to the detectives and his consent to search his laptop were
voluntary in every respect. Thus, we also conclude the court did not err in denying
Reimer’s suppression motion.
¶20 As to his sentence, Reimer challenges it on two bases. At sentencing,
the circuit court informed him that because his conviction was for the possession of
child pornography, it did not have the discretion to impose a sentence with less than
three years of initial confinement. On appeal, he claims the court did have said
discretion, but he also concedes we have already decided this issue in a manner
contrary to his position in State v. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70, 371 Wis. 2d 647,
886 N.W.2d 100, and he further concedes that under Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d
166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), we “may not overrule, modify or withdraw
language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals.” Because of
his concessions, we discuss this no further.
¶21 As to Reimer’s second sentencing challenge, he claims “the Circuit
Court should have had the discretion to sentence [him] to less than the mandatory
minimum” because, he claims, “at the time he knowingly possessed the images he
was within 48 months of the child depicted in the images.” Because Reimer
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No. 2022AP1874-CR
forfeited this issue due to failing to raise it before the circuit court and because he
has insufficiently developed it on appeal, we do not consider it.
By the Court.––Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).
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