Jackson County v. C. A. D.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 17, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2020AP69 Cir. Ct. No. 2018ME21
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF C. A. D.:
JACKSON COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
C. A. D.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Jackson County:
ANNA L. BECKER, Judge. Dismissed.
¶1 NASHOLD, J.1 C.A.D. appeals a February 1, 2019 order of the
circuit court extending his involuntary commitment for a 12-month period. The
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP69
extension, also referred to in this opinion as a recommitment, expired on or about
February 1, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that C.A.D.’s
challenge to the recommitment order is moot and that C.A.D. has not shown that
an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Accordingly, C.A.D.’s appeal is
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
¶2 C.A.D. has been diagnosed with Substance Use Disorder, Severe,
and Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type, Severe. Pursuant to WIS. STAT.
ch. 51, C.A.D. was involuntarily committed to mental health treatment by a circuit
court order entered on July 11, 2018. An order for involuntary medication and
treatment was entered on the same date.
¶3 Jackson County petitioned for an extension of C.A.D.’s commitment
on December 21, 2018. A jury trial was held on the petition on February 1, 2019.
The jury found that C.A.D. was mentally ill, was dangerous to himself or others,
and was a proper subject for treatment. In an order entered on February 1, 2019,
the court extended C.A.D.’s involuntary commitment for a period of 12 months. It
is from this order that C.A.D. filed a notice of appeal on January 9, 2020.2
2
On December 12, 2019, prior to C.A.D. filing his notice of appeal in the instant case,
the County again petitioned to extend C.A.D.’s commitment for an additional 12 months. C.A.D.
filed a request for a jury trial, and on January 15, 2020, the circuit court issued an order extending
C.A.D.’s commitment for 64 days, until March 19, 2020, “at which time a jury trial will be held
to determine if further extension of [C.A.D.’s] commitment is warranted.” The record does not
reveal any further proceedings, and, although the final brief in this case was filed on July 28,
2020, the parties do not address the second extension. Thus, this opinion does not discuss the
second extension further.
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DISCUSSION
¶4 C.A.D. makes two arguments on appeal. First, C.A.D. argues that
Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am), is unconstitutional
as applied to him, and second, C.A.D. contends that the County failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is dangerous, a prerequisite to a
commitment extension under § 51.20(1)(a)2. and (1)(am). Because I agree with
the County that C.A.D.’s appeal is moot, I do not reach the merits of C.A.D.’s
challenges to his recommitment.
¶5 Mootness is an issue that this court reviews de novo. Waukesha
Cty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140. “‘An issue is
moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying
controversy.’” Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶11, 386 Wis. 2d 672,
927 N.W.2d 509 (quoting PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis.
2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559). This court generally declines to reach moot issues but
may choose to do so in “exceptional or compelling circumstances.” See id., ¶12
(quoted source and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may overlook
mootness if an issue falls within one of five exceptions: (1) the issue is of great
public importance; (2) the issue involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) the
issue arises often and a decision from this court is essential; (4) the issue is likely
to recur and must be resolved to avoid uncertainty; or (5) the issue is likely to
repeat and yet evades review. See id.
¶6 In arguing that C.A.D.’s recommitment is a moot issue, the County
relies on J.W.K. and on Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1,
366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109. In Christopher S., our supreme court concluded
that Christopher S.’s challenge to an expired initial commitment order was moot.
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See Christopher S., 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶30-31. However, the court nevertheless
addressed the issues raised in that case, concluding that they were of great public
importance and were likely to evade review. Id., ¶¶30, 32. J.W.K. also addressed
mootness but, like this case, J.W.K. involved a recommitment order rather than an
initial commitment order. The J.W.K. court considered whether J.W.K.’s
challenge to a 2016 recommitment order was rendered moot because the 2016
order expired after the court again extended J.W.K.’s commitment in 2017 under a
separate order. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶1.
¶7 In concluding that J.W.K.’s challenge was moot, the court stated:
“Reversing the expired 2016 order for insufficient evidence would have no effect
on subsequent recommitment orders because later orders stand on their own under
the language of the statute.” Id. The court further stated that “[a]n appeal of an
expired commitment order is moot,” and that reversing the expired order “‘will
have no practical effect on the underlying controversy’” because J.W.K. “is no
longer subject to the 2016 order.” Id., ¶14 (quoting PRN Assocs., 317 Wis. 2d
656, ¶25).3
¶8 C.A.D. argues that his case is distinguishable from Christopher S.
and J.W.K. because, unlike C.A.D., the appellants in those cases did not assert that
collateral consequences resulted from the expired commitment orders. C.A.D.
3
On August 20, 2020, our supreme court accepted review in Portage County v. E.R.R.,
No. 2019AP2033, unpublished slip op. (WI App May 21, 2020). As was also true in Portage
County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, the E.R.R. court determined
that E.R.R.’s challenge to his recommitment order was moot because a new order extending his
commitment had been entered and E.R.R. was therefore no longer subject to the recommitment
order at issue on appeal. E.R.R., No. 2019AP2033, ¶10. In the instant case, both the challenged
12-month recommitment order and the subsequent 64-day recommitment order have expired, and
the record does not reveal any further proceedings or indicate whether C.A.D. is currently
committed.
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observes that, in J.W.K., the court specifically stated that its mootness holding was
“limited to situations where, as here, no collateral implications of the commitment
order are raised.” See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶28 n.11. C.A.D. contends that,
although he is no longer subject to the recommitment order, his challenge to the
order is not moot because he is subject to three collateral consequences: (1) a
firearms ban; (2) the stigma associated with being subject to an involuntary
commitment order; and (3) possible liability for costs of his care.
¶9 According to C.A.D., his case is instead governed by Marathon
County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. In that case, D.K.
was civilly committed, and he appealed the commitment order. Id., ¶¶11-13. Five
days after his notice of appeal was filed, D.K.’s commitment order expired, and
the County did not seek an extension. See id., ¶13. The County argued that
D.K.’s challenge to his commitment was moot because his commitment had
expired and the issue did not fall within any of the exceptions to the mootness
doctrine. Id., ¶20. Like C.A.D., D.K. argued that his appeal was not moot
because, even though his commitment had expired, three collateral consequences
of his commitment remained: liability for costs of his care; a firearms prohibition;
and the negative stigma attached to a mental commitment. Id. The court agreed
with D.K. that his appeal was not moot, concluding: “On appeal, a decision in
D.K.’s favor would void the firearms ban and therefore have a ‘practical effect.’
Thus, we conclude that D.K.’s commitment is not a moot issue because it still
subjects him to the collateral consequence of a firearms ban.” Id., ¶25.4
4
Because the firearms ban in itself was sufficient to render D.K.’s challenge to his
commitment not moot, the court declined to address D.K.’s costs of care or negative stigma
arguments. Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 n.7, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901.
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¶10 However, unlike D.K., the instant case involves an appeal from an
extension order, not an initial commitment order. As noted by the County, the
firearms ban here was imposed in both the original commitment order and in the
recommitment order. Both orders specifically state that the firearms prohibition
“shall remain in effect until lifted by the court” and that “[e]xpiration of the mental
commitment proceeding does not terminate this restriction.” There is no
indication in the record, nor does C.A.D. assert, that the firearms ban was ever
lifted following its initial imposition. Thus, as argued by the County, even if the
recommitment order were reversed, the firearms prohibition would still apply.
¶11 As stated, the D.K. court’s determination that D.K.’s appeal was not
moot was based on the court’s conclusion that “a decision in D.K.’s favor would
void the firearms ban and therefore have a ‘practical effect.’” Id. In contrast to
D.K., the question here is whether a decision reversing the 12-month extension
would impact the firearms ban. Because C.A.D. has failed to show that a decision
in his favor would “void the firearms ban” and therefore have a practical effect,
see id., this case is distinguishable from D.K.
¶12 C.A.D. argues that the extension order could have an impact on his
ability to have the firearms prohibition lifted. C.A.D. states that a person banned
from possessing a firearm following an involuntary commitment may petition the
circuit court to cancel the ban, and that, pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b., the circuit court may grant such a request only if, among
other things, “the individual’s record and reputation indicate that the individual is
not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the
petition would not be contrary to public interest.” Id. C.A.D. argues that the
number of commitments or extensions a person has on his or her record “is
relevant” to the court’s determination of whether an individual is likely to act in a
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manner dangerous to public safety. As a result, he asserts: “The firearms ban
associated with C.A.D.’s commitment extension and the extension’s implications
for his ability to obtain a cancellation of the ban are therefore real and substantial
collateral consequences of the recommitment order.”
¶13 However, C.A.D.’s conclusory assertion, without more, is
insufficient to show that the firearms ban, or an inability to get the ban lifted,
results from the 12-month extension challenged in this case. Thus, he has not
shown that reversing the recommitment order underlying this appeal would impact
the firearms ban. Accordingly, vacating this extension order would have no
practical effect on C.A.D.’s firearm restriction. See Sauk Cty. v. S.A.M., No.
2019AP1033, unpublished slip op. ¶12 (WI App Sept. 3, 2020); Milwaukee Cty. v.
E.C.H., No. 2019AP772, unpublished slip op. ¶11 (WI App Jan. 14, 2020).
¶14 The same rationale applies with respect to the social stigma that
C.A.D. asserts is associated with the recommitment order in this case. C.A.D.
does not explain why any potential social stigma would be the result of the 12-
month extension rather than from the initial commitment itself. Nor has C.A.D.
alleged that he has suffered from any particular social stigma associated with
either his initial commitment or the extension of his commitment. See S.A.M.,
No. 2019AP1033, ¶13; E.C.H., No. 2019AP772, ¶10.
¶15 As to C.A.D.’s argument that a reversal of the recommitment order
“would have financial consequences for him” because an individual committed
under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 is “normally liable for the costs of care,” I note that
C.A.D. has not alleged any actual monetary liability for which he has been or will
be held responsible. C.A.D.’s hypothetical liability does not constitute a
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consequence sufficient to avoid application of the mootness doctrine in this case.
See S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, ¶14; E.C.H., No. 2019AP772, ¶12.
¶16 Because C.A.D. has not shown that collateral consequences have
resulted or will result from the 12-month extension in this case, I apply the holding
in J.W.K. that the “appeal of [his] expired [re]commitment order is moot.” See
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶14. Finally, C.A.D. does not argue that any of the five
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, nor does my independent review reveal
that any of these “exceptional or compelling circumstances” are presented by this
case. See id., ¶12.
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the reasons stated, C.A.D.’s appeal is dismissed as moot.
By the Court.—Appeal dismissed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)4.
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