State v. Robin David Smolarek

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 16, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2021AP2054-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CT188
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
ROBIN DAVID SMOLAREK,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waupaca County:
TROY NIELSEN, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 NASHOLD, J.1 Robin David Smolarek appeals from a judgment of
conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted
controlled substance (Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC) in his blood, as a
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2019-20).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version.
No. 2021AP2054-CR
third offense. See WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(am) (“No person may drive or operate a
motor vehicle while … [t]he person has a detectable amount of a restricted
controlled substance in his or her blood.”); WIS. STAT. § 340.01(50m)(e)
(“restricted controlled substance” includes THC). Smolarek argues that his arrest
was not supported by probable cause and that the circuit court therefore erred in
denying his motion to suppress blood draw evidence obtained pursuant to
Wisconsin’s implied consent law. See WIS. STAT. § 343.305. I conclude that the
court did not clearly err in finding that Smolarek admitted to the arresting officer
that he had smoked marijuana not long before driving. I further conclude that
Smolarek’s admission is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest.
Accordingly, I affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 At approximately 7:00 in the evening, Smolarek was involved in an
accident while driving his motorcycle. A short time later that night, a law
enforcement officer met with Smolarek at his friend’s residence to question him
about the accident. The officer observed that Smolarek needed medical assistance;
another individual drove Smolarek to the hospital, and the officer followed him
there.
¶3 Beginning at the residence and continuing at the hospital, the officer
asked Smolarek questions about the accident. The officer initially had no grounds
to believe that Smolarek had been driving under the influence. As part of the
interview, however, the officer asked Smolarek routine questions about his alcohol
and drug use that day. According to the officer, Smolarek admitted that he had
smoked marijuana before driving his motorcycle. Based on this admission, the
officer placed Smolarek under arrest and read him the Informing the Accused
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No. 2021AP2054-CR
form. Smolarek consented to a blood test, which showed that his blood contained
THC (indicating marijuana use).
¶4 Smolarek moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the
ground that he was not lawfully under arrest when his blood was drawn.
Specifically, Smolarek disputed that he had told the officer that he had smoked
marijuana before driving, and he argued that there was no other evidence
providing probable cause to arrest. Following a suppression hearing, the circuit
court denied the motion, and Smolarek pled no contest. Smolarek appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Principles of Law and Standard of Review
¶5 Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin
Constitution, an arrest must be supported by probable cause. State v. Secrist, 224
Wis. 2d 201, 208-09, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999). Probable cause is an objective
standard; the inquiry is whether “the quantum of evidence within the arresting
officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest … would [have led] a reasonable
police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed or was committing
a crime.” Id. at 212. For probable cause to exist, “there must be more than a
possibility or suspicion that the defendant committed an offense, but the evidence
need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is
more likely than not.” Id. Probable cause is “assessed on a case-by-case basis,
looking at the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶20,
317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551.
¶6 An appellate court’s review of a probable cause determination
presents a mixed question of fact and law. County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231
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No. 2021AP2054-CR
Wis. 2d 293, 316, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). This court will uphold findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous, but it will determine de novo whether those facts satisfy
the standard for probable cause. Id.II. Application to Smolarek’s Appeal
¶7 Smolarek does not dispute that it is a crime for him to have driven
his motorcycle with the amount of a restricted controlled substance (i.e., THC)
detected in his blood. Smolarek argues, however, that the result of this blood test
must be suppressed because his consent was obtained pursuant to an unlawful
arrest. Specifically, Smolarek argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding
that he had admitted to the officer that he had smoked marijuana before driving
and, therefore, that there was no probable cause to arrest him.
¶8 At the suppression hearing, the officer testified to the following.
Smolarek initially told the officer that he had smoked marijuana in the early- to
mid-afternoon, prior to the vehicle accident that evening. Based on this
admission, the officer placed Smolarek under arrest and obtained his consent for a
blood draw. In the hours after his arrest, however, Smolarek changed his story.
Smolarek claimed to have smoked marijuana only after the accident, at which
time, he claimed, he also took a shower. The officer testified that Smolarek’s
appearance belied aspects of his changed story: when she first met with him, he
did not appear to have recently taken a shower, and he was still wearing bloody
clothes from the accident. Smolarek did not testify at the hearing.
¶9 The circuit court found that Smolarek had admitted to the officer that
he had smoked marijuana before, and not after, operating the motorcycle. The
court credited the officer’s account, remarked that Smolarek “was being less than
honest” to the officer about having showered and smoked marijuana after the
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No. 2021AP2054-CR
accident, and concluded that this later claim of smoking marijuana after the
accident “doesn’t bear out.”
¶10 Smolarek points out that there were facts before the circuit court
supporting the alternative conclusion that he had smoked marijuana after, and not
before, the accident. Specifically, Smolarek points to a witness statement that he
wrote shortly after his arrest, which states as much. However, Smolarek’s
argument reflects a misunderstanding of the scope of this court’s review. On
appeal, this court cannot rely on this written statement to independently conclude
that Smolarek’s later account is truthful. Rather, this court must defer to the
circuit court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence, see State v.
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), and cannot overturn
findings of fact so long as the evidence would permit a reasonable fact finder to
reach that conclusion, see Reusch v. Roob, 2000 WI App 76, ¶8, 234 Wis. 2d 270,
610 N.W.2d 168. Here, the circuit court’s factual findings are based on its
determination, amply supported by the officer’s testimony, that Smolarek initially
told the officer that he had smoked marijuana before driving and that he later
retracted this admission once he was arrested. I have no basis to overturn this
finding.
¶11 Smolarek further implies that his admission to the officer that he
smoked marijuana before driving cannot, in and of itself, provide probable cause
to arrest. Smolarek appears to argue that the officer needed corroborating
evidence that he was operating with a restricted controlled substance in his blood
before arresting him. This argument ignores the probable cause standard, namely,
that probable cause is a flexible, “totality of the circumstances” inquiry that takes
into account the common sense and judgment of the arresting officer. Lange, 317
Wis. 2d 383, ¶20. Moreover, Smolarek cites no law for the proposition that
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No. 2021AP2054-CR
probable cause to arrest cannot be based solely on the defendant’s admitting to
criminal conduct. Accordingly, I do not address this argument further. See Young
v. Young, 124 Wis. 2d 306, 312, 369 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1985) (appellate
courts may “refuse to consider an argument without legal authority specifically
supporting the relevant propositions”).
¶12 Because there was probable cause to arrest Smolarek, the results of
the blood test were admissible. Accordingly, there is no basis to overturn his
conviction.2
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
2
In its response brief, the State cites a “narrative report” of the officer that is included in
the State’s appendix. This “narrative report” is not in the record; therefore, I do not consider its
substance in this decision. I remind the parties that all documents relevant to their appeal must be
in the record and cannot be introduced through an appendix to the appellate briefing. See WIS.
STAT. RULES 809.15, 809.19(1)(e).
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