DocketNumber: No. 9313
Citation Numbers: 20 S.E.2d 797, 124 W. Va. 81
Judges: FOX, PRESIDENT:
Filed Date: 2/24/1942
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
In my judgment there should be an affirmance of this case solely on the ground that on the merits of the case as made before the Commissioner of Agriculture, the appellant has failed to show any error in the Commissioner's decision that it was not entitled to a permit to operate a public market at the place intended. In my judgment, it is not legally possible for the appellant to raise, or for this Court to consider, the question of the constitutionality of the act under which the appellant's petition was filed and the permit sought. This conclusion, it seems to me, inevitably results from the rule of law, universal so far as I can ascertain, that one who, by a proceeding before a public official, board, or commission, or in court, seeks *Page 93 benefits or privileges provided by a statute cannot, at least, in the same proceeding, question the constitutionality of that statute.
The case of Buck v. Kuykendall,
The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken often on various phases of this question, sometimes in terms less limited than the pronouncement in Buck v. Kuykendall, supra. In the later case of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission ofKentucky,
"It is the rule of this Court, consistently applied, that one who has invoked action by state courts or authorities under state statutes may not later, when dissatisfied with the result, assail their action on the theory that the statutes under which the action was taken offend against the Constitution of the United States. * * * The sound discretion which controls the exercise of the extraordinary *Page 94 powers of a federal court of equity should not permit them to be exerted to relieve suitors on such a ground from the very action of state authorities which they have invoked."
It will thus be seen that the Supreme Court of the United States has not adhered to so much of the holding inBuck v. Kuykendall as would say that in order to be estopped a plaintiff or petitioner must have made claim to benefits under the statute in the very proceeding in which he attacks the statute. In the case now at bar, however, we need not go beyond the principle conceded in Buck v. Kuykendall, since the appellant originally sought a certificate in this proceeding under the identical statute which he now says is unconstitutional.
This State has, apparently, recognized the soundness and propriety of this rule. In the case of State v. Jackson,
"The pleadings do not raise this constitutional question. The petition does not and could not do so for it asks mandamus to compel the issuance of a certificate of authority under that act. To aver that the act is unconstitutional would be to admit that the petition should be refused, and the writ dismissed. One who asks for a license under an act or receives benefits thereunder is estopped from denying its validity." (Italics supplied.)
The Supreme Court of Virginia is in agreement with this principle. In Purcell v. Conrad,
"It is, however, contended, in the second place, that the act of March 4, 1884, is unwarranted by the constitution, * * *." But, manifestly, all this is beside the present case, and cannot be considered on this appeal for two reasons: First, because no such question is raised in the pleadings; and, secondly, because the appellee, having availed himself of the benefit of the statute, and in his bill claiming under it, is estopped in this litigation from contesting its validity, whether it be constitutional or not." (Italics in original report.)
In an earlier case, Roanoke City v. Berkowitz,
"But it is unnecessary to dwell upon this point. Clearly, the city cannot be heard to deny the validity of the statute under which it has chosen to proceed."
From a few of the legion of state cases, I will quote. In the case of Fulton Waterworks Co. v. Bear Lithia Springs Co.,
The majority of the Court in the present case apparently concede the correctness and binding character of this general rule, but rely upon an exception thereto, under which it is held that the appellant may be heard, and quote from 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 124, p. 771, where it is stated that:
"The most important and frequent class of exceptions to the general doctrine of waiver or estoppel to assert the invalidity of a law is that where a statute requires a duty which is mandatory in form, accompanied by penalties for failure to obey its provisions, or is otherwise coercive." (Italics supplied.)
The statute here under review contains no element of a mandatory character. The appellant was not compelled to take out a license. It was not required, in any sense, to conduct a stock market. It never had conducted such a market. The statute merely provided that this appellant, and all others who might elect to conduct a market, must first obtain the certificate by the statute required. This is not in any sense a mandatory statute. Nor is the statute "otherwise coercive." It is true that the appellant is forbidden under a monetary penalty of fifty dollars to conduct a public market without the license required by the statute, but in no case cited in American Jurisprudence to illustrate the exception mentioned, is such a prohibition contested as coercive in the sense in which the word is there used. In fact, in none of the cases so cited has "coercion" been held to condone a plaintiff or petitioner who is asking a privilege under a statute and challenging its validity in the same proceeding. Nor can it be said that the appellant here had no other adequate remedy for testing the constitutionality of the act in question. The reported cases, readily available to the bar, will disclose a variety of ways in which the constitutionality of a statute may be determined without the anomaly and inconsistency of both claiming under and challenging it in one proceeding.
However, since, by the judgment of the other members *Page 98 of the Court, the constitutional question is let into the case, I record my opinion as being in favor of the validity of the statute in question.
Piccolo v. West Haven , 120 Conn. 449 ( 1935 )
Brady v. Place , 41 Idaho 747 ( 1925 )
Buck v. Kuykendall , 45 S. Ct. 324 ( 1925 )
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission , 49 S. Ct. 150 ( 1929 )
On Motion to Retax Costs , 41 Idaho 753 ( 1926 )
Oren v. Swift Company , 330 Mo. 869 ( 1932 )