DocketNumber: 11025
Citation Numbers: 106 S.E.2d 920, 144 W. Va. 103, 1959 W. Va. LEXIS 2
Judges: Berry, Browning
Filed Date: 2/24/1959
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/16/2024
- The claimant and appellee, Lucille Claytor, filed an application for compensation with the State Compensation Commissioner for herself and dependent children under the West Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act, following the death of her husband, Luther Claytor, on May 22, 1956, which occurred while he was working in the plant of the Standard Ultramarine and Color Company of Huntington, West Virginia. The State Compensation Commissioner held that the claim was compen-sable, and upon appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, said holding was affirmed. It is from this action that this appeal is prosecuted by the employer or appellant.
Luther Claytor, the decedent, and Robert Johnson, the man who is responsible for his death, were both employees of the appellant. They were engaged in the same kind of work before the fatal injury on May 22, 1956, but worked on different crews. Neither man had any supervision over the other.
Several days before the fatal injury, Robert Johnson was transferred from his regular crew and assigned to work with the crew of which Luther Claytor was a member. Claytor had the reputation of being rather talkative •and accustomed to kidding his fellow workers. In the course of their work which consisted of loading kilns there apparently had been certain “horseplay” on the part of the workers while engaged in the course of their
On the day the fatal injury was inflicted by Johnson, Claytor and another employee, Frank Reed, who was working on the same crew, were kidding Johnson with regard to the speed with which they worked. This had been planned by the men on the crew to which Johnson had been newly assigned and was not seriously intended by the men, but only as a joke. The day before Claytor’s death he had been bragging to Johnson that he was faster and better than Johnson and that Johnson was too slow to keep up with him. This continued for some time until Reed noticed that Johnson was not taking the matter as a joke and was becoming quite angry. Reed, upon noticing this attitude on the part of Johnson, told Clay-tor to leave Johnson alone. Claytor refused to stop his kidding of Johnson and indicated that he was going to continue, and did. Johnson told Claytor to leave him alone, that he didn’t want to hurt him and Claytor merely replied to the effect that he was not going to leave him alone and that he, Johnson, had never hurt anybody. It was at that time that Johnson hit Claytor in the head with a shovel which caused his death. After Johnson hit Claytor with the shovel he simply said, “I told him to leave me alone.” As a result of the incident, he was relieved of his work a short time later by his employer.
Robert Johnson was tried in the Common Pleas Court of Cabell County, West Virginia, for the murder of Luther Claytor, and found not guilty.
It is agreed that the fatal injury was received in the course of employment, but it is the appellant’s contention that it did not result from his employment. This is the only question to be decided in this case.
That the injury must result from employment before such injury is compensable is clear by the language of the statute and decided cases. Code 23-4-10. Damron v. Commissioner, 109 W. Va. 343, 155 S. E. 119; Archibald v. Compensation Commissioner, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. E. 791.
Although such question as is involved in this case has not been directly decided by this Court, it has clearly indicated that such cases are not compensable. Jn the case of Archibald v. Compensation Commissioner, supra, at pages 450 and 451 Judge Poffenbarger said: “Instances of injuries deemed not to have arisen out of the employment, although sustained in the course thereof, are found in the reported cases. An injury intentionally inflicted upon one workman by another, by a blow from a piece of iron thrown in anger, or by an assault and battery, is of that kind. * * * It is quite easy to perceive that violence of a fellow-workman or a stranger arises, not out of the work, but out of the vicious or irritable disposition of the assailant and that play or diversion, on the premises, is a step outside of the employment and a thing done for the employee himself and not for the employer. In none of these instances, is the occasion-of the injury an incident of the work.” [emphasis supplied]
It is true that the Archibald case held that an employee’s death which was caused by drinking poisonous fluid which he thought was water, while he was working on the premises of the employer, was an injury which arose in the course of his employment and as a result thereof. However, it is clear from the language of the case stated
A case where an employee is injured as a result of a purely personal matter is distinguished from a case such as Burdette v. Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 348, 167 S. E. 869, where an employee was required to face unusual risks by the employer and an assault and injury resulted therefrom, because the injuries in such case were received in the course of and as a result from his employment. The same distinction can be made in the case of Crowder v. Commissioner, 115 W. Va. 12, 174 S. E. 480, wherein it was held that injuries received by an employee caused by a third person who was angered because of the manner in which a certain feature of the employer’s business was managed was compensable. The altercation in this case did not have anything to do with the employment. The men involved were fellow workmen and none had any supervision over the other. The men were on the employer’s premises to load kilns and not to kid each other or to quarrel among themselves, and if an employee was injured as a result of the kidding or “horseplay”, or a personal quarrel, it was purely a personal matter between the individual employees and had nothing to do with their employment. Therefore such injury did not result from the employment and is not compensable under the West Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act.
It is true that some cases from other jurisdictions hold such injuries as involved in the case at bar as compen-sable, but these cases do not express the view and holding of the cases decided by this Court under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this state.
For the reasons stated herein, the orders of the Appeal Board and the Compensation Commissioner are reversed and the case remanded to the Compensation Commissioner.
Reversed and remanded.