Jeannette Wakim, as personal representative v. Christopher Pavlic, as personal representative, etc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September Term 2017
FILED
_______________ September 21, 2017
released at 3:00 p.m.
No. 16-0906 RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
_______________ OF WEST VIRGINIA
JEANNETTE WAKIM, as personal representative
of the Last Will and Testament of Lawrence J. Belt,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
v.
CHRISTOPHER PAVLIC, as personal representative
of the Last Will and Testament of Lila Belt,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent
_______________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ohio County
The Honorable Ronald E. Wilson, Judge
Civil Action No. 13-C-89
_____________
REVERSED AND REMANDED
_______________
Submitted: September 13, 2017
Filed: September 21 , 2017
Robert G. McCoid, Esq. Elgine Heceta McArdle, Esq.
McCamic, Sacco & McCoid, PLLC McArdle Law Office
Wheeling, West Virginia Wheeling, West Virginia
Paul J. Harris, Esq. Counsel for the Respondent
Shawn L. Fluharty, Esq.
Harris Law Offices
Wheeling, West Virginia
Counsel for the Petitioner
JUSTICE KETCHUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “A joint tenancy is created in money deposited in a bank in the names of two or
more persons, ‘in form to be paid to either,’ under Code, 31-8-23 [currently W.Va. Code,
31A-4-33], and the same may be withdrawn by any of the persons so named. In the event
of the death of one or more of such depositors, a sole survivor is entitled to the entire
amount remaining in such deposit.” Syl., Lett v. Twentieth Street Bank, 138 W.Va. 759,
77 S.E.2d 813 (1953).
2. “Prior to the death of a donor depositor, a rebuttable presumption exists under
the provisions of Code, 1931, 31A-4-33, as amended, that the ownership of the funds is
joint, a presumption which may be overcome by competent evidence.” Syl. pt. 3, Dorsey
v. Short, 157 W.Va. 866, 205 S.E.2d 687 (1974).
Justice Ketchum:
This appeal concerns the disposition of funds withdrawn from joint bank accounts
owned by Lawrence Belt and Lila Belt during their marriage. The funds were withdrawn
from the joint accounts by Lawrence. Several months after the withdrawals, Lila filed for
divorce but died while the divorce action was pending. The divorce action was dismissed
with prejudice and without any rulings regarding any marital property. Lawrence died
thereafter.
Lawrence’s estate, through his executrix Jeannette Wakim (the petitioner), and Lila’s
estate, through her executor Christopher Pavlic (the respondent), are now fighting over
ownership of the funds Lawrence withdrew from the joint accounts before Lila filed for
divorce. The funds are currently in an IOLTA account held on Lawrence’s behalf.
The Circuit Court of Ohio County split the funds in half, not on the basis of divorce
law, but simply to prevent the perceived unjust enrichment of Lawrence’s estate. Wakim,
as executrix of Lawrence’s estate, appeals to this Court from the circuit court’s decision.
We reverse the circuit court and conclude that Lawrence had the right to withdraw the
funds from the joint accounts by virtue of W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33 [1994], which states that
1
bank deposits may be paid to any named depositor, or the survivor of them, of an account
held in joint tenancy. Here, the bank accounts were joint accounts with the right of
survivorship, and we note that withdrawals were made by both Lawrence and Lila,
independently, during the marriage. The funds withdrawn by Lawrence during the marriage
became the sole property of Lawrence upon their withdrawal.
The circuit court’s ruling splitting the funds in half and granting summary judgment
in favor of Lila’s estate is reversed; judgment is entered in favor of Wakim as executrix of
Lawrence’s estate; and this action is remanded with directions to enter an order releasing the
funds in the IOLTA account to Lawrence’s estate.
I. Factual Background
Lawrence and Lila were married on November 29, 1975. Although no children were
born of the marriage, Lawrence had at least one child from a previous marriage and two
granddaughters, Jennifer Swiger and petitioner Wakim. Lila had three children from a
previous marriage: respondent Christopher Pavlic, Mark Pavlic and Karen Cutter. Lawrence
and Lila appeared to be financially secure during their 36 year marriage.
On October 5, 2006, Lila executed a Will in which she devised and bequeathed her
entire estate to Lawrence. She named as co-executors Christopher Pavlic and Mark Pavlic.
2
The Will provided that, if Lawrence were to predecease Lila, her estate would go to
Christopher and Mark, share and share alike. Although Lila’s daughter, Karen Cutter, was
not included in the Will, Lila executed a document, also dated October 5, 2006, stating that
Karen is mentally incompetent and providing that, if Lawrence is deceased, the co-executors
would have the discretion to include Karen in the proceeds of Lila’s estate.
On September 12, 2008, Lawrence executed a Will in which he devised and
bequeathed his entire estate to Lila. Lawrence named Lila as executrix. The Will provided
that, if Lila were to predecease Lawrence, his estate would go to his granddaughters,
petitioner Wakim and Jennifer Swiger, share and share alike. Wakim was named as an
alternate executrix.
A. The Joint Accounts and Withdrawals
During the marriage, Lawrence and Lila opened a number of joint bank accounts
between 1999 and 2006 in their names with the right of survivorship. In June 2009, Lila was
diagnosed with cancer. Thereafter, on July 30, 2010, Lila opened two additional joint
accounts: the first in the names of Lawrence, Lila or Mark Pavlic and the second in the
names of Lawrence, Lila or respondent Christopher Pavlic.
3
In July 2011, Lila learned that her cancer was terminal. On July 15, 2011, Lawrence,
age 95, withdrew $242,773.62 from the joint accounts and placed the funds in new accounts
opened in his name only at the same banking institutions. Petitioner Wakim, Lawrence’s
executrix, asserts that Lawrence made the withdrawals to protect the assets upon learning that
Lila had transferred at least $68,819.30 to respondent Pavlic without Lawrence’s knowledge
and consent. Wakim contends that Lila, in her 80s, was under the undue influence of
respondent Pavlic. Conversely, Pavlic contends that Lawrence was under the undue
influence of petitioner Wakim.1
B. The Divorce Action and New Will
On October 17, 2011, Lila filed a divorce action in the Family Court of Ohio County
on the ground of irreconcilable differences.2 During the divorce proceedings, Lila filed a
motion for emergency, temporary relief alleging that Lawrence had removed in excess of
$200,000.00 in marital assets from the joint accounts. Lila sought an order directing
Lawrence to transfer half of the funds to Lila.
1
The circuit court found that Wakim and Pavlic were well aware of Lawrence and
Lila’s respective ages, Lawrence’s life expectancy, and Lila’s terminal illness.
2
The action was styled In re: The Marriage of Lila L. Belt v. Lawrence John Belt,
Civil Action No. 11-D-367 (Family Court of Ohio County - 2011).
4
Later, on October 21, 2011, Lila executed a new Will revoking her 2006 Will and
disinheriting Lawrence. The new Will stated: “I am currently married to Lawrence J. Belt,
but have retained an attorney to file for divorce. I leave Lawrence J. Belt nothing. I
disinherit him entirely.” The new Will gave $1.00 to Mark Pavlic and devised and
bequeathed the remainder of the estate to respondent Christopher Pavlic. Respondent Pavlic
was designated as sole executor. Although the new Will provided remote contingencies for
minors or incompetents, the new Will made no reference to Lila’s daughter, Karen Cutter.
The Family Court entered a temporary order on February 9, 2012, directing that
Lawrence place the funds he withdrew in escrow. As a result, the funds withdrawn by
Lawrence from the joint bank accounts were deposited in an IOLTA account maintained by
an attorney on Lawrence’s behalf.3 Soon after, on February 21, 2012, Lila, age 84, died
while the divorce action was pending. Upon the filing of a suggestion of death, the Family
Court entered an order on March 28, 2012, dismissing the divorce action “with prejudice.”
The Family Court made no rulings regarding the money Lawrence withdrew from the joint
bank accounts prior to dismissing the divorce action.
3
See Rule 1.15. of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the
safeguarding of client property in an IOLTA account (“Interest on Lawyers Trust
Account”).
5
II. Procedural Background
In March 2013, Pavlic, as Lila’s executor under the new Will, filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Circuit Court of Ohio County.4 Pavlic alleged that Lawrence, under
the undue influence of petitioner Wakim, “transferred, dissipated, or otherwise diminished”
funds belonging to the marital estate, thereby denying Lila access thereto.
Pavlic further alleged that, in view of Lila’s new Will disinheriting Lawrence,
Lawrence’s share of the funds would be limited to his elective share of Lila’s estate as
determined by W.Va. Code, 42-3-1 [1995]. That statute provides for a surviving spouses’s
right to an elective share, calculated in proportion to the length of the marriage, against
disinheritance under the decedent’s Will. The parties agree that Lawrence’s elective share
would be 50%.5 Consequently, Pavlic alleged that Lawrence’s remedy upon being
4
The complaint was styled Christopher Pavlic, as personal representative of the
Last Will and Testament of Lila L. Belt v. Lawrence John Belt, an individual, and Paul
Harris, as trustee for monies owned by Lawrence John Belt located within a client Trust
Account, and Jeannette Wakim, an individual, Civil Action No. 13-C-89 (Ohio County ­
2013). The record indicates that Wakim, individually, was dismissed from the action.
5
W.Va. Code, 42-3-1(a) [1995], states in part:
The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this State
has a right of election, against either the will or the intestate share, under
the limitations and conditions stated in this part, to take the elective-share
percentage of the augmented estate, determined by the length of time the
spouse and the decedent were married to each other, in accordance with the
following schedule: * * * 15 years or more - 50% of the augmented
6
disinherited would be through probate court, rather than claiming ownership of the funds
through his prior unilateral transfers from the joint bank accounts. Pavlic, therefore, asked
the circuit court to impose a constructive trust on the funds held in the IOLTA account
pending the outcome of probate proceedings regarding Lila’s new Will.
Lawrence filed a motion to dismiss which alleged that, because the divorce action was
dismissed with prejudice, the current action is barred by collateral estoppel. In response,
Pavlic asserted that the current action, which challenges the validity of Lawrence’s transfers
from the joint bank accounts, seeks declaratory relief rather than relief under any domestic
relations statute, and, therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply. The circuit court agreed
with Pavlic and denied the motion to dismiss. Lawrence then filed an answer alleging that,
as an owner of the joint bank accounts, he was entitled to all of the funds he withdrew by
operation of law.6
estate.
6
Lawrence also filed a counterclaim and alleged that Lila lacked the mental
capacity in October 2011 to form a testamentary intent to execute the new Will.
Therefore, according to Lawrence, the new Will should be set aside and Lila’s estate
probated under her 2006 Will in which she devised and bequeathed her entire estate to
Lawrence. In support, Lawrence alleged (1) that Lila’s new Will was the result of
Pavlic’s undue influence; (2) that Pavlic assumed responsibility for Lila when she became
ill with cancer but failed to provide a clean and safe environment for her care; and (3) that
Lila had transferred significant funds to respondent Pavlic, Mark Pavlic, and their
children.
7
In December 2013, the circuit court placed a temporary constructive trust on the funds
placed in the IOLTA account until the resolution of Lila’s estate in probate. Thereafter,
Pavlic filed a motion for summary judgment which alleged that Lila’s estate is entitled to the
funds in the IOLTA account, subject to Lawrence’s 50% elective share.
On October 29, 2015, the circuit court granted Pavlic’s motion for summary judgment
and confirmed the constructive trust imposed on the funds in the IOLTA account. The circuit
court concluded that, at the time of Lawrence’s withdrawals on July 15, 2011, the funds
would have been marital assets in the divorce action that had been previously dismissed
without any ruling on the parties’ property, including the joint bank accounts. The circuit
court determined that 50% of the funds in an amount to be determined belonged to Lila’s
estate, with the remaining 50% constituting Lawrence’s elective share of Lila’s estate under
W.Va. Code, 42-3-1 [1995].
Lawrence alternatively alleged in the counterclaim that, if Lila’s new Will is found
to be valid and enforceable, that Lawrence be permitted to execute his right to his elective
share pursuant to W.Va. Code, 42-3-1 [1995]. In that regard, Lawrence emphasized that
respondent Pavlic had already received a legacy from Lila’s estate because of the funds
transferred to Pavlic prior to Lila’s death.
The circuit court ruled that neither Lila’s 2006 Will nor the new 2011 Will were
relevant to the issue of Lawrence’s withdrawals from the joint accounts. We agree. The
current declaratory judgment action concerns the withdrawn funds presently in the
IOLTA account. As discussed herein, Lila’s new Will and Lawrence’s elective share are
not dispositive in this appeal.
8
The circuit court found no evidence of undue influence but noted that, in the divorce
action, Lila raised the issue of ownership of the funds Lawrence had withdrawn. The circuit
court stated that the type of joint accounts involved here “are opened with the intention that
they will jointly benefit both the husband and the wife, and with a further assumption that
when the joint accounts are opened it is not the intention of either spouse to unjustly enrich
the other or to deprive the child of either spouse their fair share of their parents’ money.”
On March 2, 2016, the circuit court entered an order finding the total funds withdrawn
to be $242,773.62 and awarding $121,386.81 to Lila’s estate and $121,386.81 to Lawrence.
Lawrence died on April 1, 2016. The circuit court entered an order on August 29, 2016,
clarifying its prior rulings, therein stating that both sides were to receive $121,386.81,
“without any further addition to Lawrence or any reduction to Lila’s estate.” Lawrence’s
executrix, petitioner Wakim, appeals to this Court from the rulings of the circuit court.
III. Standards of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for
summary judgment may be filed in a declaratory judgment action. A declaratory judgment
thus entered is reviewed by this Court de novo. Syllabus point 3 of Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va.
608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995), holds: “A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is
9
reviewed de novo.” Accord syl. pt. 1, Flanagan v. Stalnaker, 216 W.Va. 436, 607 S.E.2d 765
(2004).
In Cox, this Court observed that, because the purpose of a declaratory judgment action
is to resolve legal questions, “a circuit court’s ultimate resolution in a declaratory judgment
action is reviewed de novo; however, any determinations of fact made by the circuit court in
reaching its ultimate resolution are reviewed pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard.” 195
W.Va. at 612, 466 S.E.2d at 463. See W.Va. Code, 55-13-7 [1941] (Orders, judgments and
decrees entered under the West Virginia Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act “may be
reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.”).
IV. Discussion
A. The Terminated Divorce Action
The circuit court, in the declaratory judgment action, placed a constructive trust on the
IOLTA account and awarded half of the funds to Lila’s estate and half of the funds to
Lawrence’s estate. The circuit court reasoned that the funds were marital assets and, without
the constructive trust, Lawrence would have been unjustly enriched by the withdrawals. See
Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 382, 185 S.E.2d 343, 352 (1971) (“A constructive trust is
substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment.”).
10
Petitioner Wakim contends that, in awarding Lila’s estate half of the funds, the circuit
court committed error by posthumously reviving the divorce action even though no divorce
was granted and no order was entered regarding the property rights of the parties. Wakim
asserts that Lawrence, as an owner of the joint accounts, was entitled to withdraw the funds
by operation of law. Moreover, Lawrence’s complete ownership of the funds was confirmed
by his survivorship upon Lila’s death. Wakim further asserts that Lila had also withdrawn
funds from the accounts and that Lawrence’s withdrawals were made to protect the assets
when he learned that Lila had transferred at least $68,819.30 to Pavlic.7 Pavlic, however,
emphasizes that Lawrence and Lila agreed during the divorce action that no monies would
be removed from the IOLTA account without the other’s consent, and, as such, a constructive
trust was warranted which ultimately resulted in an equitable distribution of $121,386.81 to
each estate in the declaratory judgment action.
It is well established that actions for divorce are personal and terminate upon the death
of a party. Only those property rights finally adjudicated in a family court decree survive the
divorce. In syllabus point 1 of Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 182 W.Va. 677, 391 S.E.2d 367
(1990), this Court held: “Divorce actions, and appeals therefrom, abate at the death of a
7
In an affidavit dated December 4, 2014, Wakim stated that Lawrence left some
funds in the accounts for the care and maintenance of Lila and, in addition, “made
monthly contributions to her care, as well as paid Lila Belt’s medical bills.”
11
party, except as to property rights.” Accord syl. pt. 4, Zikos v. Clark, 214 W.Va. 235, 588
S.E.2d 400 (2003). In Bridgeman, a divorce decree was entered, and the husband was
ordered to pay alimony in the lump sum of $68,500.00, plus attorney fees and costs. The
husband died shortly after the divorce decree was entered. Nevertheless, this Court in
Bridgeman affirmed the ruling of the circuit court that the alimony award was chargeable
against the husband’s estate.8 Similarly, in Zikos v. Clark this Court remanded an action to
the lower court for a determination of alimony arrearages payable to the wife’s estate. In
Zikos, the wife died after the entry of the divorce decree which directed the husband to pay
alimony in the amount of $300.00 per month.
The circumstances here are very different. Lila died during the divorce proceedings,
and no divorce decree was entered. More importantly, no marital or individual property
rights were adjudicated in the divorce proceeding before it was dismissed. Although the
funds Lawrence withdrew were placed in the IOLTA account pending the outcome of the
divorce action, a constructive trust on the funds was not contemplated until the filing of the
current declaratory judgment action long after Lila died and the divorce action was
terminated. The constructive trust was imposed in the declaratory judgment action pursuant
8
See Whitlock ex rel. Pack v. Whitlock, 2013 WL 2462167 (W.Va. 2013) (Under
Bridgeman, an action may be maintained for “attendant property rights, if those rights
survive a party’s death and are enforceable in favor of, or against, a party’s estate.”).
12
to the circuit court’s December 2013 and October 2015 orders. The circuit court then
awarded half the funds to each estate on the basis of unjust enrichment, not on the basis of
divorce law. See, e.g., W.Va. Code, 48-5-508 [2001] (authorizing a constructive trust to
preserve property during pendency of divorce action).
This Court concludes that the divorce action is of no moment in resolving the issue
of Lawrence’s withdrawals from the joint bank accounts. The circuit court committed error
to the extent it posthumously revived the divorce action in its rulings below. See Francis M.
Dougherty, Annotation, Effect of Death of Party to Divorce Proceeding Pending Appeal or
Time Allowed for Appeal, 33 A.L.R. 4th 47 § 2 (1984) (Generally, a cause of action for
divorce is purely personal, and “if an action for a divorce is commenced, and one of the
parties dies thereafter but before the entry of the final decree, the action abates.”).
Moreover, the imposition of the constructive trust was unwarranted. The record
reveals, and the circuit court specifically found, no undue influence. Nor does the record
indicate that Lawrence or Lila lacked the mental capacity to make their respective
withdrawals from the joint accounts or to make and execute their Wills. Furthermore, the
record does not show that Lawrence diminished the withdrawn funds for his personal use.
To the contrary, petitioner Wakim maintains that Lawrence left some funds in the accounts
for Lila’s care, made later contributions for Lila’s benefit, and paid her medical bills. See
13
n. 7, supra. In In Re: Shiflett, 200 W.Va. 813, 821 n. 28, 490 S.E.2d 902, 910 n. 28 (1997),
we observed that a constructive trust is an implied trust and arises by operation of law “when
equity so demands.” In the current matter, the circuit court overreached its authority in
imposing the constructive trust on the IOLTA account.9
B. The Joint Accounts and Withdrawals
During the marriage, Lawrence and Lila opened a number of joint accounts with the
right of survivorship. On July 15, 2011, Lawrence withdrew funds from the joint accounts
and opened new accounts in his name only at the same banking institutions. According to
petitioner Wakim, Lawrence made the withdrawals to protect the assets upon learning that
Lila transferred at least $68,818.30 to Pavlic without Lawrence’s knowledge and consent.
Regardless of Lawrence’s intent, or Lila’s intent, the withdrawals in question made
by Lawrence, were governed by W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33(b) [1994], which states:
When a deposit is made by any person in the name of such depositor
and another or others and in form to be paid to any one of such depositors, or
the survivor or survivors of them, such deposit, and any additions thereto,
made by any of such persons, upon the making thereof, shall become the
9
See 76 Am. Jur.2d Trusts § 169 (2016): “[T]he doctrine of constructive trust
does not allow a court to disregard existing legal rights merely to fashion a result that it
deems fairer than that created by the parties. ‘Unfairness’ is not reason enough to impose
a constructive trust.”
14
property of such persons as joint tenants. All such deposits, together with all
interest thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of the persons so named,
and may be paid to any one of them during the lifetime of them, or to the
survivor or survivors after the death of any of them.
In a sworn statement, bank employee Dorothy Billetter indicated in layman’s terms
that the joint accounts were in a form which permitted either Lawrence or Lila to transfer
money or redeem certificates of deposit, “whatever they wanted to do.”
The syllabus point in Lett v. Twentieth Street Bank, 138 W.Va. 759, 77 S.E.2d 813
(1953), holds:
A joint tenancy is created in money deposited in a bank in the names of
two or more persons, “in form to be paid to either,” under Code, 31-8-23
[currently W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33], and the same may be withdrawn by any of
the persons so named. In the event of the death of one or more of such
depositors, a sole survivor is entitled to the entire amount remaining in such
deposit.
See Koontz v. Long, 181 W.Va. 800, 802, 384 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1989) (citing Lett and noting
that “when a party’s name is added as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship on a bank
or like account, there is a presumption that the person adding the joint tenant’s name intends
to make a gift of the funds in the account.”).
15
In syllabus point 3 of Dorsey v. Short, 157 W.Va. 866, 205 S.E.2d 687 (1974), we
stated: “Prior to the death of a donor depositor, a rebuttable presumption exists under the
provisions of Code, 1931, 31A-4-33, as amended, that the ownership of the funds is joint,
a presumption which may be overcome by competent evidence.” Accord syl. pt. 2, McComas
v. McComas, 178 W.Va. 133, 358 S.E.2d 217 (1987).
There is no evidence that Lawrence, age 95, withdrew the funds in contemplation of
divorce or that he depleted the funds thereafter. With relatively small deductions, the funds
in question were transferred intact from the joint bank accounts to Lawrence’s personal
accounts and then to the IOLTA account. Nor did Lawrence’s relationship to Lila reach the
level of a fiduciary duty with respect to her illness. As the circuit court suggested, the joint
bank accounts were opened for the benefit of both Lawrence and Lila, and Pavlic assumed
responsibility for Lila as her illness progressed. Denying unjust enrichment, petitioner
Wakim asserts on Lawrence’s behalf that Pavlic had already received substantial funds
through transfers by Lila.10
10
Although Lawrence gave Wakim a power of attorney in 2011, it played no part
regarding Lawrence’s July 15, 2011, withdrawals from the joint accounts. In the October
29, 2015, order, the circuit court stated: “The power of attorney held by Jeannette Wakim
is not relevant to this controversy because Lawrence Belt was the person who transferred
all of the money from the joint tenancy account of Lila Belt and Lawrence Belt to his
personal account.”
16
Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33(b) [1994], the funds in the joint bank accounts
were non-probate assets jointly owned by Lawrence and Lila, and Lawrence had a right to
withdraw the funds on July 15, 2011, as a matter of law. Lila’s withdrawals from the joint
accounts were also proper as a matter of law. Upon her death on February 21, 2012,
Lawrence was entitled to the balance of the funds left in the joint accounts by way of
survivorship. The funds are not part of Lila’s Estate. We find no evidence, including the
terminated divorce action or Lila’s new Will, which alters this result.
V. Conclusion
The withdrawals from the joint accounts by both Lawrence and Lila during the
marriage were proper under W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33 [1994], pertaining to joint bank accounts
with the right of survivorship. Consequently, the August 29, 2016, order of the Circuit Court
of Ohio County is reversed, judgment is entered in favor of petitioner Wakim as executrix
of Lawrence’s estate, and this action is remanded with directions to enter an order releasing
the funds in the IOLTA account to the estate of Lawrence Belt.
Reversed and Remanded.
17