In Re K.E. & K.E.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2018 Term
_______________ FILED
No. 17-0496 February 20, 2018
released at 3:00 p.m.
_______________ EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
In re K.E. & K.E.
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McDowell County
The Honorable Booker T. Stephens, Judge
Civil Action Nos. 16-JA-035, 036
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 23, 2018
Filed: February 20, 2018
William O. Huffman, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Law Office of William O. Huffman Attorney General
Princeton, West Virginia S. L. Evans, Esq.
Counsel for the Petitioners Assistant Attorney General
C.G. and K.G. Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for the Respondent
Department of Health and Human
Resources
Philip A. LaCaria, Esq.
Law Office of Philip A. LaCaria
Welch, West Virginia
Guardian ad Litem to K.E. and K.E.
JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to
de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts
without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and
shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or
neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly
erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the
finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not
overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must
affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety.” Syllabus Point 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va.
223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
2. “West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) provides for grandparent preference
in determining adoptive placement for a child where parental rights have been terminated
and also incorporates a best interests analysis within that determination by including the
requirement that the DHHR find that the grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents
prior to granting custody to the grandparents. The statute contemplates that placement with
grandparents is presumptively in the best interests of the child, and the preference for
grandparent placement may be overcome only where the record reviewed in its entirety
i
establishes that such placement is not in the best interests of the child.” Syllabus Point 4,
Napoleon S. v. Walker, 217 W. Va. 254, 617 S.E.2d 801 (2005).
3. “By specifying in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a)(3) that the home
study must show that the grandparents ‘would be suitable adoptive parents,’ the Legislature
has implicitly included the requirement for an analysis by the Department of Health and
Human Resources and circuit courts of the best interests of the child, given all
circumstances of the case.” Syllabus Point 5, Napoleon S. v. Walker, 217 W. Va. 254, 617
S.E.2d 801 (2005).
ii
WALKER, Justice:
Twins K.E. and K.E.1 were born dependent on drugs in April 2016. The
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) immediately placed
the Twins in foster care. Later, the Circuit Court of McDowell County terminated the
parental rights of their biological parents, and both their foster parents and their paternal
grandparents sought to provide the Twins with a permanent home. Relying on the
“grandparent preference” contained in West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) (2015), the
circuit court selected the grandparents for permanent placement.
At issue here is whether the circuit court correctly applied the grandparent
preference in permanently placing the Twins. On the particular circumstances of the
Twins’ case, and in light of our prior guidance regarding the application of that preference,
we conclude that it did not. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order awarding
permanent placement of the Twins to their paternal grandparents and remand this matter to
the circuit court for entry of an order requiring DHHR to gradually transition K.E. and K.E.
to the custody of C.G. and K.G., their foster parents.
1
We follow our traditional practice in cases involving sensitive facts and use initials
to identify the parties rather than their full names. See In the Matter of Scottie D., 185
W.Va. 191, 192 n.1, 406 S.E.2d 214, 215 n.1 (1991).
1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Twins were born in April 2016 at Welch Community Hospital in
McDowell County. Their mother, R.E., tested positive for cocaine, benzodiazepines, and
Suboxone at their birth. Following delivery, the Twins tested positive for cocaine and
showed signs of withdrawal. They were immediately transferred from Welch Community
Hospital to Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital in Roanoke, Virginia (Roanoke
Memorial), for treatment of their withdrawal symptoms. They remained at Roanoke
Memorial for the first few weeks of their lives. R.E. did not accompany them from Welch,
West Virginia, to Roanoke, Virginia, approximately 140 miles away.
DHHR immediately took protective custody of the Twins. DHHR did not
consider granting protective custody of the Twins to a member of R.E.’s family because
she had previously told DHHR that they were not “appropriate.” Instead, DHHR placed
the Twins with foster parents C.G. and K.G., who also cared for the Twins’ older, half-
brother T.N.2 C.G. and K.G. reside in Mercer County, West Virginia, where they work
and care for seven (7) other children. Yet, either C.G. or K.G. remained with the Twins at
Roanoke Memorial through the Twins’ hospitalization. No member of the Twins’
biological family visited them at Roanoke Memorial or asked DHHR to do so.
2
C.G. and K.G. adopted T.N. in November 2016. R.E. is the biological mother of
both T.N. and the Twins.
2
DHHR did not know the identity of the Twins’ biological father when they
were born in April 2016. In May 2016, however, R.E.’s long-time boyfriend, E.N., told
DHHR that he was “most likely” the Twins’ father. This could not be confirmed by DNA
testing, though, until September 2016 due to E.N.’s lack of cooperation. According to
DHHR reports, no biological relatives of the Twins—including E.N.’s parents—had
expressed interest in giving the Twins a home as of November 2016. The Twins’ biological
parents, E.N. and R.E., stopped attending proceedings in the Twins’ abuse and neglect case
after May 2016, and they made no efforts to enter drug rehabilitation as directed by DHHR.
Concluding that the biological parents’ actions “borderline[d] on abandonment,” the circuit
court terminated their parental rights in December 2016. Meanwhile, the Twins remained
in C.G. and K.G’s care. As of November 2016, C.G. and K.G had retained counsel and
gained intervenor status in the Twins’ abuse and neglect case.
In late December 2016 or early January 2017, E.N.’s mother, M.D. (the
Twins’ paternal grandmother), contacted Child Protective Services Worker Amanda
Starling (Starling) seeking permanent custody of the Twins. M.D. and Starling were
already acquainted. They had met because M.D. and her husband, D.D. (the
Grandparents), served as guardians to another daughter of E.N.—the Twins’ half-sister.
Starling followed up on M.D.’s call with a home visit. She then referred the case to
DHHR’s adoption unit, where it was assigned to Lydia Lambert (Lambert), Region IV
Adoption Specialist, in approximately January 2017.
3
The circuit court held a review hearing on March 23, 2017 to address the
Twins’ permanent placement.3 During the hearing, the Twins’ guardian ad litem
recommended that the Twins remain with the foster parents, C.G. and K.G. Lambert,
speaking on behalf of DHHR, recommended that the Twins be permanently placed with
the Grandparents because they were an approved foster home and they were guardians to
the Twins’ half-sister. Lambert also stated that M.D. had told DHHR employee Marsha
Phillips (Phillips) that she was interested in caring for the Twins if they were, in fact, her
son’s children, as early as August 2016.
The circuit court then questioned M.D., who confirmed that she had
expressed interest in the Twins to Phillips in August 2016. She further represented that she
had told the Twins’ foster mother that she wanted to care for the Twins if they proved to
be her biological grandchildren. M.D. also stated that she called Starling “500 times” about
the matter before late December 2016 or early January 2017. In response to questioning
by the court, Starling flatly denied that M.D. contacted her before late December 2016 or
early January 2017.
3
Counsel for DHHR, R.E., and E.N. appeared at the hearing, as did Starling and
Lambert. C.G. and K.G. appeared by counsel and in person. Although M.D. was not a
party to the Twins’ abuse and neglect proceeding, the circuit court invited M.D. to
participate in the hearing after learning that she was waiting in the courtroom hallway. The
circuit court also noted on the record during the March 2017 hearing that M.D. had
submitted a letter. That letter was not included in the Appendix Record.
4
During the March 2017 hearing, it became apparent that the Twins’
biological parents, R.E. and E.N., remained a part of the Grandparents’ lives. Starling
testified that, in September 2016, she notified R.E. and E.N. of the Twins’ paternity by
calling the only contact telephone number they had given her—the Grandparents’ home.
Upon calling that telephone number, Starling spoke directly to R.E., who then shared the
test results with E.N., who was also present in the home at the time. Starling also testified
that E.N. entered the Grandparents’ home while she conducted the home visit in late 2016
or early 2017. Finally, Starling testified that R.E. and E.N. live a few doors down from the
Grandparents, in a house owned by the Grandparents. According to Starling, when parental
rights are terminated due to drug use and the biological parent has not attempted
rehabilitation, “there is no contact to be made between the terminated parents and the
children.”
Approximately one month later, on April 26, 2017, the circuit court ruled that
the Twins should be permanently placed with their Grandparents. The circuit court
explained,
This goes against the recommendation of the guardian ad litem,
but I feel that since these children are so young that—that they
will not be affected. If they were much older, I think we—we
would have a—would have a different outlook and a different
result, but they’re one-year-old children or no more than two.
They’re still babies. Also, I defer to blood relatives, I’ll just
tell you, whenever that’s possible. Plus, the grandparents have
a—is it a [sic.] half-sister? . . . That you already have of [the
Twins]. So that will be the Court’s ruling. . . . —in the best
interest of these children that they be returned to the
grandparents.
5
The circuit court memorialized its bench ruling by Order entered on May 1,
2017. C.G. and K.G. now appeal that order.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We previously have explained the dual standard we apply when reviewing
abuse and neglect cases such as this:
Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are
subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse
and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the
circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These
findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a
reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.4
With this standard at the fore, we consider the sole issue raised on appeal:
whether the circuit court in this case correctly applied the grandparent preference found in
West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) in light of this Court’s prior guidance.
4
Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
6
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, C.G. and K.G. argue that a permanent placement with the
Grandparents is not in the Twins’ best interest. They acknowledge the effect of the
grandparent preference, but contend that the circuit court failed to account for pertinent
record evidence that must be considered in conjunction with that preference, namely that
(a) the Twins’ biological parents—whose parental rights have been terminated—have free
access to the Grandparents’ home and live but two doors down the street in a home owned
by the Grandparents; and (b) the Grandparents likely knew as early as May 2016 that the
Twins were their grandchildren, yet took minimal steps to visit them or to obtain custody
until December 2016. The Twins’ guardian ad litem filed a brief in which he echoes C.G.
and K.G.’s arguments. Conversely, DHHR contends that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by placing the Twins with their Grandparents because C.G. and K.G. failed to
overcome the grandparent preference before the circuit court. We will examine the
grandparent preference, then each of C.G. and K.G.’s arguments, in turn.
The grandparent preference at issue in this case appears in West Virginia
Code § 49-4-114(a)(3). That subsection states:
For purposes of any placement of a child for adoption by the
department, the department shall first consider the suitability
and willingness of any known grandparent or grandparents to
adopt the child. Once grandparents who are interested in
adopting the child have been identified, the department shall
conduct a home study evaluation, including home visits and
individual interviews by a licensed social worker. If the
department determines, based on the home study evaluation,
that the grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents, it
7
shall assure that the grandparents are offered the placement of
the child prior to the consideration of any other prospective
adoptive parents.[5]
As we have previously explained, “[t]he Legislature adopted the so-called
‘grandparent preference’ to govern the adoption of children whose parents’ parental rights
have been terminated through abuse and neglect proceedings.”6
The preference is just that—a preference. It is not absolute. As this Court
has emphasized, the child’s best interest remains paramount:
West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) provides for grandparent
preference in determining adoptive placement for a child
where parental rights have been terminated and also
incorporates a best interests analysis within that determination
by including the requirement that the DHHR find that the
grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents prior to
granting custody to the grandparents. The statute contemplates
that placement with grandparents is presumptively in the best
interests of the child, and the preference for grandparent
placement may be overcome only where the record reviewed
in its entirety establishes that such placement is not in the best
interests of the child.
By specifying in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) that the home
study must show that the grandparents “would be suitable
adoptive parents,” the Legislature has implicitly included the
5
In 2015, the West Virginia Legislature recodified Chapter 49 of the West Virginia
Code relating to Child Welfare. The grandparent preference, which was originally set forth
in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a), is now codified at § 49-4-114(a)(3). The statutory text
relevant to the grandparent preference was not changed.
6
In re Elizabeth F., 225 W. Va. 780, 786, 696 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2010).
8
requirement for an analysis by the Department of Health and
Human Resources and circuit courts of the best interests of the
child, given all circumstances of the case.[7]
In short, “[t]he grandparent preference must be considered in conjunction
with [this Court’s] long standing jurisprudence that ‘the primary goal in cases involving
abuse and neglect . . . must be the health and welfare of the children.’”8
In this case, while the circuit court couched its permanency decision in terms
of the Twins’ best interests, it made plain during the March 2017 review hearing that its
decision rested in large part on its avowed deference to “blood relatives.”9 The circuit
court’s deference veers impermissibly close to the erroneous belief that “the grandparent
preference [is an] absolute directive to place children with their grandparents in all
circumstances.”10 That belief, by itself, is clear legal error given this Court’s earlier
7
Syl. Pts. 4 and 5, Napoleon S. v. Walker, 217 W. Va. 254, 617 S.E.2d 801 (2005).
8
In re Hunter H., 227 W. Va. 699, 703, 715 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2011) (quoting Syl.
Pt. 3, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996)).
9
We have previously observed that West Virginia law does not grant a permanency
preference to blood relatives, generally. See Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184,
193, 706 S.E.2d 381, 390 (2011). The grandparent preference is the sole exception to that
rule, and, even then, the preference is tempered by consideration of the child’s best
interests. Id.10
In re Elizabeth F., 225 W. Va. at 786, 696 S.E.2d at 302.
9
guidance that the preference must be considered in conjunction with the health and welfare
of the child.11
Setting aside the circuit court’s erroneous conception of the statutory
grandparent preference, our review of the entire record in this case leaves the Court with
the firm conviction that the circuit court mistakenly concluded that the Twins’ best interests
are served by permanently placing them with their Grandparents. First, as recounted above,
CPS Worker Starling testified that the Twins’ biological parents live in a house owned by
the Grandparents, and which is located two doors down from the Grandparents’ own home.
Starling’s testimony is unrebutted. Not only do the Twins’ biological parents live within
eyeshot of the Grandparents, they also appear to use the Grandparents’ home as their own.
They receive official telephone calls there. E.N., the Twins’ biological father, enters the
Grandparents’ home unannounced. The Twins’ biological parents’ proximity and access
to the Grandparents’ home renders their permanent placement there untenable.
This Court has reversed a circuit court’s decision to place minor children
with their grandparents in similar circumstances to ensure that the children’s best interests
11
In re Hunter H., 227 W. Va. at 703, 715 S.E.2d at 401.
10
are served.12 In In re Elizabeth F., this Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of custody
of four minor children to their maternal grandmother, despite the grandparent preference.
There, the record revealed that the grandmother had refused to shield the minor children
from the “negative influences” of her adult children.13 Specifically, the grandmother
permitted the children’s mother “to live in her home while [the mother] was using and
abusing drugs”, and the children’s uncle to live in a trailer behind the grandmother’s house
despite his numerous CPS referrals.14
Similarly, in In re T.R., this Court refused to place a child with his maternal
grandparents where the record showed that the grandparents resided in the same “family
compound” as the child’s mother, whose parental rights to T.R. were previously
terminated.15 This Court explained,
Following our review of the record on appeal, we find no
factual basis for petitioner’s claim that the DHHR failed to
consider the grandparents as a potential relative placement. It
is clear from the record on appeal that a DHHR case worker
visited the grandparents’ home and that the DHHR knew that
the grandparents and petitioner were a close family who lived
12
See In re Elizabeth F., 225 W. Va. at 785–87, 696 S.E.2d at 301–03; see also In
re T.R., App. No. 15-1235, 2016 WL 3165801, at *3 (W. Va. June 6, 2016) (memorandum
decision).
13
Id., 225 W. Va. at 785, 696 S.E.2d at 301.
14
Id.15
In re T.R., 2016 WL 3165801 at *2.
11
in close proximity to one another. According to the DHHR,
the grandparents were considered for placement in the
beginning of the case and ultimately found to be unsuitable.[16]
Despite hearing Child Protective Services Worker Starling’s testimony on
this topic, the circuit court not only granted permanency to the Grandparents, but did so
with no direction to the Grandparents as to the importance of shielding the Twins from
R.E. and E.N. According to the unrebutted evidence before the circuit court, when parental
rights are terminated due to drug use, and the biological parent has not attempted
rehabilitation, as is the case here, “there is no contact to be made between the terminated
parents and the children.” While DHHR represented at oral argument that it has verbally
instructed the Grandparents not to permit R.E. and E.N. to access the Twins, it also
admitted that there is nothing in writing to that effect. Even if there were, R.E. and E.N.’s
undisputed physical proximity to the Grandparents’ home would make that instruction
impossible to follow.
Moreover, the circuit court gave little consideration to the bond developed
by the Twins with C.G. and K.G., their foster parents, and T.N., their half-brother, during
the Twins’ first seventeen months of life. C.G. and K.G. solely cared for the Twins from
their birth in April 2016 to approximately April 26, 2017, the date the circuit court awarded
permanent placement to the Grandparents. From that date until June 9, 2017, the Twins
16
Id. at *3.
12
were gradually transitioned to the Grandparents’ home. Thus, C.G. and K.G. were part of
the Twins’ lives from April 2016 until June 2017. Also, C.G. and K.G.—not the
Grandparents—saw the Twins through their hospital stay.
This Court has previously stressed the importance of the “continuity of
relationships, surroundings and environmental influence” during a child’s first three years
of life.17 These early years are truly formative because, “[i]n their simple everyday
activities, infants and toddlers form the foundations of all later development.”18 Thus, the
Twins’ best interests require that the bonds they formed with C.G. and K.G. in their first
seventeen months of life not be short-changed.
In contrast, the Grandparents had never met the Twins as of April 26, 2017,
when the circuit court ordered that the Twins should be permanently placed with them.
DHHR contends that the Grandparents delayed asserting their claim to the Twins until
DNA testing confirmed that the Twins were, in fact, their son’s children.19 E.N., however,
17
See In Interest of Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 623, 408 S.E.2d 365, 375 (1991)
(citing J. Goldstein, A. Freud & J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 32–33
(1973)).
18
Id. (citing B. L. White, The First Three Years of Life, preface (1985)).
19
At oral argument, counsel for Respondent DHHR represented that M.D. was wary
of offering to care for the Twins before paternity was established, conclusively, because
her son, E.N., had previously claimed to be the father of another of R.E.’s children, when,
in fact, he was not. While we do not doubt counsel’s veracity, we do not find support for
this representation in this case’s Appendix Record.
13
reported to Starling in May 2016—when the Twins were approximately one month old—
that he was “most likely” their father. Despite their son’s belief that he was the Twins’
father, the Grandparents waited until at least August 2016 (when the Twins were
approximately four months old) to make any DHHR employee aware of their interest in
the Twins, and until March 2017 (when the Twins were approximately eleven months old)
to attend a hearing in the Twins’ court case. For example, the Grandparents did not appear
at the November or December 2016 hearings where the circuit court considered, and
ultimately terminated, E.N. and R.E.’s parental rights, even though it was confirmed in
September 2016 that E.N. was the Twins’ biological father.
This “wait and see” approach contrasts starkly with the actions of C.G. and
K.G., who accepted responsibility for the Twins at their births and obtained intervenor
status in the Twins’ abuse and neglect proceeding in November 2016. Had the
Grandparents wanted to build a relationship with the Twins before April 26, 2017, they
could have done the same and sought visitation. In Napoleon S., this Court explained that
it would not fault the petitioning grandparents for failing to develop a relationship with
their minor grandson because they had intervened in his abuse and neglect proceeding to
secure visitation.20 Here, the Grandparents never took that first step, and so they are not
entitled to the same credit.
20
Napoleon S., 217 W. Va. at 262, 617 S.E.2d at 809.
14
At first blush, this case presents a near perfect balance between the
Grandparents (an approved foster home, guardianship of the Twins’ half-sister) and the
foster parents, C.G. and K.G. (an approved foster home, adoption of the Twins’ half-
brother). And, were that the only record evidence, then we likely could have found little
fault with the circuit court’s application of the grandparent preference. However, viewed
in its entirety, the record in this case establishes that the placement options presented to the
circuit court were not evenly balanced. The undisputed and glaring facts about the presence
of the biological parents in and around the home in which the Twins were to be placed, not
to mention the steadfast opposition of the guardian ad litem, cannot be overlooked in the
analysis of the best interest of the Twins, which must control. Because those interests are
best served by permanent placement with C.G. and K.G., not their Grandparents, the Twins
must be placed permanently with their foster parents.
We are mindful that this is yet another disruption in the Twins’ young lives.
However, we simply cannot overlook the physical proximity of the Twins’ biological
parents to the Grandparents’ home—even after the circuit court placed the Twins there,
and with no direction to DHHR on this point. As explained above, DHHR’s solution, an
oral warning to the Grandparents to keep E.N. and R.E. away from the Twins, can hardly
suffice when E.N. and R.E. live only two doors down the street from the Twins, in a house
owned by the Grandparents. We also recognize that the foster care system faces an excess
of children in need of care and a shortage of suitable placements, and we do not mean either
DHHR or circuit courts to disregard grandparents as a preferred placement option. The
15
current systemic overload, however, cannot justify abandoning “the polar star by which
decisions must be made which affect children”21—their best interests.
Upon remand, the Circuit Court of McDowell County shall promptly
convene parties and counsel and conduct a hearing on the most effective means of gradually
transitioning the Twins from their Grandparents to C.G. and K.G.22 The transition of these
children should be accomplished in a gradual manner that most effectively serves the best
interests of the children.23
21
In re Hunter H., 231 W. Va. at 123–24, 744 S.E.2d at 233 (citing Michael K.T. v.
Tina L.T., 182 W.Va. 399, 405, 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1989)).
22
See Syl. Pt. 8, in part, In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996).
23
See Kristopher O., 227 W. Va. at 194, 706 S.E.2d at 391 (“[I]t has been long
understood that the law governing child custody directs that a child’s best interests are
served by a gradual transition to a new home.”); Syl. Pt. 3, in part, James M. v. Maynard,
185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991) (“It is a traumatic experience for children to
undergo sudden and dramatic changes . . . . Lower courts in cases such as these should
provide, whenever possible, for a gradual transition period, especially where young
children are involved. Further, such gradual transition periods should be developed in a
manner intended to foster the emotional adjustment of the children to this change and to
maintain as much stability as possible in their lives.”).
16
The circuit court may also consider setting a visitation schedule for the
Grandparents and the Twins’ half-sister during this hearing, although those visits may not
occur unsupervised at the Grandparents’ home.24
IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s May 1, 2017 order placing custody of K.E. and K.E. with
their Grandparents is hereby reversed and this case is remanded for entry of an order
gradually transitioning K.E. and K.E. from their Grandparents to their foster parents, C.G.
and K.G. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate contemporaneously herewith.
Reversed and Remanded with Directions.
24
We also caution that “the Grandparent Visitation Act automatically vacates a
grandparent visitation order after a child is adopted by a non-relative.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part,
In re Hunter H., 231 W. Va. at 118, 744 S.E.2d at 228.
17