Larry Tabata v. Charleston Area Medical Center

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2014 Term
_______________
No. 13-0766
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LARRY TABATA, SHIRLEY CHANCEY,
WILLIAM WELLS, DONALD R. HOLSTEIN, JR., AND KAY KIRK,
Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners
v.
CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., AND
CAMC HEALTH EDUCATION AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.,
Defendants Below, Respondents
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable James C. Stucky, Judge
Civil Action No. 11-C-524
REVERSED AND REMANDED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: April 23, 2014
Filed: May 28, 2014
Sean W. Cook, Esq. Marc E. Williams, Esq.
Meyer Ford Glasser & Radman Nathan I. Brown, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia Jenna E. Hess, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP
Huntington, West Virginia
Attorneys for Respondents
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE KETCHUM dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “This Court will review a circuit court’s order granting or denying a
motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure [1998] under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. pt. 1, In re W. Va. Rezulin
Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
2. “Standing is comprised of three elements: First, the party attempting
to establish standing must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’ – an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the
injury will be redressed through a favorable decision of the court.” Syl. pt. 5, Findley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002).
3. “A patient does have a cause of action for the breach of the duty of
confidentiality against a treating physician who wrongfully divulges confidential
information.” Syl. pt. 4, Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 191 W. Va. 426, 446 S.E.2d
648 (1994).
4. “The right of privacy, including the right of an individual to be let
alone and to keep secret his private communications, conversations and affairs, is a right
i
the unwarranted invasion or violation of which gives rise to a common law right of action
for damages.” Syl. pt. 1, Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
5. “A declaration in an action for damages founded on an invasion of
the right of privacy, to be sufficient on demurrer, need not allege that special damages
resulted from the invasion.” Syl. pt. 2, Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564
(1958).
6. “An ‘invasion of privacy’ includes (1) an unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of another’s name or likeness; (3)
unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably
places another in a false light before the public.” Syl. pt. 8, Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 173 W. Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983).
7. “In West Virginia, a legally protected interest in privacy is
recognized. Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).” Syl. pt. 2, Cordle
v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W. Va. 321, 325 S.E.2d 111 (1984).
8. “The party who seeks to establish the propriety of a class action has
the burden of proving that the prerequisites of Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Syl. pt. 6, Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Educ.
Assoc., 183 W. Va. 15, 393 S.E.2d 653 (1990).
ii
9. “Nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.” Syl. pt. 6, In re W. Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52,
585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
10. “Before certifying a class under Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure [1998], a circuit court must determine that the party seeking class
certification has satisfied all four prerequisites contained in Rule 23(a) – numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation – and has satisfied one of the
three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). As long as these prerequisites to class certification are
met, a case should be allowed to proceed on behalf of the class proposed by the party.”
Syl. pt. 8, In re W. Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
11. “The ‘commonality’ requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] requires that the party seeking class certification
show that ‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class.’ A common nucleus of
operative fact or law is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement. The
threshold of “commonality” is not high, and requires only that the resolution of common
questions affect all or a substantial number of the class members.” Syl. pt. 11, In re W.
Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
iii
12. “The ‘typicality’ requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] requires that the ‘claims or defenses of the representative
parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.’ A representative party’s claim
or defense is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that
gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the
same legal theory. Rule 23(a)(3) only requires that the class representatives’ claims be
typical of the other class members’ claims, not that the claims be identical. When the
claim arises out of the same legal or remedial theory, the presence of factual variations is
normally not sufficient to preclude class action treatment.” Syl. pt. 12, In re W. Va.
Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
iv
Per Curiam:
The petitioners herein and plaintiffs below appeal the June 24, 2013, order
of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that denied their motion for class certification in
their action against Respondents Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. (hereinafter
“CAMC”) and CAMC Health Education and Research Institute, Inc. (hereinafter “CAMC
Health Foundation”). The petitioners alleged below that the respondents are responsible
for placing the petitioners’ personal and medical information on a specific CAMC
electronic database and website which was accessible to the public. After reviewing the
parties’ arguments, the circuit court’s order, and relevant portions of the appendix, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS
In February 2011, the petitioners and other patients of CAMC received a
letter from CAMC notifying them that certain of their personal and medical information
contained on a database operated by CAMC accidentally was placed on the Internet.
According to the respondents, this database “contained the names, contact details, Social
Security numbers, and dates of birth of 3,655 patients, along with certain basic
respiratory care information.” The respondents explained that this information could be
exposed if someone were to conduct an advanced internet search. In addition, the
1
respondents offered all the patients whose data was potentially exposed a full year of
credit monitoring at CAMC’s cost.1
Subsequently, the petitioners and plaintiffs below, Larry Tabata, William
Wells, Donald R. Holstein, Jr., Kay Kirk, and Shirley Chancey, filed an action in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County individually and on behalf of a class of persons
similarly situated against Respondents CAMC and CAMC Health Foundation for the
placement of their personal and medical information on the Internet.2 In their complaint,
the petitioners asserted causes of action for breach of duty of confidentiality; invasion of
privacy – intrusion upon the seclusion of the petitioners; invasion of privacy –
unreasonable publicity into the petitioners’ private lives; and negligence. The petitioners
also filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure in which they alleged that they are members of a class that consists of
at least 3,655 individuals.
Discovery revealed that the petitioners and respondents are not aware of
any unauthorized and malicious users attempting to access or actually accessing their
information, and they are not aware of any of the 3,655 affected patients having any
1
It appears that the information remained on the Internet from September 2010
until February 2011.
2
The petitioners originally filed their complaint in March 2011. They then filed an
amended complaint in December 2011, in which they added CAMC Health Foundation
as a named defendant.
2
actual or attempted identity theft. Further, the petitioners have not suffered any property
injuries or sustained any actual economic losses. Finally, the petitioners are not aware if
any other potential class members have sustained such injuries.
In its June 24, 2013, order denying class certification, the circuit court
found that the petitioners have not met their burden of showing commonality, typicality,
and predominance of common issues of law or fact for the purposes of class certification
under Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, the circuit
court also found that the petitioners lack standing to bring their claims because they have
failed to show that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is not
hypothetical or conjectural. The petitioners now appeal the circuit court’s order denying
class certification.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The circuit court determined below that the petitioners do not have standing
to sue the respondents. The question of standing is a legal issue which this Court reviews
de novo. See Zikos v. Clark, 214 W. Va. 235, 237, 588 S.E.2d 400, 402 (2003) (stating
that standing is a “legal matter[] subject to de novo review in this Court”).
The circuit court also found that the petitioners do not meet the
prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This
issue is governed by this Court’s opinion in In re W. Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va.
3
52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003), which is the definitive law of this Court on class certification
under Rule of Civil Procedure 23.3 With regard to our review of the circuit court’s ruling
on class certification, we held in syllabus point 1 of Rezulin that “[t]his Court will review
a circuit court’s order granting or denying a motion for class certification pursuant to
Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] under an abuse of
discretion standard.” With these standards in mind, we now proceed to address the issues
in this case.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
The threshold inquiry for this Court’s consideration is whether the circuit
court erred in finding that the petitioners, as named plaintiffs below, lack standing. This
Court has defined standing as “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a duty or right.” Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va.
80, 94, 576 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2002), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed. 1999).
With regard to the elements of standing, we have held:
Standing is comprised of three elements: First, the
party attempting to establish standing must have suffered an
“injury-in-fact” – an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be
3
The circuit court’s findings and the respondents’ assertions that this Court has
modified its holdings in Rezulin are inaccurate.
4
likely that the injury will be redressed through a favorable
decision of the court.
Syl. pt. 5, Id.
The circuit court determined that the petitioners lack standing because they
have not suffered a concrete and particularized injury. The circuit court’s determination is
based in substantial part on the petitioners’ contention below that the common injury that
they share with the proposed class members is the increased risk of future identity theft.
The circuit court reasoned that a prospective injury does not meet the requirement for
standing of a concrete injury but rather is conjectural.
We agree with the circuit court that the risk of future identity theft alone
does not constitute an injury in fact for the purpose of showing standing. However, in
their complaint, the petitioners also asserted causes of action for breach of confidentiality
and invasion of privacy. This Court recognized a cause of action for a doctor’s breach of
confidentiality in syllabus point 4 of Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 191 W. Va. 426,
446 S.E.2d 648 (1994), in which we held that “[a] patient does have a cause of action for
the breach of the duty of confidentiality against a treating physician who wrongfully
divulges confidential information.” See also syl. pt. 3, R.K. v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc.,
229 W. Va. 712, 735 S.E.2d 715 (2012) (holding that “[c]ommon law tort claims based
upon the wrongful disclosure of medical or personal health information are not
preempted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996”). In
5
recognizing this cause of action, this Court in Morris quoted with approval the following
language:
[I]n addition to the duty of secrecy, there arises the duty of
undivided loyalty. Should a doctor breach either of these two
duties, the law must afford the patient some legal recourse
against such perfidy. We should not suffer a wrong without a
remedy, especially when the wrong complained of involves
the abuse of a fiduciary position.4
Morris, 191 at 432, 446 S.E.2d at 654, quoting Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243
F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (additional citations omitted) (footnote added).
Applying our law on standing to the petitioner’s breach of confidentiality
claim, we find that the petitioners, as patients of CAMC, have a legal interest in having
their medical information kept confidential. In addition, this legal interest is concrete,
particularized, and actual. When a medical professional wrongfully violates this right, it
is an invasion of the patient’s legally protected interest. Therefore, the petitioners and the
proposed class members have standing to bring a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality against the respondents.
In addition, the petitioners allege a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
In syllabus point 1 of Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958), this
Court held that “[t]he right of privacy, including the right of an individual to be let alone
4
In syllabus point 1 of State ex rel. Kitzmiller v. Henning, 190 W. Va. 142, 437
S.E.2d 452 (1993), this Court held that “[a] fiduciary relationship exists between a
physician and a patient.”
6
and to keep secret his private communications, conversations and affairs, is a right the
unwarranted invasion or violation of which gives rise to a common law right of action for
damages.” Significantly, in syllabus point 2 of Roach, this Court held that “[a]
declaration in an action for damages founded on an invasion of the right of privacy, to be
sufficient on demurrer, need not allege that special damages resulted from the invasion.”
More recently, this Court has held that “[a]n ‘invasion of privacy’ includes (1) an
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of another’s
name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and (4)
publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.” Syl. pt. 8,
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W. Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1984). Finally, we
indicated in syllabus point 2 of Cordle v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W. Va. 321, 325
S.E.2d 111 (1984), that “[i]n West Virginia, a legally protected interest in privacy is
recognized. Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).”
Application of our law to the facts of this case indicates that the petitioners
have standing to bring a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The petitioners and
proposed class members have a legal interest in privacy which is concrete, particularized,
and actual. Therefore, they have standing to bring a cause of action against the
respondents for the alleged invasion of that legal interest.
7
B. Prerequisites of Class Certification
Having determined that the petitioners have standing to bring causes of
action for breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy, we now turn our attention to
the circuit court’s determination that the petitioners failed to show the requirements for
bringing a class action.
In addressing this issue, we first note that “[t]he party who seeks to
establish the propriety of a class action has the burden of proving that the prerequisites of
Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Syl. pt. 6,
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Educ. Ass’n, 183 W. Va. 15, 393 S.E.2d 653 (1990). We
are also mindful that
[n]othing in either the language or history of Rule 23
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.
Syl. pt. 6, In re W. Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).5 Finally,
Before certifying a class under Rule 23 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998], a circuit court must
determine that the party seeking class certification has
satisfied all four prerequisites contained in Rule 23(a)6 –
5
During oral argument before this Court, counsel for CAMC and CAMC Health
Foundation argued that the petitioners are not able to show that their private information
was publicized for the purpose of an invasion of privacy claim because discovery
revealed that no unauthorized users have accessed the website on which the private
information appeared. While such evidence certainly is relevant to the merits of the
petitioner’s claims, it is not pertinent to the issue of class certification.
6
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides:
8
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation – and has satisfied one of the three
subdivisions of Rule 23(b).7 As long as these prerequisites to
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
7
According to Rule 23(b):
An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) Inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) Adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relieve [sic] or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
9
class certification are met, a case should be allowed to
proceed on behalf of the class proposed by the party.
Syl. pt. 8, Id. (footnote added). In the instant case, the circuit court found that the
petitioners failed to show that they have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 for the
certification of their proposed class. Specifically, the circuit court found that the
petitioners failed to meet the requirements of commonality and typicality in Rule 23(a)
and the requirement of predominance of common issues of law or fact under Rule 23(b).
This Court will now proceed to address each of these prerequisites.
1. Commonality
First, the circuit court found that the petitioners have failed to show
commonality among the claims of the petitioners and the proposed class members. In
syllabus point 11 of Rezulin, 214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52, this Court held:
The “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] requires
that the party seeking class certification show that “there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.” A common
nucleus of operative fact or law is usually enough to satisfy
the commonality requirement. The threshold of
“commonality” is not high, and requires only that the
resolution of common questions affect all or a substantial
number of the class members.
We further explained in Rezulin that
[c]ommonality requires that class members share a
single common issue. However, not every issue in the case
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
10
must be common to all class members. The common
questions need be neither important nor controlling, and one
significant common question of law or fact will satisfy this
requirement. In other words, the class as a whole must raise at
least one common question of law or fact to make
adjudication of the issues as a class action appropriate to
conserve judicial and private resources.
214 W. Va. at 67, 585 S.E.2d at 67 (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). This
Court finds that in the instant case the claims of the petitioners and the proposed class
members arise from the same set of facts and are governed by the same law. Further,
there are common questions such as whether the respondents’ conduct breached the duty
of confidentiality that a doctor owes a patient and whether the conduct invaded the
privacy of the petitioners and the proposed class members. Having found the existence of
a common nucleus of operative fact and law and common issues, we believe that the
circuit court abused its discretion in determining that the petitioners failed to meet the
commonality requirement for class certification.
2. Typicality
The circuit court also found that the lack of typicality prevents class
certification. In syllabus point 12 of Rezulin, this Court held:
The “typicality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] requires that
the “claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” A
representative party’s claim or defense is typical if it arises
from the same event or practice or course of conduct that
gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or
her claims are based on the same legal theory. Rule 23(a)(3)
only requires that the class representatives’ claims be typical
11
of the other class members’ claims, not that the same be
identical. When the claim arises out of the same legal or
remedial theory, the presence of factual variations is normally
not sufficient to preclude class action treatment.
214 W. Va. 52, 585 S.E.2d 52. As a practical matter, this case fits the definition of
typicality between the petitioners and proposed class members. The petitioners’ claims
arise from the same event that gives rise to the claims of the proposed class members
which is the disclosure by the respondents of petitioners’ personal and medical
information on the Internet. Also, the claims of the petitioners and proposed class
members are based on the same legal theories: breach of confidentiality and invasion of
privacy. Therefore, this Court concludes that the circuit court erred in finding that the
petitioners failed to meet the typicality requirement for class certification under Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)(2).
3. Predominance of Common Issues of Law or Fact
Last, the circuit court found that individual issues regarding damages,
causation, and adequate remedies will predominate over common issues of law or fact at
trial so that Rule 23(b)(3) is not met. Regarding the issue of predominance of issues, this
Court has explained:
The predominance criterion in Rule 23(b)(3) is a
corollary to the “commonality” requirement found in Rule
23(a)(2). While the “commonality” requirement simply
requires a showing of common questions, the
“predominance” requirement requires a showing that the
common questions of law or fact outweigh individual
questions.
12
A conclusion on the issue of predominance requires an
evaluation of the legal issues and the proof needed to
establish them. As a matter of efficient judicial
administration, the goal is to save time and money for the
parties and the public and to promote consistent decisions for
people with similar claims. The predominance requirement is
not a rigid test, but rather contemplates a review of many
factors, the central question being whether adjudication of the
common issues in the particular suit has important and
desirable advantages of judicial economy compared to all
other issues, or when viewed by themselves.
Rezulin, 214 W. Va. at 71-72, 585 S.E.2d at 71-72 (quotations and citations omitted).
When this Court applies these guidelines to the instant facts, it is clear that common
issues of law predominate over individual questions. Simply put, all of the proposed class
members are in the same position. Their causes of action are the same and they arise from
the same event. Also, there is no evidence of unauthorized access of their personal and
medical information, no evidence of actual identity theft, and no evidence of economic
injury arising from the alleged wrongdoing. Rather, all of the proposed class members
allege that their interests in confidentiality and privacy have been wrongfully invaded by
the respondents. Therefore, this Court finds that common questions of law and fact
predominate over individual issues for the purpose of class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).
In sum, we underscore that the scope of this opinion is narrow. We hold
only that the circuit court erred in finding that the petitioners lack standing and that the
circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that the petitioners failed to meet the
requirements for class certification of commonality, typicality, and the predominance of
13
common issues of law or fact. This Court makes absolutely no determination regarding
the merits or the lack thereof of the petitioners’ causes of action for breach of
confidentiality and invasion of privacy such as whether the petitioners have adduced
evidence sufficient to prove the elements of these causes of action.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court reverses the June 24, 2013, order
of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that denied the petitioners’ motion for class
certification, and we remand this case to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
14