Jon Conrad Joseph Ronald "Ron" Micheli Clarence Vranish Clara Jean Vranish and Troy Nolan v. The Uinta County Republican Party, a Wyoming Major Political Party Lyle L. Williams Elisabeth "Biffy" Jackson Karl Allred and Jana Lee Williams

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2023 WY 46APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023
May 18, 2023
JON CONRAD; JOSEPH RONALD
“RON” MICHELI; CLARENCE
VRANISH; CLARA JEAN VRANISH;
and TROY NOLAN,
Appellants
(Plaintiffs),
v.
S-22-0210
THE UINTA COUNTY REPUBLICAN
PARTY, a Wyoming major political
party; LYLE L. WILLIAMS;
ELISABETH “BIFFY” JACKSON;
KARL ALLRED; and JANA LEE
WILLIAMS,
Appellees
(Defendants).
Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County
The Honorable Joseph B. Bluemel, Judge
Representing Appellants:
Henry F. Bailey, Jr., Dale W. Cottam, and Brandon B. Taylor of Bailey, Stock,
Harmon, Cottam, Lopez, LLP, Afton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Taylor.
Representing Appellees:
Caleb C. Wilkins of Evans Walker, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final
publication in the permanent volume.
KAUTZ, Justice.
[¶1] This case involves a dispute within the Uinta County Republican Party over who
could vote in its 2021 officer and state committeeperson election. The district court ruled
a bylaw adopted by the Uinta County Republican Party governed who could vote in the
election and the bylaw did not violate the relevant provision of the Wyoming Election
Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-4-105 (LexisNexis 2021). The court also indicated the Party’s
constitutional right to freedom of political association would be unduly burdened if it was
prohibited from adopting and utilizing such a bylaw. We reverse because the voting
procedure used in the election and the Party’s bylaw violated the clear and unambiguous
language of § 22-4-105. We do not consider whether § 22-4-105 violates the Party’s
constitutional right to freedom of association because the issue was not properly presented
and the Wyoming Attorney General was not notified of, or allowed to participate in, the
litigation.
ISSUES
[¶2] The issues for our review are:
1. Should this Court abstain from reviewing the procedure used in the
Uinta County Republican Party Central Committee’s 2021 officer and
state committeeperson election because it is a non-justiciable internal
political party matter?
2. Did the voting procedure used in the Uinta County Republican Party
Central Committee’s 2021 officer and state committeeperson election
violate § 22-4-105?
3. Was the issue of whether § 22-4-105 violates the Uinta County
Republican Party’s members’ constitutional right to freedom of
political association properly raised and litigated?
FACTS
[¶3] In the 2020 primary election, Appellants/Plaintiffs Jon Conrad, Clarence Vranish,
Clara Jean Vranish, and Troy Nolan were elected by Uinta County Republican voters to be
party precinct committeemen and committeewomen. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-4-101(b)
(LexisNexis 2021) (major political parties, including the Republican Party, elect precinct
committeemen and committeewomen at biennial primary elections); § 22-2-104(a)-(b)
(LexisNexis 2021) (primary elections are held in August of general election years; general
elections are held in November of “even-numbered year[s]”). As precinct
committeepersons, they were members of the Uinta County Republican Party Central
Committee (hereinafter “Central Committee”). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-4-101(b) (“The
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county central committee of each political party consists of precinct committeemen and
committeewomen elected in the county at the regular biennial primary election.”).
Appellant/Plaintiff Joseph Ronald “Ron” Micheli was a registered Republican who voted
in the 2020 Uinta County primary election. We will refer to these individuals collectively
as the “Conrad Group.” Appellees/Defendants Lyle L. Williams, Elisabeth “Biffy”
Jackson, Karl Allred, and Jana Lee Williams (hereinafter referred to collectively as the
“Williams Group”) were sitting Central Committee officers in 2020. However, they were
unsuccessful in their bids for election as Uinta County Republican precinct
committeepersons in the 2020 primary.
[¶4] On March 16, 2021, the Central Committee met to elect its officers and state
committeepersons pursuant to § 22-4-105 (hereinafter referred to as the “2021 election”).
That statute states:
The county central committee shall meet at the county seat
each odd-numbered year at a time and place determined by the
county chairman. . . . At the meeting, the county central
committee shall elect the chairman of the county central
committee, one (1) state committeeman and one (1) state
committeewoman and other offices as provided by the party
bylaws. A state political party may provide in its rules for the
election of additional state committeemen and additional state
committeewomen. Neither the chairman, state committeeman
[n]or state committeewoman need be members of the county
central committee.
Section 22-4-105. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-4-110 (LexisNexis 2021), the state central
committeepersons and the county chairmen “elected at the odd-numbered year meeting[s]
of the county central committees” are members of the “state central committee.” The state
central committee serves a role in filling mid-term vacancies for Wyoming’s member of
the United States House of Representatives, Wyoming’s United States Senators, and some
state offices. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-18-106 (LexisNexis 2021) (United States congressman
vacancies) and § 22-18-111 (LexisNexis 2021) (United States Senator and some state
office vacancies).
[¶5] Even though the members of the Williams Group were not precinct
committeepersons (i.e., members of the Central Committee), they were outgoing Central
Committee officers. As outgoing chairman of the Central Committee, Mr. Williams
presided over the 2021 election. After obtaining approval from the Wyoming Republican
Party, he allowed the members of the Williams Group to vote for new Central Committee
officers and state committeepersons under Uinta County Republican Party Bylaw Art. III,
§ 9(2) (Bylaw § 9(2)):
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Duly elected officers, including Chairman, Vice-Chairmen,
Secretary-Treasurer and State Committeeman and State
Committeewoman, who are not precinct committeemen or
committeewomen, shall be entitled to vote at the Uinta County
Central Committee meetings.
Bylaw § 9(2).1 Ms. Jackson was elected county chairman, Mr. Allred was elected state
committeeman, and Ms. Williams was elected state committeewoman. They, therefore,
represented the Uinta County Republican Party in the state central committee. Mr. Conrad
filed complaints with the Wyoming Republican Party State Central Committee
Investigation Committee (IC), the Uinta County Clerk, and the Wyoming Secretary of State
claiming the voting procedure used at the 2021 election was improper. The IC determined
the voting procedure was proper, and neither the Uinta County Clerk nor the Wyoming
Secretary of State found election misconduct.
[¶6] A little over a month after the 2021 election, the Conrad Group filed a complaint in
the district court against the Uinta County Republican Party and the Williams Group
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Uinta County Republican Party” or “Party”)
seeking a declaration that § 22-4-105 did not permit the outgoing officers, who were not
members of the Central Committee, to vote. The Conrad Group asserted the four additional
voters swayed the 2021 election. They also requested the Williams Group be permanently
enjoined from exercising any “duties or rights afforded to county chairman, state
committeeman or state committeewoman” and the district court order a proper election be
held “on an expedited basis.”2
[¶7] The Uinta County Republican Party generally admitted the facts underlying the
Conrad Group’s declaratory judgment complaint but maintained the 2021 election was
proper under § 22-4-105 and Bylaw § 9(2). The two sides filed opposing motions for
summary judgment. The Uinta County Republican Party claimed the issue regarding who
could vote in the 2021 election was not justiciable because it was an internal political party
matter. In the alternative, it argued § 22-4-105 and Bylaw § 9(2) authorized the voting
procedure used at the 2021 election and, to protect its constitutional right to political
association, § 22-4-105 must be read as allowing it to adopt and use the bylaw governing
who may vote. The Conrad Group maintained the 2021 election issue was not exempt
from judicial review as an internal party matter. It also asserted the voting procedure under
Bylaw § 9(2) used in the election violated the clear and unambiguous language of § 22-4-
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The Conrad Group focuses its argument on whether Bylaw § 9(2) was consistent with § 22-4-105. It does
not argue the Williams Group members were not “duly elected officers” under Bylaw § 9(2). There is also
no clear explanation in the record about if or why Mr. Williams continued to preside over the meeting after
his successor was elected, the order in which the new officers were elected, or whether the outgoing officers
were permitted to vote after their replacements had been elected.
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The Conrad Group also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, which
the district court denied.
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105 and the statute did not interfere with the Party’s constitutional right to freedom of
political association.
[¶8] The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Uinta County
Republican Party and denied the Conrad Group’s opposing motion for summary judgment.
It generally ruled that allowing the Williams Group to vote for the Central Committee
officers and state committeepersons was appropriate under Bylaw § 9(2), the bylaw did not
violate the plain language of § 22-4-105, and the statute should not be read in a way that
violates the Uinta County Republican Party’s constitutional right to freedom of association.
The Conrad Group filed a timely notice of appeal.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 56(a) authorizes a district court to
grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “We review the
district court’s summary judgment order de novo.” Wiese v. Riverton Mem’l Hosp., LLC,
2022 WY 150, ¶ 30, 520 P.3d 1133, 1141-42 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Kappes v. Rhodes, 2022
WY 82, ¶ 14, 512 P.3d 31, 35 (Wyo. 2022)). We consider the same materials and apply
the same legal standard as the district court and consider the factual record in favor of the
party opposing the motion. Id., ¶ 30, 520 P.3d at 1142 (citing Kappes, ¶ 14, 512 P.3d at
3
Although neither side has raised the issue, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that any issue
concerning the validity of the 2021 election is likely moot. Under § 22-4-105, county central committees
meet each odd-numbered year to elect new officers. Uinta County Republican Party Bylaw Art. III, § 6(1)
directed the Central Committee to hold its election in March of each odd-numbered year. Given 2023 is an
odd-numbered year and the month of March has passed, the Central Committee has likely met and elected
new officers.
“The doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously
justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring
that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer standing persist
throughout the duration of the suit. Thus, the central question in a mootness case is whether
decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the
decision will have an impact on the parties.”
Cir. Ct. of Eighth Jud. Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, ¶ 10, 332 P.3d 523, 527 (Wyo. 2014)
(quoting Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1999)) (some citations
and quotation marks omitted). Although we typically dismiss moot cases, the rule is not absolute. Id., ¶
12, 332 P.3d at 528. We may decide technically moot cases when, inter alia, “the ‘controversy is capable
of repetition yet evading review.’” Id. (quoting Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, ¶¶
22-23, 275 P.3d 438, 448–49 (Wyo. 2012)). Given Central Committee officer and state committeeperson
elections occur every other year, “the duration of the challenged action” is “too short for completion of
[the] litigation prior to its cessation or expiration.” Id., ¶ 15, 332 P.3d at 528 (citation omitted). It is also
reasonable to expect that at least some of “the same complaining part[ies] will be subjected to the same
action again.” Id. We will, therefore, decide this case.
4
35). Although the two sides’ renditions of what occurred at the 2021 election differ in
some respects, neither side argues there are disputes of material fact related to the issues
on appeal. Thus, we are addressing only questions of law, for which our review is de novo.
Schwartz v. State, 2021 WY 48, ¶ 9, 483 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2021).
DISCUSSION
Judicial Abstention from Deciding a Political Question
[¶10] The Conrad Group argues the district court misinterpreted § 22-4-105 when it
concluded the Uinta County Republican Party properly used Bylaw § 9(2) to allow the
Williams Group to vote in the 2021 election. The Party claims we should abstain from
addressing the Conrad Group’s argument because it relates to an internal dispute within a
political party. In support of its argument, the Party directs us to 29 C.J.S. Elections § 175,
which states: “Courts generally view the internal issues arising within political parties as
best resolved within the party organization itself; therefore, judicial involvement should
only be undertaken as a last resort.” Id. (footnote omitted). See also, State ex rel. Holland
v. Moran, 865 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“The best forum for political party
disputes is the party itself and the courts are the last resort in such matters, and any
encroachment should be done with caution, if at all.” (citing Virginia E. Sloan, Judicial
Intervention in Political Party Disputes: The Political Thicket Reconsidered, 22 UCLA
622, 624 (1975))); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minn., 399 F.2d 119, 120
(8th Cir. 1968) (“The courts, generally and consistently, have been reluctant to interfere
with the internal operations of a political party.”) (citations omitted). See generally, Rock
v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, ¶ 26, 301 P.3d 1075, 1082 (Wyo. 2013) (“‘[C]ourts are, and
should be, reluctant to interject themselves in essentially political controversies . . . .’”
(quoting Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1249 (Fla. 2000), rev’d on other grounds by Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000))).
[¶11] We agree courts generally abstain from deciding intra-party disputes. In LaRouche
v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit explained the role of
the judiciary in disputes involving political parties. “‘[A] court[] may not constitutionally
substitute its own judgment for that of [a political party].’” Id. at 980 (quoting Democratic
Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 1020, 67
L.Ed.2d 82 (1981)). For example, “‘[t]he stringency, and wisdom, of membership
requirements is for the association and its members to decide-not the courts[.]’” Id., 152
F.3d at 980 (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 123 n.25, 101 S.Ct. at 1020 n.25). Thus, a
simple intra-party dispute over the application of internal party rules would not be
justiciable because there are no “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it,” which is one criterion for a nonjusticiable political question. LaRouche, 152
F.3d at 980.
[¶12] However, this “hands-off” approach to political party disputes is qualified when a
5
state has legislated political party governance. A court may consider political party matters
to “the extent that jurisdiction is conferred by statute or . . . the subject is regulated by
statute . . . .” 29 C.J.S. Elections § 175. See also, Holland, 865 S.W.2d at 832 (courts will
abstain from interfering with disputes within political parties unless there is a constitutional
or statutory right involved). It can determine whether a political party’s internal rules
comply with applicable statutory language because there is a judicially discoverable and
manageable standard for resolution of the issue. LaRouche, 152 F.3d at 980-81. The
LaRouche court, for instance, ruled the “application of the [federal] Voting Rights Act’s
language to the facts of the [Democratic] Party’s delegate-selection rules is a typical
judicial exercise.” Id.[¶13] When the issue is properly raised, a court may also decide whether a state has over-
stepped constitutional limitations by statutorily regulating political parties. LaRouche, 152
F.3d at 981. Determining whether a statute violates the constitution has been a matter for
judicial consideration since the United States Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison
in 1803. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). “‘Declaring the
validity of statutes in relation to the constitution is a power vested in the courts as one of
the checks and balances contemplated by the division of government into three
departments[,] legislative, executive and judicial.’” Gordon v. State Capitol Bldg. Rehab.,
2018 WY 32, ¶ 55, 413 P.3d 1093, 1109 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 318 (Wyo. 1980) (which cited Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1
and Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60)). “It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. A
court should not avoid this responsibility merely “‘because the issues have political
implications.’” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1428, 182
L.Ed.2d 423 (2012) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77
L.Ed.2d 317 (1983)).
[¶14] For example, in Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222-33, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020-25, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court considered whether California statutes which banned political parties from endorsing
candidates for the primary election and regulated the internal organization of political
parties violated the political party’s freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 210-25, 107 S.Ct. 544, 546-54, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut law which prohibited the
Republican Party from adopting a party rule permitting independent electors to vote in the
party’s primary elections. The law improperly infringed on the political party’s
constitutional right to “enter into political association with individuals of its own
choosing.” Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 546. Thus, a constitutional challenge to a state law
regulating political parties, when properly presented, “raise[s] a justiciable controversy
under the Constitution . . . .” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28, 89 S.Ct. 5, 9, 21 L.Ed.2d
24 (1968). A decision in such a case “reflects the [proper] exercise of judicial review,
6
rather than the abstention from judicial review that would be appropriate in the case of a
true political question.” U.S. Dep’t of Com. v. Mont., 503 U.S. 442, 458, 112 S.Ct. 1415,
1425, 118 L.Ed.2d 87 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
[¶15] In Wyoming, the election of political party officers is regulated by statute. See §
22-4-105, supra. See also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2021) (“Any person .
. . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or
by a statute . . . may have any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.”).
The issues of whether Bylaw § 9(2) complies with § 22-4-105 and whether the statute is
constitutional are appropriate matters for judicial determination, provided they are properly
presented.
Section 22-4-105
[¶16] The Conrad Group asserts the district court incorrectly interpreted § 22-4-105 as
authorizing the Uinta County Republican Party to adopt Bylaw § 9(2), which the Williams
Group used to permit outgoing officers who were not members of the Central Committee
to vote in the 2021 election. We review the district court’s interpretation of a statute as a
matter of law, applying the de novo standard of review. In re Est. of Britain, 2018 WY
101, ¶ 15, 425 P.3d 978, 982-83 (Wyo. 2018). Our goal in interpreting statutes is to
determine the legislature’s intent. Id. We begin by considering the plain and ordinary
meaning of the words used by the legislature. Ailport v. Ailport, 2022 WY 43, ¶ 22, 507
P.3d 427, 437 (Wyo. 2022). See also, Butler v. State, 2015 WY 119, ¶ 7, 358 P.3d 1259,
1262 (Wyo. 2015) (When interpreting a statute, we seek the legislature’s intent “as
reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.”) (citation
omitted). “We ‘give effect to the most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute,
given its design and purpose.’” In re VS, 2018 WY 119, ¶ 41, 429 P.3d 14, 25-26 (Wyo.
2018) (quoting Adekale v. State, 2015 WY 30, ¶ 12, 344 P.3d 761, 765 (Wyo. 2015), and
Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 20, 50 P.3d 323, 329 (Wyo. 2002)) (some quotation
marks omitted). Statutory provisions are interpreted “in pari materia, giving effect to every
word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection.” In re VS, ¶ 41,
429 P.3d at 26 (quoting TW v. State, 2017 WY 26, ¶ 12, 390 P.3d 357, 360 (Wyo. 2017))
(other citations, quotation marks, and italics omitted). “‘If the [statutory language] is
sufficiently clear and unambiguous, the Court simply applies the words according to their
ordinary and obvious meaning.’” Ailport, ¶ 22, 507 P.3d at 437 (quoting In re CRA, 2016
WY 24, ¶ 16, 368 P.3d 294, 298 (Wyo. 2016)) (other citations omitted).
[¶17] To reiterate, the relevant portion of § 22-4-105 states:
The county central committee shall meet at the county seat
each odd-numbered year at a time and place determined by the
county chairman. . . . At the meeting, the county central
7
committee shall elect the chairman of the county central
committee, one (1) state committeeman and one (1) state
committeewoman and other offices as provided by the party
bylaws.
(Emphasis added).
[¶18] The district court ruled the language of § 22-4-105 was clear and unambiguous and
did not “restrict[] or penalize[] voting by others who are not members of the [C]entral
[C]ommittee.” Under the court’s reading, § 22-4-105 did not prevent the Uinta County
Republican Party from enacting Bylaw § 9(2) to allow outgoing officers who were not
members of the Central Committee to vote in the 2021 election of new officers. The district
court stated that, to restrict the voting to members of the Central Committee, the legislature
would have had to insert “only members of” into the statutory language, i.e., the statute
would read: “At the meeting, [only members of] the county central committee shall elect
. . . .” The court reasoned the legislature did not “so limit the statute, and the [c]ourt is not
free to add language to W.S. § 22-4-105.”
[¶19] We agree the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, but we disagree with the
district court’s conclusion that it allowed the Uinta County Republican Party to adopt
Bylaw § 9(2) to expand who could vote in Central Committee elections. The statute
specifically and plainly states “the county central committee shall elect” the central
committee officers and state committeepersons. Section 22-4-105. While the district court
was correct that courts “may not add language to a statute under the guise of statutory
interpretation,” WyoLaw, LLC v. Off. of Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit, 2021 WY 61, ¶
44, 486 P.3d 964, 976 (Wyo. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted), it was
unnecessary for the legislature to add “only members of” to § 22-4-105 to limit the eligible
voters. The statute clearly designated a specific group of people who could vote – the
county central committee. That committee is made up of precinct committeepersons
elected in the preceding year’s primary. Section 22-4-101(b). By specifying the county
central committee as who “shall elect” its officers, the legislature chose to restrict the
eligible voters in such elections.
[A] statute “that enumerates the subjects or things on which it
is to operate, or the persons affected . . . [excludes] from its
effect all those not expressly mentioned. Cathcart v. Meyer,
2004 WY 49, ¶ 40, 88 P.3d 1050, 1066 (Wyo. 2004) (citing In
re West Highway Sanitary & Imp. Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d
495, 504 (1957)). See also The Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
244, 253, 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815) (‘Now the construction must
depend on the evident meaning and intent of the legislature, as
clearly to be gathered from a view of the whole provision; and
it may be adopted as a fundamental rule, that where there is an
8
express provision, there shall not be a provision by implication;
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.’).”
Gordon, ¶ 24, 413 P.3d at 1102 (quoting Walters v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Transp.,
2013 WY 59, ¶ 18, 300 P.3d 879, 884 (Wyo. 2013)).
[¶20] By allowing the Uinta County Republican Party to expand those eligible to vote for
the Central Committee officers and state committeepersons, the district court rendered the
legislature’s specific choice of the county central committee as the voters meaningless. We
do not interpret a statute “in a way that renders a portion of it meaningless . . . .” Miller v.
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2020 WY 155, ¶ 26, 478 P.3d 164, 171-72 (Wyo. 2020) (citing
MF v. State, 2013 WY 104, ¶ 11, 308 P.3d 854, 858 (Wyo. 2013)) (other citation
omitted). See also, Vance v. City of Laramie, 2016 WY 106, ¶ 23, 382 P.3d 1104, 1110
(Wyo. 2016) (the legislature intended to limit judicial review to the types of decisions
expressly listed); Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Natrona Cnty., 2004 WY
84, ¶ 27, 94 P.3d 412, 420 (Wyo. 2004) (if the court accepted Natrona County’s argument
that the statute should be interpreted as allowing it to regulate parcels of land that did not
meet the statutory definition of “subdivision,” the definition and list of exemptions would
be meaningless). Applying these principles to § 22-4-105, the legislature made a
meaningful choice to specify the county central committee as the voters for county central
committee officer and state committeeperson elections and that choice excludes all others.
The district court erred by concluding otherwise.
[¶21] The Uinta County Republican Party argues, in the alternative, it was entitled to use
its bylaws to expand the list of voters entitled to elect the Central Committee officers and
state committeepersons because the phrase “as provided by the party bylaws” found in §
22-4-105 modifies “shall elect.” While the district court ruled there was no constraint on
who the Party could, through the adoption of bylaws, allow to vote in Central Committee
elections, it rejected this interpretation of the statute. It explained that if the legislature had
intended the “‘as provided by the party bylaws’ [language] to act as [an] instruction as to
how the county central committee should carry out the election,” it would have positioned
the phrase differently within the sentence. According to the court, the legislature would
have drafted the statute to say: “At the meeting, the county central committee shall elect,
as provided by the party bylaws, the chairman . . . .” The court concluded it was “not free
to shuffle the words in W.S. § 22-4-105 to manufacture a particular meaning.” We agree
with this aspect of the district court’s interpretation of § 22-4-105. Statutory language must
be interpreted in accordance with the legislature’s arrangement and connection of the
words. In re VS, ¶ 41, 429 P.3d at 26 (citation omitted). The legislature chose to place the
“as provided by the party bylaws” language at the end of the sentence rather than adjacent
to “shall elect.” We will not interpret the statute as if the legislature had arranged the words
differently.
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[¶22] The district court also correctly stated the phrase “as provided by the party bylaws”
referred only to its direct antecedent – “other offices.” The placement of commas in § 22-
4-105 supports this interpretation. Under general grammar rules, when a modifying phrase
is separated “from the preceding language by a comma,” the phrase is intended to modify
“all preceding phrases.” Waid v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 23 (Wyo.
2000). However, if “the . . . comma [is] not present, the language [is] properly . . .
construed as modifying only the immediately preceding phrase.” Id. (citing Tietema v.
State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996)). In § 22-4-105, the phrase “as provided by the party
bylaws” modifies only the preceding phrase “other offices” because there is no comma
separating them. Thus, a political party may, through its bylaws, establish additional
central committee offices, but it may not use its bylaws to expand who can vote in the
county central committee officer and state committeeperson elections. If the legislature
had intended for “as provided by the party bylaws” to apply to all preceding phrases,
including “shall elect,” it would have placed a comma after “other offices.”
[¶23] While the Uinta County Republican Party acknowledges the general rule, it points
to other language from Waid as establishing the rule is not immutable. Waid stated: “[T]he
rule [on placement of commas] is [just] another aid to discovery of intent or meaning and
is not inflexible and uniformly binding. Where the sense of the entire act requires that a
qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even succeeding sections, the word
or phrase will not be restricted to its immediate antecedent.” Waid, 996 P.2d at 23 (quoting
2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.33 at 270 (5th ed. 1992)) (footnotes omitted).
The Uinta County Republican Party maintains the legislature’s frequent reference to party
bylaws or rules in the Election Code shows it intended the phrase “as provided by the party
bylaws” to apply to the whole of § 22-4-105. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-4-103(LexisNexis 2021) (reference to party bylaws in filling county central committee
vacancies), § 22-4-110 (reference to party bylaws regarding the composition of the state
central committee), § 22-4-111 (LexisNexis 2021) (reference to party rules for state central
committee organizational meeting). According to the Party, “it is evident that the
legislature intended to defer to the major political parties on almost all internal voting
matters . . . .” We reject that position, as it would render meaningless the legislature’s
specific statement about who could vote for the county chairman and state
committeepersons. If the legislature intended to cede all internal party voting matters to
the political parties, it would have expressly done so and foregone enacting statutory
provisions directing various aspects of party governance.
[¶24] Section 22-4-105 is entirely clear when the general rules of statutory interpretation
and grammar are applied. All county central committee officers and state
committeepersons are elected by the county central committee, alone. The district court
erroneously concluded the Uinta County Republican Party acted within its statutory
authority by enacting Bylaw § 9(2) and using it to allow the Williams Group to vote in the
2021 election.
10
Constitutional Right to Freedom of Political Association
[¶25] The Uinta County Republican Party insists that, if we do not interpret § 22-4-105 as
allowing it to adopt Bylaw § 9(2) to expand who may vote for the Central Committee
officers and state committeepersons, the statute violates its constitutional right to freedom
of political association.
[¶26] Freedom of association is protected from infringement by federal and state
governments through the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31, 89 S.Ct. at 10 (the United States Supreme Court
has “repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected . . . against federal
encroachment by the First Amendment[.]” This freedom is also “entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States.”). Id.Partisan political organizations are entitled to freedom of association, and state legislatures
have no right to interfere with that right by implementing overly burdensome statutory
requirements. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 224-26, 109 S.Ct. at 1020-22; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214-
15, 107 S.Ct. at 548-49.
Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter
has the right to associate with the political party of her choice,
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548 (quoting Kusper [v.
Pontikes,] 414 U.S. [51,] 57, 94 S.Ct. [303,] 307[, 38 L.Ed.2d
260 (1973)]), but also that a political party has a right to
“‘identify the people who constitute the association,’”
Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S., at 214, 107 S.Ct., at 548 (quoting
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 1019, 67 L.Ed.2d
82 (1981)); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460–462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958),
and to select a “standard bearer who best represents the party’s
ideologies and preferences.” Ripon Society, Inc. v. National
Republican Party, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 384, 525 F.2d 567,
601 (1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in result), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976).
Eu, 489 U.S. at 224, 109 S.Ct. at 1020-21. “As a result, political parties’ government,
structure, and activities enjoy constitutional protection.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 1369, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (citing Eu, 489
U.S. at 230, 109 S.Ct. at 1024) (other citation omitted). A state “cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the party as to the desirability of a particular internal party structure .
. . .” Eu, 489 U.S. at 233, 109 S.Ct. at 1025. Nevertheless, “it is also clear that States
may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to
reduce election-and campaign-related disorder.” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. at
11
1369 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d
245 (1992) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes.”)) (other citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶27] In Utah Rep. Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1077 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit
explained that a balancing test commonly known as the Anderson-Burdick test applies
when a political party claims a statute violates its right to freedom of association. Under
that test,
“a court considering a challenge to a state election law must
weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
the [political party] seeks to vindicate against the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
[political party’s] rights.”
Cox, 892 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063, and Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)) (some
quotation marks omitted). If a regulation is found to impose “severe burdens” on a political
party’s associational rights, it must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586, 125 S.Ct. 2029, 2035, 161 L.Ed.2d 920(2005) (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364). “However, when regulations
impose lesser burdens, ‘a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough to
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’” Clingman, 544 U.S. at 586-87, 125
S.Ct. at 2035 (quoting Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364).
[¶28] The constitutionality of § 22-4-105 has not been properly challenged in this case.
The Conrad Group’s declaratory judgment complaint sought enforcement of § 22-4-105.
It did not present any constitutional challenge to the State’s regulation of political parties
through enactment of § 22-4-105. The Uinta County Republican Party did not file a
counterclaim seeking a declaration that § 22-4-105 was unconstitutional. Without a clear
challenge to the constitutionality of § 22-4-105, we cannot conduct a full analysis of § 22-
4-105 under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.
[¶29] Furthermore, if the Uinta County Republican Party wished to challenge the
constitutionality of § 22-4-105, the Wyoming Attorney General should have been joined
as a party to these proceedings. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-113 (LexisNexis 2021),
“[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. . . . If the statute, ordinance or franchise
12
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall be served with a
copy of the proceeding and may be heard.” Similarly, Wyoming Rule of Appellate
Procedure (W.R.A.P.) 7.07 states that when “a statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to
be unconstitutional, . . . counsel shall . . . serve a copy of the [appellate] brief upon the
attorney general. Within 45 days of service of such brief, the attorney general may file a
brief.”
[¶30] As we explained in Ririe v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. One, Crook Cnty, 674 P.2d
214, 219 (Wyo. 1983): “‘The attorney general, being the chief legal officer of the State,
has a duty to protect the interests and the welfare of the people in declaratory judgment
actions where statutory constitutional questions are in issue. [Tobin v. Pursel,] 539 P.2d
[361,] 365 [(Wyo. 1975)].’ . . . [W.R.A.P. 7.07] was adopted to permit the attorney general
to react to all challenges to the constitutionality of Wyoming statutes.” Id. Without the
participation of the Wyoming Attorney General, we can only speculate as to the State’s
position regarding the interests it has in regulating political party officer elections under §
22-4-105. We refuse to consider a constitutional challenge to a statute when the issue has
not been properly raised or litigated.
CONCLUSION
[¶31] The issues in this case are justiciable because they present classic questions for
judicial resolution, including the interpretation and application of a statute. The clear and
unambiguous language of § 22-4-105 only allowed members of the Uinta County
Republican Party’s Central Committee, made up of duly elected precinct
committeepersons, to vote in the 2021 election for Central Committee officers and state
committeepersons. The Uinta County Republican Party was not authorized by the statute
to adopt Bylaw § 9(2) which expanded the eligible voters in Central Committee elections,
and the Party violated § 22-4-105 by allowing the outgoing Central Committee officers to
vote in the 2021 election. The issue of whether § 22-4-105 infringes upon the Uinta County
Republican Party’s constitutional right to freedom of association is not properly before this
Court.
[¶32] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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