Ex parte Harvey Ruffin, Shelton Patterson, Sandra Giles and Kenneth Jones.

Rel: 08/29/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
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Ex parte Harvey Ruffin, Shelton Patterson, Sandra Giles, and
Kenneth Jones
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Thomas Donahey, Jr.
v.
Harvey Ruffin, Shelton Patterson, Sandra Giles,
and Kenneth Jones)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-12-0702)
MAIN, Justice.
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Lt. Harvey Ruffin, a correctional officer at the Bullock
Correctional Facility ("the facility"); Sgt. Shelton
Patterson, a correctional officer at the facility; Sandra
Giles, the deputy warden of the facility; and Kenneth Jones,
the warden of the facility (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the petitioners"), the defendants in an
action filed by Thomas Donahey, Jr., petition for a writ of
mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to grant their
motion for a summary judgment on the ground that they are
entitled to immunity. We grant the petition and issue the
writ.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 25, 2010, Donahey was attacked and injured while
in the custody of the Mental Health Residential Therapeutic
Unit of the facility. Donahey was stabbed several times with
an ink pen by another inmate, Bruce Smith. During the
incident, one of the facility's correctional officers observed
several inmates running from one of the inmate dorms. The
fleeing inmates reported that another inmate was being
stabbed. The correctional officer radioed for immediate
assistance. Two correctional officers responded to the call
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for assistance, including Lt. Ruffin. Lt. Ruffin responded
and observed Donahey "sitting on the side of his bed bleeding"
and Smith "standing behind Donahey, with his hands held over
his head, and stating that 'the voices' had told him to attack
Donahey." Donahey was taken to the facility's health-care
unit for medical treatment and was later released back to his
dormitory. Smith was handcuffed and taken to the facility's
stabilization/segregation unit and was charged with assaulting
another inmate.
On July 6, 2012, Donahey, acting pro se, sued Lt. Ruffin,
Warden Jones, Deputy Warden Giles, and Sgt. Patterson, who was
allegedly present while Donahey was being treated in the
health-care unit following the attack. Donahey alleged that
the petitioners negligently, wantonly, and recklessly failed
to protect him from an attack by another inmate. In his
complaint, Donahey alleged that the petitioners knew that
Smith had a history of violence and that he had attacked other
inmates and prison guards. Donahey also alleged that the
petitioners knew that Smith did not like Donahey and that they
should not have housed Donahey and Smith together. Donahey
also alleged that the failure to protect him from the attack
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constituted a violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Donahey demanded
judgment in the amount of $250,000 in compensatory damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages.1
On August 28, 2013, the petitioners jointly moved for a
summary judgment on the ground that they are immune from
Donahey's lawsuit. Each petitioner submitted an affidavit in
support of the summary-judgment motion. Lt. Ruffin testified
that, contrary to Donahey's claims that Smith was known to be
violent, Smith's last disciplinary infraction involving any
form of violence was in 2005. The petitioners testified that
both Donahey and Smith were housed at the mental-health unit
and both were receiving treatment for mental-health issues.
Warden Jones testified that inmates are routinely housed
together unless there is a compelling reason to segregate
particular inmates from the general population. The
petitioners described the attack as "spontaneous." They
testified that the security staff responded immediately to the
attack and that medical aid was promptly rendered to Donahey,
while Smith was placed in the segregation unit and charged
1
Donahey did not request injunctive or declaratory relief.
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with a disciplinary violation. Deputy Warden Giles testified
that there was nothing that would have given the correctional-
security staff reason to foresee Smith's attack on Donahey.
Although Sgt. Patterson testified that he did not recall being
present at the time of the incident, he stated that security
personal quickly notify the mental-health staff any time they
witness an inmate in mental distress.
Donahey filed no response and submitted no evidence in
opposition to the summary-judgment motion.2 Thus the sworn
statements submitted by the petitioners were uncontroverted.
A hearing on the motion was held on November 6, 2013.3 On
November 7, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying the
summary-judgment motion without explanation. The petitioners
jointly petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the
Montgomery Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their
favor on the basis that they are immune from liability.
II. Standard of Review
Although the denial of a motion for a summary judgment is
generally not appealable, this Court has held that the denial
2
Nor did Donahey file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f),
Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking time to conduct additional discovery.
3
No transcript of the hearing is in the record.
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of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Ala. 2008). In such
case, we apply the following standard of review:
"'"While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, ...
the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded
on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus." Ex parte Rizik, 791 So. 2d 911,
912 (Ala. 2000). A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy available only when there is:
"(a) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte BOC
Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).'"
Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1280 (quoting Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d
541, 543 (Ala. 2003)).
III. Analysis
The petitioners invoke a pantheon of immunity defenses.
With regard to Donahey's claims that the petitioners
"negligently, wantonly, and recklessly" failed to protect
Donahey from harm, the petitioners contend that they are
entitled to State-agent immunity. As to Donahey's 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim, based on the alleged violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights, the petitioners assert that they are
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entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the petitioners
argue that, to the extent they are sued in their official
capacities, they are entitled to sovereign immunity. We
discuss each argument in turn.
A. State-law claims
The petitioners contend that they are entitled to the
protection of State-agent immunity with regard to Donahey's
claims that the petitioners "negligently, wantonly, and
recklessly" failed to protect him from attack. The
petitioners are all employees of the Alabama Department of
Corrections ("the DOC"). We have previously held that
"employees of the DOC are entitled to State-agent immunity
when in conducting the activities made the basis of the action
they were exercising 'judgment in the administration' of the
DOC." Carpenter v. Tillman, 948 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006).
The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out in Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), governs the
determination of whether a State agent is entitled to
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immunity.4 This Court, in Cranman, stated the test for
State-agent immunity as follows:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
4
The test set out in Cranman, a plurality opinion, was
subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in Ex parte
Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
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"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities of a governmental agency require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. This Court has also stated:
"'This Court has established a "burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.' Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.' 946 So. 2d at 452. Should the State agent
make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of
exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable. The exception being argued
here is that 'the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.' 946 So. 2d at 452. One of
the ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State
agent acted beyond his or her authority is by
proffering evidence that the State agent failed '"to
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discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."'
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d [173,] 178
[(Ala. 2000)])."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282–83.
There appears to be no dispute that the petitioners are
State agents who, at the time of the incident, were performing
a function -– managing the confinement of and/or guarding
prisoners with mental illness -– that entitles them to State-
agent immunity. See Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201,
206 (Ala. 2003)("Categories (3) and (4) of [the Cranman]
restatement are clearly broad enough to contemplate the
confinement of prisoners, which is the conduct in controversy
here."). Accordingly, the burden shifted to Donahey to
establish the applicability of one of the Cranman exceptions.
He failed to do so.
The record before us indicates that Donahey filed no
response in opposition to the petitioners' motion for a
summary judgment, nor has Donahey offered any evidence
indicating that one of the exceptions in Cranman to State-
agent immunity is applicable. Therefore, Donahey did not meet
his burden of establishing that the petitioners were not
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entitled to State-agent immunity with regard to the State-law
claims asserted against them in their individual capacities.
Accordingly, the respondents are entitled to State-agent
immunity as to the claims that they "negligently, wantonly,
and recklessly" failed to protect Donahey from an attack by
Smith.
B. Civil-rights claims
Next the petitioners assert that Donahey's claim that the
petitioners violated his civil rights under the Eighth
Amendment, a claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is
barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The doctrine of
qualified immunity generally shields government officials who
are performing discretionary functions from liability for
civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights." Ex parte
Madison County Bd. of Education, 1 So. 3d 980, 990 (Ala.
2008). The United States Supreme Court has recently described
the doctrine as follows:
"'The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials "from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
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(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). Qualified immunity 'gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments,' and 'protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law."' Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. __, __ [131
S.Ct. 2074, 2085] (2011)(quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). '[W]hether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official
action generally turns on the "objective legal
reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of
the legal rules that were "clearly established" at
the time it was taken.' Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 639 (1987)(citation omitted)."
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1235,
1244-45 (2012).
This Court has recognized a two-part test to determine
whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity
in a § 1983 action:
"In deciding whether a public official ... is
entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action,
this Court employs the following two-step analysis:
"'"'1) The defendant public official
must first prove that "he was acting within
the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred."
"'"'2) Once the defendant public
official satisfies his burden of moving
forward with the evidence, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show lack of
good faith on the defendant's part. This
burden is met by proof demonstrating that
the defendant public official's actions
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"violated clearly established
constitutional law."'"'"
Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Couch
v. City of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 155 (Ala. 1998), quoting
in turn Roden v. Wright, 646 So. 2d 605, 610 (Ala. 1994)).
The second prong is satisfied if the plaintiff proves that
"'(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2)
this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.'" Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).
In the present case, there appears to be no dispute that
the petitioners were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority at the time of the incident. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
defined the term "discretionary authority" to include "all
actions of a governmental official that (1) 'were undertaken
pursuant to the performance of his duties,' and (2) were
'within the scope of his authority.'" Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d
1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)(quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d
1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988)). From all the evidence before
us, the petitioners were each working within the line and
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scope of their various positions at the facility at the time
of the allegedly wrongful acts complained of by Donahey, who
has submitted no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the
burden shifted to Donahey to show that the petitioners'
actions violated clearly established constitutional law.
Donahey contends that his injuries resulted from the
petitioners' alleged "deliberate indifference" to his safety.
"'A prison official's "deliberate indifference"
to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment.' Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811(1994); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 1135
S.Ct. 2475, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993). '"[P]rison
officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners."' Farmer,
511 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct at 1976 (quotations and
citations omitted). 'It is not, however, every
injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of
another that translates into a constitutional liable
for prison officials responsible for the victim's
safety.' Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct at 1977."
Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).
In order to defeat the petitioners' properly supported
motion for a summary judgment on Donahey's Eighth Amendment
"deliberate indifference" § 1983 claim, Donahey was required
to produce substantial evidence of "'(1) a substantial risk of
serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to
that risk; and (3) causation.'" Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349
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(quoting Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th
Cir. 1995)). Donahey, however, has submitted no evidence
indicating that the petitioners were "subjectively aware" of
the "substantial risk of serious harm" created by trusting him
with Smith. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829-38
(1994) (defining the term "deliberate indifference" to require
a showing that the officer was "subjectively aware of the
risk"). To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence in the
record suggests that the attack on Donahey was "spontaneous"
and unexpected. Lt. Ruffin testified that Smith, the inmate
who attacked Donahey, had received no disciplinary action for
any act of violence since 2005; Deputy Warden Giles testified
that "[t]here was nothing that would give the correctional
security staff reason to expect an attack." Accordingly,
Donahey did not provide sufficient evidence showing that his
injuries were caused by the petitioners' "deliberate
indifference"; thus, Donahey failed to meet his burden of
establishing that the petitioners violated clearly established
constitutional law.
C. Claims against the petitioners in their
official capacities
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Finally, we note that Donahey did not designate whether
the petitioners were being sued in their individual or
official capacities. Although the above analysis assumes that
the petitioners were sued in their individual capacities, the
petitioners argue, and we agree, that, to the extent Donahey
asserts claims against them in their official capacities, they
are also immune from suit. To the extent that Donahey's
action, which seeks only monetary damages, is against the
petitioners in their official capacities, his State-law claims
are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Ala.
Const. 1901, § 14; Haley v. Barbour Cnty., 885 So. 2d 785, 788
(Ala. 2004); and Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d
257, 261 (Ala. 2003). Likewise, Donahey is not permitted to
assert a § 1983 claim for money damages against the
petitioners in their official capacities. See Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding
that a state official sued in his or her official capacity for
damages is not a "person" who may be sued under § 1983).
IV. Conclusion
Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the petitioners are
entitled to immunity from all the claims asserted against them
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by Donahey. Accordingly, the petitioners have shown a clear
legal right to the relief sought, and the trial court is
directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw,
Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
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