United States v. Datavs

UNITED STATES, Appellant and Cross-Appellee
v.
Daniel J. DATAVS, Senior Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellee and Cross-Appellant
No. 12-5001
Crim. App. No. 37537
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 9, 2012
Decided December 14, 2012
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
C.J., ERDMANN and STUCKY, JJ., and COX, S.J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant and Cross-Appellee: Captain Tyson D. Kindness
(argued); Colonel Don M. Christensen; Lieutenant Colonel
Christopher T. Smith, and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief);
Lieutenant Colonel Linell A. Letendre.
For Appellee and Cross-Appellant: Major Michael S. Kerr
(argued).
Military Judge: Grant L. Kratz
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to his pleas, a panel of officer and enlisted
members sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellee of
one specification of making a false official statement and two
specifications of forcible sodomy, violations of Articles 107
and 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 907, 925 (2006). The adjudged and approved sentence provided
for a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to E-1.
The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
(AFCCA) affirmed the findings and the sentence as approved by
the convening authority, except for the forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, of which the court affirmed a forfeiture of
“$933.00 of [Appellee’s] pay for two months.” United States v.
Datavs, 70 M.J. 595, 605 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011). Despite
this favorable ruling, the Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force (TJAG), on certification under Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2006), asked us to hold that the AFCCA
misapplied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), in determining
that trial defense counsel’s performance was ineffective.1 On
1
On February 10, 2012, TJAG requested that action be taken with
respect to the following issue:
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
April 18, 2012, we granted Appellee’s cross-petition to
determine the following issue:
WHETHER [APPELLEE] RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBTAIN AN EXPERT
CONSULTANT IN THE FIELD OF SEXUAL ASSAULT EXAMINATIONS,
FAILED TO MAKE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE AGAINST TWO PANEL
MEMBERS WHO WERE BASE VICTIM ADVOCATES, AND FAILED TO
PROPERLY IMPEACH S.M.F. USING HER PERSONAL TELEPHONE
RECORDS.2
Insofar as there was no error that materially prejudiced a
substantial right of Appellee, see Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006), the decision of the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
I. FACTS
The morning of June 15, 2008, Appellee and SF, a civilian,
engaged in consensual vaginal intercourse.3 SF alleged that,
following the vaginal intercourse, Appellee forced her to engage
in both oral sodomy and anal sodomy. Later that day, SF was
examined by Burton, a certified Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE Burton).
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS INCORRECTLY
APPLIED THE STANDARD OF LAW UNDER STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) AND HARRINGTON v. RICHTER, 131 S. CT.
770 (2011), WHEN EVALUATING WHETHER TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT SEEKING EXPERT ASSISTANCE DURING
TRIAL AFTER THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPERT WITNESS TESTIFIED.
2
United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 301 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (order
granting review).
3
For a more complete factual history, see Datavs, 70 M.J. at
596-97.
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
Prior to trial, trial defense counsel and assistant trial
defense counsel interviewed SANE Burton on three separate
occasions and observed her testimony at the Article 32, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 832 (2006), hearing. SANE Burton discussed the
findings she had made during her vaginal and anal examination of
SF. SANE Burton indicated that the trauma to SF’s vagina was
“some of the worst she had ever seen,” and “that the sexual
encounter that caused the [vaginal] trauma must have been very
painful.” SANE Burton described SF’s anal trauma as
“considerable,” but did not indicate a willingness to testify
about the likely level of pain, and agreed that a “first-time
experience with anal sex, a single insertion of the penis, or
even a partial insertion of the penis” could have been the cause
of the anal trauma she observed.
On July 28, 2008, during an interview with civilian and OSI
investigators, Appellee responded to SF’s allegation of forced
anal sex by stating that “it may have slipped in,” but that it
wasn’t anal sex. Subsequently, Appellee submitted a written
statement in which he admitted that he and SF engaged in
consensual anal sodomy.
Charges were referred to a general court-martial on March
2, 2009. During voir dire, two panel members identified
themselves as base victim advocates, who had received training
on how to deal with victims of alleged sexual abuse. Both
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
members stated they had not acted as victim advocates as of the
time of the trial and affirmed their impartiality and ability to
decide the case solely on the evidence and military judge’s
instructions. Defense counsel did not challenge the inclusion
of either member on the panel.
Prior to trial, defense counsel requested that the
convening authority appoint a SANE to assist the defense in
responding to SANE Burton’s anticipated testimony. After the
convening authority denied the request, defense counsel
submitted a motion to compel production of a SANE. However, to
avoid the potential spillover effect from SANE Burton’s vivid
and prejudicial description of SF’s vaginal injuries, and
because the defense strategy was to establish that SANE Burton’s
assessment of the anal trauma was inconclusive as to whether it
was the result of consensual or nonconsensual activity, defense
counsel withdrew the motion in exchange for the Government’s
representation that it intended “to only offer portions of the
SANE Examination that relate[] to injuries to the anus and not
to any injuries to the vaginal area.”
The trial defense counsel asserted that SANE Burton
testified about the anal injuries in “surprisingly more
provocative and aggressive ways” than she had in her previous
descriptions to defense counsel. SANE Burton also stated that,
although it was “physically possible” for SF’s anal injuries to
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
have occurred during consensual intercourse, “[t]he injuries
were . . . consistent with [SF]’s statement of forced anal
penetration.”
Rather than renew the motion for the appointment of a
defense expert to assist in responding to SANE Burton’s
testimony, defense counsel proceeded with cross-examination
without consulting a SANE expert. On cross, SANE Burton
admitted, consistent with her pretrial statements and Article
32, UCMJ, testimony, that it was “medically possible” for the
anal trauma to have been caused by a single or partial insertion
of the penis, and also admitted that she could not determine if
the trauma was caused by “consensual or unconsensual activity.”
The general court-martial convicted Appellee of one
specification of false official statement and two specifications
of forcible sodomy. Following his conviction, Appellee’s family
hired a certified SANE, SANE O’Neal, to review SANE Burton’s
examination and testimony, and to report her own conclusions.
SANE O’Neal was critical of both SANE Burton’s examination
procedures and some of her general conclusions. But, like SANE
Burton, SANE O’Neal concluded that: (1) some force is necessary
to perform anal sex, see Datavs, 70 M.J. at 601; (2) SF
sustained some anal injuries; and (3) it was possible that all
the injuries described in SANE Burton’s testimony could have
occurred as a result of either consensual or nonconsensual anal
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
sex. The AFCCA granted Appellee’s motion to submit an affidavit
from SANE O’Neal containing her report. Appellant’s Motion to
Submit Documents at 1, Datavs, 70 M.J. 595 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2011) (No. ACM 37537).
II. AFCCA DECISION
Before the AFCCA, as relevant to the issues raised before
this Court, Appellee alleged that defense counsel were
constitutionally ineffective because they: (1) failed to obtain
an expert consultant in the field of sexual assault examinations
after the Government’s expert witness testified; (2) failed to
admit telephone records to impeach SF’s testimony that she made
no attempt to contact Appellee after their encounter on June 15,
2008; and (3) failed to make challenges for cause against two
panel members who were base victim advocates. The AFCCA granted
two Government motions to submit documents, permitting trial
defense counsel and assistant trial defense counsel to provide
affidavits and supplemental affidavits that responded to each of
Appellee’s ineffectiveness claims.
After considering the defense counsel’s affidavits, the
record of trial, and SANE O’Neal’s report, the AFCCA held that
(2) and (3) of Appellee’s ineffectiveness claim fell “well
within the professional norms expected of able defense counsel.”
Datavs, 70 M.J. at 602. Defense counsel’s decisions not to
admit telephone records to impeach SF’s testimony in order to
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
avoid the risk that the Government would use the records to
locate SF’s former boyfriend –- a potential witness with whom SF
discussed details of the sexual encounter that were consistent
with her allegations -- and not to challenge two panel members
who were base victim advocates because defense counsel believed
they were favorable members, were reasonable. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable . . . .”).
The AFCCA concluded, however, with respect to (1) of
Appellee’s ineffectiveness claim, that following SANE Burton’s
testimony, defense counsel performed deficiently in proceeding
with cross-examination without expert assistance. Datavs, 70
M.J. at 600. The court then tested for substantial prejudice.
Id. at 601-02. Upon comparing SANE Burton’s testimony to SANE
O’Neal’s report, the court determined that defense counsel’s
error was nonprejudicial. Id. at 602.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “an
appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted
in prejudice.” United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
reviewing for ineffectiveness, the Court “looks at the questions
of deficient performance and prejudice de novo.” United States
v. Gutierrez, 66 M.J. 329, 330-31 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
With respect to Strickland’s first prong, courts “must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 466 U.S.
at 689; see also Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (“Even under de
novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s representation
is a most deferential one.”).
As to the second prong, a challenger must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [deficient
performance] the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “[T]he question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. “It is not enough to show that
the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome . . . .”
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693 (internal quotations omitted)). Instead, “[a] reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787-88 (“Counsel’s errors must be so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
whose result is reliable.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687(internal quotations omitted))).
B.
With respect to Appellee’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims related to defense counsel’s failure to impeach a
single statement of SF through her telephone records and failure
to challenge two members for cause, we agree with the AFCCA’s
determination that defense counsel acted “well within the
professional norms expected of able defense counsel.” Datavs,
70 M.J. at 602.
Defense counsel do not perform deficiently when they make a
strategic decision to accept a risk or forego a potential
benefit, where it is objectively reasonable to do so. See
United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(holding that it was not deficient performance to decide not to
have the military judge dismiss a specification and risk a
mistrial where counsel had strategic reasons for keeping the
assembled panel); United States v. Stephenson, 33 M.J. 79, 80
(C.M.A. 1991) (concluding that it was not deficient performance
to decline to call a character witness at a sentencing hearing
in order to avoid harmful rebuttal evidence).
Here, defense counsel determined that the members in
question possessed characteristics that made them more likely to
be persuaded by the defense’s theory of the case, and, during
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
voir dire, both members affirmed their impartiality and ability
to decide the case solely on the evidence and instructions.
Likewise, in not admitting SF’s telephone records, defense
counsel avoided alerting Government counsel to the existence of
and contact information for SF’s boyfriend, who was known to
have information that would be damaging to the defense. For
these reasons, we hold that defense counsel’s strategic choices
fell within the bounds of reasonable performance.
C.
When reviewing ineffectiveness claims, “a court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697. Rather, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should
be followed.” Id.Appellee argues that defense counsel’s decisions to cross-
examine SANE Burton without consulting with a SANE expert and
not to counter SANE Burton’s testimony with a defense SANE
expert resulted in his conviction. We are not persuaded. We
agree with the AFCCA that Appellee has not demonstrated that
there is a reasonable probability that, if SANE O’Neal had been
consulted at trial, prior to cross-examination of SANE Burton,
or had been called during the defense’s case, the panel members
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
would have harbored a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Appellee’s written statement admits that he intentionally
engaged in anal sodomy with SF, and the only contested issues
with regard to his conviction for forcible anal sodomy were
whether the sodomy occurred by force and without SF’s consent.
SANE Burton testified that SF’s anal injuries were “consistent
with [SF’s] statement of forced anal penetration,” but that it
was “physically possible” that the injuries were caused by
consensual intercourse. On cross-examination, SANE Burton
admitted that she could not conclude whether the anal trauma was
caused by “consensual or unconsensual activity.” SANE Burton
also admitted that it was “medically possible” for SF’s anal
trauma to have been caused by a single, or partial insertion of
the penis, and that there is the “potential for injury” any time
a penis enters the anus. Further, she conceded that her opinion
did not take into account whether the subjects of her prior
examinations were experienced with anal sex or whether they had
prepared their bodies prior to engaging in anal sex. Thus, SANE
Burton’s testimony, taken as a whole, was inconclusive as to
whether the sodomy occurred by force and without SF’s consent.
Appellee fails to demonstrate a sufficient “delta” between
the probative weight of SANE Burton’s testimony following
defense counsel’s unassisted cross-examination and the probative
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weight of that testimony had defense counsel either (1) cross-
examined SANE Burton with the benefit of expert assistance, or
(2) countered with testimony from a defense expert. Compare
Boyle v. McKune, 544 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that any deficiency associated with defense counsel’s
“failure to interview and call to the stand any expert
witnesses” was nonprejudicial where the appellant did not
demonstrate “that medical experts could have reached a
conclusion regarding consent contrary to the conclusions reached
by the [government’s experts]” and defense counsel “elicited
from the government’s expert nurse witnesses that it was
possible the injuries on [the victims] could have stemmed from
consensual vaginal sex, lack of lubrication, and even the re-
aggravation of a previous injury”), with Caro v. Woodford, 280
F.3d 1247, 1256-58 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that trial counsel’s
failure to investigate and present evidence of brain damage was
prejudicial error where three separate expert witnesses
testified at an evidentiary hearing that they would have
concluded that petitioner suffered from brain damage). See also
Amos v. Renico, 683 F.3d 720, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that “trial counsel’s failure to investigate and call expert
witnesses did not work to [appellant’s] actual and substantial
disadvantage” where the expert scientists who authored the
“articles that [appellant] claims counsel should have discovered
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
would not have contradicted [the government expert’s]
testimony”); Villegas v. Yates, No. CV 08-02073-JFW (VBK), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102503, at *16, *23-*25, 2009 WL 3668625, at
*4-*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (concluding that the
“[p]etitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s trial
strategy was unreasonable or prejudicial” in “fail[ing] to
present an . . . expert witness to counter the prosecution
witness” where the expert submitted a sworn declaration that
“accepts -- or does not deny -- that [the victim] sustained
injuries and, moreover, admits that it is just as likely that
such injuries were incurred during non-consensual as consensual
sex”).
Like SANE Burton’s testimony, SANE O’Neal’s report, taken
as a whole, concludes that: (1) some amount of force is
required to engage in consensual or nonconsensual anal sex; (2)
SF sustained some anal injuries; and (3) all of the injuries
could have occurred as a result of consensual or nonconsensual
anal sex. Thus, while critical of SANE Burton’s examination
procedures and some of her general conclusions, SANE O’Neal’s
report is substantially consistent with SANE Burton’s testimony
with regard to the issues of force and consent.
Appellee has not demonstrated that the assistance or
testimony of a SANE expert would have substantially undermined
the force of SANE Burton’s testimony, taken as a whole, with
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United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
regard to the issues of force and consent -- let alone offered
anything close to a definitive conclusion that the anal sodomy
was consensual. Thus, Appellee’s conviction would still have
hinged on whether the members found SF’s testimony that she did
not consent credible in light of Appellee’s statement that SF
had consented. When viewed cumulatively with Appellee’s
contradictory statements as to whether he and SF had even
engaged in anal sodomy and his conviction for making a false
official statement to the police, there is no “reasonable
probability” that the panel would have arrived at a different
outcome after hearing SANE O’Neal’s testimony. Thus, we hold
that defense counsel’s decision to forego expert assistance and
testimony is not “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome” of Appellee’s court-martial, and did not prejudice his
defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
D.
With respect to Appellant’s request that we revisit the
AFCCA’s determination that defense counsel’s failure to seek
production of a SANE expert following SANE Burton’s testimony
was not “within the bounds of reasonable performance expected
from competent counsel,” Datavs, 70 M.J. at 600, we note that
the AFCCA also concluded that there was no prejudice from that
decision. Id. at 602.
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To the extent that the AFCCA’s decision might be read to
say that counsel’s performance is per se deficient by failing to
counteract an adverse expert’s unexpected testimony with an
expert witness of their own, that would be an erroneous
statement of the law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 791(“Strickland does not enact Newton’s third law for the
presentation of evidence, requiring for every prosecution expert
an equal and opposite expert from the defense. In many
instances cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects
in an expert’s presentation.”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689(“There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would
not defend a particular client in the same way.”).
Since we conclude that Appellee was not prejudiced by any
alleged error, see supra Part III.C., we do not reach the
question whether defense counsel’s decision not to renew the
defense motion for expert assistance in fact constituted
deficient performance in this case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697. Appellant won below on the absence of prejudice, and we
agree with the AFCCA that there is no prejudice. See United
States v. Gilley, 14 C.M.A. 226, 226-27, 34 C.M.R. 6, 6-7 (1963)
(holding the questions presented moot because “[p]ractically
speaking, any action which we might take with respect to the
certified issues would not materially alter the situation
16
United States v. Datavs, 12-5001/AF
presented with respect either to the accused or the
Government”); see also United States v. McIvor, 21 C.M.A. 156,
158, 44 C.M.R. 210, 212 (1972) (holding the certified questions
moot because resolution of the issue would not “result in a
material alteration of the relationship of the parties”); United
States v. Aletky, 15 C.M.A. 536, 536-37, 37 C.M.R. 156, 156-57
(1967) (holding the certified question moot because the accused
had been separated from the service).
IV. DECISION
Accordingly, insofar as there was no error that materially
prejudiced a substantial right of Appellee, see Article 59(a),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006), the decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
17