United States v. Lewis

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Justin M. LEWIS, Lance Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 05-0551
Crim. App. No. 200200089
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued May 2, 2006
Decided August 9, 2006
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and CRAWFORD and BAKER, JJ., joined. EFFRON, J.,
filed a separate concurring opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Brian L. Mizer, JAGC, USNR (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Roger E. Mattioli, USMC (argued);
Lieutenant Guillermo J. Rojas, JAGC, USNR, and Commander C. N.
Purnell, JAGC, USN (on brief).
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Lance Corporal Justin M. Lewis was charged with numerous
drug offenses. He entered guilty pleas to attempted
distribution of ecstasy, conspiracy to use and distribute
controlled substances, use of ecstasy, use of ketamine, use of
LSD, use of methamphetamine, possession of ketamine, possession
of ecstasy with the intent to distribute, and distribution of
ecstasy in violation of Articles 80, 81 and 112a, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 881, 912a (2000).
Lewis was convicted in accordance with his pleas and sentenced
to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for five years,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.
The convening authority approved the sentence but suspended
all confinement in excess of forty-two months pursuant to a
pretrial agreement. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence. United
States v. Lewis, 61 M.J. 512, 521 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
We granted review of three issues, which included a challenge to
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that the unlawful
command influence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
alleged violations of Lewis’s right to a speedy trial and speedy
appellate review.1
1
On January 19, 2006, we granted review of the following issues:
2
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
Unlawful command influence is “‘the mortal enemy of
military justice.’” United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 178
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388,
393 (C.M.A. 1986)). Where it is found to exist, judicial
authorities must take those steps necessary to preserve both the
actual and apparent fairness of the criminal proceeding. United
States v. Rivers, 49 M.J. 434, 443 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United
States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. 1988). The
“‘appearance of unlawful command influence is as devastating to
the military justice system as the actual manipulation of any
given trial.’” United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374
(C.A.A.F. 2003) (quoting United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35,
42-43 (C.A.A.F. 2002)).
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE IN-COURT ACCUSATIONS BY THE
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE AND TRIAL COUNSEL THAT
THE MILITARY JUDGE WAS INVOLVED IN A
HOMOSEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIVILIAN
DEFENSE COUNSEL AMOUNTED TO UNLAWFUL COMMAND
INFLUENCE BUT WERE HARMLESS BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT DENIED APPELLANT
HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 10, UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
810.
III. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WHERE HE SERVED HIS ENTIRE
SENTENCE OF FORTY-TWO MONTHS CONFINEMENT
BEFORE THE LOWER COURT REACHED A DECISION IN
HIS CASE.
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
Lewis contends that outrageous conduct by the trial counsel
and staff judge advocate (SJA) placed an intolerable strain on
the public perception of fairness in his trial and the military
justice system, and that the proper remedy to cure this unlawful
command influence is dismissal of the charges. We conclude that
under the unique circumstances of this case, no remedy short of
reversal of the findings and sentence and dismissal of the
charges and specifications with prejudice will ameliorate the
unlawful command influence present and restore the public
perception of fairness in the military justice system.
Facts
The initial military judge detailed to this court-martial
was Major (MAJ) CW. At the initial Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 839(a) (2000), session held on November 7, 2002, MAJ CW
announced her qualifications as a military judge and offered the
parties the opportunity to voir dire or challenge her. Both
parties declined and Lewis was arraigned. The detailed military
defense counsel then announced that Lewis had retained a
civilian defense counsel, Ms. JS. Ms. JS was a former Marine
judge advocate who had attained the rank of colonel. Ms. JS
represented Lewis at all proceedings after the first Article
39(a), UCMJ, session.
62 M.J. 448 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
At an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session held on January 14,
2002, MAJ CW stated that trial counsel had requested a voir dire
of the military judge. The voir dire covered a number of areas
including: (1) companion cases to Lewis’s tried by MAJ CW as
military judge; (2) MAJ CW’s prior professional relationship
with the civilian defense counsel, Ms. JS; (3) the number of
cases presided over by MAJ CW at which Ms. JS appeared as
civilian defense counsel; and (4) the extent of any social
relationship between MAJ CW and Ms. JS in general, as well as
any personal contact between MAJ CW and Ms. JS since the Lewis
case had begun.
Concerning personal contact with Ms. JS, MAJ CW said, “She
boards horses at the barn where I ride, as a hobby I ride on
Sundays there, and occasionally I see her at the barn.” Based
upon the companion cases at which MAJ CW served as military
judge, the professional relationship MAJ CW had with Ms. JS and
because MAJ CW and Ms. JS had “at least interacted . . . in a
very limited social way at the barn but on no other occasion”,
trial counsel inquired whether the military judge believed there
was an “appearance of impartiality [sic].” Major CW responded
that she did not believe there was “the appearance of
impropriety.”
Trial counsel then asked MAJ CW about another case in which
she had been voir dired about whether she detailed herself to
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
the case and her relationship with Ms. JS. When asked if she
considered that voir dire inappropriate, MAJ CW responded in the
negative and added:
Well, I find it interesting that I’m
frequently voir dired on my acquaintance
with Ms. [JS] when my other military judge
counterparts are never voir dired on their
acquaintance with her. She stood as their
reviewing officer and working relationship
with them, she’s been around the Marine
Corps for over 30 years, so I do find that
as interesting.
Summarizing the voir dire to that point and specifically
including “having limited social interaction at the barn only”,
trial counsel again asked if the military judge believed there
might be an “appearance of impartiality [sic].” In response,
MAJ CW asked trial counsel if he was making a motion for
recusal. The trial counsel said that he was not, but continued
his voir dire and inquired about yet another case in which MAJ
CW was questioned about electronic mail messages generated by
Ms. JS and her relationship with Ms. JS. Noting that trial
counsel in that case had submitted a motion for recusal, trial
counsel asked MAJ CW if she “resented that inquiry or the
subsequent motion.” Major CW responded:
I resented the –- the –- Major [W] was
assigned to that case by the SJA for the
specific purpose of conducting a voir dire
of the military judge and floating the
recusal motion, and then he was taken off
the case before I even deliberated and ruled
on the motion. When I went to go and ask
him further questions on the motion, he was
6
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
not available. He had left the building.
So I found, overall, his conduct and the way
that he asked the questions, and his conduct
in leaving before the motion was even
resolved –- I found that to be
unprofessional, and, yes, I was offended by
that process.
Asked further about her reaction to that voir dire and motion,
MAJ CW indicated that she “probably” told another major that she
felt she had been put through “an inquisition”, that she felt
she had been “attacked by the government”, and that she may have
indicated “it would take . . . a few days to get back on good
terms with the government.”
Trial counsel’s voir dire continued. The questions
concerned whether MAJ CW had detailed herself to Lewis’s case
after learning that Ms. JS would be the civilian defense
counsel, the extent and nature of any communications with Ms. JS
about the Lewis case, and whether MAJ CW had received copies of
electronic mail generated by Ms. JS dealing with matters
relating to an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. At this
point, trial counsel made a motion for recusal as follows:
Ma’am, at this time taken all of the facts
that have come to light during this inquiry,
your previous involvement with the companion
cases, having worked with Colonel [JS] in
the past, having a social relationship
limited to interactions at the barn, as well
as the fact that defense counsel in the Neff
case apparently received statements from the
assistant civilian defense counsel
expressing preference for you as military
judge, also the fact that you expressed in
the Scamahorn case displeasure with the way
7
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
that you had been voir dired in the Curiel
case; also the fact that civilian defense
counsel in this case has made a habit of
CC’ing you on electronic mail messages which
contained disputed and contested substantial
issues relating to suborning perjury,
discovery issue, and making recommendations
to you as to what would be an appropriate
resolution for failure to comply with
pretrial milestones: All of that taken
together, ma’am, would you agree that
creates an appearance of impartiality [sic]
that a reasonable person might perceive with
respect to this case, ma’am?
Emphasis added. Asked if he had a written motion, trial counsel
responded, “If the issue becomes ripe, ma’am, the government
will have a written motion to reconsider.” After determining
that the motion for recusal was based solely on her responses
during voir dire, MAJ CW stated that she did not “think the
record supports recusal of the military judge. That’s my ruling
on the motion.”
At this point trial counsel indicated that the Government
had a written motion for reconsideration. The written motion
asserted three bases for recusal: “the reasonable appearance of
impartiality [sic] by the military judge, actual bias by the
military judge, and personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts.” In general, the motion noted the prior professional
relationship between Ms. JS and MAJ CW, some cases in which MAJ
CW had docketed herself as military judge when Ms. JS was to
appear as civilian defense counsel, voir dire of MAJ CW in other
cases concerning her relationship with Ms. JS, Ms. JS’s practice
8
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
of sending copies of electronic mail correspondence about
pending cases to MAJ CW, and the companion cases to Lewis’s case
over which MAJ CW had presided.
Specifically, the motion stated: “On 25 November 2001,
after already having presided over the arraignment in this case,
and being copied on numerous electronic mail messages by the
civilian defense counsel, the military judge and civilian
defense counsel were observed exiting a showing of the play
‘Dracula the Musical’ in LaJolla, California, by Colonel [RZ].”
The motion for reconsideration asserted that the appearance of
impropriety arose from a number of factors, including:
First, [MAJ CW] and [Ms. JS] have a long
professional history going back nearly a decade,
in which [Ms. JS] was in her chain of command and
assisted her in a remedial board. Second, [MAJ
CW and Ms. JS] apparently interact socially as
well, and it appears that they did so after [MAJ
CW] had docketed herself to the instant case.
Although the Government had obviously been aware as early
as January 11, 2002 of the fact that MAJ CW and Ms. JS had
attended the play, no questions were asked about that play
during the voir dire conducted on January 14, 2002. The motion
for reconsideration was the first time the Government disclosed
that knowledge. In further voir dire MAJ CW explained that when
trial counsel initially voir dired her, she did not remember
going to the play: “[I]t slipped my mind that I had gone to
that play with [Ms. JS].” Major CW denied the motion for
9
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
reconsideration and noted that she and Ms. JS had “occasional
social interaction with no discussions of any military trials
pending before me.”
In response to MAJ CW’s ruling, the trial counsel requested
a seventy-two-hour continuance to determine whether the
Government would appeal MAJ CW’s ruling under Article 62, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 862 (2000). See Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
908(b)(1). Trial counsel revealed that he had already
coordinated with the appellate government division and that they
were not yet certain whether the challenge to MAJ CW’s ruling
would be a Government appeal or a request for extraordinary
relief. Major CW denied the request for a continuance. Trial
counsel then asked for a three-hour continuance in order to seek
a stay of the trial proceedings. That request was also denied.
At an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session held on January 15,
2002, to litigate defense motions relating to pretrial
confinement and prosecutorial misconduct, the defense called the
SJA of the 1st Marine Division, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) JC, as
a witness on the prosecutorial misconduct motion. The SJA was
asked about his role in the earlier voir dire of MAJ CW. The
SJA indicated that he had given “[g]eneral advice on voir dire”
to the trial counsel and had passed along some unspecified
things he had heard.
10
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
In explaining some of the advice he had given to trial
counsel, the SJA stated that “there was some evidence out there
that, in fact, the defense lawyer had been on a date with the
judge while this case was pending.” The SJA also revealed that
he had conversations about a Government appeal or extraordinary
writ with Colonel (COL) RF at the appellate government division
during which the SJA also conveyed the things he had heard.
Those conversations included “the apparent discrepancy on the
record when the military judge could not recall going on a date”
as well as the fact that Ms. JS did not correct MAJ CW when she
omitted any mention of the play during voir dire. Asked if he
had discussed any particular evidence of bias on the part of MAJ
CW, the SJA said:
A perfect example, and I relayed this to
Colonel [RF], a perfect example is while
[trial counsel was] addressing the court
this morning, [Ms. JS] starts strolling
around the courtroom, just walking around
anywhere she wants to go. I’ve never seen
that in any court of law in my life. The
body movement being exhibited, in my
opinion, which I told Colonel [RF] was that
[Ms. JS] is running this court-martial, and
[Col. RF] was very interested in that. If
you really want to get tacky -- and I’ll
tell you what else I told Colonel [RF].
The SJA also discussed his “own personal bias observations”
with COL RF. The SJA’s testimony was periodically marked by
direct exchanges with Ms. JS. The personal nature of this
matter was reflected later when Ms. JS considered withdrawing
11
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
from the case. However, having advised Lewis of her concerns,
Ms. JS remained on the case at Lewis’s insistence.2
At a later Article 39(a), UCMJ, session MAJ CW indicated
she had been informed that a stay of proceedings had been
prepared by the appellate government division. She announced
for the record that the contents of that stay request had been
read to her over the phone. Based on the prior proceedings and
the information that had been read over the phone, MAJ CW again
reconsidered her denial of the recusal motion and concluded she
could continue to sit as military judge.
The next day, January 17, 2002, after receiving evidence on
the prosecutorial misconduct and pretrial confinement motions
and following an overnight recess, MAJ CW indicated that she had
once again reconsidered her ruling on the recusal motion and had
decided to recuse herself at this point:
I’m sure everyone in the courtroom can see
that I’m emotional about this. I handled
the government’s request to voir dire the
military judge badly. I was thrown off
balance by the motion. I didn’t expect it
from [trial counsel]; it was not a timely
request. No notice had been given. I
should have demanded a good faith basis for
his questions.
I tried to answer the questions that were
asked to my best recollection as they were
2
When called to testify as a defense witness on the motions,
Lewis’s mother stated that her observations to this point caused
her to have little faith in fairness of the trial. She
characterized her observations of the SJA’s earlier testimony as
a “personal vendetta.”
12
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
asked because I felt I had nothing to hide.
I didn’t feel it necessary to expand on my
answers because I believe that my
association with [Ms. JS] is not improper.
My poor memory for people and places now has
people questioning my truthfulness on the
record. In good faith I tried to apply the
law regarding the disqualification of the
military judge to this case. I believe that
I could strike the balance between the
interests of the government and getting a
sentencing hearing free from any appearance
of impropriety and Lance Corporal Lewis’
interests in getting a fair and prompt
resolution of his charges.
I stand by my earlier analysis and findings;
however, testimony of the trial counsel and
the SJA demonstrate how little it takes to
create an appearance of impropriety in some
people’s minds. I’m mortally disappointed
in the professional community that is
willing to draw such slanderous conclusions
from so little information. I wish I could
do this with less emotion.
I now find myself second guessing every
decision in this case. Did I favor the
government to protect myself from further
assault? Did I favor the accused to
retaliate against the government[?]
. . . .
I have consulted with the circuit military
judge and other judges in the circuit in
making this decision. I’m granting the
motion for recusal for two reasons: One, in
an abundance of caution, interpreting
appearance of impropriety at its broadest
possible meaning; and two, because my
emotional reaction to the slanderous conduct
of the SJA has invaded my deliberative
process on the motions. The proceeding
should begin anew at arraignment.
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
The court is in recess until a new military
judge is detailed and a new trial schedule
is set. I apologize to everyone.
Almost a month later, on February 15, 2002, an Article
39(a), UCMJ, session was convened before a new military judge,
LTC FD. After making a record of the various administrative
proceedings that had occurred since MAJ CW’s recusal, LTC FD
announced that after reading the record and considering some of
his R.C.M. 802 conference rulings, he had decided to disqualify
himself from Lewis’s case. Lieutenant Colonel FD stated that he
had concluded that “a reasonable person knowing the facts of
this case might reasonably question my impartiality, and . . . I
do have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”
Further, concerning MAJ CW’s recusal, LTC FD made the following
comments:
The manner in which [trial counsel] handled
the voir dire in this case particularly
offends me. Further, the SJA’s crass,
sarcastic, and scurrilous characterization
of the social interaction between Major [CW]
and Ms. [JS], bespeaks an ignorance,
prejudice, and paranoia on the part of the
government that I can neither understand nor
set aside. Accordingly, I am recusing
myself from further service on the court-
martial.
On February 22, 2002, an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session was
convened before a new military judge, Captain (CAPT) PF, who had
been detailed to the case from another judicial circuit.
Concerned with any further delay in litigating a motion to
14
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
release Lewis from pretrial confinement, CAPT PF arranged for
another military judge, Commander (CDR) RW, to hear a defense
motion to release Lewis from pretrial confinement. Commander RW
heard that motion four days later and ordered Lewis released
from pretrial confinement on that same day. Lewis had been in
pretrial confinement from August 14, 2001, until February 26,
2002, a period of 197 days. Lewis spent forty of those days
confined after MAJ CW had recused herself from the case.
On March 11, 2002, the court reconvened with CAPT PF again
serving as military judge. Over the next two days CAPT PF heard
and ruled upon numerous defense motions including a motion for
administrative pretrial confinement credit, a motion for a
change of venue, a motion for dismissal based upon a violation
of Lewis’s right to a speedy trial, a motion for mistrial, a
motion to dismiss for unlawful command influence, and a motion
to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. A number of these
motions involved allegations relating to the trial counsel’s
voir dire of MAJ CW and the SJA’s conduct with respect to the
Government’s effort to unseat MAJ CW as military judge.
Although CAPT PF denied the motion to dismiss for unlawful
command influence, he did order some relief on the related
motion for a change of venue. Captain PF noted that the defense
had received a change to a military judge from another judicial
circuit. He further ordered that the SJA be disqualified from
15
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
further participation in the case, that the SJA be prohibited
from observing further trial proceedings, and that a substitute
convening authority assume all post-trial responsibilities for
the case. Captain PF also cautioned that although he was not
ordering that all court members be selected from another
military installation, the members should be carefully
scrutinized to ensure that they were not tainted by the prior
conduct in Lewis’s case. Lewis subsequently chose trial by
military judge alone, entered guilty pleas pursuant to a
pretrial agreement, and was sentenced by CAPT PF as the military
judge.
Discussion
Article 37(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2000), establishes
the congressional prohibitions against unlawfully influencing
the action of a court-martial:
No authority convening a general, special,
or summary court-martial, nor any other
commanding officer, may censure, reprimand,
or admonish the court or any member,
military judge, or counsel thereof, with
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged
by the court, or with respect to any other
exercises of its or his functions in the
conduct of the proceedings. No person
subject to this chapter may attempt to
coerce or, by any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a court-martial or
any other military tribunal or any member
thereof, in reaching the findings or
sentence in any case, or the action of any
convening, approving, or reviewing authority
with respect to his judicial acts.
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
Lewis contends that there was unlawful command influence
when the command, through its trial counsel and SJA, forced the
recusal of MAJ CW, the first military judge detailed to his
case. He contends that this conduct was designed to prevent MAJ
CW from hearing his prosecutorial misconduct motion. Lewis
argues that if his conviction is allowed to stand, it will
create the appearance that a command can de-select military
judges and orchestrate the parties to a court-martial, which
raises serious doubt about the fairness of the military justice
system. Lewis claims that the Government’s conduct was
outrageous, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
cannot be allowed to stand without penalty.
The Government responds that there was no unlawful command
influence and, even if there was, it had no prejudicial effect
in this case. Noting that Lewis was not entitled to a specific
military judge to try his case, the Government argues that the
military judge was properly changed before Lewis requested trial
by military judge alone and that a change in military judges is
not a recognizable form of prejudice. The Government argues
that there were protective remedial steps taken that ensured the
integrity of Lewis’s court-martial and that, absent any
demonstrable prejudice, no relief is warranted.
At the outset we note that the granted issue and question
before us is not whether the defense has met its burden of
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
raising unlawful command influence or whether there was unlawful
command influence in Lewis’s case. Those issues were resolved
by the Court of Criminal Appeals:
The unprofessional actions of the trial
counsel and the SJA improperly succeeded in
getting the military judge to recuse herself
from the appellant’s court-martial. There
can be no doubt that, but for the improper
actions, the appellant would have been tried
by Maj. W, vice the judges from the
Southwest Circuit. To the extent that the
SJA, a representative of the convening
authority, advised the trial counsel in the
voir dire assault on the military judge and
to the extent that his unprofessional
behavior as a witness and inflammatory
testimony created a bias in the military
judge, the facts establish clearly that
there was unlawful command influence on the
court-martial.
Lewis, 61 M.J. at 518. The granted issue on unlawful command
influence does not challenge that ruling, nor has the Government
certified the correctness of the lower court’s conclusion that
there was unlawful command influence. See Article 67(a)(2),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2000).
Where neither party appeals a ruling of the court below,
that ruling will normally be regarded as law of the case and
binding upon the parties. United States v. Parker, 62 M.J. 459,
464 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Doss, 57 M.J. 182,
185 (C.A.A.F. 2002)); see also United States v. Grooters, 39
M.J. 269, 272-73 (C.M.A. 1994); United States v. Sales, 22 M.J.
305, 307 (C.M.A. 1986). The law of the case doctrine is a
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United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
matter of discretionary appellate policy and does not prohibit
this court from reviewing the ruling below. Parker, 62 M.J. at
464-65; United States v. Walker, 57 M.J. 174, 177 n.3 (C.A.A.F.
2002) (citing United States v. Williams, 41 M.J. 134, 135 n.2
(C.M.A. 1994)). However, under the law of the case doctrine
this court will not review the lower court’s ruling unless “the
lower court’s decision is ‘clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice’ if the parties were bound by it.” Doss, 57
M.J. at 185 (quoting Williams, 41 M.J. at 135 n.2). “That
standard is difficult to achieve: a finding of manifest
injustice requires a definite and firm conviction that a prior
ruling on a material matter is unreasonable or obviously wrong.”
Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 648-49 (1st Cir. 2002);
see also United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2004)
(describing the burden of establishing manifest injustice as “a
steep uphill climb”).
Although the Government has argued in its brief that there
was no unlawful command influence and did not concede the
existence of unlawful command influence during oral argument, it
has not carried its burden of establishing that the ruling of
the Navy-Marine Corps court was clearly erroneous or that
adhering to its ruling would create a manifest injustice. Nor
does the record in this case support a determination that the
conclusion that unlawful command influence existed was clearly
19
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
erroneous or amounted to a manifest injustice. Therefore, we
conclude that the lower court’s determination that there was
unlawful command influence is the law of the case and we will
not review that determination.
As a general matter, “the defense has the initial burden of
raising the issue of unlawful command influence.” United States
v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citing United
States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208, 213 (C.M.A. 1994)). At trial,
the defense meets its burden by showing “facts which, if true,
constitute unlawful command influence, and that the alleged
unlawful command influence has a logical connection to the
court-martial, in terms of its potential to cause unfairness in
the proceedings.” Id. at 150. A similar burden exists for the
defense on appeal where the defense raises unlawful command
influence by showing: “‘(1) facts which, if true, constitute
unlawful command influence; (2) . . . that the proceedings were
unfair; and (3) . . . that unlawful command influence was the
cause of the unfairness.’” United States v. Richter, 51 M.J.
213, 224 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150).
Once the issue of unlawful command influence has been raised,
the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt either that there was no unlawful command
influence or that the proceedings were untainted. Stoneman, 57
M.J. at 41. This burden is high because “‘command influence
20
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
tends to deprive servicemembers of their constitutional
rights.’” Gore, 60 M.J. at 185 (quoting Thomas, 22 M.J. at
393).
Because the conclusion of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals that there was unlawful command influence is
law of the case, we need not determine whether Lewis has met the
burden of raising the issue nor need we review whether the
Government has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was no command influence. We are concerned only with whether
the Government has met its burden of demonstrating, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that these proceedings were untainted by
unlawful command influence. We review this question de novo.
See United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 299 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(de novo review of whether constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J.
27, 30 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (de novo review of issues of unlawful
command influence). Our review of the effect of this unlawful
command influence must necessarily consider both whether actual
command influence was cleansed from these proceedings as well as
whether any perceived unlawful command influence has been
eradicated. Simpson, 58 M.J. at 374; Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 42.
We turn first to the actual unlawful command influence in this
case.
21
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
Authority to detail military judges has been delegated to
service secretaries. Article 26(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(a)
(2000). The Secretary of the Navy has further delegated that
authority to the Judge Advocate General who has prescribed that
military judges will be detailed by and from a standing
judiciary. See Dep’t of the Navy, Judge Advocate General Instr.
5800.7D, Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) para.
0130a.(1) (Mar. 15, 2004); Dep’t of the Navy, Judge Advocate
General Instr. 5813.4G, Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary para.
6 (Feb. 10, 2006). In addition, military judges of general
courts-martial are “designated by” and “directly responsible to”
the Judge Advocate General of the service. Article 26(c), UCMJ.
Neither the government nor the defense at a court-martial is
vested with the power to designate, detail, or select the
military judge. Conversely, neither party can usurp the
authority of the service secretaries or Judge Advocates General
by removing or unseating properly certified and detailed
military judges.
A military judge “‘shall perform the duties of judicial
office impartially and fairly.’” United States v. Quintanilla,
56 M.J. 37, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting Canon 3 of the American
Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2000 ed.)).
Both the accused and the government are “permitted to question
the military judge and to present evidence regarding a possible
22
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
ground for disqualification.” R.C.M. 902(d)(2). Should grounds
arise, the “military judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in any proceeding in which that military judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” R.C.M. 902(a).
The orchestrated effort to unseat MAJ CW as military judge
exceeded any legitimate exercise of the right conferred upon the
Government to question or challenge a military judge. But for
the Government’s attack upon MAJ CW, it appears unlikely that
there existed grounds for disqualification. Nevertheless,
through suggestion, innuendo, and the SJA’s personal
characterization of the relationship between MAJ CW and Ms. JS,
the Government compelled MAJ CW to remove herself from the case.
Major CW’s own words clearly illustrate how the Government
itself created this disqualification:
[T]estimony of the trial counsel and the SJA
demonstrate how little it takes to create an
appearance of impropriety in some people’s
minds. I’m mortally disappointed in the
professional community that is willing to
draw such slanderous conclusions from so
little information. I wish I could do this
with less emotion.
I now find myself second guessing every
decision in this case. Did I favor the
government to protect myself from further
assault? Did I favor the accused to
retaliate against the government[?]
Major CW’s recusal was the result of an unlawful effort to
unseat an otherwise properly detailed and qualified military
23
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
judge. As found by the Court of Criminal Appeals, this was
actual unlawful command influence. Lewis, 61 M.J. at 518.
The record reflects that the SJA -- a staff officer to and
legal representative for the convening authority –- was actively
engaged in the effort to unseat MAJ CW as military judge. The
trial counsel, who was provided advice on voir diring MAJ CW by
the SJA, became the tool through which this effort was executed.
The SJA went so far as to coordinate a possible review of MAJ
CW’s decision by the Navy-Marine Corps court and in so doing he
passed along his own gratuitous characterization of MAJ CW’s
relationship with Ms. JS. The record also makes it clear that
the effort to unseat MAJ CW in Lewis’s case was a continuation
of an ongoing effort to remove MAJ CW from any case in which Ms.
JS served as civilian defense counsel. Major CW made note of
this effort on the record: “Well, I find it interesting that
I’m frequently voir dired on my acquaintance with Ms. [JS] when
my other military judge counterparts are never voir dired on
their acquaintance with her.”
We are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
effects of this actual unlawful command influence were
ameliorated by later actions and remedial steps. We are
concerned that the SJA’s instrument in the courtroom, the trial
counsel, remained an active member of the prosecution despite
participating fully in the unlawful command influence. In
24
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
short, the Government has not sustained its burden of
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis’s court-
martial was free from the effects of actual unlawful command
influence from the moment that MAJ CW was detailed as military
judge.
We do not doubt the qualifications and neutrality of CAPT
PF or CDR RW who eventually served as military judges in Lewis’s
case. We are also mindful of the remedial measures ordered by
CAPT PF when he directed that the SJA be disqualified, that the
SJA be barred from sitting in the courtroom, and that there be a
new convening authority for post-trial actions. A military
judge should direct such measures when he or she finds unlawful
command influence in a given case. See Rivers, 49 M.J. at 443;
Sullivan, 26 M.J. at 444. However, the actions taken by CAPT PF
fell short of removing doubts about the impact of the actual
unlawful command influence in this case.3
Our review of the command influence in this case is not
limited to actual unlawful influence and its effect on this
trial. Congress and this court are concerned not only with
eliminating actual unlawful command influence, but also with
“eliminating even the appearance of unlawful command influence
3
Our decision in this case is based upon its unique facts as it
is presented to us. We do not speculate on what our decision
might have been had CAPT PF directed other remedial steps, short
of dismissal with prejudice, which would have put the case
before us in a different posture.
25
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
at courts-martial.” United States v. Rosser, 6 M.J. 267, 271
(C.M.A. 1979). “[O]nce unlawful command influence is raised,
‘we believe it incumbent on the military judge to act in the
spirit of the Code by avoiding even the appearance of evil in
his courtroom and by establishing the confidence of the general
public in the fairness of the court-martial proceedings.’”
Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 42 (quoting Rosser, 6 M.J. at 271). This
call to maintain the public’s confidence that military justice
is free from unlawful command influence follows from the fact
that even the “‘appearance of unlawful command influence is as
devastating to the military justice system as the actual
manipulation of any given trial.’” Simpson, 58 M.J. at 374
(quoting Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 42-43). Thus, “disposition of an
issue of unlawful command influence falls short if it fails to
take into consideration . . . the appearance of unlawful command
influence at courts-martial.” Id.
Whether the conduct of the Government in this case created
an appearance of unlawful command influence is determined
objectively. Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 42. “Even if there was no
actual unlawful command influence, there may be a question
whether the influence of command placed an ‘intolerable strain
on public perception of the military justice system.’” Id. at
42-43 (quoting United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 175
(C.A.A.F. 2001)). The objective test for the appearance of
26
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
unlawful command influence is similar to the tests we apply in
reviewing questions of implied bias on the part of court members
or in reviewing challenges to military judges for an appearance
of conflict of interest. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 58
M.J. 192, 194 (C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. Calhoun, 49 M.J.
485, 488 (C.A.A.F. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000);
R.C.M. 902(a); R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N). We focus upon the
perception of fairness in the military justice system as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable member of the public. Thus,
the appearance of unlawful command influence will exist where an
objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the
facts and circumstances, would harbor a significant doubt about
the fairness of the proceeding. Applying this test to the
instant case, we believe that a reasonable observer would have
significant doubt about the fairness of this court-martial in
light of the Government’s conduct with respect to MAJ CW.
To find that the appearance of command influence has been
ameliorated and made harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Government must convince us that the disinterested public would
now believe Lewis received a trial free from the effects of
unlawful command influence. Despite the fact that CAPT PF was
from another judicial circuit and even though he ordered some
remedial action, we are not convinced that these proceedings
have been cleansed of the appearance of unlawful command
27
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
influence. The Government wanted to ensure that a given
military judge, properly detailed and otherwise qualified, would
not sit on Lewis’s case. In the end, the Government achieved
its goal through unlawful command influence. To this point,
from an objective standpoint, the Government has accomplished
its desired end and suffered no detriment or sanction for its
actions.4
Because we conclude that neither actual nor apparent
unlawful command influence have been cured beyond a reasonable
doubt, we must consider what relief, if any, should be fashioned
in this case. In Rosser, 6 M.J. at 273, after concluding that a
military judge did not properly consider the appearance of
unlawful command influence over witnesses and court members, we
set aside the findings and sentence and authorized a rehearing.
In United States v. Grady, 15 M.J. 275, 276-77 (C.M.A. 1983), we
also set aside the findings and sentence, and authorized a
rehearing where we concluded that the military judge did not
ensure Grady a trial by members “unencumbered from powerful
4
The record before us does not indicate whether the unlawful
command influence in this case was the subject of any ethical or
disciplinary investigations or sanctions. Had such occurred,
they could have had an impact on the public’s perception and
perhaps restored some confidence in the military justice system.
Similarly, we are concerned that there appears to be no response
from supervisory officials such as the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps or the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy. Therefore, we direct that the Clerk of the Court
send copies of this decision to those officials for review and
consideration of appropriate action, if any.
28
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
external influences.” In Villareal, 52 M.J. at 30, we found
that the appearance of unlawful command influence upon a
convening authority was cured because the charges were forwarded
to a new convening authority after any possible taint arose.
The remedial actions taken or approved above have a common
thread in that they address the unique circumstances of each
unlawful command influence issue individually and they remedy
the specific harm.
To fashion an appropriate remedy in this case, we must
consider both the specific unlawful influence (unseating of the
military judge) and the damage to the public perception of
fairness. Since the appearance of unlawful influence was
created by the Government achieving its goal of removing MAJ CW
without sanction, a rehearing before any military judge other
than MAJ CW would simply perpetuate this perception of
unfairness. Further, even if we wished to consider ordering a
rehearing before MAJ CW, that option is unavailable in light of
her acknowledgement that the conduct of the SJA “invaded [her]
deliberative process” and influenced her specific decision to
disqualify herself from this case.
We have long held that dismissal is a drastic remedy and
courts must look to see whether alternative remedies are
available. United States v. Cooper, 35 M.J. 417, 422 (C.M.A.
1992). Dismissal of charges with prejudice, however, is an
29
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
appropriate remedy where the error cannot be rendered harmless.
Gore, 60 M.J. at 189 (holding that a military judge did not
abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice to
remedy unlawful command influence).
Having found that the unlawful command influence in this
case has not been cured, we cannot let the findings and sentence
stand. Although it is drastic, we believe that the only remedy
to cure the unlawful command influence in this case is to
reverse the decision of the lower court, set aside the findings
and sentence, and dismiss the charges with prejudice. We do not
do so lightly, but the nature of the unlawful conduct in this
case, combined with the unavailability of any other remedy that
will eradicate the unlawful command influence and ensure the
public perception of fairness in the military justice system,
compel this result.
In light of our disposition of the first granted issue, it
is unnecessary for us to address the remaining issues in this
case.
Decision
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The findings and sentence are
set aside. The charges and specifications are dismissed with
prejudice.
30
United States v. Lewis, No. 05-0551/MC
EFFRON, Judge (concurring):
I agree with Judge Erdmann’s opinion for the Court, and
write separately to underscore the unique circumstances of this
case. The military judge who completed the trial and the Court
of Criminal Appeals each had the opportunity to dismiss the
charges without prejudice, accompanied by an order disqualifying
the command from any further proceedings. Under such an order,
any subsequent decisions as to investigation, preferral, and
referral could have been made by commanders and legal personnel
untainted by the impermissible actions in the original
proceedings.
In the absence of such an order, we have before us a case
in which the prejudice from unlawful command influence was
compounded by post-trial processing delay. Over three years
transpired from the end of trial to the completion of review by
the Court of Criminal Appeals, including over fourteen months in
which the case was pending action by the convening authority
under Article 60, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §
860 (2000). In light of the unlawful command influence detailed
in the opinion for the Court, it would be inappropriate to
subject Appellant to new proceedings after the untimely post-
trial processing of this case. In that context, dismissal with
prejudice provides an appropriate remedy.