Bergdahl v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
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ROBERT B. BERGDAHL, )
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Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 21-418 (RBW)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, Robert B. Bergdahl, brings this civil action against the defendant, the
United States of America, seeking collateral review of his conviction by a general court-martial,
see Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Am. Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 3,
pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
see id. ¶ 1; the Rules for Courts-Martial (“R.C.M.”) 104(a)(1) and 902, see id.; and “Rule 2.11 of
the binding Rules of Judicial Conduct for Army Trial and Appellate Judges[,]” id. Currently
pending before the Court are (1) the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.” or the
“defendant’s motion”), ECF No. 16, and (2) the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Pl.’s Mot.” or the “plaintiff’s motion”), ECF No. 18. Upon careful consideration of the parties’
submissions,1 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant in part and deny in
1
In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its
decision: (1) the Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 16-1; (2) the Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 17; (3) the
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s Facts”), ECF No. 18-1; (4) the Defendant’s Combined Reply in
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF
No. 21; (5) the Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (“Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts”), ECF
No. 21-4; and (6) the Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s
Reply”), ECF No. 23.
part the defendant’s motion to dismiss and grant in part and deny in part the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Framework
“In the exercise of its authority over the armed forces, Congress has long provided for
specialized military courts to adjudicate charges against service members.” Ortiz v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2018). These courts “form[] part of an integrated
‘court-martial system’ that closely resembles civilian structures of justice.” Id. Under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), a general court-martial may be “convened” against
a service member by any of the authorities set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 822, including “the President
of the United States[,]” “the Secretary of Defense[,]” and any of the statutorily designated
“commanding officer[s.]” 10 U.S.C. § 822(a). Once charges are brought by a convening
authority, “[a] military judge shall be detailed to . . . [preside over the] court-martial[,]” id.§ 826(a), which consists of “an officer-led tribunal . . . [tasked with] determin[ing the service
member’s] guilt or innocence and levy[ing] appropriate punishment, up to lifetime imprisonment
or execution[,]” Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2171 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 818). The service member,
“knowing the identity of the military judge and after consultation with defense counsel, [may]
request[] . . . a court composed of a military judge alone[.]” 10 U.S.C. § 816(b)(3).
An adverse decision issued against a member of the military as part of a court-martial
proceeding is subject to multiple levels of judicial review. First, a service member may appeal a
“judgment of a court-martial . . . that includes a finding of guilty[,]” id. § 866(b)(1)(A), to a
“Court of Criminal Appeals [(‘CCA’)] which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each
such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges[,]” id. § 866(a)(1).
2
The decision of the CCA may then be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (“CAAF”). See id. § 867(a)(3) (“The [CAAF] shall review the record in . . . all
cases reviewed by a [CCA] in which, upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the
[CAAF] has granted a review.”). Following the CAAF’s review, the Supreme Court of the
United States “possesses statutory authority to step in afterward . . . by writ of certiorari[,]”
Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2171 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1259). Finally, a service member may collaterally
attack his or her court-martial conviction in a federal district court, regardless of whether the
service member is in custody. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 745 (1975) (ruling
that the district court’s power to preside over collateral attacks of court-martial convictions was
not limited to proceedings for writs of habeas corpus).
B. Factual & Procedural Background
In this case, the plaintiff “is a soldier in the U.S. Army[,]” Am. Compl. ¶ 3, who was
stationed in Afghanistan in 2009, when the events that resulted in his court-martial began, see
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6.
1. The Plaintiff’s Capture by the Taliban and Return to the United States
“Around midnight on June 29, 2009, the plaintiff left [his post] without authority . . . to
hike overland to Sharana[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 7; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 7, “hop[ing] to
report [what he alleged were] unit leadership issues that he believed to be severe and life-
threatening, to a general officer[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 11; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 11. “Before
he could reach Sharana, the plaintiff was abducted by members of the Haqqani network, a group
of guerrilla fighters loosely affiliated with the Taliban.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 15; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 15. The plaintiff was subsequently “held captive by the enemy for five years under
‘abominable’ and ‘brutal’ conditions.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 16; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 16.
Throughout the course of his captivity, he “complied with the Code of Conduct for Members of
3
the Armed Forces of the United States[,]” 2 Pl.’s Facts ¶ 19; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 19,
and tried to escape multiple times, see Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 20–22, 24–26; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts
¶¶ 20–22, 24–26. After enduring prolonged and severe torture for approximately five years in
captivity, “[t]he plaintiff was returned to United States control on May 31, 2014, as part of a
prisoner exchange involving five Taliban leaders who were being detained [by the United States]
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 35; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 35. Upon his
return to the United States, “the plaintiff provided significant intelligence to the Army[,]” Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 36; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 36, which “was later incorporated into Army training
programs[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 38; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 38.
2. The Plaintiff’s Court-Martial
On March 25, 2015, the U.S. Army brought charges against the plaintiff. See Pl.’s Mem.,
Exhibit (“Ex.”) 28 (Charge Sheet) at 31–32, ECF No. 17-11. And, from 2015 to 2017, “the
Army prosecuted the plaintiff before a general court-martial at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on
charges of desertion and misbehavior before the enemy.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 46; see Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 46. “The court-martial was convened by an Army general in charge of U.S. Army
Forces Command[.]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 48; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 48.
2
Article III of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States provides that a prisoner
of war must “continue to resist by all means available[,] . . . make every effort to escape and aid others to escape[,]
. . . [and] accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.” Art. III, Code of Conduct for Members of the
Armed Forces of the United States, Exec. Order No. 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6,057 (Aug. 17, 1955). Article IV of the
Code provides that a prisoner of war must “keep faith with [his or her] fellow prisoners . . . [and] give no
information or take part in any action which might be harmful to [his or her] comrades.” Art. IV, Code of Conduct
for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States. And, Article V of the Code provides that a prisoner of war
must, “[w]hen questioned, . . . give name, rank, service number, and date of birth[,] . . . evade answering further
questions to the utmost of [his or her] ability[,] . . . [and] make no oral or written statements disloyal to [his or her]
country and its allies or harmful to their cause.” Art. V, Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the
United States, as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,017, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,941 (Nov. 3, 1977).
4
i. The Plaintiff’s First and Second Unlawful Command Influence Motions
During the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings, he filed three motions to dismiss
alleging unlawful command influence, which were all denied. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling – Defense Motion to Dismiss and, in any Event, to Limit
the Sentence That May be Adjudged to No Punishment (“1st UCI Ruling”)) at 1, ECF No. 16-17;
id., Ex. 8 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling – Defense Motion to Dismiss for
Unlawful Command Influence (“2d UCI Ruling”)) at 1, ECF No. 16-20; id., Ex. 11 (Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling – Defense Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Unlawful
Command Influence (“3d UCI Ruling”)) at 1, ECF No. 16-23. One of the plaintiff’s allegations
of unlawful command influence “ar[ose] from words and deeds of [now-deceased ]Senator
[John] McCain and two ar[ose] from words and deeds of former President [Donald] Trump.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 32.
At the time of the plaintiff’s court-martial, Senator McCain was the Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 75; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 75.
“Three days after the plaintiff’s return from captivity, Senator McCain . . . announced his
displeasure with the prisoner exchange negotiated by the Obama administration[,]” Pl.’s Facts
¶ 76; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 76, stating, “‘this decision to bring [the plaintiff] home[—
]and we applaud that he is home[—]is ill-founded . . . [. I]t is a mistake, and it is putting lives of
American servicemen and wom[e]n at risk. And that to me is unacceptable[,]’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 76
(first and fifth alterations in original); see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 76. Furthermore, after an
Army general “who had conducted an extensive investigation and interviewed the plaintiff at
length testified that confinement ‘would be inappropriate[,]’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 82; see Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 82, and “recommend[ed] [ ] a special court-martial not empowered to impose a jail
sentence or punitive discharge[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83, McCain
5
stated, “‘[i]f it comes out that [the plaintiff] has no punishment, we’re going to have to have a
hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee,’ adding that the plaintiff . . . ‘is clearly a
deserter[,]’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83. Thus, the plaintiff
move[d] th[e] [military c]ourt to dismiss the charges against [him] with prejudice
because Senator John McCain and Mr. Steve Barney (General Counsel to the
Senate Armed Services Committee ([‘]SASC[’])) made public and other
comments indicating that [the plaintiff] was a deserter and that if he wasn’t court-
martialed and sent to jail the SASC would hold hearings to determine why.
Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 1. However, the military judge presiding over the
plaintiff’s court-martial denied the motion, concluding that even if Senator McCain were subject
to Article 37, under the provision of the UCMJ governing unlawful command influence, no
actual unlawful command influence 3 existed because “the executive, not the legislative branch,
has civilian command authority over the military” and “no member of congress, not even the
Chairman of the SASC, holds command authority over the military.” Id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling)
¶ 11. Furthermore, the military judge concluded that no apparent unlawful command influence 4
existed because “[n]o reasonable member of the public knowing that Senator McCain has
absolutely no command authority or color of command authority over [the plaintiff’s] court-
martial . . . could ever reasonably conclude that the proceedings were unfair—no matter what he
said or did.” Id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 12.
3
The military judge noted that “[unlawful command influence] can occur in one of two ways[:] either through [(]1)
[a]ctual [unlawful command influence] or [(]2) apparent [unlawful command influence].” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (1st
UCI Ruling) ¶ 4. Furthermore, the military judge generally defined actual unlawful command influence as
“cover[ing] a multitude of situations in which superiors have unlawfully controlled the actions of subordinates in the
exercise of their duties under the UCMJ.” Id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 4 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 41
M.J. 32, 36 (C.M.A. 1994)).
4
The military judge noted that “even if there is no actual [unlawful command influence], there may still be apparent
[unlawful command influence.]” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 4. And, in determining whether there is
apparent unlawful command influence, “the focus must be on the ‘perception of fairness in the military justice
system as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable member of the public[,]’” i.e., “whether an ‘objective,
disinterested observer fully informed of all the facts and circumstances would harbor a significant doubt about the
fairness of the proceeding.’” Id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 4 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 416
(C.A.A.F. 2006)).
6
As to the plaintiff’s second unlawful command influence motion, which concerned
comments made by former President Trump, “[b]efore and during the 2016 presidential
campaign, candidate [ ] Trump repeatedly vilified the plaintiff, describing him as a traitor at
numerous rallies, and suggesting, among other things, that he be executed.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90; see
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90. Specifically, prior to the plaintiff’s filing of his first unlawful
command influence motion, former President Trump “asserted[ that the plaintiff] ‘went to the
other side’ and ‘negotiated with terrorists[,]’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 91; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶
91, and that the plaintiff “was ‘the worst,’ ‘no good,’ ‘[a] bum,’ a ‘whack job,’ ‘[a] piece of
garbage,’ a ‘son of a bitch,’ and ‘a very bad person who killed six people[,]’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 92;
see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 92. Former President Trump further stated that “deserters used
to be shot, implying and at times saying outright that the plaintiff deserved the death penalty[,]”
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94; see Def’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94, and in the context of these types of remarks,
“pantomimed executions by rifle and pistol shot, complete with sounds effects[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶
95; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 95. Thus, the plaintiff “move[d] th[e] [military c]ourt to
dismiss the charges against him because” former President Trump, then
a candidate for President of the United States, . . . made numerous public
comments describing him as a deserter, a traitor, responsible for the death of five
or six soldiers and many other similar comments disparaging of the [plaintiff]
personally as well as expressing an opinion about his guilt and promising that, if
the accused didn’t get jail time and [former President] Trump were elected
President, he would review the case.
Def.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 1. However, the military judge presiding over the
plaintiff’s court-martial denied the motion, concluding that even though “[former President]
Trump’s comments were disturbing and disappointing[,] [ ] they do not rise to the level of ‘some
evidence’ [of unlawful command influence] required for the [plaintiff] to meet his initial burden
[of proof,]” namely because “the statements of a private citizen, even if running for President,
7
cannot be unlawful command or influence.” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 11. Furthermore, the
military court opined that “[a]ssuming, for the sake of argument, that the [plaintiff] ha[d] met
[his] initial burden,” the government still met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was no [unlawful command influence] or that any [unlawful command influence] w[ould]
not taint [the plaintiff’s] proceedings.” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 12. Specifically, the
military court stated that “[i]t is simply not logical, meaning reasonable, to conclude that because
[former President Trump] made those statements when he was running for office in a heated and
contentious campaign, now that he is President, the [plaintiff] cannot possibly receive a fair trial”
because “[t]he reasonable observer would know that his comments were typical campaign
rhetoric[.]” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 13. But, “recogniz[ing] that this is an unusual case,
perhaps unique in all the annals of justice,” the military judge “require[d] the parties to submit a
member’s questionnaire on these issues which w[ould] be provided to the members well in
advance of trial and returned for review by the parties well prior to voir dire[,]” and “allow[ed]
very liberal voir dire on this topic.” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 15.
ii. The Plaintiff’s Third Unlawful Command Influence Motion
“On October 16, 2017, without waiving his [unlawful command influence] claims and
without a pretrial agreement, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to misbehavior before the enemy and a
one-day desertion[.]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 60; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 60. “Shortly thereafter
on that same day, former President Trump[,]” who had since taken office as President,
stated, in the course of a Rose Garden news conference with then[-]Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell: “Well, I can’t comment on [the plaintiff]
because he’s—as you know, they’re—I guess he’s doing something today, as we
know. And he’s also—they’re setting up sentencing, so I’m not going to
comment on him. But I think people have heard my comments in the past.”
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 103; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 103.
8
“On October 17, 2017, the plaintiff filed a renewed [unlawful command influence]
motion based on the Rose Garden remarks that ratified former President Trump’s disparaging
pre-Inauguration comments about him.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 104; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 104.
After the plaintiff filed this motion, the military judge presiding over the plaintiff’s court-martial
allowed the parties the opportunity to ask him individual voir dire questions. See generally
Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Record of Trial (“Trial Tr.”)) at 1723:7–1725:1, ECF Nos. 16-4–16-12. The
military judge was asked, “prior to the defense filing, were you aware of any comments made by
the [P]resident regarding this case since his election?” Id., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1723:10–11. The
military judge represented that he “never saw any of the comments [former President Trump]
made during his election—during his campaign” and that he “didn’t see these comments or hear
them until the defense filed their motion.” Id., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1723:12–14. He further stated
that he “ha[d] purposely avoided any news or—printed or otherwise, of this—any coverage of
this case[,]” that he “just d[idn]’t want to expose [him]self to it[,]” and that he “had no idea that
the [P]resident had said anything until” the plaintiff’s motion was submitted. Id., Ex. 1 (Trial
Tr.) at 1723:15–19. The government then asked the military judge, “Is there anything about the
knowledge that you’ve now gained, as a result of reading that filing, that makes you believe that
you would be unable to sit impartially and fairly as the military judge in this case?” Id., Ex. 1
(Trial Tr.) at 1723:20–1724:2. The military judge responded:
No. I’m what’s referred to as a terminal Colonel, which means I’m not going
anywhere but the retirement pastures. And that’s in almost a year from now.
I have never aspired to any rank. I did aspire to be a military judge [thirteen]
years ago; but since accepting that posting or assignment, I have recognized that
that, in the modern [Judge Advocate General (‘]JAG[’)] Corps, pretty much,
meant that I was going to stay at the rank I was, which at the time was Lieutenant
Colonel. So I was actually a little bit surprised to be promoted to Colonel. And
when that happened, I knew obviously that any general officer rank was beyond
my reach and, quite frankly, nothing I ever aspired to.
9
So that’s a long way of saying, “No, no effect on me whatsoever.” I don’t expect
to go anywhere but back home as soon as the Army is done with me in a year.
Id., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1724:3–16.
The military judge denied the plaintiff’s third unlawful command influence motion on
October 30, 2017. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 109; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 109. Specifically, the
military court concluded that the plaintiff had “met [his] initial burden of providing some
evidence, beyond mere speculation that [unlawful command influence] exists[,]” Def.’s Mot.,
Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(a), and that “the government [ ] failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the comments do not constitute [unlawful command influence,]” id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI
Ruling) ¶ 6(b). However, the court found that the government
met [its] burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [unlawful command
influence] has not and will not place an intolerable strain on the public’s
perception of the military justice system and that an objective, disinterested
observer, fully informed of all the facts and circumstances, would not harbor a
significant doubt about the fairness of the proceedings.
Id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(c) (capitalizations omitted) (underline added); see id., Ex. 11 (3d
UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(c) (“I, the military judge in this case, am the sole sentencing authority[ and t]he
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that I am uninfluenced by the President’s
comments and more importantly, that I hold no fear of any repercussions from anyone if they do
not agree with my sentence in this case. As their affidavits make clear, the same is true of
[General] Abrams and [Colonel] Berry with respect to their respective post-trial duties in this
case.”). The military judge further stated that he would “consider the President’s comments as
mitigation evidence as [he] arrive[d] at an appropriate sentence in this case” and “require anyone
involved in any way in the exercise of discretion in any post-trial aspect of this case to read [an
10
October 20, 2017] statement [issued by] the White House Press Office before they exercise that
discretion[.]” 5 Id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(d).
“On November 3, 2017, the military judge sentenced the plaintiff to a dishonorable
discharge, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade, and forfeiture of $10,000 in pay and
allowances.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 62; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 62.
3. The Plaintiff’s Appeal to the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (“Bergdahl I”)
Following the imposition of his sentence, the plaintiff appealed his conviction to the U.S.
Army Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”) and “[b]y a 2-1 vote, the . . . []ACCA[] thereafter
affirmed the findings of guilt and the sentence.” Am. Compl. ¶ 23 (citing United States v.
Bergdahl (“Bergdahl I”), 79 M.J. 512 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2019)). First, the ACCA
“disagree[d] with the military judge as to his conclusions regarding whether Senator McCain was
subject to the UCMJ for Article 37 purposes[,]” but because Senator McCain was a military
retiree, it “agree[d] with [the military judge’s] conclusion that there was no evidence of unlawful
command influence.” Bergdahl I, 79 M.J. at 522. Second, the ACCA agreed with the military
judge that, with regard to former President Trump’s comments made while a presidential
candidate, he was not subject to Article 37 of the UCMJ and his comments did not create
apparent unlawful command influence because he was a private citizen at the time. See id. at
522–23 (noting that “[t]here is no precedent for finding [unlawful command influence] based on
5
The military court noted that this White House press statement, entitled “Statement Regarding Military Justice[,]”
“stated essentially that the President ‘expects all military personnel who are involved in any way in the military
justice process to exercise their independent professional judgment [ ]’ as they perform their duties with respect to
the military justice system.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 2(h). The court further noted that this statement
“b[ore] a striking resemblance” to an August 2013 statement by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, which
“was intended to address comments [former] President Obama made about sexual assault cases in the military
generally—not about any particular case.” Id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 2(h).
11
the remarks of private citizens” and “[i]ncendiary remarks by private citizens, even influential
ones, do not constitute evidence of unlawful command influence”).
Third, the ACCA held that, although the plaintiff had met his initial burden of showing
“some evidence” of unlawful command influence with respect to former President Trump’s
ratification of his comments while serving as President, there was nonetheless “not an intolerable
strain on the public’s perception of the military justice system because a fully informed observer
would not harbor a significant doubt as to the fairness of the proceedings.” Id. at 524. In support
of this conclusion, the ACCA noted that “[t]he military judge gave [the plaintiff] an opportunity
to withdraw his plea[ and h]e chose not to[;]” “[t]he actual comments were removed in time from
the sentence proceedings . . . [and therefore] their impact was lessened[;]” and “the military
judge, the [Staff Judge Advocate (‘]SJA[’)], and the convening authority credibly explained that
they were not and would not be influenced by the President’s statements.” Id.
Finally, the ACCA found no unlawful command influence in the post-trial process. See
id. at 524–27. The plaintiff raised for the first time on appeal unlawful command influence
based upon tweets made by former President Trump (1) immediately after the military judge’s
sentencing of the plaintiff, but before the convening authority’s approval of that sentence, see id.
at 524 (“The same day [that the plaintiff’s] sentence was announced, [former] President Trump
. . . post[ed] on Twitter: ‘the decision on [the plaintiff’s sentence] is a complete and total disgrace
to our [c]ountry and to our [m]ilitary.”), and (2) during the pendency of the plaintiff’s appeal to
the ACCA, see id. at 527 (quoting former President Trump’s tweet as “No money was paid to
North Korea for Otto Warmbier, not two Million Dollars, not anything else. This is not the
Obama Administration that paid 1.8 Million Dollars for four hostages, or gave five terro[r]ist
hostages plus, who soon went back to battle, for traitor [the plaintiff]!!”). The ACCA concluded
12
that, as to former President Trump’s comment immediately following the plaintiff’s sentencing,
the plaintiff had met his burden to show some evidence of unlawful command influence, but that
“an informed member of the public would [not] harbor any doubt, let alone a significant doubt,
that [the plaintiff] received a fair trial[.]” Id. at 526. Furthermore, although the ACCA “f[ound]
some strain” on the military justice system resulting from the statement, “[it was] convinced
[that] the military justice system is not so fragile that this comment caused an intolerable strain.”
Id. at 527. As to President Trump’s tweet made during the pendency of the plaintiff’s appeal, the
ACCA found that “[w]hile parts of the tweet are inaccurate, there is no nexus between the tweet
and the appellate process[,] [the] court would have no knowledge of the President’s statement
but for the submission by appellant[,]” and it “do[es] not believe that this tweet meets [the
plaintiff’s] threshold burden of evidence of [unlawful command influence].” Id.
4. The Plaintiff’s Appeal to the CAAF (“Bergdahl II”)
The plaintiff next appealed this decision to the CAAF, which “[b]y a 3-2 vote, . . .
affirmed” the prior rulings. Am. Compl. ¶ 25 (citing United States v. Bergdahl (“Bergdahl II”),
80 M.J. 230 (C.A.A.F. 2020)). The CAAF concluded that “[a]s a threshold matter, . . . [a]t the
time of the comments regarding [the plaintiff’s] case, Senator McCain . . . [and] a sitting
president of the United States[,]” i.e., former President Trump, were both “capable of committing
unlawful command influence.” Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 234; see id. at 234–36. The CAAF also
“h[e]ld that [the plaintiff] [ ] satisfied his low burden of presenting ‘some evidence’ of unlawful
command influence[,]” id. at 236, as to both Senator McCain, see id., and former President
Trump, see id. at 236–38. However, the CAAF ultimately concluded that “a finding of apparent
unlawful command influence is not warranted because there was no intolerable strain on the
military justice system.” Id. at 239.
13
The CAAF “predicated [its conclusion] on all of the relevant facts of th[e] case” at
various stages of the court-martial proceedings. Id. Regarding the “investigation and preferral
stages of th[e] case[,]” id., the court noted that “compelling evidence was presented at a hearing
held pursuant to Article 32[ of the] UCMJ[,]” 6 id. (noting that the evidence presented indicated
that the plaintiff had “deserted his unit with intent to shirk hazardous duty and that he engaged in
misbehavior before the enemy”), and, “[i]n light of both the severity of [the plaintiff’s alleged]
offenses and the strength of the [g]overnment’s evidence, an objective disinterested observer
clearly would have expected the Army to court-martial [the plaintiff] for his conduct regardless
of any public comments by [former] President Trump or Senator McCain[,]” id.
The CAAF next addressed the convening authority’s decision to refer the plaintiff’s case
to a general court-martial rather than a special court-martial, despite the fact that “the Article 32,
UCMJ, preliminary hearing officer [had] recommended that [his] case be referred to a special
court-martial not empowered to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge—which would have precluded
the dishonorable discharge that was actually imposed [in the plaintiff’s case.]” Id. Although the
court “acknowledge[d] that this aspect of the case is a close question and [that] it ha[d] given
[the court] great pause[,]” id., it ultimately concluded that “an objective, disinterested observer
would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the [convening authority’s] referral
decision[,]” id. at 239–40. The CAAF noted three major bases for its conclusion. First, the
convening authority stated “in a sworn affidavit that his decisions were ‘not impacted by any
outside influence’” and “den[ounced] [ ] and disassociat[ed] [himself] from [Senator McCain’s]
6
“An Article 32 [i]nvestigation is the military counterpart to the civilian grand jury.” McKinney v. Caldera, 141 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 27 n.3 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 678 n.13 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub
nom., Morgan v. Cohen, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999)). Furthermore, according to the R.C.M., “[t]he primary purpose of
[the Article 32 Investigation] is to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, the form of the
charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case[,]” id.(quoting R.C.M. 405(a)), and “[n]o charge may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until an Article 32
investigation has been conducted[,]” id.14
comments.” Id. at 240. Second, “there is no requirement that a convening authority adopt the
recommendations of an Article 32, UCMJ, preliminary hearing officer.” Id. (citing R.C.M. 601).
And third, the preliminary hearing officer stated “that the ‘strongest factor’ in causing him to
make a recommendation for a special court-martial was the fact that the [g]overnment failed to
submit . . . any evidence ‘demonstrating that anyone was killed or wounded’ during the
military’s search and recovery efforts related to [the plaintiff’s] disappearance.” Id. However,
“it was later shown . . . that several American servicemembers were indeed injured, some
severely, while on missions primarily designed to locate [the plaintiff,]” id., and the convening
authority “served in military positions where he would [have] be[en] privy to such information”
at the time of his referral decision, id. at 241.
Regarding the guilty plea stage of the plaintiff’s case, the CAAF stated that “it cannot be
emphasized strongly enough that [the plaintiff] chose to plead guilty,” entered a knowing and
voluntary plea, and later declined when the military judge offered him the opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea in light of the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claims. Id. at 242
(emphasis in original). Thus, the CAAF concluded that “no claim of unfairness regarding the
guilty plea phase of the court-martial proceedings can prevail.” Id.
Regarding the sentencing stage of the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings, the CAAF
noted that significant mitigation evidence was presented at sentencing. See id. at 242–43.
Furthermore, the court noted that “[the plaintiff] acknowledged both that he was fully aware of
the implications of receiving a dishonorable discharge and that he wanted the military judge to
impose that specific punishment upon him.” Id. at 243–44. The court
underscore[d] the fact that despite the sensational nature of this case, despite the
public calls for the lengthy imprisonment of [the plaintiff], despite Senator
McCain’s threat that he would hold a hearing if [the plaintiff] did not receive a
sentence to his liking, and despite the Commander in Chief’s ratification of his
15
statements that [the plaintiff] was a traitor who should be severely punished, the
military judge imposed no prison time whatsoever.
Id. at 244 (emphasis in original). Thus, the court reasoned, “an objective, disinterested observer
would conclude that rather than being swayed by outside forces, the military judge was notably
impervious to them.” Id.
Finally, “in terms of the clemency and appellate stages of this case, [the CAAF] reiterated
[several] critical points[,]” including the plaintiff’s decision to plead guilty, the compelling
evidence presented by the government, and the military judge’s sentence, which was consistent
with what the plaintiff requested. Id. Based upon these facts, the CAAF concluded that “an
objective disinterested observer would decide that the convening authority’s decision not to
exercise his discretionary clemency authority on behalf of [the plaintiff] was a forgone
conclusion unaffected by any public comments made about the case[,]” and that “there would be
no basis . . . to believe that the decision by the [ACCA] . . . was in any way unfair.” Id.
5. The Plaintiff’s Petition for Reconsideration and Motion to Supplement the Record
During the course of the plaintiff’s appeal to the CAAF, the plaintiff’s attorneys obtained
a copy of an application submitted to the United States Department of Justice by the military
judge who presided over the plaintiff’s court-martial. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 132; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 132. This application indicated that “[o]n October 16, 2017, the military judge applied to
the [Department of] Justice [ ] to be an immigration judge[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119; see Def.’s Resp.
to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119, and that “[t]he sole writing sample the military judge submitted was his
February 24, 2017[] ruling denying the plaintiff’s January 20, 2017[] [unlawful command
influence] motion[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 121; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 121. Furthermore,
“[s]ometime between October 16, 2017, and September 28, 2018, the [Department of] Justice [ ]
16
hired the military judge[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 128; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 128, and “[t]he
military judge retired from the Army on November 1, 2018[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 131; see Def.’s Resp.
to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 131. “The plaintiff’s attorneys filed a copy of the military judge’s application
[submitted to the Department of Justice] with the [CAAF] on September 18, 2020[,]” Pl.’s Facts
¶ 133; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 133, but the CAAF “denied [the] plaintiff’s petition for
reconsideration and motion to supplement the record regarding the military judge’s [Department
of Justice] job application without prejudice to his right to seek a writ of error coram nobis from
the appropriate court.” Am. Compl. ¶ 27 (citing United States v. Bergdahl (“Bergdahl III”), 80
M.J. 362 (C.A.A.F. 2020)) (underline added) (internal citation omitted).
6. The Plaintiff’s Petition for Coram Nobis
The plaintiff subsequently filed a writ of error coram nobis petition with the ACCA, see
id. ¶ 28,
assert[ing] [that] the military judge who presided over his court-martial and made
rulings adverse to [the plaintiff] concerning unlawful command influence [ ],
failed to disclose his application for employment as an immigration judge . . . to
the parties while [the plaintiff’s] case was ongoing and, as a result, [the plaintiff]
did not receive a fair trial.
United States v. Bergdahl (“Bergdahl IV”), ARMY MISC 20200588, 2020 WL 7316058, at *1
(Army Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2020). The ACCA denied the plaintiff’s petition on December
11, 2020. See Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Bergdahl IV, 2020 WL 7316058, at *1. In its opinion denying
the petition, the ACCA noted the six “threshold criteria for a petitioner to obtain coram nobis
review[,]” Bergdahl IV, 2020 WL 7316058, at *2, and concluded that the plaintiff “ha[d] not met
the third threshold requirement[,]” id. at *3, because it “f[ound] no valid reason why [the
plaintiff] did not seek relief earlier[,]” id. Specifically, the ACCA noted that “[the plaintiff’s]
case was pending direct review at [the ACCA] from [ ] June [8, ]2018[,] through [ ] July [16,
17
]2019[,]” “[t]he military judge’s new employment as an immigration judge became public
knowledge on [ ] September [28, ]2018[,]” and “[t]hus, [the plaintiff’s] case had only been
pending at [the ACCA] for less than three months prior to the [Department of Justice]’s press
release notice” regarding the military judge’s appointment as an immigration judge. Id.Furthermore, the ACCA noted that “[a]pproximately another ten months passed after the
[Department of Justice]’s notice until [the ACCA] issued its decision in [the plaintiff’s] case on
[ ] July [16, ]2019” and “[a]t no point during those ten months did [the plaintiff] request the
military judge’s employment application.” Id. Thus, the court reasoned, “[the plaintiff] has not
presented a sound reason why he failed to pursue this claim while his case was [on direct
appeal], when such a claim could have been reasonably raised.” Id. at *5. The ACCA declined
to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, noting that, “[h]aving concluded [the plaintiff] fails to
meet the stringent threshold requirements to establish eligibility for coram nobis review, [it] need
not address the merits of his petition.” Id. at *3 n.4.
Finally, “[o]n December 17, 2020, [the] plaintiff filed a writ-appeal petition [ ] [with the]
CAAF seeking review of [the] ACCA’s denial of his coram nobis petition.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30
(underline added). The CAAF summarily denied his writ-appeal petition on February 2, 2021.
See id. ¶ 31; Bergdahl v. United States (“Bergdahl V”), 81 M.J. 128, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
7. This Action
On February 17, 2021, the plaintiff initiated this action, see Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 1, and on February 19, 2021, he filed his
Amended Complaint, see Am. Compl. at 1. On August 2, 2021, the defendant filed its motion to
dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. at 1. The plaintiff filed his opposition and cross-motion for summary
judgment on October 4, 2021, see Pl.’s Mem. at 1; Pl.’s Mot. at 1, the defendant filed its reply in
18
support of its motion and its opposition to the plaintiff’s motion on December 17, 2021, see
Def.’s Reply at 1, and the plaintiff filed his reply in support of his motion on January 28, 2022,
see Pl.’s Reply at 1.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can
be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the
complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court must “assume [the] veracity” of any
“well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Court need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual
allegations” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the
facts set out in the complaint[.]” Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476. Finally, the Court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
19
complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it ‘might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]’’” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
that the non-moving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case[.]” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Accordingly, the non-moving
party “must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] [ ] genuine issue[s]” in dispute.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[non-moving party’s] position . . . [is] insufficient” to withstand a motion for summary
judgment[.]” Id. at 252.
III. ANALYSIS
The plaintiff challenges his court-martial conviction on two bases: (1) unlawful command
influence, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75–78, and (2) the military judge’s failure to disclose a ground for
20
his disqualification, see id. ¶¶ 79–82. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that “[b]ecause [the]
CAAF mistakenly found that the government had carried its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt” in regards to its unlawful command influence ruling, “and that an intolerable strain had
not been placed on public confidence in the administration of justice, [the] plaintiff’s conviction
and sentence violated due process and are invalid.” Id. ¶ 78. Furthermore, he argues that,
[b]y failing to disclose his job application and indicating that he was simply going
to retire, and then citing that as a basis for denying the renewed [unlawful
command influence] motion, [the military judge] (a) concealed a material
financial interest; (b) thwarted [the] plaintiff’s opportunity to conduct voir dire,
challenge him for cause, reconsider his pleas and decision to waive trial by jury;
and thereby (c) denied him a fair trial before an impartial judge as guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment.
Id. ¶ 81. The defendant argues in response that the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed
because (1) the CAAF conducted a “full and fair consideration of [the p]laintiff’s unlawful
command influence claim” as required, Def.’s Mem. at 24, and (2) “[the p]laintiff failed to
timely raise th[e] issue [of the military judge’s failure to disclose his job application] during the
direct appeal of his case, and the ACCA fully and fairly considered his argument and effectively
found that the issue had been waived[,]” id. at 34. Furthermore, the defendant argues that “even
if the Court were to reach the merits of [the p]laintiff’s argument, []his claim [that the military
judge improperly failed to disclose his job application] would not support the relief that he
seeks.” Id. In response, and in support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argues
that (1) “[his] claims were [not] fully and fairly considered by the military courts[,]” Pl.’s Mem.
at 11; (2) the prosecution did not carry its burden of proof regarding the plaintiff’s unlawful
command influence claim, see id. at 26; and (3) “[e]ven if [the] CAAF was right to find that the
prosecution had carried its [unlawful command influence] burden, that determination cannot
stand in light of the military judge’s improper concealment of his application for a job with the
21
[Department of] Justice [ ,]” id.
The Court will first consider the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claim, before
turning to his claim that the military judge who presided over his court-martial failed to disclose
a ground for his disqualification.
A. The Plaintiff’s Unlawful Command Influence Claim
The Court first considers whether the CAAF conducted a “full and fair consideration[,]”
Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2009), of the plaintiff’s unlawful command
influence claim. In affirming the decisions of the two lower military courts, the CAAF ruled that
although “a sitting president of the United States can commit both apparent and actual unlawful
command influence[ and t]he same [is] true for the late Senator McCain[,]” Bergdahl II, 80 M.J.
at 238, “[i]n this particular case, . . . a finding of apparent unlawful command influence is not
warranted because there was no intolerable strain on the military justice system[,]” id. at 239.
Specifically, the CAAF concluded that “the record reflects that the decision-making at each stage
of [the plaintiff’s] court-martial proceedings was unaffected by any outside influences” and
“therefore, . . . an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and
circumstances, would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of these proceedings.’”
Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2017)) (alteration in
original).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claim should be
dismissed because “[a] review of the CAAF’s reasoning reveals, manifestly, that the court fully
and fairly considered this issue” and “[e]specially given the heightened deference due a decision
of the CAAF regarding military law, [the p]laintiff supplies no reason to disturb the CAAF’s
judgment.” Def.’s Mem. at 28 (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, the defendant states that
22
“contrary to [the p]laintiff’s contention that there was an ‘absence of evidence’ supporting the
CAAF’s decision regarding clemency, the CAAF clearly identified four facts supporting its
analysis[,]” id., namely, (1) the plaintiff’s decision to “plead[] guilty to deserting his unit with
intent to shirk hazardous duty and of engaging in misbehavior before the enemy[,]” id. (quoting
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244); (2) that “American servicemembers were injured searching for [the
plaintiff] after he chose to desert his post in a combat zone[,]” id. at 29 (quoting Bergdahl II,
80 M.J. at 244); (3) that “the United States government was required to exchange five members
of the Taliban who had been held at the U.S. detention facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in
order to secure [the plaintiff’s] release[,]” id. at 31 (quoting Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244); and
(4) that “despite [those] three aggravating factors . . . , the military judge ‘imposed [ ] a sentence
[of] only a dishonorable discharge, a reduction in rank, and partial forfeitures of pay after [the
plaintiff] specifically asked to receive a dishonorable discharge,’ implying that . . . the sentence
was already quite lenient[,]” id. (quoting Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244). In response and in support
of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argues as a preliminary matter that, contrary to
the defendant’s suggestion, “‘greater deference’ [to the CAAF] is not warranted [here] simply
because [the] plaintiff is not in custody.” Pl.’s Mem. at 12 (citing Def.’s Mem. at 22).
Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that “[t]he military courts’ consideration [of the plaintiff’s case]
was neither full nor fair[,]” id. at 14, and specifically, that the CAAF did not afford the plaintiff’s
claims full and fair consideration because: (1)
in deciding by a 3-2 vote that “a reasonable member of the public,” fully informed
of the facts and circumstances, would not harbor a significant doubt as to the
fairness of the proceedings, it imputed to that observer numerous facts that would
not be known to a member of the public[,]
23
id.; and (2) “[t]he CAAF majority’s [unlawful command influence] analysis . . . was
under-inclusive, failing to take into account a host of matters that tended to detract from the
government’s claim that an intolerable strain had not been placed on public confidence[,]” id. 7
The standard of review to be applied in cases involving collateral attacks on court-martial
convictions “has been described by the D.C. Circuit as ‘tangled.’” Luke v. United States,
942 F. Supp. 2d 154, 162 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, No. 13-5169, 2014 WL 211305 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 13, 2014) (quoting United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403, 406
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). “It is clear that, in a habeas petition after a court[-]martial, a civilian court
applies the ‘full and fair consideration’ standard ‘to determine whether the military have given
fair consideration to each of [the petitioner’s] claims.’” Penland v. Mabus, 78 F. Supp. 3d 484,
493 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953)). However, in cases
involving a non-habeas collateral attack on a court-martial judgment—i.e., in cases where the
plaintiff is not in custody—“[c]ollateral relief . . . is barred unless it appears that the judgment is
void.” Priest v. Sec’y of Navy, 570 F.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Schlesinger, 420
U.S. at 748). “Whether a judgment may be deemed void turns upon two factors: the nature of
the alleged defect in the proceedings and the gravity of the harm from which relief is sought.”
Id. And, “[t]hese [factors] in turn must be considered in light of the deference Congress
expected the military justice system to receive in the federal courts.” Id. Furthermore, because
“non-habeas review is if anything more deferential than habeas review of military judgments, a
7
The plaintiff also makes arguments regarding (1) the CAAF’s “deni[al of] leave to supplement the record with the
military judge’s job application[,]” Pl.’s Mem. at 15; (2) “the ACCA’s coram nobis decision[,]” id. at 17 (underline
added); and (3) the “CAAF’s denial of the plaintiff’s writ-appeal petition[,]” id. The Court will address these issues
in the context of its analysis regarding whether the ACCA properly denied the plaintiff’s writ of coram nobis
petition, see infra Section III.B.1, and whether the military judge improperly failed to disclose a basis for his
disqualification, see infra Section III.B.2.
24
military court’s judgment clearly will not suffer such a defect if it satisfies [the] ‘[full and ]fair
consideration’ [standard,]” Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d at 408 (internal citation omitted).
Thus, district courts routinely apply the “full and fair consideration” test to non-custodial
collateral attacks on court-martial convictions because this standard is the less deferential of the
two, and thus, court-martial proceedings that satisfy this standard will also necessarily satisfy the
“void” standard articulated in Priest. See, e.g., Henry v. Kendall, No. 21-cv-865 (CKK), 2022
WL 3081408, at *4–7 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2022) (applying the “full and fair consideration” test to a
collateral attack on a court-martial conviction brought by a non-custodial plaintiff); Scott v.
United States, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–10 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, No. 19-5033, 2019 WL 3229390(D.C. Cir. June 25, 2019) (same); Luke, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 165–67 (same); Oppermann v. United
States, No. 06-cv-1824 (EGS), 2007 WL 1748920, at *6–9 (D.D.C. June 15, 2007) (same); see
also Def.’s Mem. at 24 (arguing for the application of the “full and fair consideration” test to the
plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claims “[b]ecause any opinion that fully and fairly
considers a plaintiff’s claim cannot be found to have such a defect” to render the decision
“void”); Pl.’s Mem. at 11–12 (arguing that the “full and fair consideration” test is the proper
standard to be applied in this case).
Although in [Rumsfeld] the [D.C. Circuit] did not describe the exact degree of
deference accorded to the military courts, its analysis suggests there are two steps
in applying the “full and fair consideration” standard: (1) a review of the military
court’s thoroughness in examining the relevant claims, at least where
thoroughness is contested; and (2) a close look at the merits of the claim, albeit
with some degree of deference and certainly more than under [a] de novo
standard.
Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32. The Court will apply each of these considerations in turn.
25
1. Whether the Military Courts Thoroughly Considered the Plaintiff’s Unlawful
Command Influence Claims
Here, as to the first prong of the “full and fair consideration” test, see id., the Court
concludes that the military courts conducted a thorough examination of the plaintiff’s unlawful
command influence defense. At the court-martial stage of the case, the military judge considered
three separate motions to dismiss filed by the plaintiff that were based on unlawful command
influence. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) at 1; id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) at 1; id., Ex.
11 (3d UCI Ruling) at 1. In ruling on these motions, the military judge fully articulated the
relevant law of unlawful command influence to be applied, see id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶¶ 3–
9; id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶¶ 3–9; id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶¶ 3–5, noting in relevant part
that “Article 37[] of the . . . []UCMJ[,]” id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 3, which concerns unlawful
command influence, “was enacted by Congress to prohibit commanders and convening
authorities from attempting to coerce, or by unauthorized means, influence the action of a
court-martial, or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case[,]” id.,Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 3. The military judge further specified that “[unlawful command
influence] can occur in one of two ways[:] either through [(]1) [a]ctual [unlawful command
influence] or [(]2) [a]pparent [unlawful command influence].” Id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 4;
see also id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶¶ 3–4 (articulating the same unlawful command influence
standards in the context of the plaintiff’s second motion); id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 3
(articulating the same legal standard for apparent unlawful command influence in the context of
the plaintiff’s third motion).
The military judge’s written decisions demonstrate that he thoughtfully considered the
application of the law to the facts alleged by the plaintiff regarding then-Senator McCain’s and
former President Trump’s statements and that his conclusions were well-reasoned. Specifically,
26
as to the plaintiff’s first motion, the military judge found that then-Senator McCain was not
“‘subject to this chapter’ as contemplated by Article 37[,]” id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 10, and
that, even if he were subject to Article 37, his statements could not constitute either actual
unlawful command influence, see id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 11 (stating that “[s]ince Senator
McCain holds no[] command authority over anyone involved in this case, he simply does not
have the ability to control this case or to exercise command control of any kind over those who
do”), or apparent unlawful command influence, see id., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 12 (“A
reasonable member of the public knowing all the facts and circumstances would recognize
Senator McCain’s ill-advised statements for just what they were[—]political posturing[.]”).
As to the plaintiff’s second motion, the military judge found that former President Trump
was not subject to Article 37 because “when he made the referenced comments [that were the
basis of the plaintiff’s second motion] . . . , he was only Candidate Trump . . . [and t]herefore, [ ]
could not commit actual [unlawful command influence].” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 10.
However, the military judge concluded that, even if former President Trump were subject to
Article 37, “the defense ha[d] failed to establish some facts which, if true, would constitute
[unlawful command influence] or establish that such evidence has a ‘logical connection’ to th[e]
court-martial in terms of potential to cause unfairness in the proceedings.” Id., Ex. 8 (2d UCI
Ruling) ¶ 11 (quoting United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2002)); see also id.,Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 11 (inviting the plaintiff to “renew [his] motion” if “after voir dire, [ ] it
appears the landscape on this issue has changed”).
Finally, as to the plaintiff’s third motion, the military judge found that, although the
plaintiff “met [his] initial burden of providing some evidence, beyond mere speculation, that
[unlawful command influence] exists[,]” id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(a),
27
the government . . . met [its] burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[unlawful command influence] has not and will not place an intolerable strain on
the public’s perception of the military justice system [and] that an objective,
disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and circumstances, would
not harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the[] proceedings[,]
id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(c). Namely, the military judge reasoned that “[t]he evidence
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that [he was] uninfluenced by the President’s comments
and more importantly, that [he] h[e]ld no fear of any repercussions from anyone if they d[id] not
agree with [his] sentence in th[e] case.” Id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(c); see also id., Ex. 11
(3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(c) (noting that a White House statement disavowed any “expect[ation of]
any certain sentence” in the case); id., Ex. 11 (3d UCI Ruling) ¶ 6(d) (stating that the military
judge would “consider the President’s comments as mitigation evidence” at sentencing and
“require anyone involved in any way in the exercise of discretion in any post-trial aspect of this
case to read the statement from the White House Press Office”). Based on this careful reasoning
employed by the military judge, the Court concludes that the military judge “heard [the plaintiff]
out on[,]” Burns, 346 U.S. at 144, his unlawful command influence claims and that his rulings
“thorough[ly] [ ] examin[ed]” them, Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32.
Furthermore, on appeal, the ACCA conducted a thorough review of the military judge’s
unlawful command influence assessment, “analyz[ing] each allegation of [unlawful command
influence] in a discrete fashion[,]” as well as any potential “cumulative effect . . . that [would
have] denied [the plaintiff] of a fair trial.” Bergdahl I, 79 M.J. at 527. The ACCA detailed the
facts of the plaintiff’s court-martial and scrutinized the military judge’s reasoning, applying
relevant case law and legal standards. See, e.g., id. at 522 (distinguishing this case from Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), in analyzing whether the comments by then-candidate Trump
created an appearance of unlawful command influence); id. at 524 (comparing the facts of the
28
plaintiff’s case to United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (C.A.A.F. 2017), and United States v.
Barry, 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018), in determining whether the statements made by
then-President Trump created an appearance of unlawful command influence). The ACCA
ultimately concluded in its well-reasoned opinion that, although it disagreed with the military
judge’s reasoning regarding whether then-Senator John McCain was “subject to” Article 37, see
id. at 521–22, “[t]he military judge correctly found that the defense failed to meet its burden of
establishing some evidence which, if true, would constitute [unlawful command influence,]” id.
at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the ACCA “agree[d] with the military
judge that [the plaintiff] did not meet his burden to establish any evidence of [unlawful command
influence]” as to former President Trump when he was a presidential candidate, concluding that
“[i]ncendiary remarks by private citizens, even influential ones, do not constitute evidence of
[unlawful command influence].” 8 Id. at 523; see id. at 522 (“There is no precedent for finding
[unlawful command influence] based on the remarks of private citizens, even influential ones.”).
And, finally, the ACCA concluded that, “[a]lthough President Trump ratified [his] comments”
made prior to his presidency once he became president, “their impact was lessened by the
remoteness [in time to the plaintiff’s court-martial]” and “the military judge [and other decision-
makers involved with the court-martial] credibly explained that they were not and would not be
influenced by the President’s statement.” Id. at 524. The ACCA was also “struck by [the]
differences between cases where individuals reached out to the convening authority and the SJA
8
The plaintiff argued that “th[e] court should look to the rationale in Trump v. Hawaii[, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018),]” in
which “the Supreme Court considered candidate Trump’s campaign vows to bar Muslims from entering the [United
States] as extrinsic evidence of his motive to issue an Executive Order that placed restrictions on the nationals of
predominantly Muslim countries seeking entry into the [United States]” once he became President. Bergdahl I, 79
M.J. at 522. However, the ACCA distinguished this case, opining that “[i]n Trump v. Hawaii, . . . [former President
Trump’s] campaign rhetoric was merely a consideration in the Court’s analysis of the [Executive Order’s]
constitutionality[,]” id., and “[i]n [the plaintiff’s] case, by contrast, at the time of [the plaintiff’s] second motion to
dismiss for [unlawful command influence], President Trump had just been inaugurated and had not taken any action
as President or made any comment regarding [the plaintiff,]” id. at 522–23 (emphasis in original).
29
instead of a case like [the plaintiff’s], where the comments were brought to the attention of the
court by the defense itself.” Id. Thus, based upon the ACCA’s reasoning and sufficient
thoroughness in addressing each of the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence allegations, the
Court concludes that the ACCA accorded these claims “full and fair consideration[.]” Sanford,
586 F.3d at 32. See Luke, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66 (concluding that the appellate military
court had “carefully assessed all of the evidence presented” where it noted and considered all of
the lower court’s factual findings and made its own legal conclusions based on these findings
and an analysis of the appellant’s arguments).
In conducting its review, the CAAF also “treated the plaintiff’s arguments[,]” Luke, 942
F. Supp. 2d at 166, with sufficient “thoroughness[,]” id., to constitute “full and fair
consideration[,]” Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32, of the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claims.
The CAAF concluded, contrary to the military judge’s rulings, that both Senator McCain and
former President Trump were capable of creating unlawful command influence under Article 37,
see Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 234–35, but ultimately agreed with the military judge’s rulings
because it found “no intolerable strain on the military justice system[,]” id. at 239—a finding
which it “predicated on all of the relevant facts of th[e] case, regardless of whether the various
stages of the court-martial proceedings are viewed individually or cumulatively[,]” id. In
reaching this conclusion, the CAAF acknowledged that the plaintiff had met his initial burden of
showing “some evidence” of unlawful command influence, see id. at 236–38, and conducted an
exhaustive review of the court-martial proceedings, as well as the subsequent appellate
proceedings before the ACCA, applying the relevant law to the facts of the plaintiff’s case, see
id. at 238–44. As part of its conclusion that the plaintiff established no apparent unlawful
command influence, the CAAF “underscore[d] the fact that despite the sensational nature of this
30
case, the public calls for the lengthy imprisonment of [the plaintiff],” and the comments made by
Senator McCain and former President Trump, “the military judge imposed on [the plaintiff] no
prison time whatsoever[ and t]hus, an objective, disinterested observer would conclude that
rather than being swayed by outside forces, the military judge was notably impervious to them.”
Id. at 244 (emphasis in original). Thus, based upon its comprehensive review of each of stage of
the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings and application of the unlawful command influence
doctrine, the Court concludes that the CAAF conducted a thorough review of the plaintiff’s
unlawful command influence claims, sufficient to constitute “full and fair consideration[,]” of
them. 9 Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32.
2. The Merits of the Plaintiff’s Unlawful Command Influence Claim
Having determined that the military judge and subsequent appellate military courts
conducted a thorough review of the plaintiff’s unlawful command influence claims, the Court
must next independently consider “the merits of the [plaintiff’s] claim[s], albeit with some
degree of deference[,]” id. Article 37 of the UCMJ provides that “[n]o person subject to [the
UCMJ] may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, attempt to influence the action of
a court-martial . . . or any member thereof[.]” 10 U.S.C. § 837(a)(3). The R.C.M., which also
explicitly prohibits unlawful command influence, provides that
[n]o convening authority or commander may censure, reprimand, or admonish a
court-martial . . . or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect
9
The plaintiff argues that “[t]he CAAF majority’s [unlawful command influence analysis] was not full because it
was under-inclusive[,]” Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (emphasis omitted), citing one example—its “dismissal of the fact that the
plaintiff’s prosecution ran counter to American practice since [the] Vietnam [War] to not prosecute returning
[prisoners of war] unless they were guilty of misconduct while in enemy hands[,]” id. at 14–15. However, the
CAAF did consider this argument, but ultimately concluded based on its review of the source cited by the plaintiff
for this proposition, that “an objective, disinterested observer would give little weight to [ ] [this] argument.”
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 239 n.10. Although the CAAF may not have weighed this argument as heavily as the
plaintiff desired, the CAAF’s evaluation of this evidence satisfied its obligation to “take account of anything in the
record that ‘fairly detracts’ from the weight of the evidence supporting” its decision. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Lab.
Rels. Bd., 117 F.3d 627, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
31
to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court-martial . . . , or with respect to
any other exercise of the functions of the court-martial . . . or such persons in the
conduct of the proceedings.
R.C.M. 104(a)(1). Furthermore,
[n]o person subject to the [R.C.M.] may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any
member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case or the action of
any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to such authority’s
judicial acts.
R.C.M. 104(a)(2). The accused in a court-martial proceeding “bears the initial burden of raising
unlawful command influence” and “[t]he quantum of evidence required . . . is ‘some evidence.’”
United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 423 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (quoting Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41).
Next,
[o]nce an issue of unlawful command influence is raised by some evidence, the
burden shifts to the government to rebut an allegation of unlawful command
influence by persuading the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the
predicate facts do not exist; (2) the facts do not constitute unlawful command
influence; or (3) the unlawful command influence did not affect the findings or
sentence.
Id. Furthermore, “[e]ven if there was no actual unlawful command influence, there may be a
question whether the influence of command placed an ‘intolerable strain on public perception of
the military justice system[,]’” i.e., apparent unlawful command influence. Stoneman, 57 M.J. at42–43 (quoting United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “An appearance of
unlawful command influence arises ‘where an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed
of all the facts and circumstances, would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the
proceeding.’” Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 415
(C.A.A.F. 2006)). On appeal, as to unlawful command influence, the plaintiff only sought
review of “whether the charges and specifications should be dismissed with prejudice or other
meaningful relief granted because of apparent unlawful command influence.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9
32
(capitalization omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court will analyze the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims under the standard applicable to apparent unlawful command influence. See
Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423.
i. Whether Senator McCain and Former President Trump Were Capable of
Committing Unlawful Command Influence
As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that Senator McCain and former President
Trump, during the time that he was President, were capable of committing unlawful command
influence under Article 37 and R.C.M. 104(a). Specifically, Senator McCain, although not an
active member of the military at the time of his comments regarding the plaintiff’s case, was a
“[r]etired member of a regular component of the armed forces[,]” 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4), and thus
“subject to” the UCMJ, id. § 804(a). See Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 234 (stating that “Senator
McCain was a retired member of the United States Navy”). And, former President Trump, while
President, served as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and thus constituted a
“commander” under the R.C.M. R.C.M. 104(a)(1). However, as a candidate, former President
Trump was essentially a private, albeit widely publicized, citizen for purposes of the UCMJ and
R.C.M., in that he had no association with the military at the time and did not fall under any of
the categories of individuals subject to the UCMJ as specifically delineated in the relevant
provision of that statute. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 802. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis
regarding former President Trump’s comments made in his capacity as a presidential candidate
must stop there.
ii. Whether the Plaintiff Has Presented “Some Evidence” of Unlawful
Command Influence
The parties agree that former President Trump ratified his comments made as a candidate
once he became President. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 104; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 104. And,
33
therefore, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has presented “some evidence” of
unlawful command influence as to both Senator McCain and former President Trump during the
time that he served as President. Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41. “Some evidence” is defined as “facts
that, if true, constitute unlawful command influence, . . . [with] a logical connection to the court-
martial in terms of potential to cause unfairness in the proceedings.” Id. “This burden [of
presenting some evidence] is low, but the evidence presented must consist of more than ‘mere
allegation or speculation.’” Boyce, 76 M.J. at 249 (quoting Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423). Here,
because Senator McCain’s and former President Trump’s comments pertained squarely to the
plaintiff and his court-martial proceedings, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has presented
some evidence as to both McCain’s and Trump’s apparent unlawful command influence. Both
vilified the plaintiff, labeling him with terms that “presuppos[ed] [his] guilt[,]” which the ACCA
has viewed as evidence of unlawful command influence. United States v. Alton, ARMY
20190199, 2021 WL 2232100, at *7 (U.S. Army Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2021); see, e.g., Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 83 (Senator McCain stating that the plaintiff “is clearly a deserter”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 83; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90 (“Trump repeatedly vilified the plaintiff, describing him as a traitor at
numerous rallies[.]”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90; see Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 234 (opining
that former President Trump’s labeling of the plaintiff as a deserter “is antithetical to the
presumption of innocence the Constitution affords to all accused”).
Moreover, both Senator McCain and former President Trump expressly stated their
desires that the plaintiff be punished harshly, and noted actions they would take if he were not.
See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83 (Senator McCain stating that “‘[i]f it comes out that [the plaintiff] has no
punishment, we’re going to have to have a hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee’”);
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 1 (accepting as fact that
34
former President Trump “express[ed] an opinion about [the plaintiff’s] guilt and promis[ed] that,
if the [the plaintiff] didn’t get jail time and [former President] Trump were elected President, he
would review the case”); Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244 (noting that former President Trump ratified
his comments once he became President). The Court concludes that these statements clearly
constitute at least some evidence of an “attempt to influence the action of a court-martial . . . or
a[] member thereof[.]” 10 U.S.C. § 837(a)(3). Therefore, because the plaintiff has presented
some evidence of apparent unlawful command influence, “the burden shifts to the government to
rebut [this] allegation[.]” Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423.
iii. Whether the Command Influence Placed an Intolerable Strain on Public
Perception of the Military Justice System
As noted above, in the context of an allegation of apparent unlawful command influence,
the government must show that “the influence of command placed [no] ‘intolerable strain on
public perception of the military justice system[,]’” Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 42–43 (quoting
Wiesen, 56 M.J. at 175), by demonstrating that “an objective, disinterested observer, fully
informed of all the facts and circumstances, would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the
fairness of the proceeding[,]” Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. 10 In making this determination, the CAAF
“has assessed the aggravating and mitigating facts and circumstances and then decided, in its
own estimation, whether the [g]overnment’s conduct ‘place[d] an intolerable strain upon the
10
The plaintiff argues that in concluding that “‘a reasonable member of the public,’ fully informed of the facts and
circumstances, would not harbor a significant doubt as to the fairness of the proceedings, [the CAAF] imputed to
that observer numerous facts that would not be known to a member of the public.” Pl.’s Mem. at 14. However, in
the context of a review of a court-martial conviction, while the CAAF “focus[es] upon the perception of fairness in
the military justice system as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable member of the public[,]” that “reasonable
member of the public” is considered “an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and
circumstances” of the case. Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415 (emphasis added). Thus, the test is not governed by the
perceptions of just any hypothetical member of the public, but rather one who is fully informed of every factual
aspect of the case. See id. Given this standard, the Court concludes that the CAAF properly imputed to such an
observer knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff’s case. See Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 238–43
(imputing to the “reasonable observer” knowledge of various aspects of the underlying facts in the plaintiff’s case,
as well as facts regarding the procedural history of his case).
35
public’s perception of the military justice system.’” United States v. Horne, 82 M.J. 283, 287
(C.A.A.F. 2022) (quoting Boyce, 76 M.J. at 249). Furthermore, “unlike actual unlawful
command influence where prejudice to the [plaintiff] is required, no such showing is required for
a meritorious claim of an appearance of unlawful command influence.” Boyce, 76 M.J. at 248(emphasis added). However, “the lack of personal prejudice [to the plaintiff] is still a
‘significant factor in determining whether the unlawful command influence created an
intolerable strain on the public’s perception of the military justice system.’” Horne, 82 M.J. at
289 (quoting United States v. Proctor, 81 M.J. 250, 255 (C.A.A.F. 2021)) (emphasis added).
There are five primary stages of the proceedings at issue in this case, which the plaintiff
contends were tainted by unlawful command influence: (1) the investigation and preferral stage;
(2) the convening authority’s decision to refer the plaintiff’s case to a general—rather than
special—court-martial; (3) the plaintiff’s entry of a guilty plea; (4) the plaintiff’s sentencing; and
(5) the appellate proceedings. See supra Section I.B.4. The Court will “assess[] the aggravating
and mitigating facts and circumstances[,]” Horne, 82 M.J. at 287, as to each of these stages,
keeping in mind the deference that must be afforded to the military courts, Sanford, 586 F.3d at
32 (noting that, in examining the merits of a plaintiff’s collateral attack to a military conviction,
the Court must employ “some degree of deference and certainly more than under [a] de novo
standard”).
Regarding the first two stages of the court-martial process—the investigation and
preferral stage, and the convening authority’s decision to refer the case to a general court-
martial—the Court concludes that the factors regarding (1) the government’s evidence of the
plaintiff’s desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, and (2) the significant, compelling
evidence regarding casualties incurred as a result of the plaintiff’s alleged desertion, support the
36
CAAF’s conclusion that there was no apparent unlawful command influence as to these aspects
of the proceedings. The CAAF noted that “compelling evidence was presented at a hearing held
pursuant to Article 32 . . . that [the plaintiff] deserted his unit with intent to shirk hazardous duty
and that he engaged in misbehavior before the enemy[,]” which are serious offenses that “can be
punishable by death, or by any punishment other than death” under the UCMJ. Bergdahl II, 80
M.J. at 239; see Pl.’s Mem., Ex. 28 (Charge Sheet) at 31. Thus, given that the government
presented evidence in support of charges which trigger court-martial jurisdiction and serious
potential penalties, see 10 U.S.C. § 885 (desertion); 10 U.S.C. § 899 (misbehavior before the
enemy), the Court concludes that “an objective, disinterested observer . . . would [not] harbor a
significant doubt about[,]” Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415, the preferral stage of the plaintiff’s case or the
convening authority’s decision to refer the case to a court-martial. See Pl.’s Mem., Ex. 28
(Charge Sheet) at 31 (stating that the plaintiff “did . . . with intent to shirk important service and
avoid hazardous duty, namely: combat operations[,] . . . guard duty[,] . . . and combat patrol
duties[,] . . . quit his place of duty”); id., Ex. 28 (Charge Sheet) at 31 (stating that the plaintiff
“did, at or near Observation Post Mest, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, . . . before the enemy,
endanger the safety of Observation Post Mest and Task Force Yukon, which it was his duty to
defend, by intentional misconduct[,] . . . left without authority[,] and wrongfully caused search
and recovery operations”). Rather, a member of the public informed of the serious facts which
the government alleged in its charges would likely expect the plaintiff to be charged and that the
case would be referred for court-martial proceedings. Compare, e.g., Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 239
(noting the gravity of the charges and the strength of the government’s evidence), with United
States v. Butler, No. ACM 39802, 2021 WL 3732722, at *29–30 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 20,
2021) (finding that “the severity of the offenses and the strength of the [g]overnment’s evidence
37
would [not] negate the logical connection between [command] influence and [the] decision to
prefer the charges” where the Article 32 preliminary hearing officer found that “the evidence
against the [a]ccused on each charged offense except [one] . . . meets the very low probable
cause standard” (seventh alteration in original) (emphasis in original)). 11
Additionally, regarding the convening authority’s decision to refer the plaintiff’s case to a
general court-martial, the Court finds the evidence regarding the numerous casualties incurred as
a result of the plaintiff’s alleged desertion persuasive in determining whether an objective
observer “would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the proceeding[,]” Lewis, 63
M.J. at 415. With respect to the convening authority’s decision to refer the case to a general
court-martial—contrary to the preliminary hearing officer’s recommendation for a special court-
martial—the CAAF “acknowledge[d] that this aspect of the case is a close question and [stated
that] it ha[d] given [the court] great pause.” Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 239. The CAAF noted,
however, that “the ‘strongest factor’ in causing [the preliminary hearing officer] to make a
recommendation for a special court-martial was the fact that the [g]overnment”—at that stage of
11
The plaintiff argues that his “prosecution ran counter to American practice since [the] Vietnam [War] to not
prosecute returning [prisoners of war (‘]POW[][’)] unless they were guilty of misconduct while in enemy hands.”
Id. at 15; see also id. at 3, 27–28, 32. However, the source he cites in support of this contention states that “[t]he
[United States] Military has taken varied approaches to pre-capture and post-capture misconduct by POW[]s [that]
range from a general amnesty for misconduct after repatriation to aggressive prosecution of deserters.” Id., Ex. 19
(Information Paper: Historical Approach to Pre-Capture and Post-Capture Misconduct by POW[]s (July 1, 2014)
(“Information Paper”)) ¶ 2, ECF No. 17-2 (emphasis added). The source further states that “the [Department of
Defense] made two policy decisions regarding allegations of misconduct by returning POW[]s at the end of the
Vietnam War: (1) there would be no prosecutions for ‘propaganda statements,’ and (2) no charges would be brought
against POW[]s except by other POW[]s.” Id., Ex. 19 (Information Paper) ¶ 2(c). The source noted that “Pentagon
officials dropped charges [against multiple Vietnam War POWs] ‘owing to the complex legal and policy issues that
would have made conviction problematical and the damaging publicity that would have attended a long trial.’” Id.,
Ex. 19 (Information Paper) ¶ 2(c)(ii). Thus, the practice the plaintiff alludes to appears to have been put in place in
response to the specific legal and policy circumstances during the Vietnam War. Moreover, the plaintiff’s
contention does not at all account for the fact that the government charged the plaintiff with desertion, an offense
which the cited source notes has been “aggressive[ly] prosecut[ed]” by the United States Military. Id., Ex. 19
(Information Paper) ¶ 2. Accordingly, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive in determining whether “an
objective, disinterested observer . . . would harbor a significant doubt about[,]” Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415, the preferral
stage of the plaintiff’s case.
38
the case—had “failed to submit before him any evidence ‘demonstrating that anyone was killed
or wounded’ during the military’s search and recovery efforts related to [the plaintiff’s]
disappearance.” Id. at 240. However, there were numerous significant casualties that resulted
from the plaintiff’s disappearance, and the CAAF detailed some of these in its opinion. See id.
(stating that, after the plaintiff’s disappearance, “thousands of United States soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and Marines conducted an intensive search of the region spanning thirty to forty-five
days[,]” resulting in “increased presence of American troops precipitat[ing] increased
interactions with the enemy, which ultimately increased the risk to those searching for [the
plaintiff”); id. at 240–41 & n.10 (noting “numerous American casualties,” including “Retired
Navy SEAL Senior Chief Petty Officer James Hatch[, who] was shot in the leg, requiring
eighteen surgeries over several years[;]” “a military dog[] . . . killed during the mission[;]” “at
least two Army specialists [who] came under rocket-propelled grenade fire[;]” “Specialist
Jonathan Morita[, who] sustained serious [permanent] injuries to his right hand[;]” and “Master
Sergeant [ ] Mark Allen[, who] was shot through the head[,] . . . [placing him] in a ‘vegetative
state,’ . . . [requiring him to] undergo[] fifteen to twenty surgeries which included the removal of
both his frontal lobes,” and eventually leading to his death). Although the preliminary hearing
officer was not provided with this information, the CAAF found that the convening authority,
who
served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, during which
time he was present for briefings regarding [the plaintiff], was aware of
negotiations taking place to effect [the plaintiff’s] return from Taliban captivity,
and provided daily reports to the Secretary of Defense concerning [the plaintiff’s]
health and welfare following his eventual return to the United States[,]
would have clearly had access to this casualty information. Id. at 241. And, although it might
require an objective observer to make an inference regarding the convening authority’s
39
knowledge of this information, the Court concludes that this is a reasonable inference fairly
encompassed by the knowledge of “an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the
facts and circumstances,” of the case, Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415 (emphasis added). See supra note
10. Therefore, the Court concludes that an objective observer would reasonably expect a
convening authority, with knowledge of these serious casualties, and with significant discretion
in his referral decision, see R.C.M. 601(d)(1), to refer the case to a general court-martial, where
the plaintiff might face harsher penalties.
Regarding the third stage of the proceedings—the plaintiff’s entry of a guilty plea—the
Court concludes that an objective observer would not harbor a significant doubt about the
fairness of the guilty plea. See Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. At multiple points in its opinion, the
CAAF heavily emphasized the fact that the plaintiff chose to plead guilty. See, e.g., Bergdahl II,
80 M.J. at 242, 244. The Court recognizes that there are various reasons why an individual
might choose to plead guilty, some of which are noted by the plaintiff. See Pl.’s Mem. at 31
(arguing that “in light of the military judge’s rulings on pretrial motions, the plaintiff’s dilemma
was clear” and that “[h]e pleaded only after the military judge had rejected challenges to the
legal sufficiency of the charges, his claim that the charges were redundant, and three [unlawful
command influence] motions”). However, having concluded that the military judge thoroughly
considered the plaintiff’s dispositive motions, see supra Section III.A.1, the Court also concludes
that the plaintiff’s subsequent entry of a guilty plea cuts against a finding of apparent unlawful
command influence as to this specific stage of the proceeding. Specifically, the plaintiff
concedes that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea, see Pl.’s Mem. at 31 (“There was no
dispute that he had left his post seeking to travel overland to a forward operating base and make
a report.”), and that his plea was voluntary, see id. at 32 (“We do not contend that the plaintiff’s
40
plea or his request for a punitive discharge were involuntary[.]”). And, while it is possible that
he chose to plead guilty for other strategic reasons—for example, based on the prior adverse
rulings by the military judge—given the thoroughness of the military judge’s evaluation of the
plaintiff’s dispositive motions, see supra Section III.A.1, “an objective, disinterested observer,
fully informed of all the facts and circumstances, would [not] harbor a significant doubt about
the fairness of” the plaintiff’s entry of his guilty plea, Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. Compare Bergdahl
II, 80 M.J. at 242 (“In [pleading guilty], [the plaintiff] explicitly agreed in open court that he was
voluntarily pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty and not for any other reason. In a
lengthy plea colloquy, [he] explained in detail his intent to walk off his post in hostile territory,
his reasoning for doing so, and the exact steps he took to attain this objective.”), with United
States v. Gattis, 81 M.J. 748, 757–58 (N.M.C. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2021) (finding that “no
impartial observer would conclude it was the actions of the command master chief and other
members of his chain of command that caused him to plead guilty” where “[d]uring a substantial
plea colloquy, [the a]ppellant explained in detail [the factual basis for his plea]”).
Regarding the fourth stage of the proceedings—the plaintiff’s sentencing—the Court
concludes that consideration of this factor shows that there was no apparent unlawful command
influence for two reasons. First, the discrepancy between the sentence the plaintiff received, and
the potential penalties, as well as the sentences called for by Senator McCain and former
President Trump, was significant. And second, the sentence the plaintiff received overall
indicates a lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, which is a “significant factor in determining whether
the unlawful command influence created an intolerable strain on the public’s perception of the
military justice system.” Horne, 82 M.J. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the
plaintiff’s sentencing, Senator McCain stated that, “‘[i]f it comes out that [the plaintiff] has no
41
punishment, we’re going to have to have a hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee,’
adding that the plaintiff . . . ‘is clearly a deserter.’” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 83; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 83; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (1st UCI Ruling) ¶ 2(i). And, former President Trump
stated that “deserters used to be shot, implying and at times saying outright that the plaintiff
deserved the death penalty[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94; see Def’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94, and in the
context of these types of remarks, in effect “pantomimed executions by rifle and pistol shot,
complete with sounds effects[,]” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 95; see Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 95. Former
President Trump later “promis[ed] that, if the [plaintiff] didn’t get jail time and [former
President] Trump were elected President, he would review the case.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (2d UCI
Ruling) ¶ 1. Furthermore, after the military judge imposed the plaintiff’s sentence, former
President Trump called it “a complete and total disgrace to our [c]ountry and to our [m]ilitary.”
Bergdahl I, 79 M.J. at 524.
Thus, the sentence that the military judge ultimately imposed was in direct contrast to the
harsh punishments requested by Senator McCain and former President Trump. And, the Court
therefore concludes that a reasonable observer comparing these officials’ passionate advocacy
for severe sentences with the far less punitive sentence that the plaintiff actually received,
“would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of” the sentencing in this case, Lewis,
63 M.J. at 415. Rather, the Court agrees with the CAAF that, with respect to sentencing, “rather
than being swayed by outside forces, the military judge [appeared] notably impervious to them.”
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244. Moreover, at sentencing, the plaintiff requested a dishonorable
discharge in lieu of a prison sentence, see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 2694:15–17 (“[T]he
defense respectfully requests that you sentence [the plaintiff] to a dishonorable discharge.”); see
also id., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 2695:1–2697:1 (affirming the plaintiff’s understanding of the
42
consequences of a dishonorable discharge sentence), which the military judge imposed. Despite
that penalty, the plaintiff argues that he “did not receive ‘the very sentence [he] requested’”
because “he never suggested a five-figure financial sanction” or a “demot[ion] to the lowest
enlisted pay grade.” Pl.’s Mem. at 32 (quoting Def.’s Mem. at 45) (first alteration in original).
While the plaintiff is correct that he did not request these financial sanctions, see generally Def.’s
Mot., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 2670:12–2694:20, the Court nonetheless concludes that, given the
aggravating factors in this case—the government’s strong evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
charges, see Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 239 (noting the government’s strong evidence presented at
the Article 32 hearing); Pl.’s Mem., Ex. 28 (Charge Sheet) at 31 (describing the plaintiff’s
charges); the seriousness of the charges, see 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (noting that potential penalties
for desertion include “death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct” “if the
offense is committed in time of war”); 10 U.S.C. § 899 (noting that a person convicted of
misbehavior before the enemy “shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct”); and the extensive casualties that resulted from the plaintiff’s actions, see
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 240–41 (listing casualties)—“an objective, disinterested observer . . .
would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of” the military judge’s imposition of a
hefty fine and demotion in rank, Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
there was no apparent unlawful command influence as to the sentencing stage of the plaintiff’s
court-martial proceedings.
Finally, regarding the appellate stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that,
because each stage of the court-martial proceedings at the trial level appears untainted by
unlawful command influence, it follows that “an objective, disinterested observer . . . would
[not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of” the ACCA’s affirmance of the plaintiff’s
43
conviction and sentence, id. The Court further agrees with the CAAF that, given the aggravating
factors in this case, “an objective, disinterested observer would decide that the convening
authority’s decision not to exercise his discretionary clemency authority . . . was a foregone
conclusion[,]” 12 and that “there would be no basis for an impartial observer to believe that the
decision by the [ACCA] to affirm the findings and sentence in this case was in any way unfair.”
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244.
Based on “the totality of the circumstances in this case[,]” Boyce, 76 M.J. at 252, the
Court concludes that “an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and
circumstances, would [not] harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the proceeding[s,]”
Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415, and therefore, command influence did not “place[] an ‘intolerable strain
on public perception of the military justice system[,]’” Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 43 (quoting Wiesen,
56 M.J. at 175). Thus, according significant deference to the CAAF as required, see Sanford,
586 F.3d at 32, “the Court finds no reason to disturb [the CAAF’s] decisions on the merits of [the
plaintiff’s unlawful command influence] claim[s,]” Scott, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 8. Accordingly, the
Court must grant the defendant’s motion and deny the plaintiff’s motion as to Count I of the
plaintiff’s Complaint. Although it must reach this conclusion, the Court notes that what occurred
in this case illustrates why individuals aspiring for public office and those achieving that
12
The plaintiff disputes the CAAF’s characterization that his “post-trial matters submitted to the convening
authority were ‘absent any formal request for clemency in the form of a sentence reduction.’” Bergdahl II, 80 M.J.
at 244 (quoting Bergdahl I, 79 M.J. at 526); see Pl.’s Mem. at 29–30. However, even assuming for purposes of the
Court’s analysis that the plaintiff did effectively seek clemency, the Court concludes that there was no apparent
unlawful command influence in the clemency stage of the proceedings. The fact that the plaintiff received a
dishonorable discharge consistent with his request, combined with the multiple aggravating factors which an
objective observer would view as justifying the imposition of financial sanctions and the plaintiff’s demotion in
rank, see supra Section III.A.2.iii, support the convening authority’s decision to approve the military judge’s
findings and sentence. Furthermore, the Court concludes that because these aggravating factors form such a solid
basis for the convening authority’s approval of the sentence and denial of clemency, the fact that former President
Trump deemed the sentence “a complete and total disgrace to our [c]ountry and to our [m]ilitary[,]” Bergdahl I, 79
M.J. at 524, would not create “a significant doubt about the fairness of” the convening authority’s decision, Lewis,
63 M.J. at 415.
44
objective should not express their desired verdict and punishment of individuals merely accused
of committing criminal offenses. They must be mindful that in the United States, individuals
merely accused of committing crimes are presumed to be innocent until the prosecution has
satisfied the high bar of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of the severity of the
charged offense. So too must they appreciate the potential impact their comments may have on
those who have to adjudicate the accused’s culpability and the perception the public may have on
the fairness of the process, which the credibility of the judicial system relies on in order for its
decisions to be widely accepted. Otherwise, the system will become subject to widespread
condemnation by the public it serves. And that applies equally to our military justice system.
B. The Plaintiff’s Claim that the Military Judge Failed to Disclose a Basis for His
Disqualification
Having concluded that the military courts fully and fairly considered the plaintiff’s
unlawful command influence claims, the Court will next address the plaintiff’s claim that the
military judge who presided over his court-martial proceedings improperly failed to disclose a
basis for his disqualification. After the CAAF denied the plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed his
conviction on August 27, 2020, see Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 244, the plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration and motion to supplement the record based upon a newly discovered job
application submitted to the Department of Justice by the military judge while he was actively
presiding over the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings, see Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 119, 132; Def.’s Resp.
to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 119, 132. On October 14, 2020, the CAAF “denied [these motions] without
prejudice to [the plaintiff’s] right to file a writ of error coram nobis with the appropriate court.”
Bergdahl III, 80 M.J. at 362 (underline added). After the plaintiff subsequently filed a writ of
error coram nobis with the ACCA, that court denied the plaintiff’s writ solely based on its
45
conclusion that the plaintiff “d[id] not meet the threshold criteria for coram nobis review[,]”
Bergdahl IV, 2020 WL 7316058, at *1, “find[ing] no valid reason why [the plaintiff] did not
seek relief earlier[,]” id. at *3. Thus, the ACCA denied the plaintiff’s writ entirely based on only
one of the criteria for coram nobis review—his delay in raising this particular issue—and did not
reach the merits of his challenge. See id. at *1–5. The CAAF summarily affirmed this decision
on February 2, 2021. See Bergdahl V, 81 M.J. at 128 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
The defendant argues that, “[e]specially given that the [ACCA] closely hewed to
Supreme Court precedent, there is no error, fundamental or otherwise in th[at] court’s
decision[,]” “[b]ut [even] if the Court were to consider the merits of this claim, [the p]laintiff
nonetheless would not be entitled to relief.” Def.’s Mem. at 37. In response, the plaintiff argues
that the “ACCA’s insistence that he should have raised the issue sooner is not well-taken because
‘sound’ or ‘valid’ reasons exist for not having done so[,]” Pl.’s Mem. at 18, 13 and that,
13
With respect to the ACCA’s review of the plaintiff’s coram nobis petition, the plaintiff also argues that “[t]he
unfairness [of the ACCA’s review] was compounded by the makeup of the ACCA panel[,]” given that “one of the
ACCA judges was married to the head of the Army’s Criminal Law Division.” Pl.’s Mem. at 16. The plaintiff
argues that the judge “should have recused [herself] when the plaintiff objected to her participation” and “[h]er
failure to do so in a case that concerns, of all things, a recusal issue is baffling (as is [the] ACCA’s failure to explain
its denial of the recusal motion).” Id. (emphasis omitted). The Rules for Courts-Martial provide in relevant part:
a military judge shall [ ] disqualify himself or herself . . . [w]here . . . the military judge’s
spouse . . . (A) [i]s a party to the proceeding; (B) [i]s known by the military judge to have an
interest, financial or otherwise, that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding; or (C) [i]s to the military judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
R.C.M. 902(b)(5)(A)–(C). Thus, the fact that one the ACCA judge’s spouse was employed by the Army’s Criminal
Law Division does not render that judge subject to disqualification under this provision, given that there is no
indication that she was a party, had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, or served as a witness. See Pl.’s
Mem. at 16. Moreover, the mere fact that a judge’s spouse is employed by a party to litigation before that judge
does not necessarily warrant recusal, where the spouse is not otherwise involved in that particular litigation. See
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 156 F. Supp. 3d 36, 52 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding that the
presiding judge’s wife’s employment with a law firm representing one of the litigants in a case before the judge
“d[id] not compel [his] recusal” where “[his] wife was not involved in the firm’s representation of [the litigant] in
connection with [the subject matter of the case]” and this was “too remote and too attenuated a connection to merit
[ ] recusal”); see also id. (listing cases from multiple district courts all declining to require recusal where a judge’s
spouse worked for a law firm representing a litigant before the judge, but was not involved in that litigation in any
form). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the mere fact that the ACCA judge’s spouse worked for the Army’s
(continued . . .)
46
consequently, the “CAAF’s decision cannot survive the later-obtained evidence of the military
judge’s concealed job application[,]” id. at 34.
In support of his argument that the military judge improperly failed to disclose grounds
for his disqualification based upon his job application for an immigration judge position with the
Department of Justice, the plaintiff relies heavily upon this Circuit’s opinion in In re Al-Nashiri,
921 F.3d 224 (D.C. Cir. 2019). See Pl.’s Mem. at 38. In that case, a Guantánamo Bay detainee
“fac[ing] capital charges before a military commission” “s[ought] a writ of mandamus vacating
commission orders by [the military judge that presided over his proceedings]” based upon the
military judge’s failure to disclose his application for employment as an immigration judge with
the Department of Justice, which litigated the case on behalf of the government. Al-Nashiri, 921
F.3d at 226. This Circuit granted the petition, “conclud[ing] that [the military judge’s] job
application to the [Department of] Justice [ ] created a disqualifying appearance of partiality[.]”
Id. Specifically, the Circuit identified three primary factors which created an appearance of
impartiality requiring disclosure. See id. at 233–37.
First, the Circuit noted that, because “the Attorney General was a participant in [the] case
from start to finish[,]” id. at 236, “[t]he fact of the [military judge’s] employment application [to
a position under the Department of Justice] alone would [ ] be enough to require his
disqualification[,]” id. at 237, as “it is beyond question that judges may not adjudicate cases
involving their prospective employers[,]” id. at 235. Second, the Circuit opined that the military
judge’s “cho[ice] to emphasize his role as the presiding judge over [the petitioner’s]
commission” in his job application by “boast[ing]” about his role and “even suppl[ying] an order
(. . . continued)
Criminal Law Division, without any additional connection to the plaintiff’s case, did not warrant the ACCA judge’s
recusal.
47
from [the petitioner’s] case as his writing sample” “affirmatively called the [Department of]
Justice[’s] attention to his handling of [the] case, making his performance as presiding judge a
key point in his argument for employment.” Id. at 237. Third and finally, the Circuit noted that
“[a]t no point in the two-plus years after submitting his application did [the military judge]
disclose his efforts to secure [this] employment” and “[i]ndeed, perhaps most remarkably, less
than twenty-four hours after receiving his [ ] start date [for the immigration judge position], [he]
indefinitely abated commission proceedings, musing on the record that ‘over the next week or
two’ he would decide whether ‘it might be time . . . to retire.’” Id. (final alteration in original).
All of these factors, the Circuit reasoned, combined to “cast an intolerable cloud of partiality
over [the military judge’s] subsequent judicial conduct.” Id. Consequently, the Circuit
“grant[ed] [the petitioner’s] petition for writ of mandamus and vacate[d] all orders issued by [the
military judge] on or after” the date that he submitted his application for employment as an
immigration judge. Id. at 241. In this case, the plaintiff argues that
[t]he[] circumstances [in Al-Nashiri]—the reference to Al-Nashiri’s case in [the
judge’s] job application, the inclusion of a pertinent ruling from that case as the
judge’s writing sample, the misleading reference to retirement—all bear a striking
resemblance to the plaintiff’s case and easily meet the [ ] standard for concern
over partiality, and therefore plainly require disqualification, as the Court of
Appeals ordered in Al-Nashiri.
Pl.’s Mem. at 38.
The Court will proceed by first determining the threshold issue of whether the ACCA, in
denying the plaintiff’s writ of error coram nobis based upon his delay in raising the issue of the
military judge’s job application, thoroughly considered the plaintiff’s claims. And, because the
Court concludes that it did not, see infra Section III.B.1, the Court will then evaluate the merits
of the plaintiff’s claim that the military judge improperly failed to disclose a ground for his
disqualification, see infra Section III.B.2. See Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32 (articulating “two steps in
48
applying the ‘full and fair consideration’ standard: (1) a review of the military court’s
thoroughness in examining the relevant claims, at least where thoroughness is contested; and
(2) a close look at the merits of the claim, albeit with some degree of deference and certainly
more than . . . [a] de novo standard”).
1. Whether the ACCA Properly Denied the Plaintiff’s Writ of Error Coram Nobis
Based Upon the Plaintiff’s Delay in Seeking Such Relief
The Court must first determine whether the ACCA properly denied the plaintiff’s writ of
error coram nobis based upon his delay in raising the issue of the military judge’s job
application. “The writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed ‘to correct
errors of fact[,]’” United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 910 (2009) (quoting United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954)), and “enabl[e a] court[,] where the action was commenced
and where the judgment was rendered[,] to avoid the rigid strictures of judgment finality by
correcting technical errors[,]” id. at 910–11 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the
doctrine of coram nobis has been extended to “redress a fundamental error, . . . as opposed to
mere technical errors.” Id. at 911; see id. at 917 (holding that “Article I military courts have
jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of
conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect”). “Continuation of litigation after final
judgment and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be allowed through
this extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”
Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511. The Supreme Court has established the following threshold criteria for
coram nobis review:
(1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no remedy other
than coram nobis is available to rectify the consequences of the error; (3) valid
reasons exist for not seeking relief earlier; (4) the new information presented in
the petition could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence prior to the original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek to reevaluate
49
previously considered evidence or legal issues; and (6) the sentence has been
served, but the consequences of the erroneous conviction persist.
Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512–13).
Because the ACCA denied the plaintiff’s coram nobis petition based solely on the finding that he
“ha[d] not met the third threshold requirement[,]” Bergdahl IV, 2020 WL 7316058, at *3, the
Court will consider whether the ACCA “thorough[ly] [ ] examin[ed] the [plaintiff’s] claims[,]”
Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32, by analyzing the ACCA’s dispositive conclusion regarding that
criterion—i.e., whether the ACCA properly found that the plaintiff failed to establish “valid
reasons [ ] for not seeking relief earlier[,]” Denedo, 66 M.J. at 126.
Recognizing that “[i]n American jurisprudence the precise contours of coram nobis
[review] have not been well defined,” Denedo, 556 U.S. at 910 (internal quotation marks
omitted), and that “the D.C. Circuit’s precedent in this area is thin[,]” United States v. Williams,
630 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2009), the Court concludes that the plaintiff has established
“valid reasons [ ] for not seeking relief earlier[,]” Denedo, 66 M.J. at 126. The Supreme Court
has held that a coram nobis petition should be granted where, in addition to the other criteria,
“sound reasons exist[] for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief[.]” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512.
And, while courts in this Circuit have not articulated a bright-line definition of “sound” or
“valid” reasons, see Williams, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 32, “[c]ourts generally deny coram
nobis petitions when ‘none of the material facts or applicable laws have changed since [the
petitioner]’s conviction[,]’” United States v. Pole, No. 09-cr-354 (EGS), 2021 WL 5796518,
at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (quoting United States v. Lee, 84 F. Supp. 3d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2015)), or
where the information relevant to the petitioner’s challenge was in his or her possession, or
otherwise known to him or her, at the time of conviction, see id. (finding that the petitioner failed
to show valid reasons for not seeking relief earlier where “his claim derive[d] from materials the
50
defendant himself produced to the government through counsel” and “he and his appellate
counsel had everything they needed in order to raise the claim on direct appeal” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, as a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that the plaintiff had no actual knowledge
or possession of the military judge’s job application during his court-martial proceedings, see
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 132 (stating that the plaintiff “obtained a copy of the military judge’s application
from the [Department of] Justice [ ] on September 15, 2020”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 132;
see also Pl.’s Mem., Ex. 33 (Writ-Appeal Petition for Review of U.S. Army Court of Criminal
Appeals Opinion and Action on Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“Writ-Appeal
Petition”)) at 3, ECF No. 17-17 (stating that the military judge’s employment application was
“obtained under [the Freedom of Information Act (‘]FOIA[’)]”), and therefore, “material facts
. . . have changed since his conviction[,]” Pole, 2021 WL 5796518, at *9. The defendant argues
that the plaintiff reasonably should have known about the fact of the military judge’s application
and the potential legal import of that application either when “[t]he military judge’s employment
as an immigration judge became public on September 28, 2018[,]” or when the Al-Nashiri
opinion—upon which the plaintiff heavily relies—was issued on April 16, 2019. Def.’s Mem. at
21. However, the Court finds it unreasonable to impose a duty upon the plaintiff to not only
monitor the employment status of a judge after the conclusion of proceedings before that judge,
but also to file a baseless FOIA request to obtain the judge’s employment application that would
call into question the judge’s impartiality, based upon the mere theoretical possibility that he
might have applied for such employment while presiding over the plaintiff’s case, absent any
51
reason to surmise that the possibility existed. 14 This is especially true where, as here, the
ultimate duty in situations of potential judicial disqualification is imposed on the judge, see Al-
Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 234 (noting that various “rules governing judicial conduct[,]” including the
Rules for Courts-Martial, “all speak with one clear voice when it comes to judicial recusal:
judges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)), and
the military judge here not only failed to disclose potential grounds for disqualification but also
affirmatively misled the parties, see Pl.’s Mem. at 43 (quoting the military judge as stating, “I’m
what’s referred to as a terminal Colonel, which means I’m not going anywhere but the retirement
pastures . . . [a]nd that’s in almost a year from now” (quoting Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at
1724:3–5)); see also supra Section I.B.2.ii. 15
14
To the extent that the defendant intends to argue that the appropriate standard to apply in this context requires the
plaintiff to have exercised reasonable diligence, or imposes inquiry notice as to the newly-discovered material facts,
see Def.’s Mem. at 36–37, the Court notes that while at least one other federal Circuit has affirmed a denial of a
coram nobis petition based upon the conclusion that the petitioner “should have known” of the facts underlying his
challenge, see Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1996), the Court has been unable to locate any
precedent in this Circuit imposing this sort of duty on a petitioner in this context. However, even if the Court were
to impose this duty on the plaintiff, it would still conclude that requiring the plaintiff in this case to have discovered
the military judge’s employment application prior to the CAAF’s judgment would go beyond any “reasonable
diligence” expectation under the circumstances. Cf. Momenian v. Davidson, 878 F.3d 381, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(noting in the context of a legal malpractice case that “[i]nquiry notice extends to that knowledge which a plaintiff
would have possessed after due investigation as measured by an objective standard of reasonable diligence under the
circumstances” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). The Court would reach this conclusion, because
it finds that it would be unreasonable to demand that a party pursue information he or she has no reason to suspect
exists.
15
The defendant argues that the plaintiff “errs in his characterization of the military judge’s comments, which are
reasonably understood to be answering a question regarding his plans within the military,” Def.’s Reply at 22
(emphasis added), i.e., that he planned to retire from the military, not from all employment. However, the military
judge’s references to “not going anywhere but the retirement pastures[,]” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1724:4,
and not “expect[ing] to go anywhere but back home as soon as the Army is done with [him,]” id., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.)
at 1724:15–16, do not unambiguously support the defendant’s interpretation. While one could infer from the
entirety of the military judge’s comments that he only intended to retire from the military, see supra Section I.B.2.ii,
the Court concludes that a reasonable person would have just as likely construed the military judge’s statements on
their face as indicating an intention to retire from employment totally, which is misleading given the submission of
his job application to become an immigration judge seven days prior to the date when these statements were made,
see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119 (“On October 16, 2017, the military judge applied to the [Department of] Justice [ ] to be an
(continued . . .)
52
In other words, based upon the military judge’s representations during the court-martial
proceedings, as well as his failure to disclose his job application, the plaintiff had no reason to
know or even suspect that the military judge was applying for a job within the executive branch
and that his impartiality could therefore be in question, considering the executive branch’s
involvement in this case. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that even though there
was “a known appellate issue as to the job application submitted by the judge in Al-Nashiri[,]”
Pl.’s Mem. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted), after the issuance of that opinion, “there was
no such issue as to the military judge in this case[,]” id. (emphasis omitted and added), until the
plaintiff received, and could review the contents of, the military judge’s employment application.
That is, even if the Court could expect the plaintiff to be aware of the press release issued on
September 28, 2018, announcing the military judge’s appointment as an immigration judge, see
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 129; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 129, mere notice of his appointment would not
have informed the plaintiff of either (1) the military judge’s submission of his application during
the pendency of the court-martial proceedings; (2) the misleading nature of the military judge’s
comments regarding his retirement, in light of the timing of the submission of his application; or
(3) the military judge’s submission of an order denying the plaintiff’s unlawful command
influence motion as the writing sample submitted with his employment application, see Pl.’s
Mem., Ex. 33 (Writ-Appeal Petition) at 52–67 (consisting of the military judge’s application),
three facts which are extremely important in applying the rulings in Al-Nashiri to the plaintiff’s
case, see Pl.’s Mem. at 37–38 (noting these factual similarities between the two cases). 16
(. . . continued)
immigration judge.”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1717 (indicating that the
military judge’s statements regarding retirement were made on October 23, 2017).
16
Furthermore, to the extent the defendant argues that the publication of the Al-Nashiri opinion triggered an
obligation on the plaintiff’s part to seek out the military judge’s employment application, see Def.’s Mem. at 36–37,
(continued . . .)
53
In its decision denying the plaintiff’s coram nobis petition, the ACCA relied heavily upon
United States v. Kates, Misc. Dkt. No. 2014-05, ACM S32018, 2014 CCA LEXIS 360 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. June 17, 2014), which involved a petitioner’s challenge to an appeal affirming his
court-martial conviction based upon the participation of an appellate military judge who was
later found to have been improperly appointed to his position, see id. at *1–3. See Bergdahl IV,
2020 WL 7316058, at *3–4 (comparing the plaintiff’s case to the facts in Kates). However, this
case is distinguishable from Kates, and accordingly warrants a different result.
The factual predicate for the petitioner’s challenge in Kates—i.e., the appointment of a
military appellate judge who then participated in deciding the petitioner’s appeal—was a known
fact throughout the petitioner’s appellate proceedings. See Kates, 2014 CCA LEXIS 360, at *2
(stating that the military appellate judge “took part in the decision” “that found no basis for relief
in the appellant’s assigned errors” and that the petitioner “did not raise the issue of [the military
appellate judge’s] participation” in his subsequent appeal). Moreover, the court in that case
noted that the validity of the specific military appellate judge’s appointment had been “very
much at issue in appellate litigation” throughout the petitioner’s subsequent appeal. Id. at *7.
Conversely, the plaintiff in this case had no knowledge of the factual predicate for his
challenge—i.e., the submission and content of the military judge’s job application—until he
(. . . continued)
the Court re-emphasizes that the military judge in the plaintiff’s case affirmatively misled the plaintiff regarding his
intentions to retire, see supra note 14, and the press release announcing the military judge’s appointment as an
immigration judge provided the plaintiff with no knowledge regarding the timing of the submission of his
application, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 129 (“On September 28, 2018, the [Department of] Justice [ ] issued a press release that
stated in part, ‘Attorney General Jeff Sessions appointed [the military judge] to begin hearing cases in October
2018.’” (third alteration in original)); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 129. Thus, even after the issuance of the Circuit’s
opinion in Al-Nashiri, the plaintiff was not on notice that the rulings in that opinion would apply to his case. And, to
the extent the defendant argues that the plaintiff must have been aware of the military judge’s employment
application given that the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request soon after the issuance of the Al-Nashiri opinion, see
Def.’s Reply at 22, the Court declines to speculate regarding the plaintiff’s potential subjective suspicions at the time
prior to obtaining the military judge’s employment application where, from an objective standpoint, the plaintiff was
not on notice of the submission of the application during his court-martial proceedings.
54
received the application after the CAAF’s final ruling in his case. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 132; Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 132. Furthermore, there was no other pending litigation or controversy
pertaining specifically to the military judge in his case that would have alerted the plaintiff of
potential grounds for his disqualification. See generally Pl.’s Facts; Def’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts;
Pl.’s Mem.; Def.’s Mem. Accordingly, the Court finds the ACCA’s invocation of the ruling in
Kates unpersuasive in determining whether the plaintiff has established “sound reasons [ ] for
[his] failure to seek appropriate earlier relief.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that because the plaintiff did not
“ha[ve] everything [he] needed in order to raise th[is] claim on direct appeal[,]” Pole,
2021 WL 5796518, at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted), he has established “sound reasons
[ ] for [his] failure to seek appropriate earlier relief[,]” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512. Therefore,
having concluded that the ACCA improperly denied the plaintiff’s coram nobis petition, the
Court must proceed by taking “a close look at the merits” of this claim. Sanford, 586 F.3d at 32.
2. Whether the Military Judge Improperly Failed to Disclose a Basis for His
Disqualification
The Court must next evaluate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that the military judge
improperly failed to disclose a basis for his disqualification. The plaintiff argues that “[t]he
military judge’s job application gave him an impermissible pecuniary interest [that] he had a
duty to disclose[,]” Pl.’s Mem. at 34, and,
[b]y failing to disclose his job application while claiming that he was impervious
to [unlawful command influence] because he was retiring, the military judge
deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to conduct midstream voir dire . . . , to
move for recusal, and to decide whether to elect [a] bench trial before whichever
judge was assigned to the case in his place[,]
55
id. at 42. In support of his position, the plaintiff relies heavily on the Circuit’s decision in Al-
Nashiri and analogizes the facts of that case to his case. See id. at 37–40. In response, the
defendant argues first that “Al-Nashiri is inapposite here[,]” Def.’s Mem. at 39, and “[the
p]laintiff [e]rrs in [a]nalogizing [this case] to Al-Nashiri[,]” id., and second, that “[n]either the
military judge’s employment application, nor his conduct of the trial, nor the outcome in this
case supplies any reason to question his impartiality[,]” id. at 41.
“Unbiased, impartial adjudicators are the cornerstone of any system of justice worthy of
the label.” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 233–34. “And because ‘[d]eference to the judgments and
rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges,’
jurists must avoid even the appearance of partiality.” Id. at 234 (quoting United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). In other words, “to perform its high function in the best way[,] justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,
486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Violation of a statute or rule regarding judicial disqualification is
generally established where “a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that
a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality,
notwithstanding a finding that the judge was not actually conscious of those circumstances.”
Id. at 850. And, this standard applies equally to military judges subject to the Rules for Military
Commissions. See Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 234 (“Like the judicial recusal statute they mirror, the
Rules for Military Commissions focus not on whether a military judge harbored actual bias, but
rather on what ‘would appear to a reasonable person . . . knowing all the circumstances.’”
(quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860–61) (alteration in original)). Thus, “[s]uch a stringent rule
56
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to
weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136(emphasis added).
Furthermore, while “[t]he Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications[,]” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986), more
specific statutes and rules governing judicial conduct “provide more protection than due process
requires,” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009). In this case, the Rules
for Courts-Martial provide these more specific requirements governing the conduct of military
judges. See Def.’s Mem. at 38; Pl.’s Mem. at 35–36. Specifically, Rule 902 requires that “a
military judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which that military judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” R.C.M. 902(a). Furthermore, “[a] military judge
shall also disqualify himself or herself . . . [w]here the military judge . . . [knows he or she] ha[s]
an interest, financial or otherwise, that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding[.]” R.C.M. 902(b)(5)(B).
Here, the Court concludes that, “based on the totality of the circumstances, [the military
judge’s] conduct falls squarely on the impermissible side of the line[,]” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d
at 235, with respect to the appearance of judicial partiality. Specifically, the combination of the
three following undisputed facts in this case supports the conclusion that “a reasonable person
. . . would expect that . . . [the] judge . . . knew of circumstances creating an appearance of
partiality[,]” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850: (1) the judge’s application for an immigration judge
position with the Department of Justice while the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings were
pending before him, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119, after former
President Trump had made comments directly concerning the plaintiff’s case, see Pl.’s Facts ¶¶
57
90–97, 103; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 90–97, 103, and the plaintiff had moved to dismiss the
case partially on the former President’s comments, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 104; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 104; (2) the judge’s submission with his application of an order denying the plaintiff’s
unlawful command influence motion as his writing sample, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 121; Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 121; and (3) the judge’s statements regarding his intent to retire, see Def.’s Mot.,
Ex. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 1724:3–5, 15–16.
The Court agrees with the plaintiff that these facts “all bear a striking resemblance to” the
facts in Al-Nashiri, Pl.’s Mem. at 38, a case in which the Circuit found that a military judge had
exhibited an appearance of partiality sufficient to require disclosure of a job application during
the course of the petitioner’s trial, see Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 237. See id. (noting that the
military judge applied for a job as an immigration judge during Al-Nashiri’s trial, “emphasize[d]
his role as the presiding judge . . . [by] suppl[ying] an order from Al-Nashiri’s case as his writing
sample[,]” and “mus[ed] on the record that ‘over the next week or two’ he would decide whether
‘it might be time . . . to retire’”). Nonetheless, despite the similarity of these facts, the defendant
argues that this case is inapposite, see Def.’s Mem. at 39, mainly based upon the high degree of
emphasis the Circuit placed on the Department of Justice’s active involvement in Al-Nashiri’s
case as one of the parties, see Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 235–37. However, while that aspect of the
case was dispositive in Al-Nashiri, see id. at 237 (stating that, due to the Department of Justice’s
involvement in the case, “[t]he fact of [the military judge’s] employment application alone would
[ ] be enough to require his disqualification”), the Court ultimately considered the “totality of the
circumstances[,]” id. at 235, in rendering its decision, including the facts which track closely
with those in this case.
58
Moreover, although the Department of Justice was not one of the parties in the plaintiff’s
court-martial proceedings, this case is unique in that the head of the executive branch during part
of the plaintiff’s court-martial proceedings—former President Trump—and thus the ultimate
authority over the agency that would determine the military judge’s appointment as an
immigration judge, expressed during his candidacy and subsequently ratified after his election
explicit condemnations of the plaintiff, reflecting his “discernible interest in the outcome[,]”
United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 39387, 2021 WL 2390367, at *13 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June
10, 2021), of the plaintiff’s case. 17 See, e.g., Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90 (stating that Trump “repeatedly
vilified the plaintiff, describing him as a traitor at numerous rallies, and suggesting, among other
things, that he be executed”); id. ¶ 92 (“The plaintiff, [ ] Trump further asserted, was ‘the worst,’
‘no good,’ ‘this bum,’ a ‘whack job,’ ‘this piece of garbage,’ a ‘son of a bitch,’ and ‘a very bad
person who killed six people.’”); id. ¶ 94 (“Trump asserted that deserters used to be shot,
implying and at times saying outright that the plaintiff deserved the death penalty.”); id. ¶ 104(stating that, after he was elected president, Trump “ratified [his] disparaging pre-Inauguration
comments about [the plaintiff]”); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 90, 92, 94, 104. See also Def.’s
Mot., Ex. 8 (2d UCI Ruling) ¶ 15 (noting that the military judge “recognizes that this is an
unusual case, perhaps unique in all the annals of military justice” in part because “a man who
17
The defendant cites to two opinions issued by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals to support its proposition
that courts have “declined to extend Al-Nashiri’s holding to court-martial proceedings in which [the Department of
Justice] played no role.” Def.’s Mem. at 40 (citing Wilson, 2021 WL 2390367; United States v. Snyder, No. ACM
39470, 2020 WL 1896341 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020)). However, neither of these cases implicated the
head of the executive branch, and his widely publicized explicit interest in the case via the president’s remarks, in
the way that this case does. See Wilson, 2021 WL 2390367, at *13; Snyder, 2020 WL 1896341, at *20–21. Rather,
both cases involved challenges to a military judge’s application to positions which did not implicate any active
litigants that were before the court in those cases, and neither case involved an individual with supervisory authority
over a hiring official, who had expressed desires concerning the outcome of those cases. See Wilson, 2021 WL
2390367, at *13; Snyder, 2020 WL 1896341, at *21. Therefore, the facts of those cases did not create the same
appearance “that [the judge]’s impartiality was in jeopardy[,]” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 235, which exists in the
plaintiff’s case by virtue of former President Trump’s comments and status as the authority over an ultimate
appointing official for immigration judge positions.
59
eventually became President of the United States and Commander[-]in[-]Chief of all the armed
forces ma[de] conclusive and disparaging comments . . . about a soldier facing potential
court-martial” and that “[t]he Court recognizes the problematic potential created by these facts”);
Bergdahl II, 80 M.J. at 245 (Stucky, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This case is
unique in modern American military jurisprudence. Let us hope that we shall not see its like
again.”). Thus, former President Trump—and, arguably, the executive branch by extension—
had explicitly stated an interest in a particular outcome in the plaintiff’s case, i.e., that the
plaintiff would be convicted and receive the death penalty. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94; Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Facts ¶ 94. Furthermore, Trump’s statements formed the basis for the plaintiff’s second and
third motions to dismiss based upon unlawful command influence. See Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 100, 104;
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 100, 104. Therefore, even though the Department of Justice was
not directly involved in the plaintiff’s case as a party, Trump’s statements were integral to the
potential success of the plaintiff’s defense, see Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 100, 104 (indicating that former
President Trump’s remarks formed the basis for two of the plaintiff’s motions to dismiss); Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 100, 104, and specifically referenced the former president’s desire that the
plaintiff be convicted and how he should be punished, see, e.g., Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 90, 94, 103; Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 90, 94, 103. Thus, the Court concludes that, based upon the military
judge’s job application to an executive branch position—a situation in which he might
reasonably be expected to appeal to the president’s expressed interest in the plaintiff’s conviction
and punishment—“it would appear to a reasonable person[,]” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860,
“knowing all the circumstances,” id. at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted), “that [the
judge]’s impartiality was in jeopardy[,]” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 235.
60
Having concluded that this case presents a unique situation where the military judge
might be inclined to appeal to the president’s expressed interest in the plaintiff’s conviction and
punishment when applying for the immigration judge position, or at least that being the
perception a reasonable member of the public would have, the Court concludes that the other
circumstances of this case further “undermine [the judge’s] apparent neutrality[,]” id. at 237.
Namely, the military judge in this case submitted a writing sample along with his application,
consisting of an order in which he denied the plaintiff’s unlawful-command-influence motion
which was based upon former President Trump’s statements, and ruled against the plaintiff—
both actions that a reasonable person might view as serving the president’s interests in the case
and thus, “creating the appearance of impropriety[,]” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 858. See Al-Nashiri,
921 F.3d at 237 (concluding that, by “cho[o]s[ing] to emphasize his role as the presiding judge
over Al-Nashiri’s commission” and “suppl[ying] an order from Al-Nashiri’s case as his writing
sample[,]” the judge “affirmatively called the [Department of] Justice[’s] [ ] attention to his
handling of Al-Nashiri’s case, making his performance as presiding judge a key point in his
argument for employment”). Finally, the military judge’s decision not to disclose his application
for the immigration judge position, coupled with his misleading affirmative statements regarding
his impending retirement, see supra note 14, also could lead “a reasonable observer [ ] [to]
wonder whether the judge had done something worth concealing[,]” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 237.
The Court therefore concludes, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that “a
reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that [the military judge in this case]
knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality[,]” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850, and
because, “in [this] proceeding[,] . . . [ ] th[e] military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned[,]” R.C.M. 902(a), he should have disclosed his job application as a potential ground
61
for his disqualification. In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not mean to opine that there
was actual bias in this case or that the military judge’s “orders were [not] the product of his
considered and unbiased judgment, unmotivated by any improper considerations.” Al-Nashiri,
921 F.3d at 237. Rather, the facts of this case present an appearance of partiality and, while
“[a]ppearance may be all there is, [ ] that is enough[.]” Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 115.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it must deny the defendant’s motion and grant the
plaintiff’s motion as to Count II of the plaintiff’s Complaint. Furthermore, the Court will vacate
all orders and rulings issued by the military judge who presided over the plaintiff’s court-martial
as of October 16, 2017, and thereafter—which was the date when that military judge submitted
his employment application for an immigration judge position, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119; Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 119—and “further vacate all decisions issued by [the appellate military
courts] reviewing such orders [and rulings].” Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d at 241 (vacating all orders
issued by the military judge after the submission of his job application which the D.C. Circuit
concluded should have been disclosed). Consequently, the judgment of the military judge
regarding the plaintiff’s court-martial is rendered void. See Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 746–47
(“Collateral attack seeks, as a necessary incident to relief otherwise within the [C]ourt’s power to
grant, a declaration that the judgment is void.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant in part and
deny in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and grant in part and deny in part the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment.
62
SO ORDERED this 25th day of July, 2023. 18
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
18
The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
63