Malinski v. BNSF Railway Company

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 9, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
TYLER D. MALINSKI,
Plaintiff Counter Defendant -
Appellant,
and
PAULA SMITH,
Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-5001
(D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00502-JED-FHM)
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant Counterclaimant -
Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Tyler Malinski and Paula Smith appeal the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). For the reasons explained
below, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
On December 4, 2014, 1 a train owned and operated by BNSF struck Malinski’s
pickup truck as he drove through a railroad grade crossing near Afton, Oklahoma.
The crossing is passive: signs mark the crossing, but there is no physical barrier to
prevent a vehicle from driving across. It is undisputed that the train was traveling at
55 miles per hour at the time of the accident and that it sounded its horn for
approximately 15 seconds prior to the accident. A video captured by a recording
device on the locomotive at the front of the train shows that as the train approached
the crossing, a pickup truck driven by Malinski’s cousin crossed the tracks in front of
Malinski. Malinski, who was headed to the same destination as his cousin, followed
him through the crossing without stopping. As Malinski did so, the train struck his
truck. The collision injured Malinski and his passenger, Nathan Smith, who later died
from his injuries.
Malinski sued BNSF, 2 claiming that it acted negligently in maintaining the
crossing and that this negligence proximately caused Malinski’s injuries. BNSF twice
moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Malinski was negligent per se
because (1) he violated Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 11-701(A)(3) by failing to stop at the
crossing after the train emitted a signal audible from approximately 1500 feet away
1
Although parts of the record indicate that the accident occurred on December
5, 2014, the district court order stated it occurred on December 4, 2014, and on
appeal the parties do not dispute this latter date.
2
Paula Smith, Nathan Smith’s mother, later intervened; she and Malinski
submitted joint briefing on appeal. Throughout this opinion, we refer to Paula Smith
as “Smith” and use Nathan Smith’s full name where necessary.
2
from the crossing and (2) this statutory violation caused the collision. In support of
its second motion for summary judgment, BNSF provided evidence of the horn test
that it conducted ten days after the collision. The testing demonstrated that when
measured 100 feet in front of the locomotive, the horn’s volume was 100.5 decibels.
BNSF also noted that its signal was compliant with the decibel range required by the
Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) regulations for locomotive horns and
argued that the regulations were developed to ensure the horn’s audibility within a
quarter-mile, or 1320-foot, range. BNSF also provided testimony from a local
resident who can hear the train’s horn from his home, which is located more than
1500 feet from the crossing.
The district court granted BNSF’s second motion for summary judgment. 3 It
found that BNSF’s horn test, the rationale for the FRA’s horn regulations, and the
local resident’s testimony all demonstrated that the signal was audible from
approximately 1500 feet away from the crossing. Based on this audibility finding, the
district court concluded that Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3). The district court then
ruled that Malinski’s statutory violation proximately caused the collision.
Accordingly, it determined that Malinski was negligent per se and granted summary
judgment to BNSF. Malinski and Smith now appeal.
3
In its first motion for summary judgment, BNSF neither explained the
significance of the horn testing nor included the local resident’s testimony. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that “[w]hile BNSF may, at most, have
demonstrated that the train emitted an audible signal from one-hundred feet away,
there is no evidence to show that the signal was audible from approximately 1,500
feet away, as required by the statute.” App. vol. 1, 234.
3
Analysis
We review de novo a ruling on summary judgment, “applying the same
standard as the district court.” Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1180 (10th
Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if, under the governing law,
it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is
‘genuine’ if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the
evidence presented.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.
2000)).
Here, BNSF is the movant and thus bears the “initial burden of making a prima
facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Savant
Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian
Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2007)). If BNSF meets this
initial burden, the burden then shifts to nonmovants Malinski and Smith to “set forth
specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for” them. Id. (quoting
Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309). In evaluating the record, we make all
“reasonable inferences . . . in the light most favorable to” nonmovants Malinski and
Smith. Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995).
The district court granted BNSF’s second motion for summary judgment
because it found Malinski negligent per se. Under Oklahoma law, a statutory
violation amounts to negligence per se when “(1) the violation of a statute . . . caused
4
the injury, (2) the harm sustained [is] of the type intended to be prevented by the
statute[,] and (3) ‘the injured party [is] one of the class intended to be protected by
the statute.’” Nye v. BNSF Ry. Co., 428 P.3d 863, 873 (Okla. 2018) (quoting Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 510 (Okla. 1991)), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1600
(2019). Because the parties do not dispute that the second and third elements are
satisfied here, this case turns solely on the first element. The district court found this
first element satisfied, ruling both that Malinski violated the statute and that the
violation caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. Malinski and Smith
challenge both rulings on appeal.
Thus, applying the summary-judgment standard and the negligence-per-se test,
we must determine if BNSF “ma[de] a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a
genuine” factual dispute regarding (1) whether Malinski violated the statute and, if he
did, (2) whether that statutory violation caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan
Smith’s death. Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Libertarian Party of
N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309); see also Nye, 428 P.3d at 873. If we find that BNSF has
made such a demonstration, we must then determine whether Malinski and Smith “set
forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find” either that Malinski
did not violate the statute or that the violation did not cause Malinski’s injuries and
5
Nathan Smith’s death. Id. at 1137 (quoting Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d
at 1309).
I. Statutory Violation
We first consider whether the evidence BNSF presented makes a prima facie
demonstration that Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3) and, if so, whether Malinski and
Smith set forth sufficient evidence to place that demonstration in dispute. Section 11-
701(A)(3) requires a driver at a “railroad grade crossing” to stop in the presence of
certain visual or auditory signals indicating that a train is crossing or approaching. 4
When considering whether such a signal is present, Oklahoma courts apply an
“objective test” and ask whether a “reasonably prudent person, situated as was the
4
In full, § 11-701(A) provides:
A. Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a
railroad grade crossing under any of the circumstances
stated in this section, the driver of such vehicle shall stop
within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from
the nearest rail of such railroad, and shall not proceed until
he can do so safely. The foregoing requirements shall
apply when:
1. A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device
gives warning of the immediate approach of a railroad
train;
2. A crossing gate is lowered or when a human flagman
gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or
passage of a railroad train;
3. A railroad train approaching within approximately one
thousand five (1,500) hundred feet of the highway crossing
emits a signal audible from such distance and such railroad
train, by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing, is
an immediate hazard;
4. An approaching railroad train is plainly visible and is in
hazardous proximity to such crossing; or
5. The tracks at the crossing are not clear.
6
motorist and exercising ordinary care for his own safety, should have” perceived the
signal. Nye, 428 P.3d at 874–75 (second quoting Ross v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 528 F. App’x 960, 963 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)).
As relevant here, § 11-701(A)(3) requires drivers to stop if “[a] railroad train
approaching within approximately [1500] feet of the highway crossing emits a signal
audible from such distance and such railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness
to such crossing, is an immediate hazard.” Accordingly, when Malinski failed to stop
at the crossing, he violated the statute if a “reasonably prudent” driver in Malinski’s
position should have heard the signal from approximately 1500 feet. 5 Nye, 428 P.3d
at 874 (quoting Ross, 528 F. App’x at 963). Thus, to meet its prima facie burden of
demonstrating that Malinski violated the statute, BNSF must show two things:
(1) sufficient distance, i.e., that the train signal sounded approximately 1500 feet
5
Although the statute creates a duty to stop if a “train approaching within
approximately [1500] feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such
distance,” § 11-701(A)(3) (emphasis added), the district court interpreted this to
mean that the statutory duty to stop is triggered if “the train’s horn was audible at
approximately 1,500 feet,” App. vol. 4, 893 (emphasis added); see also Turnbull v.
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., No. CIV-90-1432-R, 1991 WL 544257, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
10, 1991) (unpublished) (noting that to establish violation of § 11-701(A)(3), “a
signal must be audible from 1,500 feet from the crossing”), aff’d sub nom. Robinson
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994). And the parties do not dispute
this interpretation on appeal. Further, this interpretation accords with jury
instructions based on § 11-701(A)(3) that the Oklahoma Supreme Court found
“adequate.” Myers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 P.3d 1014, 1031 (Okla. 2002) (approving
instruction providing that “a motorist is required to stop at a railroad crossing . . .
if . . . the train emits a signal audible from approximately 1,500 feet from the
crossing”). Thus, we assume that the signal must be audible at, and not merely
within, approximately 1500 feet from the crossing in order to trigger a driver’s duty
to stop under § 11-701(A)(3).
7
away from the crossing, and (2) audibility, i.e., that the signal sounded loudly enough
that a reasonably prudent person at the crossing should have heard it.
As to sufficient distance, the parties do not dispute that the video shows the
horn sounded for 15 seconds before the collision. Because the train was moving at 55
miles per hour, we can deduce that this signal began sounding approximately 1210
feet before the crossing. 6 And a signal audible from as close as only 1100 feet
triggers a driver’s duty to stop under § 11-701(A)(3). Henning v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding it “flies in the face of the
plain language of the statute” to argue that driver did not violate § 11-701(A)(3)
because train emitted signal 1100 feet and not 1500 feet from crossing because
statute requires audibility from only “approximately” 1500 feet). Thus, BNSF has
established that the signal began sounding approximately 1500 feet from the
crossing.
As to audibility, the horn test demonstrates that the signal was audible from
that distance. 7 Ten days after the collision, BNSF tested the horn and found that, as
6
The district court reached this same conclusion, and our calculations support
it. Converting 55 miles per hour to feet per second, a train traveling at this speed is
traveling at 4840 feet per minute and thus travels 1210 feet in 15 seconds.
7
In addition to the facts discussed here, BNSF presented testimony from a
nearby resident who could hear the train from his house, which is located more than
1500 feet from the crossing. The district court relied in part on this testimony in
determining that BNSF met its prima facie burden. Malinski and Smith argue that this
reliance subverts the reasonably-prudent-driver standard because the testimony
merely demonstrates that a local resident sometimes hears the signal from over 1500
feet away from the crossing—not that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s
position should have heard the signal on the day of the accident. But unlike the
district court, we do not find the resident’s testimony useful or necessary and thus do
8
measured at 100 feet in front of the locomotive, the horn’s volume was 100.5
decibels. This volume is within the 96- to 110-decibel range (as measured at 100 feet
in front of the locomotive) required by FRA regulations, which were designed to
provide for audibility from 1320 feet. See 49 C.F.R. § 229.129(a); Use of Locomotive
Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,586, 70,610, 70,627 (Dec.
18, 2003). Specifically, during the rulemaking process, the FRA sought to “establish
and quantify . . . the level of sound that needs to be delivered to be detectable.” Use
of Locomotive Horns, 68 Fed. Reg. at 70,610. In doing so, it determined that when a
horn sounds at a volume of 100 decibels (measured from 100 feet away), that volume
“will have diminished to roughly 75 [decibels] at one-quarter mile[, or 1320 feet,] in
front of the locomotive,” which is “near the outer margin of utility in terms of
alerting the motorist to oncoming trains at that crossing.” Id. at 70,627 (emphasis
added). But because such a horn signal sounding from 1320 feet away is near the
outer margin of utility for warning motorists at this distance, it is within the margin
of utility. And for a signal to be of any utility at all, it must be audible. See id. at
70,602 (determining that “[s]ounding the horn [within the required decibel range]
over a distance greater than one-quarter mile would add no value, since the loss of
volume . . . would almost certainly prevent any effective warning”). Thus, per the
rulemaking history, a 100.5-decibel signal (measured from 100 feet away) is audible
not rely on it. Because, as explained below, we find that BNSF meets its prima facie
burden even without the resident’s testimony, we need not determine whether the
district court erred in relying on this testimony.
9
from at least a quarter mile away. And a signal audible from a quarter mile away
triggers a driver’s duty to stop under § 11-701(A)(3). See Henning, 530 F.3d at 1221.
Malinski and Smith do not dispute the results of the horn test. But they do
dispute the relevance of the horn test in combination with the FRA decibel-range
regulations. They first argue that the regulations are not relevant because they
regulate trains rather than drivers. But the significance of the regulations is not
BNSF’s compliance with them; it is that the rulemaking history demonstrates that a
horn sounding at 100 decibels (measured from 100 feet away) is evidence of
audibility from approximately 1500 feet.
Next, Malinski and Smith argue that a study underlying the decibel-range
regulations is unrepresentative. In particular, they fault the study because in
analyzing the safety of crossings, it did not consider whether “railway companies
failed to maintain the crossing in a reasonably safe manner,” as they alleged BNSF
did. Aplt. Br. 27. But the maintenance of the crossing is irrelevant to the conclusion
we draw from the FRA’s regulations and rulemaking history: that a 100.5-decibel
signal is audible from at least quarter mile, or 1320 feet. 68 Fed. Reg. 70,586, 70,627.
Thus, like the district court, we find that BNSF’s compliance with the FRA decibel-
range requirements provides evidence of audibility in this case. And Malinski and
Smith’s arguments to the contrary fail to undermine that conclusion. 8
8
Malinski and Smith also argue that the signal was tested “in a train yard,
while it was immobile, and during different weather conditions” than those on the
day of the collision. Aplt. Br. 29. They contend that these differences make the
testing unreliable evidence of what occurred on the day of the accident. But they
10
Taking the video and testing evidence together, then, the BNSF train signaled
at 100.5 decibels (as measured from 100 feet) when it was approximately 1500 feet
away from the crossing where it struck Malinski and Nathan Smith. See Henning, 530
F.3d at 1221. And because such a signal is audible from that distance, the BNSF
signal was audible from approximately 1500 feet at the crossing where the train
struck Malinski and Smith. See id.; Use of Locomotive Horns, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 70,627.
We therefore conclude that BNSF meets its initial burden to make a prima
facie demonstration that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position should
have heard the signal when the train was approximately 1500 feet away from the
crossing. See Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137. The burden now shifts to
Malinski and Smith, who must “identify specific facts that show the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484.
In attempting to do so, Malinski and Smith first argue that they raised a
genuine issue of material fact when Malinski testified that he could not hear the
signal. They contend that the district court misapplied the reasonably-prudent-driver
standard when finding otherwise. In doing so, they maintain that when a driver
“claims an inability to detect an approaching train—a jury, not the courts—must
decide” the issue of audibility. Aplt. Br. 16. But this is a subjective analysis: it asks
make this attack on BNSF’s testing for the first time on appeal and do not argue for
plain-error review. We therefore decline to consider this waived argument. See
Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011).
11
whether Malinski actually heard the signal, not whether a reasonably prudent driver
in Malinski’s situation should have heard it. See Nye, 428 P.3d at 875 (explaining
that “an objective test is consistent with [the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s] long-
standing jurisprudence”). Even Ross, which Malinski and Smith rely on for this point,
frames the inquiry as “whether the train emitted a signal that would have been
audible to a reasonably prudent driver in [the driver’s] position at the crossing.” 528
F. App’x at 966 (emphasis added).
To be sure, Malinski and Smith cite cases that consider witness testimony as a
relevant factor when denying summary judgment in § 11-701(A) cases. In those
cases, however, either additional evidence corroborated the witness testimony or the
railroad had not made a prima facie demonstration that a § 11-703(A) visual or
audible signal was present. See, e.g., id. (denying summary judgment when multiple
witnesses, including crewmembers on train, did not recall hearing train’s signal and
expert opined that driver’s vehicle would have been “significant acoustical barrier” to
hearing signal (quoting App. 328)); Cornwell v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 08-CV-638-
JHP, 2010 WL 3521668, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished) (denying
summary judgment because railroad had not established whether driver was “given
notice of the train’s approach by way of the sounding of the horn/whistle”). Thus,
Malinski’s testimony does not raise a factual dispute.
Next, Malinski and Smith contend that the district court impermissibly drew an
inference in BNSF’s favor by determining that the music playing in Malinski’s truck
was loud. But Malinski and Smith do not explain how this alleged error affects our
12
analysis here. So although we acknowledge the practical possibility that the volume
of music in a vehicle could theoretically impact the audibility analysis (for example,
if a reasonably prudent person would listen to music at a passive railroad crossing at
such a volume as to impact a signal’s audibility), such a possibility is not before us in
this case. See Wilburn v. Mid-S. Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir.
2003) (declining to consider inadequately briefed argument).
Finally, Malinski and Smith argue that the district court ignored the facts that
Malinski was driving on a gravel road as he approached the crossing, that it was
raining at the time of the collision, that he approached the crossing at dusk, and that
the driver who crossed the tracks before Malinski testified that he could not hear the
signal. But as BNSF points out, Malinski and Smith did not argue in the district court
that any of these facts impacted the signal’s audibility, and they do not argue for
plain-error review on appeal. Therefore, any arguments based on these allegedly
ignored facts are waived. See Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127–28; Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 675 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding summary judgment in
part by determining that party waived argument it made on appeal because it did not
“raise and support [the] argument below”).
Thus, we do not find that either Malinski’s testimony or any of Malinski and
Smith’s other arguments “show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact” as
to whether the signal was audible to a reasonably prudent driver. Thomas, 48 F.3d
at 484. Accordingly, Malinski and Smith have not rebutted BNSF’s prima facie
demonstration that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position should have
13
heard the signal from approximately 1500 feet, triggering Malinski’s duty to stop
under § 11-701(A)(3). 9 And because Malinski did not stop, he violated § 11-
701(A)(3). Nye, 428 P.3d at 873.
II. Causation
Even though Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3), this statutory violation gives
rise to negligence per se only if the violation proximately caused the collision that led
to his injuries and to Nathan Smith’s death. See id. Proximate cause is the “cause
[that] sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury.” Akin v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 977 P.2d 1040, 1054 (Okla. 1998). Here, BNSF can prevail on
summary judgment only if it makes a prima facie demonstration that Malinski’s
failure to stop in the presence of an audible signal “set[] in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to” his injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. Id.
The video shows that the collision occurred immediately after Malinski failed
to stop, without any intervening events. The video therefore establishes a prima facie
demonstration that Malinski’s § 11-701(A)(3) violation proximately caused the
9
Malinski and Smith argue that a “driver does not solely bear the burden for
preventing accidents”; instead, they contend, a “driver’s duty to stop depends on
whether the railway company first satisfies its duty to maintain its crossing in a
reasonably safe manner.” Aplt. Br. 17, 20. But this argument misunderstands
negligence per se, where the statute defines the duty. Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299
P.3d 463, 467 (Okla. 2013) (“The negligence per se doctrine is employed to
substitute statutory standards for parallel common[-]law, reasonable[-]care duties.”).
Here, a driver has a duty to stop when a signal is audible from approximately 1500
feet. § 11-701(A)(3).
14
collision, which in turn caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. The
burden now shifts to Malinski and Smith to rebut this prima facie demonstration.
In attempting to meet their burden, Malinski and Smith argue that summary
judgment is not appropriate because (1) BNSF’s negligence in maintaining the
crossing proximately caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death and
(2) there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether any negligence on
Malinski’s part, in violating § 11-701(A)(3), supervened that cause. A supervening
cause “is a new, independent[,] and efficient cause of the injury [that] was neither
anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable” and breaks the chain of causation between an
otherwise proximate cause and the injury. Id. at 1054–55. Malinski and Smith argue
that there are fact issues as to (1) whether Malinski’s “inability to hear the train was
independent from BNSF’s negligent maintenance, building, and construct[ion] of the
crossing” and (2) whether Malinski’s decision to cross the tracks without stopping
was “reasonably foreseeable considering BNSF’s negligent conduct.” Aplt. Br. 35
(emphases added). Thus, they reason, summary judgment is not appropriate because
of fact issues as to whether Malinski’s alleged negligence broke the chain of
proximate causation between BNSF’s alleged negligence and the injuries.
This argument fails because, as a matter of law in Oklahoma, a driver’s
violation of § 11-701(A) proximately causes injuries from resulting train collisions.
Akin, 977 P.2d at 1055; Hamilton v. Allen, 852 P.2d 697, 701 (Okla. 1993). This
remains true “even if” the railroad “could have been shown to be [in] breach of its
common-law duty of care.” Akin, 977 P.2d at 1056. In Oklahoma, a driver’s violation
15
of § 11-701(A) “constitutes a supervening act of negligence [that] insulates the
railroad from the legal consequences of its own lack of due care, if any.” Id.; see also
Hamilton, 852 P.2d at 700–01 (explaining that when “it is undisputed that warnings
were given,” the issue of proximate cause “becomes one of law”).
Malinski and Smith argue that Hamilton and Akin are inapposite because the
collisions in those cases occurred at crossings with visual active-warning systems
such as crossing gates. However, they do not explain why or how the proximate-
cause analysis should differ based on whether the crossing was passive or active or
whether the signals were visual or audible. Indeed, § 11-701(A) creates a duty to stop
both in the presence of active visual signals, § 11-701(A)(1)–(2), and in the presence
of an audible signal, § 11-701(A)(3). They also attempt to distinguish these cases
because they involve instances where the driver obviously “broke the law” by, for
example, driving along the center line past two stopped cars and lowered crossing
gates in order to cross the tracks. Rep. Br. 13; see Hamilton, 985 P.2d at 698–99. But
even if Malinski’s failure to stop was not as egregious as that in Hamilton, he
nevertheless violated the statute. Accordingly, Hamilton and Akin’s conclusion that a
§ 11-701(A) violation is the proximate cause for any resulting injuries applies equally
here.
The three cases Malinski and Smith rely on do not say otherwise. First, none
of the cases address the legal rule that a § 11-701(A) violation supervenes any
negligence on the part of a railroad. Next, two of these cases are not negligence-per-
se cases and instead involved situations where it was unclear whether any warning
16
signal was present. See Kan., Okla. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Collins, 251 P.2d 178, 180
(Okla. 1952) (finding proximate cause was jury question when “evidence as to
whether or not the whistle was blown or bell rung when the train approached the
crossing [was] in conflict”); Okla. Union Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 242 P. 176, 178 (Okla.
1925) (denying summary judgment when “the evidence was very conflicting . . . as to
whether or not any signal warning was given”). These two cases are not relevant here
because, as explained above, Malinski and Smith have failed to rebut or call into
question BNSF’s prima facie demonstration that the signal was audible. And thus—
unlike Collins and Lynch—this case must be analyzed as a per-se-negligence case,
where the statutory violation proximately causes the injury as a matter of law.
Finally, in the third case, the court found that a jury must determine whether a police
officer’s negligence in violating a law that required him to use an audible signal
before crossing a highway median proximately caused a multi-car collision. See
Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067, 1072 (Okla. 1995). But in that case, multiple actors
intervened between when the officer crossed the median without an audible signal
and when the collision occurred. Id. at 1070. Here, there are no other actors who may
have supervened Malinski’s negligence, so Jackson, too, is inapposite.
In sum, then, Malinski and Smith fail to rebut or call into question BNSF’s
prima facie demonstration that Malinski’s § 11-701(A)(3) violation proximately
caused the collision that led to his injuries and Nathan Smith’s death.
17
Conclusion
Through the video and horn test, BNSF made a prima facie demonstration that
the train signal, when sounded approximately 1500 feet away from the crossing, was
audible to a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position at the crossing. Because
we find that Malinski and Smith did not provide evidence sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact on this issue, we conclude that Malinski violated
§ 11-701(A). And because under Oklahoma law a driver’s violation of § 11-701(A)
acts as a supervening cause to any negligence on a railroad’s part, we find that
Malinski’s negligence proximately caused the collision that led to Malinski’s injuries
and Nathan Smith’s death. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order ruling that
Malinski was negligent per se and granting summary judgment to BNSF. 10
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
10
BNSF argues in the alternative that the Federal Railroad Safety Act
preempts Malinski and Smith’s state-law claims. Because we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on negligence per se, we do not reach this
argument.
18