United States v. Stefanoff

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 22 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-7044
(D.C. No. 88-CR-33-S)
DAN L. STEFANOFF, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant
_______________________________
STEFANOFF ELECTRIC
CORPORATION, 123 North Birch,
Jenks, OK 74037
Garnishee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , LOGAN , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On November 17, 1988, defendant pleaded guilty to three banking-related
felonies in federal court. 1
Imposition of a sentence on each count was suspended,
and defendant was put on probation for five years and fined $250,000. Defendant
was ordered to pay the fine in five annual installments of $50,000, plus interest,
with the final payment due on or before October 1, 1993. By the end of August
1993, however, defendant had paid only $49,000 of the fine. In early September
1993, the government began using garnishment procedures to collect the
outstanding fine.
In April 1994, after defendant had served his probationary period, he filed a
pleading, entitled “Supplemental Memorandum as Relates to Garnishment Issues
and Whether Defendant Stefanoff is Still Indebted to the United States of
America,” in which he argued that he had no further liability for the fine.
Defendant advanced two alternative claims in his memorandum. First, he
contended that the sentencing court unlawfully imposed a fine of $250,000.
Defendant argued that the court had no authority to impose a fine greater than
$25,000, which defendant had since paid. Alternatively, defendant argued that
even if the $250,000 fine was lawfully imposed, he was discharged from any
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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continuing liability for the fine on November 17, 1993, when his probation ended.
On April 3, 1997, the district court entered an order denying defendant relief.
The court concluded that defendant had been sentenced properly and that the
expiration of his probationary period did not exonerate defendant from liability
for the unpaid fine. Defendant now appeals.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to
hear this appeal. Defendant filed his notice of appeal from the April 1997 order
before the sixty days required in a civil case involving the government under
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), but after the ten days required in a criminal case under
Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). The government argues that this is a criminal case and,
therefore, that the notice of appeal was untimely. Defendant, in turn, argues that
because he raised his claims as a defense to the government’s continuing
garnishment activities, the action is inherently civil.
Although defendant raised his claims in the process of defending against
the government’s collection efforts, his claims did not attack the garnishment
procedures being used by the government. Instead, defendant’s claims attacked
his conviction and sentence. While we might otherwise construe defendant’s
collateral attack as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, we note that he did not assert the claims at issue until after his
probationary period had expired. Therefore, we doubt that defendant met the “in
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custody” requirement of § 2255 at the time he asserted his claims in the district
court. See, e.g. , United States v. Michaud , 901 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding that defendant who had served confinement portion of sentence, but
remained obligated to pay $60,000 fine, was not “in custody” for § 2255
purposes). Nonetheless, a criminal defendant who seeks to collaterally attack his
conviction and sentence, but who is no longer in custody, is not without remedy:
he may file a petition for writ of error coram nobis under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See United States v. Morgan , 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954)
(holding that district court has power to grant writ of error coram nobis
challenging criminal, as opposed to civil, judgment); United States v. Mischler ,
787 F.2d 240, 241 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1986) (approving use of writ of error coram
nobis to challenge restitution order). Therefore, we will construe defendant’s
“supplemental memorandum” as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
We have held that the time for appealing the denial of a writ of error coram
nobis is the same as that for appealing the denial of a § 2255 motion: sixty days.
See United States v. Pinto , 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993). Therefore,
defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed, and we have jurisdiction over the
appeal. We turn then to the merits of defendant’s appeal.
The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available
to a petitioner no longer in custody who seeks to vacate his
conviction in circumstances where the petitioner can demonstrate
that he is suffering civil disabilities as a consequence of the criminal
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convictions and that the challenged error is of sufficient magnitude
to justify the extraordinary relief.
United States v. Castro , 26 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1994) (quotations and citation
omitted). “[T]he burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the asserted error
is jurisdictional or constitutional and results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”
Klein v. United States , 880 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1989).
Defendant first claims that the sentencing court erroneously imposed a fine
greater than $25,000. The district court sentenced defendant under the alternative
fines provisions of the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 (“CFEA”), Pub. L.
No. 98-596, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3134, 3137 (formerly codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3623), which permitted imposition of a fine up to $250,000 for a felony
conviction. Defendant did not appeal his sentence. However, he now argues that
at the time he was sentenced, the alternative fines provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3623
had been repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), Pub. L. No.
98-473, ch. 2, sec. 212(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1987, 1987, which
was enacted on October 12, 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984. Therefore, defendant contends, the court had authority to impose a fine
no greater than $25,000, the aggregate amount of fines provided by each of the
specific criminal offense statutes to which defendant pleaded guilty.
At the outset, we note that defendant could have raised this challenge to his
sentence on direct appeal, but failed to do so. “[C]oram nobis . . . (like habeas
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corpus) cannot be used to reach issues that could have been raised by direct
appeal. . . .” Barnickel v. United States , 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997). In
any event, defendant’s argument is without merit. The CFEA, which was enacted
on October 30, 1984, provided that the alternative fines provisions would apply to
offenses committed after December 31, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-596, sec. 10, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3138. The SRA, as amended by the Sentencing Reform
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, sec.4, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99
Stat.) 1728, 1728, and the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, sec. 2,
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 1266, 1266, applies only to offenses committed
after November 1, 1987. See, e.g. , United States v. Sanchez , 907 F.2d 127, 128
(10th Cir. 1990). Because defendant’s offenses were committed between May
1985 and May 1986, the district court properly sentenced defendant under the
alternative fines provisions of the CFEA.
We turn to defendant’s claim that, if he was properly sentenced under the
CFEA, then by that act’s own terms, his liability for the fine ended upon his
successful completion of probation. Section 12(a)(1)(2) of the CFEA amended
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 concerning probation, by striking out the
following paragraph, which had been added by the SRA: 2
“‘If the court has
imposed and ordered execution of a fine and placed the defendant on probation,
2
See Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 238(b), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2038.
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payment of the fine or adherence to the court-established installment shall be a
condition of the probation.’” Pub. L. No. 98-596, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
3139. Section 12(a)(1)(3) of the CFEA further amended § 3651 by striking out
the last paragraph, which had also been amended by the SRA, 3
and inserting in
lieu thereof the following: “The defendant’s liability for any fine or other
punishment imposed as to which probation is granted, shall be fully discharged by
the fulfillment of the terms and conditions of probation.” Pub. L. No. 98-596,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3139. Based on the amendment contained in CFEA
section 12(a)(3), defendant argues that his successful completion of his
probationary period fully discharged his liability for the fine.
As the district court pointed out, however, section 4 of the CFEA made
further amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Most significantly, section 4 altered the
language in the final paragraph of § 3651 that had been added by CFEA section
12(a)(1)(3), by striking out the words “‘fine or other punishment’” and inserting
in lieu thereof the words “‘punishment (other than a fine).’” 4
Pub. L. No. 98-596,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3136. CFEA section 4 then added the following
language to the final paragraph:
3
See Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 238(c), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2038
4
Thus, the first sentence of the final paragraph of § 3651 would read: “The
defendant’s liability for any punishment (other than a fine) imposed as to which
probation is granted, shall be fully discharged by the fulfillment of the terms and
conditions of probation.”
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“If at the end of the period of probation, the defendant has not
complied with a condition of probation, the court may nevertheless
terminate proceedings against the defendant, but no such termination
shall affect the defendant’s obligation to pay a fine imposed or made
a condition of probation, and such fine shall be collected in the
manner provided in section 3565 of this title.”
Id.
Defendant argues that the amendments to § 3651 made by CFEA sections 4
and 12 created two categories of criminal offenders: those who successfully
complete their probationary period and, therefore, are fully discharged from any
further liability on their fines, pursuant to section 12; and those who do not
comply with all the conditions of their probation and, therefore, are not
discharged from payment of the fine, pursuant to section 4. Defendant claims he
is entitled to the full discharge granted by section 12.
Defendant’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, the amendments to
§ 1365 made by CFEA sections 4 and 12 were not intended to coexist. The
amendments made by section 12 became effective as of October 12, 1984, the day
on which Congress enacted the SRA. See Pub. L. No. 98-596, sec. 12(b),
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3140 (referring to H. J. Res. 648, 98th Cong.,
enacted as Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1837). The
amendments made by CFEA section 4, however, did not become effective until
December 31, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-596, sec. 10, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98
Stat.) 3138. Thus, Congress first reversed some of the changes to § 3651 made by
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the SRA, through CFEA section 12, and then amended the restored version of
§ 3651, through CFEA section 4. Cf. United States v. Atlantic Disposal
Serv.,Inc. , 887 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (3d Cir. 1989) (tracking relationship between
provisions of CFEA and SRA).
Second, defendant’s argument ignores the first change to § 3651 made by
CFEA section 4, which was to provide that a defendant’s fulfillment of the terms
and conditions of probation would discharge his liability for any punishment other
than a fine . A proper reading of the CFEA and SRA reflects that, if a defendant
committed his offense after December 31, 1984, but before November 1, 1987, his
successful completion of probation would not discharge his continuing liability
for any unpaid fine imposed. Therefore, the district court correctly determined
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that defendant was still liable for the full amount of the unpaid fine at issue here.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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