United States v. William Elijah Trailer

Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 1 of 9
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-14583
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00251-WHA-TFM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM ELIJAH TRAILER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(June 30, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 2 of 9
Defendant William Trailer appeals his 18-month sentence and life term of
supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were
part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant argues that
the life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. After careful
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2011, Defendant was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment and a life
term of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of failing to register as
a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. As a special condition of his
supervised release, Defendant was prohibited from having contact with children
under the age of 18.
Defendant’s supervised release commenced in August 2014. Just a few
months later, on February 26, 2015, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition
seeking revocation of his supervised release. The petition stated that Defendant
had violated the conditions of his supervised release by (1) living with his now-
wife’s four minor children, (2) failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions
to have no contact with these children, (3) committing another crime by violating
Alabama’s Community Notification Act, and (4) failing to answer truthfully
inquiries by his probation officer related to whether he was having contact and
residing with the children.
2
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 3 of 9
At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted to the violations set forth in
the petition, and the district court revoked his supervised release. The district court
calculated a guideline range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment based on a Class B
violation and a criminal history category of V. Defendant requested a lenient
sentence because the offense that led to his status as a sex offender had occurred
decades earlier. He explained that he had violated the conditions of his supervised
release out of a desire to do what was right for his wife and her children. He
further asserted that a life term of supervised release was not appropriate given that
he has to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.
Emphasizing that this was not a hearing about the severity of the sex
offender laws, but was instead a hearing for Defendant’s violations of supervised
release, the district court stated that Defendant had ignored the terms of his
supervised release and lied about it to his probation officer. After considering the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Defendant to 18 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release with many of the
same conditions of supervised release as his original sentence. Defendant objected
to the life term of supervised release as excessive, and the district court responded
that it was merely continuing the term of supervised release that was previously
imposed on Defendant.
3
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 4 of 9
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court’s imposition of
a life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is greater
than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing and is not reasonably related
to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.1
Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a district court’s
sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014); United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d
1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release for reasonableness). We first look to whether the district court
committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory
guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 2 selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Cubero, 754
1
To the extent Defendant also attempts to challenge the severity of the sex offender laws and the
restrictions placed upon him for being a sex offender, this argument is not properly before this
Court.
2
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
4
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 5 of 9
F.3d at 892. Then, we examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We
will only vacate a defendant’s sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, the district court
may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). The district court may also impose a new term of supervised release
which “shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the
offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” Id.
§ 3583(h).
In the present case, Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing a life term of supervised release.
The statutorily-authorized term of supervised release for failing to register as a sex
offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is five years to life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Thus,
5
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 6 of 9
Defendant’s life term of supervised release is within the statutory range.3 See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(h), (k).
The district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release is also
supported by the § 3553(a) factors. In particular, the offense that led to
Defendant’s status as a sex offender involved sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s
eight-year-old daughter. With respect to the nature of the present violations,
Defendant was not only living with four children between the ages of two and nine,
but he was also going to the children’s elementary school on a regular basis. By
doing so, he blatantly disregarded the terms of supervised release that were meant
to protect against the same conduct that was the basis for his original sex-offense
conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). What’s more, Defendant then repeatedly
lied to his probation officer about violating the terms of his supervised release. As
emphasized by the district court, a serious term of supervised release was also
necessary to promote respect for the law and to deter the future crimes of other
defendants because not doing so would send a message that defendants can
3
Although not mentioned by the parties, at the time of Defendant’s original sentencing for the
failure to register offense, the Guidelines recommended the statutory maximum term of
supervised release for a “sex offense,” but were ambiguous as to whether failure to register
qualified as a sex offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b) & comment. (n.1) (2010). Since then, the
Guidelines have been amended and now explicitly state that failure to register is not a sex
offense under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b). See id. § 5D1.2(b) & comment. (n.1) (2014); U.S.S.G. App.
C, Amend. 786 (2014). As such, the Guidelines’ advisory supervised release range for failure to
register is now five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a), (c) & comment. (n.6)
(2014).
6
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 7 of 9
disregard the terms of their supervised release and then lie about it with impunity.
See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B).
Defendant asserts that a life term of supervised release ignores the fact that
he has been a law-abiding citizen for over seven years and that he chose to violate
the terms of his supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife’s
children. Whatever Defendant’s motivation, it does not change the fact that having
molested his then girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter, he was thereafter prohibited
from having contact with children under the age of 18. Nor does it change the fact
that Defendant’s probation officer warned him several times not to have contact
with his wife’s minor children, and yet he continued to do so, all the while lying to
the officer about his conduct.
In support of his argument, Defendant also relies on a state investigation that
did not find any evidence that his wife’s children had been sexually abused. The
investigation also revealed, however, that the children had been coached on what
to say. In fact, investigators eventually asked the children’s mother to encourage
the children to speak truthfully. And without getting into specifics as to what
investigators learned, the investigation indicated that Defendant was involved in
the children’s lives in a way, and to a degree, that could give cause for concern.
We are also not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that because he is
already required to register as a sex offender for life, a life term of supervised
7
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 8 of 9
release is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Again, a
life term of supervised release is authorized by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).
Moreover, Defendant’s argument also completely ignores the fact that he was on
supervised release in the first place because he had failed to register as a sex
offender. Defendant then compounded this act of disregard for the law by
choosing to live with and care for four minor children, in clear and willful violation
of the terms of supervised release.
Defendant points to research showing that “sex offenders, as a group,
reoffend less than other criminal offenders,” as additional support for his argument
that his life term of supervised release is grossly unreasonable. This research,
however, does not lend credence to his argument because it does not show that
Defendant is less likely to re-offend. Nor does it have any bearing on whether a
life term of supervised release is reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances
in this particular case.
As a final matter, we note that Defendant’s life term of supervised release
can be shortened in the future by the district court. Indeed, Defendant can petition
that court for modification of the conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2). He may also seek early termination of his supervised release after he
has served at least one year of the term. See id. § 3583(e)(1). The district court
may shorten the term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is
8
Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 9 of 9
warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” Id.
In fact, the district court acknowledged that if Defendant demonstrated a
willingness to comply with the terms of supervised release, he could petition the
court in the future for modification or early termination of his supervised release.
Further, a defendant is not without recourse if a district court denies a
motion to terminate early (or shorten) supervised release because a defendant may
appeal the district court’s denial of such a motion. See United States v. Mathis-
Gardner, 783 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (entertaining, under an abuse of
discretion standard, an appeal of the district court’s denial of an offender’s motion
to shorten his term of supervised release); United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d
311, 315 (2d Cir. 2003) (the same); United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282
(4th Cir. 1999) (the same).
Thus, given the totality of the circumstances in this case, considered in light
of the § 3553(a) factors, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that
Defendant’s life term of supervised release lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. In short, Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term
of supervised release.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
9